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## Chapter 1 : Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science Conference – The Brains Blog

*The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness.*

Bryson Norman Vision and Painting: Goodman, Nelson , Languages of Art: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. Goodman Nelson and Elgin Catherine Z. Republished in Husserliana X, The Hague: Hyman, John , The Objective Eye: The University of Chicago Press. Kulvicki, John , On Images: Their structure and content Oxford: Lopes, Dominic , Understanding Pictures Oxford: Lopes, Dominic , Sight and Sensibility: Maynard, Patrick , The Engine of Visualization: Thinking Through Photography Ithaca: Maynard, Patrick , Drawing Distinctions: The Varieties of Graphic Expression Ithaca: University of Chicago Press. Image, Text, Ideology, Chicago and London: University Of Chicago Press. Inquiries into the semiotic heritage and its relevance for the analysis of the visual world. Willats, John , Art and Representation: Wollheim, Richard , Painting as an Art London: British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, Journal of Genetic Psychology, , Academic Press, New York and London, pp. Virtue and Taste Oxford: Third conference of a series published online at the Semiotics Institute Online. Essays for Richard Wollheim, Oxford: Oxford University Press Cambridge University Press p. Thames and Hudson pp ,

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## Chapter 2 : CiteSeerX " Citation Query A functionalist plea for self-consciousness

*with M, but it mustn't be mediated by any conscious inference or observation (, pp. ; , pp. ).*<sup>2,3</sup> In order to locate the point at which the self-representational theory diverges.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: This first publication, in which homosexuals speak out about themselves, should be understood as part of a process that is developing as well in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The fact that the first "National" Meeting of Chinese homosexuals was held in Hong Kong in December is further evidence that an all-encompassing solidarity is beginning to form among Chinese homosexuals in the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Zhou Huashan, et al. *Xianggang tongzhi yanjiushe*, ; Zhou Huashan, *Tongzhi lun On homosexuals*, ibd. *Medium and Representation in Chinese Painting*. University of Chicago Press, Having just published his weighty volume on *Monumentality in Early Chinese Art and Architecture* in , he has come out with this reasonably sized paperback in the following year. While both treat objects as represented in and representative of their culture, the approaches differ. *Monumentality* grew out of and is shaped by a historical survey of early Chinese art. *The Double Screen* deals with a problem object, tripled in fact as an object, a painting medium, and a pictorial representation. As an art object, it is a pictorial ground, and it can compete for attention with natural surroundings when depicted in whole or in part. As a painted image, the screen can serve both to represent pictorial space and to supply visual metaphors of "poetic space" that add spatial and temporal dimensions to a scene. While a screen can play both roles in a painting, one is usually emphasized over the other. As metaphor, the imagery must be interpreted in its pictorial context. There it often comments on the main scene, particularly in the artistic game of a screen-within-a-screen within a screen. The focus of the first chapter is the handscroll "Night Entertainment of Han Xizai. As for the painting itself, we are presumably dealing with a twelfth-century copy of a tenth-century original that depicted scenes of revelry. The screens in the painting indicate the likely date and the probable academy affiliation of the artist. Han pictorial designs already use screens to define spatial depth and indicate both discontinuity and continuity" as in this scroll, where three screens separate four units. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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## Chapter 3 : Self-representation | calendrierdelascience.com

*While this explanation appears plausible, it has to rely on pictorial representation and suggestive statements in the letters--the same challenge as with interpreting the message in Bonheur's painting of an injured bird or Degas' double portrait of his wartime friends.*

For the only viable alternative resolution of our Bertie dilemma seems to be belief in actual Russellian sense-data or at least in immaterial properties. If sensory experience presents us with sense-data and nothing but, the sense-data wall us off from whatever may be the rest of reality, and we are left with a justificatory gap between our beliefs about sense-data and our beliefs about the external world. More likely, an opponent will hold the line at property dualism, as do Jackson and Chalmers. That is quite bad enough for the materialist, but of course one who holds no brief for materialism in the first place will not be convinced by the present argument. There are still nonrepresentationalist alternatives. Rather, Bertie senses greenly, greenly-sensing being just a type of visual sensing. But as was not often noticed, adverbialism is a semantical thesis about the logical forms of sensation statements, and as such it has been severely and tellingly criticized, e.g. Eliminativism about sensory qualities is suggested if not championed by Dennett and by Rey, Levine discusses eliminativism at more length. Dretske maintains that there is nothing intrinsic to the brain that constitutes the difference between a red quality and a green one. Unless there are Russellian sense-data or at least immaterial properties, what distinguishes the two qualities must be relational, and the only obvious candidate is, representing red or green. But as before, if one has no objection to sense-data or immaterial properties, one will be unmoved. The neurophysiological type-identity theorist would protest here too, though the same rejoinders apply. A less commissive objection is that, contra Dretske, there are candidate relations besides that of representing: The Argument from Veridicality We distinguish between veridical and nonveridical visual experiences. That is hard to dispute. But one will then have to give an oblique account of the notion of veridicality. If one joins Campbell et al. Once the greenness has already been accounted for, what qualitative content is left? For example, Block maintains that Bertie could introspect a certain qualitative property in addition to the greenness of the after-image. And we shall definitely encounter a further kind of content in Section 5 below, that may or may not be the same sort of property Block has in mind. Tye and Crane extend this argument to bodily sensations such as pain. The transparency argument can be extended also to the purely hallucinatory case. Suppose you are looking at a real, richly red tomato in good light. Suppose also that you then hallucinate a second, identical tomato to the right of the real one. You may be aware that the second tomato is not real. Phenomenally, the relevant two sectors of your visual field are just the same; the appearances are just the same in structure. The redness involved in the second-tomato appearance is exactly the same property as is involved in the first. But if we agree that the redness perceived in the real tomato is just the redness of the tomato itself, then the redness perceived in the hallucinated tomato is "the red quality involved in the second-tomato appearance" is just the redness of the hallucinated tomato itself. The appeal to transparency makes it immensely plausible that visual experience represents external objects and their apparent properties. But as noted above, that weak representationalist thesis is not terribly controversial. What the transparency argument as it stands does not show, but only claims, is that experience has no other properties that pose problems for materialism. The argument needs to be filled out, and typically is filled out by a further appeal to introspection. The obvious additional premises are: But ii not even the most determined introspection ever reveals any such additional properties. Transparency is vigorously defended by Tye, and by Crane. Dretske endorses a radical version of it: Objections to the transparency thesis typically take the form of counterexamples, mental features of our experiences that can be introspected but allegedly are nonrepresentational. Block further mentions bodily sensations and moods whose representational contents are minimal but which are vividly introspectible. We may add that we can introspect the visualness of the representation, i. Finally, it would seem that for any sensory quality, one can introspect the higher-order

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property of what it is like to experience that quality of. These apparent counterexamples take a lot of overcoming. Tye addresses some of them, arguing in each case that what appears to be a nonrepresentational difference between two experiences is actually a difference in representata. As representationalism has been defined here, it does not require the transparency thesis. Representationalism itself is a claim only about sensory qualities, while transparency is about features of experience more generally. Even if transparency fails and there are introspectible nonrepresentational features of experiences, those features are presumably not sensory qualities. Though some of the foregoing examples have also been used against representationalism; see Section 4. Of course, if representationalism should be construed as applying to features of experience more broadly, then the existence of some such features may be troublesome for the view so construed; but they may be acceptable to the materialist, e. Very briefly, as Byrne puts it: Suppose a subject has two consecutive experiences that differ in qualitative character. If so, Byrne argues, the way things seems to her when she has the second experience must differ from the way they seemed to her while she was having the first. For suppose that consecutive experiences are the same in content. Then the world seems exactly the same to the subject during both. The argument generalizes in each of several natural ways, and Byrne concludes that experiences cannot differ in qualitative character without differing in representational content. Therefore, a difference in paint would be another difference in representatum, not a qualitative difference unaccompanied by a content difference. From the orthodox representationalist point of view, that may seem a dangerous concession. While doing that does not strictly beg the question, the argument does help itself to an assumption that is unlikely to be granted by the anti-representationalist. Suppose you hallucinate simultaneously a red ellipse, an orange circle, and a green square, without ever previously having encountered any of those colors or shapes. That experience directly gives you the capacity to form beliefs about the external world, e. Now, why not extend representationalism to experience across the board? At this point there is just one still unrefuted opponent: Pautz argues that that view is not worth the complications it enforces. In no case, Pautz maintains, is there going to be an experiential difference without a representational difference. Since Pautz has proceeded by objecting to various competing views, we must hear what their respective proponents will say in rebuttal. According to the representationalist, the qualities are not mental; the corresponding mental property of a sensory state is that of representing the relevant quality. Of course, it is sensory states and experiences themselves that interest philosophers of mind, and some critics of representationalism will protest that merely representing a quality cannot be all there is to having the qualitative character that needs explaining; we shall return to that complaint in section 4. As yet we have said nothing about what it is to be aware of a quality. There are various options: In any case, however, the problems of awareness of content are already with us, and do not afflict the representational theory of sensory qualities in particular. Objections to the Representational Theory The strong representational theory entails the obvious supervenience claim: Objections to the theory have most often come in the form of counterexamples to that thesis. But we shall begin with three more general complaints. One could not without circularity explicate phenomenal greenness in terms of represented real-world public color and then turn around and construe the latter real physical greenness as a mere disposition to produce sensations of phenomenal greenness, or in any other way that presupposed phenomenal greenness. There is a variety of realist answers, though none of them is uncontroversial. Representationalists Dretske , Tye , Lycan , Lewis and Byrne and Hilbert each gesture toward one. But it is far from obvious that the representational theory does require color realism in the first place. There is a more general problem of identifying the relevant worldly representata. For example, Loar imagines comparing the experience of seeing a lemon and a subjectively indistinguishable case of hallucinating an exactly similar lemon. A similar sentiment is sympathetically attributed to Fred Dretske by Levine , p. There are things that do not exist, such as a hallucinated pink rat or a hallucinated lemon. The representational theory of sensory qualities is neutral on such underlying issues; it says only that when you hallucinate a lemon, the yellowness you experience is that of the lemon. Of course, neither the lemon nor its color actually exists, but as before, there are plenty of things that do not exist. And one should question whether, as Loar maintains, nonactual things and people cannot

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resemble actual ones. This appears to refute pure representationalism, since according to that view representation of the relevant sort of property does necessarily constitute a sensory quality. The point is not highly significant, since as before, pure representationalism is an unoccupied position. Sturgeon does seem to hold the stronger view that not even representation of whatever special sort is appealed to by the quasi-representationalist can suffice for a sensory quality, because any such representation can occur unconsciously. Since the quasi-representationalist maintains precisely that a sensory quality is simply a representatum of the relevant sort, this would be an outright refutation. This objection rests on the crucial assumption that sensory qualities can occur only consciously. But if we then understand the tacit assumption in the same way, it would be independently rejected by most representationalists, who already hold that a sensory quality can occur without being noticed by its host. What of sense 4? Here the objection gets a slightly better foothold. The premise is true; representation can occur without there being something that representing is like for the subject. Recall that some theorists have used that phrase simply to mean a sensory quality in sense 3 ; so again the assumption would be tautologous. But the present concern is for sense 4 , and at this point the objection breaks down. For so far as has been shown, a first-order quality can occur without there being anything it is like for the subject to experience that quality on that occasion; the subject may be entirely unaware of it. At this stage, Kriegel and Chalmers have pushed against strong representationalism from a somewhat different direction. Suppose the strong representationalist appeals, as most do, to functional considerations as what is needed to make mere representation into representation of the particular sort that is supposed to constitute a sensory quality. Then, in effect, their position is a functionalist account of the difference between phenomenal and nonphenomenal representation. Moreover, a functionalist theory of the distinction should inherit all the usual problems of functionalism about the phenomenal.

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## Chapter 4 : Representational Theories of Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Chapters 2 and 3, focuses on phenomenological depth as embodied in key relations between the ontology of pictorial representation, the unity of self-consciousness, and the objective and subjective dimensions of cognition.*

The aim of this three-day conference is to bring reflection on depiction and pictorial experience in the philosophy of perception and aesthetics into dialogue with relevant research and methodologies in the vision sciences. Structuring questions include the following: What is the nature of pictorial experience? Is the experience of depth and 3D structure typically elicited by paintings, photographs, and other kinds of pictures properly perceptual in nature? Or is it rather, as some philosophers have proposed, imaginative? And what is the proper object of pictorial experience? Is it the light-reflecting or light-emitting pattern on the 2D, pictorial surface? Or do we somehow manage to see through that superficial pattern to the depicted scene itself? Does work in the philosophy of perception or vision science have anything to tell us about the aesthetic appreciation of pictorial art? Do aesthetic properties belong to the admissible contents of visual experience? Does the neuroscience of perception have the potential to contribute to philosophical debates concerning the nature of aesthetic experience? Is there a form of attention that is distinctive to viewing or otherwise perceptually engaging with works of art? There is a long tradition in philosophy of analogizing visual experience to viewing flat media such as paintings and photographs. Seeing, it has been widely supposed, involves the construction of image-like representations in consciousness. Is this analogy plausible? If not, then what does this mean for contemporary accounts of perception? What is the best account of the kind of iconic representation exemplified by pictures? There are salient respects, however, in which our experience before a picture is normally distinguishable from that of actually seeing a 3D scene. How ought we to understand the explanatory success of virtual psychophysics in vision science research? This event is supported by: Online registration is available through Eventbrite and Facebook.

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## Chapter 5 : Pictorial | Define Pictorial at [calendrierdelascience.com](http://calendrierdelascience.com)

*The beginnings of self-representation emerge early in infancy, with the recognition that one is a separate physical being from others. Self-representation development continues throughout adulthood.*

Necessity and Control – The Practical Aspects Often we as emerging artists begin our practice with minimal resources at our disposal. We resort to using whatever materials available, through whatever means possible. Without the financial resources to hire professional actors or models to pose as subjects for our works, artists often rely on themselves or on the assistance of friends to avoid complications with model release forms and financial compensation. If the work that we want to create requires the human figure or face, nothing could be more accessible than our own bodies. After all, no one can articulate your thoughts better than you can. The primacy of thought leaves no chance of misinterpretation. We control what details are included in the final works and what details are excluded. For a moment, we seize control of time and space. We control the decisive moment that is captured and the setting in which we are contained. The artist becomes director in the clip in which they are the lead actor. The self-portrait can become a major exercise in independent production. As the artist advances in the stages of their career, some of these roles may be delegated to assistants, but the original modus operandi generally remains the same. Consider the elaborate works by Cindy Sherman or Rodney Graham, or even my own similarly independent productions. However, even in the opposite style of self-portraiture, within the most candid and spontaneous works, there is also a conscious element of control.

Self-Consciousness The concept of self-portraiture is inherently linked to the concept of self-consciousness. And, the concept of portraiture, if not even art itself, is linked to consciousness. There is always a conscious element of involvement. Let's suppose we were to consider robots that can paint. Can an unconscious entity create art? Though the robots themselves may not be conscious of painting, the sheer observation of painting by others and defining it as such, makes it so. But, in order to perform the act of painting, the robots have to be programmed to perform the actions required of painting. The consciousness therefore lies in the programmer rendering the robots seemingly automatic actions possible. Even the use of randomness in the creative process reflects a conscious decision to use randomness as criteria for the work. Every stroke of a paintbrush, or click of the shutter at any particular time and place reflects a conscious decision. Art is the reflective result of consciousness. The fact that humans make art is one of the few traits that set us apart from most other species. While scientists have worked with primates testing for the ability to create art, they have found that what they produce are mere pictorial representations at best. So how are we any different? While most of us have seen videos of cats or chimps that paint, it is rare that they will ever produce a self-portrait. However, at an elephant park in Thailand elephants have been seen by many and recorded painting portraits of elephants. Though we cannot be sure if their intent is to paint a portrait of themselves or of some other elephant, the question of the existence of self-awareness among other species has been raised through this portrait vs. All sentient beings are conscious, but not all sentient beings are self-conscious, a standard measure of advanced intelligence.

Maetang Elephant Park, Maeteng, Chiang Mai, Thailand, photographer unknown Identity Issues and Autobiography If art making always involves conscious decision-making and self-portraiture reflects self-consciousness, then what is the message or meaning of self-portraiture? Why do certain artists decide to create self-interpretations or visual archives of their presence and decidedly so in a particular time and space? The question answers itself. The notion of a portrait is intrinsically linked to that of identity. Contemporary art draws largely on the signifiers of identity as subject for discussion. Artists, in their self-awareness utilize their signifiers, whether intimate and personal, specific to gender, race, class, culture, sexual orientation or transfiguration, for intellectual discourse. The complexities of the definition of self are played out on the metaphorical and literal canvas. Whether abstract, subtle, or intimately detailed, the self-portrait is inherently autobiographical. Many artists experiment with negating the self through hiding or masquerading within their works. While most of us would still think that we are ourselves after a heart transplant, the same cannot be

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said if we were to consider a similar question, but with a brain transplant. Furthermore, the performance works of French artist ORLAN, in which she undergoes cosmetic surgeries, repeatedly altering her facial construction, also questions the locus on which we place self-identity. No matter how much we attempt to distort or abstract our appearance, we are trapped within our selves as our identity lies not in any one physical feature or set of characteristics, but in the conscious entity behind these. Ultimately, any conscious representation of the self, disguised or not, can be classified as a self-portrait. It has become an example in which self-portraiture hides in plain sight. I am referring to the performing arts. Think of your favourite musician, whether a pop-singer, guitar player, or operatic soprano. Consider a dancer, dance troupe or your favourite film actors. Each of these artists appear in their own art. They tell stories with their bodies and voices through the art of performance. Often self-portraits in contemporary photography are a documentation of a performance whose sole audience is the camera. Any narrative that surrounds the image is left to the realm of the imagination, evoked by a myriad of visual signifiers chosen by the self-portrait artist. Photographic self-portraits can be traced back even earlier than that circa by Robert Cornelius but no wonder with the influence that painting has had on the art of photography. Documentation has become an essential element in almost any art form. In a photographic self-portrait, documentation becomes an art unto itself. Photography holds a privileged position in art with its unique ability to mirror reality with such accurate and detailed precision. But are these ruses simply critiquing the medium and challenging our perceptions of reality? How does this relate when combined with self-portraiture? The photograph then becomes a stage on which to enact our stories. Often like reality, there is no singular truth, and what one perceives as fiction may also contain certain elements of truth, albeit often hidden. Protected by it he can lay bare his soul down to the last intimate detail. As complex being with rich, inner lives, one role is hardly satisfying. We are not easily defined by a single identity. The self-portrait enables us to create a realm where we can express our past-selves, repressed selves, desires, maladies of the mind, intellectual interests or to fantasize about being someone altogether different than ourselves. The masqueraded self-portrait can be an escape into a world where we have full creative control – not surprising in a reality where we can often feel that we have little control over. We crave the world where we are free to be anyone that we chose to be. Though these self-portraits may be disguised as masquerading, any one that knows even a bit about the real Rodney Graham, can see elements of truth in these representations. These self-portraits contain a fascinating irony with their self-deprecating humour as Graham reveals many of his semi-incomplete dreams to his viewers through his art. It is only natural to tell our experiences in the first-person, as observed in our typical speech pattern. The self-portrait artist goes beyond this, creating a visual literary work where he or she is the protagonist or antagonist. And just as one cannot write the great American novel without first living it, it follows that one cannot produce a great work of art without first experiencing the life to reflect it. Using their personal lives as subject matter for their art, some artists prefer to work with straight photography, from a very direct first-person experience. Their blatantly honest images simultaneously demand and defy us to look at them. The capacity of photography to tell the truth is used as a diary, archiving particular moments in time for means of reflection. Another threshold is crossed through this photographic method – the threshold between private and public. The very specificity of diaristic self-portraits paints a vivid picture, casting light on issues that are often kept in the dark. The self-portraits of Nan Goldin come to mind, illuminating the life of her and her friends, where drug use, AIDs and domestic abuse and violence were typical. This genre of self-portraiture can be both an enlightening and a cathartic experience. The veil of denial is lifted concurrently with the opening of the shutter. The photograph is a 2D clone of that individual. Further yet, we could mean a portrait or self-portrait of her. Our art, whether our likeness is presented within it or not, is an extension of ourselves. If successfully planted into the fabric of history, this extension of self will surpass our physical existence. Just as many attempt to extend their existence into the future through having a family of future generations that carry on both their DNA along with values and traditions, we as artists aim to extend our mental selves into the future, injecting our art works with our own ideologies and mental selves. This theory could be ascribed to any role of

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creative producer – architect, philosopher, composer, painter, etc. Logically, self-portraiture is therefore closely linked to performance, and therefore to the body. And what is the body if not a living organism prone to birth, growth, entropy and eventually – death? The self-portrait acts simultaneously as a memento mori, and as a vehicle for immortality. Most of us expect to live no longer than years of age. Given that even the earliest photographs are still in existence, albeit in a fragile state, and given the advances and assurance of photographic technologies archival standards today, we can safely assume that a photograph will exist far beyond our own lifespan. For the artist who is both knowledgeable in the medium of photography and is self-aware, self-portraiture is a conscious exercise in existentialism. As a conscious act, we document our inner and outer selves, meticulously curating the facets of our existence, both the painful and the triumphant, that we wish to leave behind in the world. And from these archives we hope that others can learn – to look inside themselves, to reconsider their stereotypes of those around them, to remind ourselves of the brevity of youth, beauty and life itself, to challenge previous modes of perceptions of reality, and to question where in fact our very identity lies and how it is constructed. And, like reality, there is no sole explanation for why artists create self-portraiture; there are many truths. Not only is the empress wearing clothes, but she is wearing many layers of them. Holly Marie Armishaw Holly Marie Armishaw retains full ownership of all images on this site unless otherwise specified.

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## Chapter 6 : Depiction - Wikipedia

*The Logic Structure of Pictorial Representation* »A scheme is syntactically dense if it provides for infinitely many characters so ordered that between each two there is a third.

This article critically examines the way in which Sartre dealt with the problem of alterity in his early works, proposing that Sartre presented an unsatisfactory account of alterity in his first philosophical work entitled *The Transcendence of the Ego*, though his study of imagination offers ample opportunities to re-examine the question of alterity and to arrive at a more adequate formulation of the way in which the self relates to the other. I therefore begin by demonstrating that the *Transcendence of the Ego* perpetuates the Cartesian tradition where the self is defined primarily in terms of thinking-that is, self-consciousness and immanence. Next, I turn to the Sartrean *Psychology of Imagination* to find another way of conceptualizing the problem. As such, the theory of imagination does not allow us to bring the fundamental character of alterity to light. Still, we uncover a more adequate way of dealing with alterity in the context of the imaginary life. Finally, I make evident that the imaginary subject is necessarily divided between itself and itself as another and due to that internal split, can grasp the alterity of another person. Sartre develops the notion of transcendence in a radical opposition to that of immanence. His ultimate aim is to arrive at the notion of immanence purified of any transcendent elements and to use that notion as a clue for his definition of subjectivity. That is to say, to the question: I am a pure stream of consciousness without any contents. I am an absolute transparency without opacity. I am no more than the temporal unity of my life-which means-a pure self-contained flow that no alien element can interrupt or contaminate". The idea of pure self-transparent subjectivity has a long history behind it. It originated in the philosophy of Descartes and was further developed by Husserl. The elaboration of the idea of the immanent subjectivity by Sartre needs therefore to be situated in the Cartesian and in the Husserlian tradition. For Descartes, I am defined as a "thinking thing," that is as the unity of all the conscious acts. For thinking is "all that of which we are conscious as operating in us,"<sup>2</sup> that is all the "actions" and "passions"<sup>3</sup> which belong to us as to their conscious subject. These conscious acts are part of us, that is to say, they are immanent to us. In that way I, the thinking thing, am defined primarily in terms of immanence. Opposed to the field of immanence where the subjectivity is situated is the sphere of all that is other to me. The things that I am not - the surrounding world, the body, other people - are given to me in a mediated and indirect way. They never enjoy the direct givenness of the internal acts of thinking and can never be known in the way in which I know myself. The thing that I see - but am not - is always dubitable and might turn out to be an illusion but the fact that I am the seeing subject or the subject who "seems to see" cannot be questioned. For Husserl the subject is the unity of all the conscious acts directed to their intentional objects and accompanied by the I or the ego. The subject - albeit originally open upon the world defined as the intension of its conscious life - is not in its essence dependent on the world and would "survive the annihilation of the world". Such a self-sufficient subject is therefore defined primarily in terms of immanence - even though Husserl enlarges the domain of immanence to comprise not only the subjectivity but also everything that is given to us with an absolute certainty - i. He embraces the idea of subjectivity as that which is given in a direct fashion to me, or, as he puts it - "without intermediaries". The sphere of subjectivity delineated by them was still weighed down by a foreign element - that of the ego. The ego - in the sense of the subject who thinks and who can in principle be distinguished from the activity of thinking - is other to pure subjectivity. The ego is transcendent with regards to my immanent life. What is the ego then? The ego is a solidified self. Why such a solidification? It is due to the fact that primo: Being active means for Sartre being made dependent on a whole range of external determining circumstances, which affect my action and so affect me as the acting subject. I, as an agent, am defined by means of things like the material I am working with, the tools I am using be they hammers or logical principles and the results that I want to attain. In other words - I am defined by things whose sort of being is different from the being of the pure consciousness that I am. I am defined by things

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whose esse is different that their percipi - that is, things which extend beyond the mere appearance, which are more than what they appear to be. As the reader will see easily, the paradigm of a thing whose esse is more than its percipi comes from the field of perception. The objects of perception are more than the facets which they offer to view at a given moment, their being is not identical with the visible profiles. I have a personal history, I have also plans and projects to be realised in the course of my life. Now, the past and the present - insofar as they are not actually lived by me in the now, insofar as they belong to me without affecting me in a direct way, are other than the living present in which I, the conscious subject, am immersed. That is to say: For example, the hatred that I feel towards Peter is transcendent to the repulsion that overpowers me when I see him. The hatred overflows the instantaneity of the lived affect for it involves a history I have hated Peter for a long time and the future I think that I will always hate him. The exact nature of this relationship is of great importance to our study, for - as we shall demonstrate in what follows - the relationship between myself or my consciousness and my ego serves as the matrix for the relationship between myself or my consciousness and the other. The other is to me no more than another transcendent ego. We must therefore inquire into the transcendence of my ego with regards to the immanent consciousness so as to throw light onto the way in which other people - or better, other transcendent egos - relate to my immanent consciousness. For the otherness of other people is an extension of the otherness of my ego. In order to grasp the nature of the relation which holds between the ego and the pure consciousness we must ask the following: Or is it rather an otherness external to the subjective life, an otherness which does pertain to the life of the subject but which does not affect that life in its essence, which does not penetrate into the life of the subject, which does not divide the subject and estrange her from her own life? Our analysis will make clear that the otherness of the ego is an otherness of the latter kind - i. The Sartrean subject is still Cartesian in that she is defined by means of terms like self-transparency and self-knowledge. Did Descartes not believe that I know myself better than I know all that is other to me? Yet, the vision of subjectivity such that the subject is not penetrated, contaminated or rendered opaque by otherness makes it impossible - as we shall proceed to argue later on - to account for the otherness of other people or of the other. Let us begin with the otherness of my ego. Wherein does this otherness lie with regards to the pure subject? It lies in the difference between the sort of being of the subject or the pure consciousness and the being of the ego. The difference can therefore be qualified as an ontological difference. The ego is other than the consciousness and that is why it is other to the consciousness. Let us make that point more precise. The ego is transcendent to the consciousness - which means that it falls under the general category of the transcendent object. The ego - as we already noted above - is more than what it appears, it hides behind the appearance, it is not entirely given to view, it is opaque. The ego is not essentially different from physical things like trees or chairs I identify it as mine, I take it to stand for the totality of my life, my personal style, my way of living. How is it possible to take this transcendent object - so much like a chair or a tree - to stand for my personality, my self? This has to do with a fundamental illusion - says Sartre. I trick myself into thinking that I have a personality, an identity and so on, so as to forget that I am no more than an impersonal subject, a mute and undefinable stream of consciousness. The ego is made of a different "stuff" than the consciousness is, the ego is an inert object akin to material things whereas the consciousness can best be defined as a sheer unhindered spontaneity. And yet the ego appears to me as not simply inert and passive - it appears as endowed with its own dynamism, as having spontaneity of its own. The ego appears as an object that has "subjective" qualities. Yet the appearance of spontaneity, of activity etc. It is an illusion that allows me to cover over the fact that, strictly speaking, I am nothingness and that nothing can define me. The ego is transcendent to the consciousness insofar as it is different from the consciousness, its otherness to the consciousness consists in being other than the consciousness. For the consciousness itself is not divided, it is not split between different consciousnesses. The consciousness is one, it is not other to itself - and the ego is an otherness that comes from outside and that does not affect the perfect immanence of the non-divided consciousness. Now, the impact of these remarks will quickly let itself be felt when we recall that Sartre takes the relation between the immanence of the consciousness and the transcendence or the

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otherness of the ego to function as a blueprint for the relation between the immanence of the consciousness and the transcendence or the otherness of the other. The other is simply another ego, she is so to speak, my alter ego. Still, these appearances cannot but turn out to be - as they did in the case of my ego - mere illusions, tricks that I play with objects by projecting my own spontaneity upon them and thus creating a semblance of another spontaneity, another subject or another consciousness. Now that means that the entire argument put forward in the Transcendence of the Ego leads to postulate a kind of solipsism where I am surrounded by objects which appear to be other subjects but which are no more than opaque things called the egos. Surely Sartre insists on the fact that we need to infer that behind every ego there is a consciousness - and yet this argument fails for we have absolutely no means of encountering the other consciousness itself and so no means of ascertaining that there is another consciousness "behind" the ego. The subject or the consciousness - at least the one presented in the Transcendence of the Ego - can conceive of other objects but it cannot conceive of other consciousnesses. The consciousness or the subject can conceive of other egos - be it my ego, be it the ego of another person - but it cannot conceive of another subject. It cannot conceive of another consciousness insofar as it is an enclosed, self-contained consciousness for which the very amalgam "other" and "consciousness" is simply unthinkable. It would have to - in other words - to experience an otherness in the midst of the conscious life, an otherness that comes from inside, an otherness that virtually splits the consciousness up. An otherness that remains an otherness of the consciousness and not of a transcendent object, an otherness which implicates what is other to the consciousness and not what is other than the consciousness. Only such an internally divided consciousness can grasp an other consciousness, that is, the consciousness of another person. Can we find an account of a divided consciousness which apprehends itself as another and which can therefore apprehend another subject in the work of Sartre? We believe that his study of imagination, or as he puts it, of the imaginary consciousness, opens the way to a novel approach to subjectivity where the subject is both "itself and another". That is to say, the object of the image is "given in its absence" - it hides itself at the same time as it unveils itself, it withdraws and resists appropriation. Let us begin with the question of the alterity of the imaginary object. In other words, there is an otherness in the midst of the imaginary representation insofar as the image involves - that is to say, represents or depicts - something or someone who is not actually there. By means of the image we make - as if by magic - an absent friend appear, by means of the image we render a distant being present - even though only in a quasi or an as-if way. This quasi or as-if sort of presence of the imaginary object points to the fact that the object appears as inaccessible, that its givenness to the imaginary subject is permeated by a sort of nothingness: The friend who is present cannot retain her alterity. The above remarks reveal that for Sartre the image is first of all a sort of a picture - that is to say a visual representation of something or someone. The "something or someone" represented by the picture can in an analogous fashion be termed the original of the picture - that is to say, the being that serves as the model of the pictorial representation. The original is the subject of the picture, the original is that which the picture renders present. And it is the absence of the original that motivates and makes possible the production of images or pictures:

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## Chapter 7 : 20th WCP: The Self, the Other, the Self as An/other: A Reading of Early Sartre

*Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness.*

The Representational Theory of Mind The Representational Theory of Mind RTM which goes back at least to Aristotle takes as its starting point commonsense mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, perceptions and imagings. For example, the thought that cousins are not related is inconsistent, the belief that Elvis is dead is true, the desire to eat the moon is inappropriate, a visual experience of a ripe strawberry as red is accurate, an imaging of George W. Bush with dreadlocks is inaccurate. RTM defines such intentional mental states as relations to mental representations, and explains the intentionality of the former in terms of the semantic properties of the latter. For example, to believe that Elvis is dead is to be appropriately related to a mental representation whose propositional content is that Elvis is dead. The desire that Elvis be dead, the fear that he is dead, the regret that he is dead, etc. To perceive a strawberry is, on the representational view, to have a sensory experience of some kind which is appropriately related to e. RTM also understands mental processes such as thinking, reasoning and imagining as sequences of intentional mental states. For example, to imagine the moon rising over a mountain is, inter alia, to entertain a series of mental images of the moon and a mountain. To infer a proposition q from the propositions p and if p then q is inter alia to have a sequence of thoughts of the form p, if p then q, q. Contemporary philosophers of mind have typically supposed or at least hoped that the mind can be naturalized "i. This assumption is shared within cognitive science, which attempts to provide accounts of mental states and processes in terms ultimately of features of the brain and central nervous system. In the course of doing so, the various sub-disciplines of cognitive science including cognitive and computational psychology and cognitive and computational neuroscience postulate a number of different kinds of structures and processes, many of which are not directly implicated by mental states and processes as commonsensically conceived. There remains, however, a shared commitment to the idea that mental states and processes are to be explained in terms of mental representations. In philosophy, recent debates about mental representation have centered around the existence of propositional attitudes beliefs, desires, etc. Within cognitive science itself, the philosophically relevant debates have been focused on the computational architecture of the brain and central nervous system, and the compatibility of scientific and commonsense accounts of mentality. Propositional Attitudes Intentional Realists such as Dretske e. What a person believes, doubts, desires, fears, etc. We are thus committed to the basic truth of commonsense psychology and, hence, to the existence of the states its generalizations refer to. Some realists, such as Fodor, also hold that commonsense psychology will be vindicated by cognitive science, given that propositional attitudes can be construed as computational relations to mental representations. Intentional Eliminativists, such as Churchland, perhaps Dennett and at one time Stich argue that no such things as propositional attitudes and their constituent representational states are implicated by the successful explanation and prediction of our mental lives and behavior. Churchland denies that the generalizations of commonsense propositional-attitude psychology are true. He argues that folk psychology is a theory of the mind with a long history of failure and decline, and that it resists incorporation into the framework of modern scientific theories including cognitive psychology. As such, it is comparable to alchemy and phlogiston theory, and ought to suffer a comparable fate. It should be noted that Churchland is not an eliminativist about mental representation tout court. Dennett a grants that the generalizations of commonsense psychology are true and indispensable, but denies that this is sufficient reason to believe in the entities they appear to refer to. If the strategy of assigning contentful states to a system and predicting and explaining its behavior on the assumption that it is rational "i. But there is nothing more to having a propositional attitude than this. In the event that there are two or more explanatorily adequate but substantially different systems of intentional ascriptions to an individual, however, Dennett claims there is no fact of the matter about what the individual believes b, This does suggest an irrealism at

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least with respect to the sorts of things Fodor and Dretske take beliefs to be; though it is not the view that there is simply nothing in the world that makes intentional explanations true. Davidson, and Lewis also defend the view that what it is to have a propositional attitude is just to be interpretable in a particular way. It is, however, not entirely clear whether they intend their views to imply irrealism about propositional attitudes. Stich argues that cognitive psychology does not or, in any case, should not taxonomize mental states by their semantic properties at all, since attribution of psychological states by content is sensitive to factors that render it problematic in the context of a scientific psychology. The semantic properties of a mental state, however, are determined by its extrinsic properties – e. Hence, such properties cannot figure in causal-scientific explanations of behavior. Fodor and Dretske are realist attempts to come to grips with some of these problems. Stich proposes a syntactic theory of the mind, on which the semantic properties of mental states play no explanatory role. Stich has since changed his views on a number of these issues.

### Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Representation

It is a traditional assumption among realists about mental representations that representational states come in two basic varieties cf. Nonconceptual content is usually defined as a kind of content that states of a creature lacking concepts might nonetheless enjoy. Perceptual states such as seeing that something is blue, are sometimes thought of as hybrid states, consisting of, for example, a non-conceptual sensory experience and a belief, or some more integrated compound of conceptual and nonconceptual elements. There is an extensive literature on the representational content of perceptual experience. See the entry on the contents of perception. Disagreement over nonconceptual representation concerns the existence and nature of phenomenal properties and the role they play in determining the content of sensory experience. Dennett, for example, denies that there are such things as qualia at all as they are standardly construed; while Brandom, McDowell, Rey and Sellars deny that they are needed to explain the content of sensory experience. Among those who accept that experiences have phenomenal content, some Dretske, Lycan, Tye argue that it is reducible to a kind of intentional content, while others Block, Loar, Peacocke argue that it is irreducible. See the discussion in the next section. Some historical discussions of the representational properties of mind e. On such a view, all representational states have their content in virtue of their phenomenal features. There has also been dissent from the traditional claim that conceptual representations thoughts, beliefs lack phenomenology. Chalmers, Flanagan, Goldman, Horgan and Tienson, Jackendoff, Levine, McGinnis, Pitt, Forthcoming, Searle, Siewert and Strawson, claim that purely conceptual conscious representational states themselves have a perhaps proprietary phenomenology. This view – bread and butter, it should be said, among historical and contemporary Phenomenologists – has been gaining momentum of late among analytic philosophers of mind. If this claim is correct, the question of what role phenomenology plays in the determination of content rearises for conceptual representation; and the eliminativist ambitions of Sellars, Brandom, Rey, et al. It would also raise prima face problems for reductivist representationalism see the next section, as well as for reductive naturalistic theories of intentional content. Representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a mental state is reducible to a kind of intentional content, naturalistically construed à la Dretske. Phenomenalists claim that the phenomenal character of a mental state is not so reducible. The representationalist thesis is often formulated as the claim that phenomenal properties are representational or intentional. On one hand, it could mean that the phenomenal content of an experience is a kind of intentional content i. On the other, it could mean that the intrinsic, subjective phenomenal properties of an experience determine an intentional content. Representationalists such as Dretske, Lycan and Tye would assent to the former claim, whereas phenomenalists such as Block, Chalmers, Loar and Peacocke would assent to the latter. Among phenomenalists, there is further disagreement about whether qualia are intrinsically representational Loar or not Block, Peacocke. Do Ganzfeld experiences represent anything? It may be that doubts about the representationality of such experiences is simply a consequence of the fact that outside the laboratory we never encounter things that would produce them. Supposing we routinely did and especially if we had names for them, it seems unlikely such skepticism would arise. Most reductive representationalists are motivated by the conviction that one or another naturalistic explanation of intentionality see the next section is, in broad

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outline, correct, and by the desire to complete the naturalization of the mental by applying such theories to the problem of phenomenality. Needless to say, most phenomenologists Chalmers is the major exception are just as eager to naturalize the phenomenal " though not in the same way. The main argument for representationalism appeals to the transparency of experience cf. If nonetheless they were properties of the experience, perception would be massively deceptive. But perception is not massively deceptive. According to the representationalist, the phenomenal character of an experience is due to its representing objective, non-experiential properties. In veridical perception, these properties are locally instantiated; in illusion and hallucination, they are not. On this view, introspection is indirect perception: In order to account for the intuitive differences between conceptual and sensory representations, representationalists appeal to structural or functional properties. Dretske , for example, distinguishes experiences and thoughts on the basis of the origin and nature of their functions: Lycan , distinguishes them in terms of their functional-computational profiles. Tye distinguishes them in terms of their functional roles and the intrinsic structure of their vehicles: Phenomenalists tend to make use of the same sorts of features function, intrinsic structure in explaining some of the intuitive differences between thoughts and experiences; but they do not suppose that such features exhaust the differences between phenomenal and non-phenomenal representations. For the phenomenalist, it is the phenomenal properties of experiences " qualia themselves " that constitute the fundamental difference between experience and thought. Another sort of representation appealed to by some phenomenologists e. Jackson , and Nagel Chalmers b puts pure phenomenal concepts to use in defending the Knowledge Argument against physicalism. Alter and Walter is an excellent collection of essays on phenomenal concepts. Imagery Though imagery has played an important role in the history of philosophy of mind, the important contemporary literature on it is primarily psychological. McGinn is a notable recent exception. The question of how these experimental results are to be explained kindled a lively debate on the nature of imagery and imagination. Kosslyn claims that the results suggest that the tasks were accomplished via the examination and manipulation of mental representations that themselves have spatial properties " i. Others, principally Pylyshyn , a, b, , argue that the empirical facts can be explained in terms exclusively of discursive, or propositional representations and cognitive processes defined over them. Pylyshyn takes such representations to be sentences in a language of thought. The idea that pictorial representations are literally pictures in the head is not taken seriously by proponents of the pictorial view of imagery see, e. The claim is, rather, that mental images represent in a way that is relevantly like the way pictures represent. The distinction between pictorial and discursive representation can be characterized in terms of the distinction between analog and digital representation Goodman For one thing, there may be nonphenomenal properties of representations that vary continuously. Moreover, there are ways of understanding pictorial representation that presuppose neither phenomenality nor analogicity. But distances between parts of a representation can be defined functionally rather than spatially " for example, in terms of the number of discrete computational steps required to combine stored information about them. Tye proposes a view of images on which they are hybrid representations, consisting both of pictorial and discursive elements. Content Determination The contents of mental representations are typically taken to be abstract objects properties, relations, propositions, sets, etc. A pressing question, especially for the naturalist, is how mental representations come to have their contents. There are two basic types of contemporary naturalistic theories of content-determination, causal-informational and functional. Such relations are common, but representation is not.

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## Chapter 8 : The World as Will and Representation - Wikipedia

*The aim of this three-day conference is to bring reflection on depiction and pictorial experience in the philosophy of perception and aesthetics into dialogue with relevant research and methodologies in the vision sciences.*

The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the firstperson perspective by Thomas Metzinger , " Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its basic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant: This contribution analyzes these properties on a representational as well as on a functional level of description. One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar selfawareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a different state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued i that the difference between the Neo-Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and ii that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory. Toward a Theory of Consciousness by David J. Chalmers - Indiana University , " This reportability immediately implies that we are aware in the relevant sense. Of course, an animal or a prelinguistic human might have conscious experience without the ability to report. Such a being would plausibly also have a degree of awareness. Awareness does not entail the ability to report, Awareness does not entail the ability to report, but in a being with sophisticated linguistic abilities, one goes along with the other. Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts literature, a novel self-represen-tational account is introduced that Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts literature, a novel self-represen-tational account is introduced that does. This is the quotational theory of phenomenal consciousness, according to which the higher-order component of a conscious state is constituted by the quotational com-ponent of a quotational phenomenal concept. According to the quotational theory of consciousness, phenomenal concepts help to account for the very nature of phenomenally conscious states. Thus, the paper integrates two largely distinct explanatory projects in the field of consciousness studies:

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### Chapter 9 : Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame) | Paul Crowther - calendrierdelascience.co

*A Cognitive Approach to Robot Self-Consciousness Figure 4: A pictorial representation of a scattering between two situations in the conceptual space.*

English translations[ edit ] In the English language, this work is known under three different titles. Although English publications about Schopenhauer played a role in the recognition[ who? Kemp, titled *The World as Will and Idea*, appeared already in 1818, [4] the first English translation of the expanded edition of this work under this title *The World as Will and Representation* appeared by E. Payne who also translated several other works of Schopenhauer as late as in [5] paperback editions in 1930. According to him, "Idea", "Representation", and "Presentation" are all acceptable renderings of the word *Vorstellung*, but it is the notion of a performance or a theatrical presentation that is key in his interpretation. The world that we perceive is a "presentation" of objects in the theatre of our own mind; the observers, the "subject", each craft the show with their own stage managers, stagehands, sets, lighting, code of dress, pay scale, etc. The other aspect of the world, the Will, or "thing in itself", which is not perceivable as a presentation, exists outside time, space, and causality. Aquila claims to make these distinctions as linguistically precise as possible. Schopenhauer demands that the introduction be read before the book itself, although it is not fully contained in this book but appeared earlier under the title *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. He also states in his introduction that the reader will be at his best prepared to understand his theories if he has lingered in the school of Plato or he is already familiar with Indian philosophy. Schopenhauer believed that Kant had ignored inner experience, as intuited through the will, which was the most important form of experience. Schopenhauer saw the human will as our one window to the world behind the representation; the Kantian thing-in-itself. He believed, therefore, that we could gain knowledge about the thing-in-itself, something Kant said was impossible, since the rest of the relationship between representation and thing-in-itself could be understood by analogy to the relationship between human will and human body. According to Schopenhauer, the entire world is the representation of a single Will, of which our individual wills are phenomena. Matter and causality were both seen as a union of time and space and thus being equal to each other. Schopenhauer frequently acknowledges drawing on Plato in the development of his theories and, particularly in the context of aesthetics, speaks of the Platonic forms as existing on an intermediate ontological level between the representation and the Will. This first volume consisted of four books    covering his epistemology, ontology, aesthetics and ethics, in order. Much later in his life, in 1851, Schopenhauer published a second edition in two volumes, the first a virtual reprint of the original, and the second a new work consisting of clarifications to and additional reflections on the first. His views had not changed substantially. His belated fame after stimulated renewed interest in his seminal work, and led to a third and final edition with more pages in 1859, one year before his death. In the preface to the latter, Schopenhauer noted: It is through the will that mankind finds all their suffering. Desire for more is what causes this suffering. He argues that only aesthetic pleasure creates momentary escape from the Will. Although the concept of desire may be influenced by Buddhist teachings, it should not be treated as direct reference since desire is not thought to be the fundamental nature of human beings in Buddhism. Kant believed that space, time, causation, and many other similar phenomena belonged properly to the form imposed on the world by the human mind in order to create the representation, and these factors were absent from the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer pointed out that anything outside of time and space could not be differentiated, so the thing-in-itself must be one and all things that exist, including human beings, must be part of this fundamental unity. Our inner-experience must be a manifestation of the noumenal realm and the will is the inner kernel of every being. All knowledge gained of objects is seen as self-referential, as we recognize the same will in other things as is inside us. *Ontology Book 2* [ edit ] In *Book 2*, electricity and gravity are described as fundamental forces of the will. Knowledge is something that was invented to serve the will and is present in both human and non-human animals. It is subordinate to the demands of the will for all animals and

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most humans. The fundamental nature of the universe and everything in it is seen as this will. Schopenhauer presents a pessimistic picture on which unfulfilled desires are painful, and pleasure is merely the sensation experienced at the instant one such pain is removed. However, most desires are never fulfilled, and those that are fulfilled are instantly replaced by more unfulfilled ones. Genius, according to Schopenhauer, is possessed by all people in varying degrees and consists of the capacity for aesthetic experience. An aesthetic experience occurs when an individual perceives an object and understands by it not the individual object itself, but the Platonic form of the object. The individual is then able to lose himself in the object of contemplation and, for a brief moment, escape the cycle of unfulfilled desire by becoming "the pure subject of will-less knowing". Those who have a high degree of genius can be taught to communicate these aesthetic experiences to others, and objects that communicate these experiences are works of art. Based on this theory, Schopenhauer viewed Dutch still-life as the best type of painting, because it was able to help viewers see beauty in ordinary, everyday objects. However, he sharply criticized depictions of nude women and prepared food, as these stimulate desire and thus hinder the viewer from the aesthetic experience and becoming "the pure subject of will-less knowing". Where other forms of art are imitations of things perceived in the world, music is a direct expression and articulation of the will. Ethics Book 4 [ edit ] Schopenhauer claims in this book to set forth a purely descriptive account of human ethical behavior, in which he identifies two types of behavior: According to Schopenhauer, the Will the great Will that is the thing-in-itself, not the individual wills of humans and animals, which are phenomena of the Will conflicts with itself through the egoism that every human and animal is endowed with. Compassion arises from a transcendence of this egoism the penetration of the illusory perception of individuality, so that one can empathise with the suffering of another and can serve as a clue to the possibility of going beyond desire and the will. Schopenhauer categorically denies the existence of the "freedom of the will" in the conventional sense, and only adumbrates how the will can be "released" or negated, but is not subject to change, and serves as the root of the chain of causal determinism. His praise for asceticism led him to think highly of Buddhism and Vedanta Hinduism, as well as some monastic orders and ascetic practices found in Catholicism. He expressed contempt for Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam, which he saw as optimistic, devoid of metaphysics and cruel to non-human animals. According to Schopenhauer, the deep truth of the matter is that in cases of the over-affirmation of the will "that is, cases where one individual exerts his will not only for its own fulfillment but for the improper domination of others" he is unaware that he is really identical with the person he is harming, so that the Will in fact constantly harms itself, and justice is done in the moment in which the crime is committed, since the same metaphysical individual is both the perpetrator and the victim. Schopenhauer discusses suicide at length, noting that it does not actually destroy the Will or any part of it in any substantial way, since death is merely the end of one particular phenomenon of the Will, which is subsequently rearranged. By asceticism, the ultimate denial of the will, one can slowly weaken the individual will in a way that is far more significant than violent suicide, which is, in fact, in some sense an affirmation of the will. According to Schopenhauer, denial of the will to live is the way to salvation from suffering. Volume 2[ edit ] The second volume consisted of several essays expanding topics covered in the first. Most important are his reflections on death and his theory on sexuality, which saw it as a manifestation of the whole will making sure that it will live on and depriving humans of their reason and sanity in their longing for their loved ones. Less successful is his theory of genetics: The contents of Volume II are as follows. Supplements to the First Book[ edit ] First Half: Exceptions were Goethe and Jean Paul. Goethe immediately started to read the magnum opus of Schopenhauer when it arrived and "read it with an eagerness as she [Otilie von Goethe] had never before seen in him. Schopenhauer would become the most influential philosopher in Germany until World War I. No philosopher had given so much importance to art: Lawrence and Samuel Beckett. Schopenhauer argued in favor of transformism by pointing to one of the most important and familiar evidences of the truth of the theory of descent, the homologies in the inner structure of all the vertebrates. Historiography, Analysis, Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. Payne Indian Hills, Colorado: Aquila in collaboration with David Carus New York: A New Look at

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