

Chapter 1 : Learn Liberty | What are the Limits of Democracy?

Perspectives and Limits of Democracy provides a summary of the third Vienna Workshop on International Constitutional Law. The first part of the book focuses on perspectives of the democratic concept beyond the nation state.

Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy Published: January 13, Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: This duality may have had something to do with his communitarianism, which, although a philosophical view, emphasizes the particularities of community, history, and culture. I take myself to be a political philosopher in a traditional sense, focused on the universal or the universalizable. Thus, I can appreciate much more of Bell the political philosopher, although Bell the political observer, with in-depth exposure to both the West and East Asia both theories and practices and sometimes with a contrarian bent, can often offer new perspectives on politics and culture that are interesting and thought-provoking. What is new in this book is that he goes further down the "particularist" road. The last book of his I reviewed was *Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context*. The main title sounds universalist, while it is only the subtitle that suggests a particularist leaning. The title of his new book reverses this order. For him, the latter has features from both traditional Chinese regimes and Confucian classics. He uses materials from all these sources, but the main emphasis is on contemporary Chinese governmental practices. Although the mainstream belief is still that liberal democracy is the best possible model of governance, both the failures in the West and the successes of China have given momentum to questioning this belief, which Bell acknowledges in the Introduction. He then sets out to defend what he calls political meritocracy. He distinguishes this from the existing meritocracy in liberal democracies, in which experts are selected to work in narrowly defined domains and in a neutral manner, and also from economic meritocracy, which follows the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution" 5. On the economic issues, Bell is firmly on the left with political theorists such as John Rawls and even the "higher communism" that follows the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" 5. In order to make space for political meritocracy, Bell has to challenge the tenet that democracy is the least bad regime. Political realists, such as Samuel Huntington, and even the party conservatives in China, "warn us that democracy cannot readily be established in poor, developing countries" 15, but the issue is really about timing, not about the desirability of democratization. By contrast, in Chapter 1, Bell points out "four key problems with electoral democracy: By the first tyranny, he means that the majority of citizens, which has a decisive role in political decision-making, is ignorant of politics, and rationally so. One might argue that in spite of this ignorance, the collective wisdom of the voters should be trusted, but Bell argues that the collective wisdom is wisdom only if the participants are already informed. The second problem is the dominance of the super rich that results from increasing economic inequality. In spite of the lack of economic and political mobility, Americans somehow manage to believe the opposite, which, to Bell, is but an illusion. The third problem is that voters of a state can decide about affairs that have repercussions beyond the state and its citizens, such as climate change and torture of enemy combatants and alleged terrorists. Bell suggests that the contemporary Chinese regime, especially its meritocracy, may address some of the problems of electoral democracy. But an issue is whether the Chinese regime would be better than electoral democracy, even if it did better address these problems. But Bell considers discussing the Chinese regime maybe in a slightly idealized form worthwhile for the following reasons. First, from Chapter 2, we can at least see that electoral democracy is not clearly better than other alternatives. Second, the Chinese regime offers a real-world model of meritocracy rather than some imagined regime that may be easily dismissed as unrealistic. In Chapter 2, Bell discusses an issue key to meritocracy: The social skills of political leaders also matter but are hard to measure. Another political merit is virtue. War heroes or those who devote themselves to non-profit organizations also tend to be virtuous. In Chapter 3, Bell deals with a few problems with political meritocracy and proposes solutions. The first issue is corruption, and his solutions include the rule of law, freedom of speech, law enforcement, the market-based salary system, and moral cultivation. The second issue is ossification, and as examples, he mentions the problem that the political elites in Singapore and France lack sympathy and are full of arrogance toward the masses. The solutions he

proposes are strengthening sympathy and humility, including in the political elites those from different backgrounds or sending the best and the brightest to poor regions for a few years as part of their training, and most importantly, promoting economic equality that would close the gap between the elites and the masses. Different merits should be sought in the selection procedure for different situations. For this to happen, there also needs to be sufficient freedom of speech to allow open discussions and experiments in attracting people with different kinds of merits through different channels. Equally important, the central government needs to be able to put successful experiments from one region into national practice. The third issue is legitimacy. Bell argues that one-person-one-vote is not the only source of legitimacy. In non-democracies, there can be other sources of legitimacy. This nationalism can be toxic, and it has recently been transformed, though not completely, into a pride-based nationalism that is rooted in the re-embrace of traditions. The second source is performance. The third source is the recognition of the inner worth of political meritocracy. A problem with this is the discontent of those who fail in the meritocratic selection process. In traditional China, those who failed to make to the top of the meritocratic ladder could still enjoy social and political roles in local communities and were thus absorbed into the system, which Bell welcomes. There should also be a stronger recognition of the value of those who are not in the meritocratic system. More participation by the people helps as well. In other words, democracy may be necessary to legitimize meritocracy" Therefore, in order to defend the real-world political meritocracy, Bell is led to discuss the reconciliation between democracy and meritocracy, which then leads to the discussion of three ideal models. The first model is to combine democracy and meritocracy at the level of voters, meaning plural voting, which was proposed by Mill and suggested by Lee Kuan Yew. But voters with fewer votes would feel insulted, and plural voting may perpetuate the dominance of those with more votes and thus lead to corruption, for politicians would give extra votes to their own kind and would do special favors to those with extra votes. An objective and reliable procedure to determine who should get how many votes is also elusive. The second model is a hybrid of democracy and meritocracy, which can be implemented by a bicameral structure with a house of "meritocrats," a model Bell himself championed before. He discusses the proposals made by Sun Yat-sen, Friedrich Hayek, and Jiang Qing, as well as the English House of Lords, and argues that the meritocratic house will be overshadowed by the democratically elected house when people enjoy a sense of empowerment through one-person-one-vote. East Asian societies cannot bet on the meritocratic heritage because Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all embraced electoral democracy instead of a Confucian hybrid regime. The third model is democracy on the bottom, and meritocracy on top through selections that are discussed in Chapter 2. In the Concluding Remarks, Bell also adds a middle level that allows experiments in combining meritocracy and democracy. He calls this three-level structure the China model. But in order for meritocracy on top to work, the potential candidates, when going through a long period of training, need guarantees that their training will be rewarded. This means that one-party rule is a pre-condition. Then, the problem of the legitimacy of such a meritocracy can only be ultimately solved by a referendum that can render legitimacy to this regime for a long period of time say, 50 years until the next referendum. In the Concluding Remarks, Bell first discusses the defects of the China model in reality, and suggests ways to correct them. Then he speculates on whether this model can be exported. Being a good communitarian, he thinks that this model is rooted in history, culture, and the fact that the Chinese government is very powerful, and so maybe it can only be exported partially. He also argues that for China to be a model for the rest of the world, the Chinese government needs to be less oppressive and more tolerant. In addition to the replacement of communism with Confucianism, he also suggests that the CCP talk the talk, that is, change its name to "the Chinese Meritocratic Union. One of them is a Harmony Index that ranks countries according to factors that would make a society harmonious, which is extremely innovative and provocative. Moreover, the diversity of the sources Bell draws from in order to present the China model also leads to the issue of whether these sources can be used to present a consistent picture. He has reasons to do so. But this book has also been ruthlessly savaged by some critics with similar accusations. Many of these critics sound like ideologues. Their belief in the alleged open society of liberal democracy is closed to open discussions. To them, anyone who dares to challenge the desirability of liberal democracy must be either foolish or evil. They owe us an explanation about why the

West has been failing in so many fronts, and China has been doing relatively well. Moreover, Bell is not painting a purely rosy picture of China, and he offers critical remarks on the Chinese regime. Nonetheless, I feel that Bell gives too much credit to the present Chinese regime and not enough to criticisms of it. While criticizing the end-of-history view about liberal democracy, he himself seems to think that China will continue to be successful under the present Chinese regime, with its present way of doing politics. I am not that optimistic. I share with Bell many of his criticisms of contemporary liberal democracy and many of his normative proposals. But some of his ideas seem somewhat one-sided. As for the general methodology, I think that a safer ground is to go back to one or two Confucian thinkers or texts, tease out the political models they would advocate, update them to the contemporary settings, and then defend their desirability. Other Confucian texts and practices in traditional China should only be used when they are possible illustrations of this model. This model is based on a coherent set of Confucian ideas mostly from Mencius and is insulated from the ups and downs of a real-world regime thanks to its normative nature. Bell criticizes the viability of such a regime by arguing that the democratic element on top will eventually erode the meritocratic one. But his own China model also has to derive legitimacy from a referendum that takes place every 50 years or so. This arrangement can be challenged, especially when this model keeps failing. Yes, even East Asian countries have gone down the road of pure electoral democracy, but maybe this is because electoral democracy has appeared to be the sole winner. But the wind has turned a bit, and there is a hope for an open-minded search for better models.

Chapter 2 : Perspectives and Limits of Democracy - Harald Eberhard - online bestellen | facultas.

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Therefore, while it is championed as the most righteous brand of government, this does not say anything about it being an efficient brand of government. In fact, if you think about it, it is the inefficiency of democratic government that sustains its righteousness. Meaning, the people ought to rule over themselves rather than the power-hungry dictator who does not have the best interest of the people in mind. The premise of democracy, therefore, is that one man or group should not trample over the masses in its midst and, for that reason, we ought to limit the power of the leadership. Now, it is true that in the democratic system the minority still does not get its way and 49 percent of the population winds up having its will trampled on by the 51 percent of the population that opposes it, but that is certainly better than the alternative in which one monarch or a number of noblemen assert their will onto the majority. Superseding Values However, even the democratic system is not foolproof: What if 86 percent of the population votes in favor of killing off the other 14 percent? Of course, this actually happened in Nazi Germany. Our answer to this quandary would have to be that sometimes there are other values that outweigh, supersede, and trump the value of having the people rule over themselves. Thus, in extreme cases, even pundits for democracy would agree that it is appropriate to pull back the power of democracy and assert the will of the minority over the will of the majority due to a superseding value. Drawing the Line The question then becomes: Where do you draw the line? What values supersede "the will of the people"? And what or who is the basis for determining this hierarchy? However, what is natural and obvious to you and your society in the year , will certainly not be natural and obvious to the average Joe and his society in the year Thus, "natural and obvious" is not a plausible explanation for establishing the criteria of superseding universal values. Taking Reality into Account I think we can get a glimpse into the determining factor we are looking for by looking at another facet of the U. Despite wanting to lessen the power of government and give the most power to the people as possible, we find that modern democracies are not true democracies. Unlike the original direct democratic system that took place in ancient Greece, in which everyone in the society had a direct vote on issues that arose, the democracies of our time have a representative system. Note that the Greek "everyone" here is theoretical: Certainly with the technological advances of our time, it is quite feasible to pull off a true "one man, one vote" brand of government. There are a number of answers we can posit to this question but I think the most sensible and simple argument for a representative democracy over a direct democracy is that if everyone votes on everything, it would lead to uninformed decision making, resulting in unproductive and destructive policy that causes damage to the country. It comes out from this that the democratic ideal of "power to the people" is sacrificed yet again by Western democratic societies, giving way to the "partial tyranny" of a non-direct democracy, all for the sake of taking reality into account. That is, since the masses are uninformed of the reality of most situations, we have them elect supposedly informed individuals to vote on the issues instead of actually voting on those issues themselves in the hope that this will lead to more constructive and productive decision-making resulting in a more prosperous country. This is an important point because it is making the statement that democracy is only really sensible in situations in which there is no objective reality. If there is no reality in a given situation or if the issues being discussed are a matter of preference, then go ahead and vote on it and do whatever you feel. But in situations where there is a reality at play, then you have to take that reality into account.

Chapter 3 : The Limitations of Democracy

Democracy is basically considered to be the most important aspect of constitutions. Still, democracies all over the world are also facing major difficulties; some for exam-ple are being confronted with antidemocratic and fundamentalist movements.

Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which I mean decisions that are made for groups and that are binding on all the members of the group. Second, this definition means to cover a lot of different kinds of groups that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight to it. It is quite compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to an assembly where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building. It may involve direct participation of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions. The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. For instance, Joseph Schumpeter argues , chap. XXI , with some force, that only a highly formal kind of democracy in which citizens vote in an electoral process for the purpose of selecting competing elites is highly desirable while a conception of democracy that draws on a more ambitious conception of equality is dangerous. Others have argued that democracy is not desirable at all. To evaluate their arguments we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of humanity and society from which they proceed.

The Justification of Democracy

We can evaluate democracy along at least two different dimensions: John Stuart Mill argued that a democratic method of making legislation is better than non-democratic methods in three ways: Strategically, democracy has an advantage because it forces decision-makers to take into account the interests, rights and opinions of most people in society. Since democracy gives some political power to each, more people are taken into account than under aristocracy or monarchy. The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor. Epistemologically, democracy is thought to be the best decision-making method on the grounds that it is generally more reliable in helping participants discover the right decisions. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and critical assessment of laws and policies. Democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. Furthermore, the broad based discussion typical of democracy enhances the critical assessment of the different moral ideas that guide decision-makers. Many have endorsed democracy on the basis of the proposition that democracy has beneficial effects on character. Many have noted with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference whether they do or not. Finally, some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and

against other forms of rule Mill , p. Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. More detailed knowledge of the effects of political institutions can be used to discriminate in favor of particular kinds of democratic institutions or modifications of them. For instance in the United States, James Madison argued in favor of a fairly strong federal government on the grounds that local governments are more likely to be oppressive to minorities Madison, Hamilton and Jay , n. Of course the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth or validity of the associated substantive views about justice and the common good as well as the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions. Plato Republic, Book VI argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to properly governed societies. In a democracy, he argues, those who are expert at winning elections and nothing else will eventually dominate democratic politics. Democracy tends to emphasize this expertise at the expense of the expertise that is necessary to properly governed societies. The reason for this is that most people do not have the kinds of talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. XIX argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects. But his skepticism is not based in a conception that most people are not intellectually fit for politics. On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. For Hobbes, then, democracy has deleterious effects on subjects and politicians and consequently on the quality of the outcomes of collective decision making. Many public choice theorists in contemporary economic thought expand on these Hobbesian criticisms. They argue that citizens are not informed about politics and that they are often apathetic, which makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone else. Some of them argue for giving over near complete control over society to the market, on the grounds that more extensive democracy tends to produce serious economic inefficiencies. More modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions. There are a number of different kinds of argument for instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a certain kind of moral theory. For example classical utilitarianism simply has no room in its fundamental value theory for the ideas of intrinsic fairness, liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy. And there are many moral theories of this sort. But one need not be a thoroughgoing consequentialist to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process Arneson , pp. Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. No general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair Riker , p. Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality, so it cannot be intrinsically fair or just Dworkin , ch. In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism Dworkin , ch. Some argue in addition, that some forms of

decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value. The most common of these come broadly under the rubrics of liberty and equality. Democracy, it is said, extends the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life to the domain of collective decision making. Second, only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould, pp. Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. This right is established at least partly independently of the worth of the outcomes of democratic decision making. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share. Here we can see the makings of an argument against instrumentalism. But if the liberty argument is correct our right to control our lives is violated by this. One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision. The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals. Citizens justify laws and policies to each other on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions. The aim of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested to this kind of worry. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.

Chapter 4 : Political Theory - Habermas and Rawls: Prospects and Limits of Deliberative Democracy

Perspectives and Limits of Democracy 3rd Workshop on International Constitutional Law Venue: Vienna University Law School, Juridicum (Top floor).

Political Science People often associate freedom with electoral democracy. Pavel Yakovlev, the freedom to vote is an inherently limited tool for fostering a free society. Although majority vote can serve as a useful tool for expressing the will of the people, it can be taken too far. Imagine a world governed entirely by majority votes—including your personal decisions! Would you be happy if a majority vote determined who you could date? What you could eat? Now consider the world you currently live in, where you make decisions and purchases in the context of a marketplace. In a market, you can choose goods, services, and activities that diverge from majority trends. Moreover, markets also provide a greater number of choices. Free markets and limited government depend upon and facilitate individualized and decentralized choices; they create the conditions necessary for a truly free and democratic society. Transcript What are the Limits of Democracy? But freedom to vote is a very small portion of all individual freedoms we enjoy in a truly free society. While majority voting in a democracy is a valuable tool for expressing the will of the people as a whole, it can be taken too far. Imagine if everything in society was determined through a majority vote. You are better off, much better off, if you are in charge of your own life. This is why most decisions in life are done at the individual level rather than collective level. Every day, millions of people in a free market economy vote with their dollars by buying the things that they like independently of each other. And every dollar spent benefits those who spend it and rewards those who earn it by serving the needs of others. The marketplace is also very pluralistic because it allows people with very different tastes and preferences to get what they want and coexist peacefully with the rest of society. In contrast, when we try to make decisions collectively by voting, we are far more limited in our options. Compare that to how much innovation and product differentiation exists in a free-market economy. The amount of new products developed every year is staggering. By this measure, the political sphere looks positively static. Ask yourself, what are the freedoms you cherish most? Many people cherish the freedoms of their daily lives: A free-market economy that is based on individualized and decentralized choice is what makes these freedoms possible. Therefore it is important to remember that individual choice, limited government, and free markets are the necessary conditions for a free and truly democratic society.

Chapter 5 : S.M.a.r.t.-Term Limits: The Heart of Democracy - Santa Monica Mirror

Perspectives and limits of democracy: proceedings of the 3rd Vienna workshop on international constitutional law: 6. Perspectives and limits of democracy.

Introduction [pdf] by James S. But the model of competition-based democracy has come under threat by a disillusioned and increasingly mobilized public that no longer views its claims of representation as legitimate. This essay introduces the alternative potential of deliberative democracy, and considers whether deliberative institutions could revive democratic legitimacy, provide for more authentic public will formation, provide a middle ground between mistrusted elites and the angry voices of populism, and help fulfill some of our shared expectations about democracy. Second, it will discuss a popular yet, as I shall argue, worryingly misguided response to that crisis: So what have we learned about deliberative democracy, its value, and its weaknesses? This essay reflects on the development of the field of deliberative democracy by discussing twelve key findings that capture a number of resolved issues in normative theory, conceptual clarification, and associated empirical results. We argue that these findings deserve to be more widely recognized and viewed as a foundation for future practice and research. We draw on our own research and that of others in the field.

Political Deliberation and the Adversarial Principle by Bernard Manin Retrieving an insight dating back to antiquity, this essay argues that the confrontation of opposing views and arguments is desirable in political deliberation. But freedom of speech and diversity among deliberators do not suffice to secure that outcome. Therefore we should actively facilitate and encourage the presentation of contrary opinions during deliberation. Such confrontation is our best means of improving the quality of collective decisions. It also counteracts the pernicious fragmentation of the public sphere. It facilitates the comprehension of choices. Lastly, arguing for and against a given decision treats the minority with respect. This essay proposes practical ways of promoting adversarial deliberation, in particular the organization of debates disconnected from electoral competition. If deliberative democracy is necessarily representative and if representation betrays the true meaning of democracy as rule of, by, and for the people, then how can deliberative democracy retain any validity as a theory of political legitimacy? Any tight connection between deliberative democracy and representative democracy thus risks making deliberative democracy obsolete: This essay argues that the problem comes from a particular and historically situated understanding of representative democracy as rule by elected elites. This new paradigm privileges nonelectoral forms of representation and in it, power is meant to remain constantly inclusive of and accessibleâ€”in other words openâ€”to ordinary citizens. Inequality is Always in the Room: We conclude by describing how deliberative contexts can be modified to reduce certain types of power asymmetries, such as those often associated with gender, race, or class. In so doing, we hope to help readers consider a broader range of factors that influence the outcomes of attempts to restructure power relationships through communicative forums.

Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation [pdf] by Ian Shapiro Recent calls to inject substantial doses of deliberation into democratic politics rest on a misdiagnosis of its infirmities. Far from improving political outcomes, deliberation undermines competition over proposed political programsâ€”the lifeblood of healthy democratic politics. Moreover, institutions that are intended to encourage deliberation are all too easily hijacked by people with intense preferences and abundant resources, who can deploy their leverage in deliberative settings to bargain for the outcomes they prefer. A better focus would be on restoring meaningful competition between representatives of two strong political parties over the policies that, if elected, they will implement. I sketch the main outlines of this kind of political competition, differentiating it from less healthy forms of multiparty and intraparty competition that undermine the accountability of governments. Can Democracy be Deliberative and Participatory? Against such proposals, I argue that inserting deliberative mini-publics into political decision-making processes would diminish the democratic legitimacy of the political system as a whole. This negative conclusion invites a question: Drawing from a participatory conception of deliberative democracy, I propose several uses of mini-publics that could enhance the democratic legitimacy of political decision-making in current societies. Deliberative Citizens, Non Deliberative Politicians: In this essay, we first

show that both politicians and citizens have the capacity to deliberate when institutions are appropriate. Yet high-quality deliberation sometimes collides with democratic principles and ideals. On this account, we propose a number of institutional interventions and reforms that may help boost deliberation in ways that both exploit its unique epistemic and ethical potential while simultaneously making it compatible with democratic principles and ideals. *Deliberation and the Challenge of Inequality* by Alice Siu Deliberative critics contend that because societal inequalities cannot be bracketed in deliberative settings, the deliberative process inevitably perpetuates these inequalities. As a result, they argue, deliberation does not serve its theorized purposes, but rather produces distorted dialogue determined by inequalities, not merits. Advocates of deliberation must confront these criticisms: Could their arguments ever be perceived or weighed equally? This essay presents empirical evidence to demonstrate that, in deliberations that are structured to provide a more level playing field, inequalities in skill and status do not translate into inequalities of influence. Sunstein In the last decades, many political theorists have explored the idea of deliberative democracy. The basic claim is that well-functioning democracies combine accountability with a commitment to reflection, information acquisition, multiple perspectives, and reason-giving. Does that claim illuminate actual practices? Much of the time, the executive branch of the United States has combined both democracy and deliberation, not least because it has placed a high premium on reason-giving and the acquisition of necessary information. It has also contained a high degree of internal diversity, encouraging debate and disagreement, not least through the public comment process. These claims are illustrated with concrete, if somewhat stylized, discussions of how the executive branch often operates. *Applying Deliberative Democracy in Africa*: But this approach has never before been tried in Sub-Saharan Africa. Reflecting on the first two applications in Uganda, we apply the same criteria for success commonly used for such projects in the most advanced countries. Can this approach work successfully with samples of a public low in literacy and education? Can it work on some of the critical policy choices faced by the public in rural Uganda? We find that the projects were representative in both attitudes and demographics. They produced substantial opinion change supported by identifiable reasons. They avoided distortions from inequality and polarization. They produced actionable results that can be expected to influence policy on difficult choices. *Warren* Authoritarian rule in China increasingly involves a wide variety of deliberative practices. These practices combine authoritarian command with deliberative influence, producing the apparent anomaly of authoritarian deliberation. Although deliberation and democracy are usually found together, they are distinct phenomena. Democracy involves the inclusion of individuals in matters that affect them through distributions of empowerments like votes and rights. Deliberation is the kind of communication that involves persuasion-based influence. Combinations of command-based power and deliberative influence – like authoritarian deliberation – are now pervading Chinese politics, likely a consequence of the failures of command authoritarianism under the conditions of complexity and pluralism produced by market-oriented development. The concept of authoritarian deliberation frames two possible trajectories of political development in China. One possibility is that the increasing use of deliberative practices stabilizes and strengthens authoritarian rule. An alternative possibility is that deliberative practices serve as a leading edge of democratization.

Chapter 6 : Democracy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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As ordinary citizens are encouraged to take part in the political life of the country, they have the power to directly influence the outcome of government policies through the democratic procedures of voting, campaigning and the use of press. Essentially this means that a democratic government may not be providing the most good for the largest number of people. However, some have argued that this should not even be the goal of democracies because the minority could be seriously mistreated under that purported goal. Madison, "Federalist 63," in *The Federalist Papers*, p. He does not defend this phenomenon but rather seeks to describe it. Manin draws from James Harrington, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to suggest that the dominant form of government, representative as opposed to direct, is effectively aristocratic. As far as Montesquieu is concerned, elections favor the "best" citizens who Manin notes tend to be wealthy and upper-class. As far as Rousseau is concerned, elections favor the incumbent government officials or the citizens with the strongest personalities, which results in hereditary aristocracy. Manin further evinces the aristocratic nature of representative governments by contrasting them with the ancient style of selection by lot. However, Manin also provides criticism of direct democracy, or selection by lot. Montesquieu finds that citizens who had reason to believe they would be accused as "unworthy of selection" commonly withheld their names from the lottery, thereby making selection by lot vulnerable to self-selection bias and, thus, aristocratic in nature. The revolutionaries prioritized gaining the equal right to consent to their choice of government even a potentially aristocratic democracy, at the expense of seeking the equal right to be face of that democracy. And it is elections, not lots, that provide citizens with more opportunities to consent. In elections, citizens consent both to the procedure of elections and to the product of the elections even if they produce the election of elites. In lotteries, citizens consent only to the procedure of lots, but not to the product of the lots even if they produce election of the average person. That is, if the revolutionaries prioritized consent to be governed over equal opportunity to serve as the government, then their choice of elections over lotteries makes sense. Michels[edit] A major scholarly attack on the basis of democracy was made by German-Italian political scientist Robert Michels who developed the mainstream political science theory of the iron law of oligarchy in "Who says organization, says oligarchy" and went on to state "Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy. Maurras criticized democracy as being a "government by numbers" in which quantity matters more over quality and prefers the worst over the best. Maurras denounced the principles of liberalism as described in *The Social Contract* by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* as based upon the false assumption of liberty and the false assumption of equality. Lagardelle[edit] French revolutionary syndicalist Hubert Lagardelle claimed that French revolutionary syndicalism came to being as the result of "the reaction of the proletariat against democracy," which he claimed was "the popular form of bourgeois dominance. Shach[edit] Israeli politician Rabbi Elazar Menachem Shach promoted Judaic law to be the natural governance for Jews and condemned democracy, he claimed that "Democracy as a machinery of lies, false notions, pursuit of narrow interests and deceit - as opposed to the Torah regime, which is based on seeking the ultimate truth. The one does what the other asks him to do in pursuit of his own interest, so as to be given what he himself asks for, and the whole purpose of the transaction is that each would get what they want. As governments are frequently elected on and off there tend to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally. Even if a political party maintains power, vociferous, headline grabbing protests and harsh criticism from the mass media are often enough to force sudden, unexpected political change. Frequent policy changes with regard to business and immigration are likely to deter investment and so hinder economic growth. For this reason, many people have put forward the idea that democracy is undesirable for a developing country in which economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priority. Coalitions are frequently

formed after the elections in many countries for example India and the basis of alliance is predominantly to enable a viable majority, not an ideological concurrence. This opportunist alliance not only has the handicap of having to cater to too many ideologically opposing factions, but it is usually short lived since any perceived or actual imbalance in the treatment of coalition partners, or changes to leadership in the coalition partners themselves, can very easily result in the coalition partner withdrawing its support from the government. Democratic institutions work on consensus to decide an issue, which usually takes longer than a unilateral decision. Golwalkar in his book *Bunch of Thoughts* describes democracy as, "is to a very large extent only a myth in practice The high-sounding concept of "individual freedom" only meant the freedom of those talented few to exploit the rest. Another form is commonly called Pork barrel , where local areas or political sectors are given special benefits but whose costs are spread among all taxpayers. Mere elections are just one aspect of the democratic process. Other tenets of democracy, like relative equality and freedom, are frequently absent in ostensibly democratic countries. Potential incompatibility with former politics[edit] The new establishment of democratic institutions, in countries where the associated practices have as yet been uncommon or deemed culturally unacceptable, can result in institutions that are not sustainable in the long term. One circumstance supporting this outcome may be when it is part of the common perception among the populace that the institutions were established as a direct result of foreign pressure. Sustained regular inspection from democratic countries, however effortful and well-meaning, are normally not sufficient in preventing the erosion of democratic practices. In the cases of several African countries, corruption still is rife in spite of democratically elected governments, as one of the most severe examples, Zimbabwe, is often perceived to have backfired into outright militarism. Efficiency of the system[edit] Economist Donald Wittman has written numerous works attempting to counter criticisms of democracy common among his colleagues. He argues democracy is efficient based on the premise of rational voters, competitive elections, and relatively low political transactions costs. Economist Bryan Caplan argues that, while Wittman makes strong arguments for the latter two points, the first is vitiated by the insurmountable evidence for voter irrationality. For many voters, the difficulty of learning about a particular issue is too high compared to the likely costs of ignorance, but this ignorance does not lessen their enthusiasm for voting. By the median voter theorem , only a few people actually hold the balance of power in the country, and many may be unhappy with their decisions. In this way, they argue, democracies are inefficient. Fierlbeck points out that such a result is not necessarily due to a failing in the democratic process, but rather, "because democracy is responsive to the desires of a large middle class increasingly willing to disregard the muted voices of economically marginalized groups within its own borders. Susceptibility to propaganda[edit] See also: Low information voter , Low-information rationality , Deliberative democracy , and Meritocracy Voters may not be educated enough to exercise their democratic rights prudently. While arguments against democracy are often taken by advocates of democracy as an attempt to maintain or revive traditional hierarchy and autocratic rule, many extensions have been made to develop the argument further. However, education alone cannot sustain a democracy, though Caplan did note in that as people become educated, they think more like economists. Opinion polls before the election are under special criticism. Suppression of dissent Various reasons can be found for eliminating or suppressing political opponents. Methods such as false flags , counterterrorism-laws , [27] planting or creating compromising material and perpetuation of public fear may be used to suppress dissent. Dahl defines democracies as systems of government that respond nearly fully to each and every one of their citizens. He then poses that no such, fully responsive system exists today. Thus, Dahl rejects a democracy dichotomy in favor of a democratization spectrum. To Dahl, the question is not whether a country is a democracy or not. The question is to what extent a country is experiencing democratization at a national level. And polyarchy, or "rule of the many people," is the only existing form of democratizeable government; that is, it is within polyarchies that democratization can flourish. Countries do not immediately transform from hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into democracies. Instead, a country that adopts democracy as its form of government can only claim to have switched to polyarchy, which is conducive to, but does not guarantee, democratization. Dahl is not deeply concerned about the limits of his polyarchy spectrum because he believes that most countries today still have a long way before they reach full polyarchy status. Assuming that the Republic was

intended to be a serious critique of the political thought in Athens, Plato argues that only Kallipolis , an aristocracy led by the unwilling philosopher-kings the wisest men , is a just form of government. Plato attacked Athenian democracies for mistaking anarchy for freedom. The lack of coherent unity in Athenian democracy made Plato conclude that such democracies were a mere collection of individuals occupying a common space rather than a form of political organization. According to Plato, other forms of government place too much focus on lesser virtues and degenerate into other forms from best to worst, starting with timocracy , which overvalues honour, then oligarchy , which overvalues wealth, which is followed by democracy. In democracy, the oligarchs, or merchant, are unable to wield their power effectively and the people take over, electing someone who plays on their wishes for example, by throwing lavish festivals. However, the government grants the people too much freedom, and the state degenerates into the fourth form, tyranny , or mob rule. Tyranny of the majority The constitutions of many countries have parts of them that restrict the nature of the types of laws that legislatures can pass. A fundamental idea behind some of these restrictions, is that the majority of a population and its elected legislature can often be the source of minority persecutions, such as with racial discrimination. For example, during the mids and mids in the democratic country of Sweden, the government forcibly sterilized thousands of innocent women. Some countries throughout the world have judiciaries where judges can serve for long periods of time, and often serve under appointed posts. This is often balanced, however, by the fact that some trials are decided by juries. While many, like Wittman, have argued that democracies work much the same way as the free market and that there is competition among parties to prevent oppression by the majority, others have argued that there is actually very little competition among political parties in democracies due to the high cost associated with campaigning. Wenders, a professor of Economics at the University of Idaho , writes: In words attributed to Scottish historian Alexander Tytler: It can only exist until a majority of voters discover that they can vote themselves largess out of the public treasury. A majority bullying a minority is just as bad as a dictator, communist or otherwise, doing so. Democracy is two coyotes and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. For example, Fierlbeck Of course this is only a critique of a subset of types of democracy that primarily use majority rule. The Founding Fathers of the United States intended to address this criticism by combining democracy with republicanism. A constitution [39] would limit the powers of what a simple majority can accomplish. He put forth a cyclical theory of government where monarchies tend to decay into aristocracies, which then decay into democracies, which subsequently decay into anarchy, then tyranny, then return to monarchy. He hypothesized that a hybrid system of government incorporating facets of all three major types monarchy, aristocracy and democracy could break this cycle. Many modern democracies that have separation of powers are claimed to represent these kinds of hybrid governments. For example, the modern United States executive branch has slowly accumulated more power from the legislative branch, and the Senate no longer functions as a quasi-aristocratic body as was originally intended, since senators are now democratically elected. Political Coase theorem[edit] Some have tried to argue that the Coase theorem applies to political markets as well. Daron Acemoglu , however, provides evidence to the contrary, claiming that the Coase Theorem is only valid while there are "rules of the game," so to speak, that are being enforced by the government. But when there is nobody there to enforce the rules for the government itself, there is no way to guarantee that low transaction costs will lead to an efficient outcome in democracies.

Chapter 7 : Project MUSE - Deliberative Democracy and the Epistemic Benefits of Diversity

What are the Limits of Democracy? When people hear the word "freedom" they often think of electoral democracy. But freedom to vote is a very small portion of all individual freedoms we enjoy in a truly free society.

Chapter 8 : Criticism of democracy - Wikipedia

The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Edited by Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn. New York: Columbia University Press, p. \$ cloth, \$ paper - Volume 1 Issue 3 - Paul

Kubicek.