

Patronage is an enduring feature of contemporary politics and may well develop in modern, mass organized, and ideological political parties. The paper approaches patronage in an analytical way, and seeks to explore its microfoundations and logic of.

Tammany boss William M. Tweed and his cronies ruled for a brief time with absolute power over the city and state of New York. Guiteau , a disappointed office-seeker, assassinated him. To prevent further political violence and to assuage public outrage, Congress passed the Pendleton Act in , which set up the Civil Service Commission. Henceforth, applicants for most federal government jobs would have to pass an examination. Democratic Organization of Cook County , occurred involving political patronage and its constitutionality. Shakman claimed that much of the patronage going on in Chicago politics was unlawful on the grounds of the first and fourteenth amendments. Through a series of legal battle and negotiations, the two parties agreed upon The Shakman Decrees. Under these decrees it was declared that the employment status of most public employees could not be affected positively or negatively based on political allegiance, with exceptions for politically inclined positions. The case is still in negotiation today, as there are points yet to be decided. In the United States, the U. Constitution provides the president with the power to appoint individuals to government positions. He or she also may appoint personal advisers without congressional approval. Not surprisingly, these individuals tend to be supporters of the president. Similarly, at the state and local levels, governors and mayors retain appointments powers. Some scholars have argued that patronage may be used for laudable purposes, such as the "recognition" of minority communities through the appointment of their members to a high-profile positions. Bearfield has argued that patronage be used for four general purposes: Many Barmakids were patrons of the sciences, which greatly helped the propagation of Indian science and scholarship from the neighbouring Academy of Gundishapur into the Arabic world. They patronized scholars such as Gebir and Jabril ibn Bukhtishu. They are also credited with the establishment of the first paper mill in Baghdad. We know of Yahya b Khalid al Barmaki as a patron of physicians and, specifically, of the translation of Hindu medical works into both Arabic and Persian. In all likelihood however, his activity took place in the orbit of the caliphal court in Iraq, where at the behest of Harun al Rashid , such books were translated into Arabic. Those who attend the Masters Tournament , one of the four major championship of professional golf , are still traditionally referred to as "patrons," largely at the insistence of the Augusta National Golf Club. This insistence is occasionally made fun of by sportswriters and other media. The rest of the team may be amateurs, often including the patron himself or, increasingly, herself.

intra-party actors - the party leader, the patrons, and the partisans. Parties, office-seeking, personal motives, and office-gaining strategies To commence with fundamentals, and following a long line of authors beginning with.

Takis Pappas Party Politics [http: Pappas Party Politics](http://Pappas Party Politics) The contents of the Correc correction have been appended to the original article in this reprint. This article approaches patronage in an analytical way, and seeks to explore its micro-foundations and logic of development. Three particular actors are identified and their relations analysed: Patronage is likely to develop when a party leader is able to exercise control of both the party organization and the appointments for public office; in this case, even ideologically motivated partisans are expected to turn into self-interested patrons. Finally, some interesting implications for further research are pointed out. Even so, most researchers still associate patronage politics with long-established parties that have built close relationships with their respective states and lack ideologi- cal definition. To such traditional parties, patronage is a convenient strategy [DOI: This view is well illustrated by the experience of the nineteenth-century European socialist parties, which relied for electoral success on ideological and programmatic appeals rather than patronage- based promises. Yet, in reality, not every new, mass-based and ideological party is patronage-free. When, and under what conditions, is patronage politics most likely to emerge in modern parties? Most accounts on patronage politics typically stress factors that are exogenous to the cases examined. For instance, patronage is attributed to deficient socio-economic modernization; certain democratic institutions such as a powerful presidential executive or electoral laws promoting the individualization of candidate competition; a strong public sector economy, which creates a large area for patronage; the predominance of some politi- cal ideology emphasizing selective rather than collective incentives, and so on for a review of such factors, see Kitschelt, The present analysis differs from previous ones in that it offers an analytical explanation of the emergence of patronage politics based mostly on endogenous factors. Its central thesis is that party patronage may be the deliberate outcome of choices made by political actors at the sub-party level. More specifically, it will be argued that patronage may still be the optimal vote maximization strategy in young, mass and ideological parties. This article seeks to explore and analyse the peculiar logic, micro-foundations and internal party dynamics of patronage in such parties. Founded by Andreas Papandreou shortly after the transition to democracy in Greece in July , that party appeared as a new, socialist, political force placing a high premium on developing mass organizational structures PASOK, a. Despite an inauspicious beginning in the first democratic elections of the same year at which the party received It doubled its electoral strength Most interpretations of the political rise of PASOK revolve around its novel ideological messages, its organizational effectiveness or its populist character Elefantis, ; Lyrintzis, a, b; Sotiropoulos, ; Spourdalakis, This article will show that PASOK, exactly like its main party opponents during the early years of democratization, not only relied Downloaded from ppq. Even more surprisingly, PASOK was far more successful in practising patronage politics than its rivals â€” a success that, to a large extent, explains both its rapid consolidation as a party and its phenomenal electoral performance. It is argued that party patronage in PASOK was a conscious strategy of the party leadership to increase the party base as quickly as possible in order to win state power. In what follows, I first introduce a simple intra-party mapping of the main party actors, complete with their preferences, their chosen strategies and the other alternatives available to them. Self-interested office-seekers are distin- guished from ideologically motivated ones, and the conditions under which each category is more likely to predominate are examined. The third section of the article includes the bulk of empirical data and demon- strates that party patronage predominated in PASOK at the expense of party organization and efforts to develop ideology. Finally, to explain why things turned out that way, I introduce a simple theoretical model based on the strategic choices of the three intra-party actors: Parties, to be sure, are not unitary actors; they consist of sub-units, which help articulate, or disarticulate, the entire party. When looking inside parties, three party sub-units, each with its own specific primary goals, become immediately visible: Political parties, furthermore, offer their sub-units two kinds of incentives, collective and selective ones. Collective incentives

derive from the nature of parties as non-market-based organizations whose major output consists of non-material and public goods, such as specific policies, organizational identification or group solidarity. Schlesinger, Selective incentives, on the other hand, mostly characterize market-based organizations seeking material and private benefits. Yet, because of the imbalanced market created by elections and the control of office,¹ parties, similarly to business firms, also produce private goods or other material benefits. Which type of incentives prevails? Downloaded from ppq. This, in turn, depends on the strategies each party sub-unit will use for achieving its own primary goals. Party leaders have two chief goals: To achieve these goals, party leaders have two options: As the two strategies are inimical to each other, no party leader can pursue them consistently at the same time. Party leaders make their choices by calculating the specific payoffs each strategy is expected to yield. The organizational strategy is particularly associated with mass and ideological parties. The patronage strategy, on the other hand, is mostly associated with traditional parties in which local patrons enjoy considerable autonomy from the party centre. Party organizations are the least unruly of the party sub-units. Since they are motivated primarily by collective incentives, organization cadres and party activists are expected to support the bureaucratization of the party and the institution of parallel hierarchies, collective decision-making and the maintenance of ideological purity; where they are strong in number and have a voice, as in the mass ideological parties, they are expected to oppose leaders trying to apply a patronage strategy. Party office-seekers – a term meant to include both those who hold and those who seek elective office Aldrich, ; Schlesinger, , – are political entrepreneurs who, above all, seek re-election. To succeed, they must convince greater numbers of the voting public to support them than their opponents. In this effort, office-seekers have a choice between two strategies: In reality, both types of office-seekers coexist in both party types, but in varying mixes Geddes, The crucial point, then, is to find out when, and under which circumstances, one type Downloaded from ppq. But before delving into this issue, let us consider the different logics applied by each type of office-seeker, their available strategies and the conditions most favourable for goal attainment. The logic followed by party patrons is quite straightforward: For this category of office-seeker, the best strategy for collecting votes is party patronage, that is, the creation of extensive patron-client networks through which votes are exchanged for personal favours Eisenstadt and Roniger, ; Schmidt et al. A second benefit follows the first. Although such self-interested patrons are more common in traditional political formations, they may also thrive in modern mass parties with weak leadership and loose organizational structures. Partisans, on the other hand, tend to emphasize ideological matters, uphold party policies and rely for support on the formal party organization from which they often draw their political origins. In theory, partisans are more likely to prevail over patrons under three conditions: When partisans prevail over patrons, the party leader is expected to pursue an organizational rather than a patronage strategy. Paradoxically, however, in political systems with a tradition of patronage, strong party leaders may decide to shun the organizational strategy in favour Downloaded from ppq. As a new and ideological party competing in a multiparty political system, PASOK appealed to voters dissatisfied with traditional politics and keen to dissociate from such long-standing but morally objectionable practices as party patronage. According to the preceding analysis, and given the ideological character of the new party, as well as the fact that it developed in a fluid multiparty system Pappas, , one should have expected the following: Of these expectations, none was realized. The data have been collected through more than personal interviews with former office-holders, central and regional organization cadres, intermediary and top party leaders conducted in person or by telephone over a period of several months throughout and Sociologically speaking, they represented diverse social classes and belonged to various, especially lower-paid, professions. Patrons, on the other hand, may be further distinguished into three more specific categories: Although younger than their political antecedents, and even ideologically sensitive to socialism, such beneficiaries of established patronage networks found it easier to rely on them than get involved in the murky workings of party organization. Prominent individuals, finally, were people who sought elective office on the basis of their social prominence and name recognition. Even when they joined PASOK for ideological reasons, they depended for electoral success on their names instead of their loyalty to the party. The foregoing breakdown leads to some remarkable findings. As the first democratic elections in Greece took place in November , when PASOK was only two months old, there was

no time for this or any other party to build an organization and refine its ideology. Both problems became clear during candidate recruitment. PASOK had considerable difficulty in filling the party lists in many electoral districts, including the Athens metropolitan area. The incipient local party organizations played no significant role in recruiting and selecting candidates. The interviews reveal see also Elefantis, Instead of selecting young partisan ideologues, Papandreou clearly preferred old centrists with past political experience and name recognition in their respective constituencies. Party partisans were included in the party lists only when patrons were unavailable; in the elections they performed dismally. Every single deputy of the new party drew his or her political origins from the pre-dictatorship Downloaded from ppq. A closer look at this group is revealing. Seven of those, including Andreas Papandreou himself, had been elected to parliament in The remaining two, S. Floros, had been selected as EK candidates for the elections planned for but prevented by the military coup. In the mid- s, all nine had belonged to a small centreâ€”left party faction within the Center Union constructed around Andreas Papandreou. After the dictatorship, these early disciples eagerly followed Andreas and, in the years to come, many became members of the innermost party circle surrounding the leader and were given responsibility for key decisions. The remaining four of the deputies had also been members of the pre-dictatorship EK, but had not run as party candidates in elections. Even so, all four enjoyed a strong personal relationship with Andreas. In the elections, PASOK performed phenomenally; by increasing the number of its seats in parliament from 15 to 93, it emerged as the main opposition party. Who were those men and women? Most of its members 74 out of the total 93, or This, however, is not the only angle from which to view the matter. Unexpectedly for a new, mass-based and socialist party, almost half of its parliamentarians in were patrons Table 1. Of them, no fewer than 29, roughly one-third, were old regime insiders, or paleokommatikoi, who had sought elective office with the pre-dictatorship EK and, in most cases, been elected. They such as I. Papaspyrou in Piraeus, S. Tsaparas in Thessaloniki and D. Without exception, all had been personal friends of the Papandreou family, and especially Andreas. In selecting candidates, Andreas had clearly preferred this group of office-seekers over party partisans. In several cases, he personally tried to attract centrist patrons into PASOK and, whenever he succeeded, it yielded significant electoral results. Their most defining characteristic was that they had inherited large political clienteles they now had to maintain. The group of prominent individuals contains candidates with significant name recognition because of past political history or professional and social prominence.

Chapter 3 : Patronage - Wikipedia

*Patrons and Partisans: A Study of Politics in Two Southern Italian Comuni (Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology) [Caroline White] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

History[edit] Promotional poster, ca. In the South, poor farmers bore the brunt of the Civil War and were suspicious of Northerners like Kelley. Kelley found he was able to overcome these sectional differences as a Mason. With Southern Masons as guides, he toured the war-torn countryside in the South and was appalled by the outdated farming practices. He saw the need for an organization that would bring people from the North and South together in a spirit of mutual cooperation and, after many letters and consultations with the other founders, the Grange was born. Grosh , John R. Thompson , William M. Ireland , and Caroline Hall. Many of the state and local granges adopted non-partisan political resolutions, especially regarding the regulation of railroad transportation costs. The organization was unusual at this time because women and any teen old enough to draw a plow were encouraged to participate. The importance of women was reinforced by requiring that four of the elected positions could be held only by women. Poor fiscal management, combined with organizational difficulties resulting from rapid growth, led to a massive decline in membership. By the turn of the 20th century, the Grange rebounded and membership stabilized. The Granger movement supported efforts by politicians to regulate rates charged by the railroads and grain warehouses. The peak of their political reputation was marked by the Supreme Court decision in *Munn v. Illinois* , which held that grain warehouses were a "private utility in the public interest ," and so could be regulated by public law. However this achievement was overturned later by the Supreme Court in *Wabash v. Grange* membership has declined considerably as the percentage of American farmers has fallen from a third of the population in the early 20th century to less than two percent today. The Grange provides opportunities for individuals and families to develop to their highest potential in order to build stronger communities and states, as well as a stronger nation. As a non-partisan organization, the Grange supports only policies, never political parties or candidates. Although the Grange was founded to serve the interests of farmers, because of the shrinking farm population the Grange has begun to broaden its range to include a wide variety of issues, and anyone is welcome to join the Grange. The Junior Grange is open to children Regular Grange membership is open to anyone age 14 or older. In , the Grange signed on to a letter to Congress calling for the doubling of legal immigration and legalization for undocumented immigrants currently in the United States. However, this position has been somewhat revised, and the Grange now emphasizes an expansion in the H-2A visa program to increase legal immigration and address the crisis-level labor shortage in agriculture. They support the enforcement of immigration law but urge discretion with regard to the impact on labor availability. Small, ceremonial farm tools are often displayed at Grange meetings. Elected officers are in charge of opening and closing each meeting. There are seven degrees of Grange membership; the ceremony of each degree relates to the seasons and various symbols and principles. Though the secret meetings do not occur, the Grange still acknowledges its rich history and practices some traditions. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. March Learn how and when to remove this template message The Grange is a hierarchical organization ranging from local communities to the National Grange organization. At the local level are community Granges, otherwise known as subordinate Granges. All members are affiliated with at least one subordinate. In most states, multiple subordinate Granges are grouped together to form Pomona Granges. Typically, Pomona Granges are made up of all the subordinates in a county. Next in the order come State Granges, which is where the Grange begins to be especially active in the political process. State Masters Presidents are responsible for supervising the administration of Subordinate and Pomona Granges. The National Grange represents the interests of most Grangers in lobbying activities similar to the state, but on a much larger scale. In addition, the National Grange oversees the Grange ritual. The Grange is a grassroots organization; virtually all policy originates at the subordinate level. The motto of the Grange is *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas* "In essentials, unity; in non-essentials, liberty; in all things, charity". Indeed, the word "grange" comes from a Latin word for grain, and is related to a

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"granary" or, generically, a farm.

Chapter 4 : Patron Synonyms, Patron Antonyms | calendrierdelascience.com

Die ländliche Kleingemeinde in Nordwestdeutschland, in geschichtlicher, verwaltungsmässiger und soziologischer Sicht: von Herbert Morgen, zusammen mit Hermann Lubbing und Karl Steinhoff.

Chapter 5 : National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry - Wikipedia

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