

Chapter 1 : The Punjab saga: towards political uncertainty – Imtiaz Gul

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Definition, Role and Criticism of Elitism are described below: Aristotle held that some persons are fit to rule while others are fit to be ruled over. Elite consists of those persons who come at the top because of their superior quality. Such chosen few generally exist in trade-Unions, bureaucracy, armed forces and almost everywhere. The Elite Theory consists of the idea that there are two groups: Elite theory assures that men may be equal in the eyes of God but they are not so in the eyes of man. According to the theorists, inequality is largely found in every state and society, thus making every one of them oligarchical in different degrees. Elites arise in every type of society and state because of the ancient traditions, wealth, physical might, economic status and ability. Rule of Elite differentiated from Aristocracy and Oligarchy: It is a minority, like an aristocracy but there is neither in the sense of self-preparation and selfishness which often is associated with the latter". In simpler words oligarchy and aristocracy are both distinct from the elite. Oligarchy is a government by the few privileged and the Aristocracy is a government by the few best but with the Elite there is no grandeur of aristocracy and no desire for self-perpetuation and selfishness as we found in Oligarchy. The Elite always works in the interest of those from whom it derives its power and authority but still it works against democracy because it believes in the rule of the few. Therefore Maurice Duverger holds the opinion that "government of the people and by the people must be replaced by another formula Government of people by an elite sprung from the people". Consequently, the theory of political elite stands on the principle of natural inequality and is opposed to the liberal democratic state. Role of the Elite: The role of the elite in the society is extremely important because it formulates the policies and takes the decisions. The elite give political education to the masses and they set certain model standards in the society. It is throughout the elites, writes Rajni Kothari, that-values of political development penetrate into society at various levels and by stages. The role of the writers, artists, social workers and scientists ever more important than the bureaucrats and politicians. They enlighten the people. Thus they preserve and promote the culture. No society without a governing elite can hope to transmit the culture it has inherited. Not only that the elite help the poor and remove their genuine grievances. In times of crisis the people look to the elite to show them the way. The elite theories which had been first advocated against Marxism have been put to searching questions and found lacking. Some of the points of criticism are: Elite cannot control the whole sphere of political activity: The advocates of elite theories wrongly believe that elite can control the whole sphere of political, social and economic activity. An elite may influence one field but it cannot influence all the fields. For example, Dahl holds that economically well-off section of society cannot find any place in the sphere of education. Wealth and political position cannot be proportionate: The supporters of the elite theory wrongly hold the belief that the wealthy persons may rise to political power and control the political structure. It is not necessary that the most powerful man of the state may be also wealthiest. Besides that it is also not certain that the wealthiest person may rise to political power. In communist countries the wealth has no role to play. Even in democratic countries like India, though the wealth has played a notable role in the elections, yet all the wealthy persons have not risen to power. Many big capitalists of India may exercise political influence upon the government directly or indirectly but they have not contested the election so far. Hence there is no proportionate relation between the two. Elites are more concerned about their personal interest than the interest of the whole community: Supporters of the elite theory wrongly lead us to believe that the elites look to the interests of the whole community. In fact they never look to the interests of the whole community. In fact they never look to the interest of entire society but confine themselves to their own interests. Decision-making does not lie solely in the hands of the elites: It is argued by prominent supporters of the elite theory that the decisions in the government are generally taken by the elites. When the government takes decisions, several factors influence it and not only the wishes of the elites. Ideas of elites never create values: The supporters of elite theory

believe that the ideas of the elites create value for the society but this is only one-sided picture. On the other hand the truth is that the elite give ideas in accordance with the values recognised by the masses because the elites can never force their values on society. Elites are not cohesive, conscious and conspiratorial: The main exponents of the elite theory hold that the elites are linked by ties of common interests and they are cohesive, conscious and conspiratorial but it is not so. Friedrich says that, "It is not the class that rules but the class from which the rulers and in whose interest they exercise power. Elites do not rule with their inherent ability: It has been held that the elites rule any country because of their inherent abilities but it is not so. Even if a small section of the people is alienated from the political system, then it may resort to protests and demonstrations which may paralyze the elite rule and the theory of the elites.

Chapter 2 : Essay on the pluralism and democracy in India

*Political elite and society in the Punjab [Nina Puri] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

Scholarship on the region has emphasized that Punjab dominated the political fabric of Pakistan and excluded other provinces and autonomous regions from economic resources and equal power-sharing arrangements. Kanwal elaborates this argument through an in-depth study of the constitutional provisions in Pakistan that allowed the centre to dominate the provinces. She also analyzes the role played by various ethnicities in administrative bodies – the legislature, the bureaucracy, and the military. During the colonial era, the act covered two main areas – provincial and federal. The provinces were empowered to deal with local issues while the British kept sufficient emergency and reserved powers to dismiss the ministries and bring the provincial administration under the direct sway of the British governor and his civil servants, if necessary. The top brass of the bureaucracy was British, while the Punjabi landed elite, who were loyal to the crown, received jobs in lower levels of administration. The domination of the centre over the provinces made the provincial government in Punjab aware that the way to secure maximum benefits was to adopt a pro-British stance and avoid any conflict with the colonial state. The privileged groups, the landed elites and the military recruits, collaborated with the British bureaucracy to protect their economic interests. In the post-colonial era, the Punjabi elites wanted to retain their privileged position in the federal structure of Pakistan. The second chapter elaborates on how the province of Punjab struggled to maximize its political and bureaucratic role from to Even the principle of parity suggested by the Basic Principle Committee in was rejected by Punjab, as they believed the smaller units of West Pakistan could align with East Pakistan to increase their political influence. Punjab lost its demographic share in political representation, while already playing a minimum role in the central bureaucracy, which was mostly dominated by the muhajir community. The crux of the chapter is that because Punjab was unable to influence policy decisions at the centre, it asserted its presence through the institution of the army, where Punjab had a considerable majority. After the new constitution of once again allowed the muhajir-dominated centre to curb provisional autonomy, the Punjabi military elite supported the imposition of martial rule in Pakistan under President Ayub. Contrary to the popular perception, Kanwal argues, the imposition of martial rule did not lead to Punjab playing an active political role in framing state policies. This step only provided the president of Pakistan with extra-constitutional powers, making the provinces, including Punjab, subject to his will. As such, the issues that mattered to Punjab, like adequate share in water resources, economic development, and the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, remained unresolved. The separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in , which allowed Punjab to emerge as a majority province with the largest share in food grains and gross domestic product GDP , is the main theme of the fourth chapter. In this phase, Punjab sought a hegemonic role in setting up a new constitution and a democratic government based on adult franchise. Kanwal argues that although Punjab had maximum representation in the national assembly, it still failed to secure its interest. This was largely due to the Interim Constitution of , which granted extra-constitutional powers to the president to suspend the fundamental rights of the citizens without the approval of the National Assembly. The last chapter focuses on military rule in Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq This not only widened the gulf between Punjab and other provinces but also alienated the masses. It shatters the popular perception of Punjabi dominance and highlights the class and ethnic differences within Pakistan that prevented Punjab from gaining any special privileges. Her work sheds new light on the complex relationship between the centre and the states in post-colonial South Asia that has provoked regional dissidence and conflicts in the region.

Chapter 3 : Jat people - Wikipedia

*DOWNLOAD POLITICAL ELITE AND SOCIETY IN THE PUNJAB political elite and society pdf In political and sociological theory, the elite (French *l'élite*, from Latin *eligere*) are a small group of powerful.*

Essay on the pluralism and democracy in India Shanti Advertisements: India is home to all the major religions of the world. But Hindus and Muslims divide the religious-cultural matrix in India. The competition for resources between the two communities, basically initiated by the elite-driven politics during the colonial days led to partition of the British colonial India into two separate states. One of them, Pakistan, later split on the basis of language. The Bengali speaking Muslims of the eastern Pakistan split to form Bangladesh. In India, in spite of the partition on the basis of religion, the elite ensured the introduction of secular, parliamentary democracy which has exhibited exemplary capacity for evolution and endurance. However, in the post-independence India, ironically the system of democratic governance, especially through the electoral method of selection of the ruling dispensation, has enabled political mobilisation on the basis of all possible group loyalties-caste, class, community, region, religion and language. This has deeply politicised the peripheral identities and groups and fragmented the polity. The primary reason for such fissiparous tendencies has been the functions of democracy and the shrinking capacity of the state to deliver. The root cause for the rise of militancy in Kashmir was the manipulation of the democratic process by the regional elite and the gross and injudicious oversight of such a phenomenon by the central administration. The same has been true often north-eastern states as well. The primary cause of disaffection in these states has been a perception that the people there have been discriminative against. The crisis of governance at the local level has thrown up a secessionist elite at the periphery. The introduction of the element of force into the whole framework of resistance has created more problems for the Indian state than it has resolved. This in turn has engendered the right wing and militant politics. The overwhelming assertion of the Hindu right wing in politics in recent years emerged as yet another indication of the nature of political transform, certain levels. This has compelled analysts to observe that hegemonic Hindu majoritarian political culture is in ascendance in India, which will seek to impose an artificial uniformity on the Hindus themselves. At the sometime, in spite of such assertion, the intra-religious divides have evolved into lasting political constituencies, the Yadavas, the Bhumihars, the Dalits or Bahujans. The left wing extremist constituency-Naxals, Maoist Communists or Peoples War Group, is slowly rising on the political horizon as yet another political class. This again traces its origin primarily to dysfunction of democracy and inability of the state to address the grievances of a underprivileged section of the population. India with its emphasis on unity in diversity indirectly emphasises on the cultural unity that acted as a unifying thread to tie together diverse cultural groups. But this cultural unity had an inevitable Hindu cultural or communal overtone. The image of Akhand Bharat unified India, spreading from the Himalayas in the north to Kanyakumari in the south was born out of a mythical romantic past which had definite Hindu reflexes. It is true that such unity was conceived purely from geo-cultural perspective by secular Congress leadership led by Jawharlal Nehru. But it is also a fact that the idiom that people employed to demonstrate such unity were drawn from Hindu Puranas and other religious tejas. The enthusiastic nationalistic historians of such a resurgent nation resorted to contrived throwbacks into history for attesting ancientness of such unity in order to portray it as natural and eternal. The enthusiasm to build such a nation had induced in the elite a reflexive urge to unite disparate groups. They adopted mostly an assimilative posture, where intra-communal differences were even glossed over. It was considered natural and perfectly just to expect them to shed their differentiating characteristics in favour of a centralised, hegemonic and construct. There was an absence of efforts at the level of the elite to accommodate diversity initially; they interpreted their nation building endeavours in hegemonic ways. But gradually, as democracy has matured, there are positive signs of the elite adopting an accommodationist posture. Thus one finds the progressive nationalist leadership accommodating linguistic diversity in no uncertain terms in the early years of independence. Even ethno-cultural and regional diversities have been accommodated progressively as has been seen in the cases of demands for Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh etc. However, such accommodative posture leaves out certain types of

diversities and it will take some more time for the Indian polity to take it to its logical end.

Chapter 4 : Political Elites: Definition, Role and Criticism of Elitism

If the theory of 'circulation of elite' refers to the process of movement in which individuals circulate between the elite and the non-elite, I would submit, on the basis of my own study of political elite, that this theory does not hold good in the context of InÅ-dian society.

The uncertainty is not because of a strident and increasingly assertive Nawaz Sharif alone. The alarming situation has in fact further eroded public faith in national institutions and the ruling elite. Our present lot of rulers has only reinforced the popular perception of the ruling elite. He took upon himself the onerous job of engineering the so called unification bloc within the PML-Q and thus stands out as the epitome of the grimy politics of Pakistan. Tahir Ali Javed, the son of Dr. Naimat Ali Javed, a former scientist in the Pakistani nuclear establishment, ran a clinic in Nebraska long before escaping indictment for medical malpractice involving as many as 82 patients who had contracted Hepatitis C. The origin of the epidemic was traced to his clinic, where the management, in order to save money, was using used syringes. It was only after instructions from the Supreme Court of Pakistan that a case was registered against him under Section A of the Pakistan Penal Code. Section A deals with offences which caused deliberate and malicious hurt to a citizen of Pakistan by insulting their religious beliefs. The aggrieved party was eventually coerced into an out-of-court settlement and the FIR was withdrawn. Now we have the same Tahir Ali Javed in action to help the Sharifs pave the way for early elections. This move will most likely embroil the country in another legal battle over the issue of defection and floor-crossing. Legal wizards such as S M Zafar argue that the issue has been accepted and settled in the 18th amendment, which accords primacy to the head of the party to decide the fate of those defecting or leaving the party or voting against it in cases of vote of confidence or the finance bill. If the Sharif brothers subvert this principle by embracing and defending the unification bloc, they will lose high moral ground on the issues of corruption and abuse of power. The contravention of fundamental principles the brothers have been insisting on time and again will further erode public trust in the ruling elite and raise questions as to what really prompted Nawaz Sharif to take such an extreme step especially when Ishaq Dar, a Sharif loyalist, had declared that they had made good progress on the point agenda placed before the PPP? Do the Sharif brothers want to create a Tunisia-like situation in Pakistan and rock the boat through street agitation, plunging this crisis-ridden country into another phase of political uncertainty and economic adversity? The only way to cause an impasse and paralyse the federal government is to resort to street agitation. This is likely to confront the Pakistan Army with another dilemma i.e. to intervene or to look on as law and order breaks down. It will be the real test of nerves for the army because its leadership seems quite reluctant to resort to direct intervention. The emerging situation is likely to bring more pressure on the judiciary as well as on the media; judiciary as the legal censure of last resort on shortcomings and weaknesses in governance and the media as a mirror to society in general. This is likely to create dejection and despondency in the people already reeling under the burden of inflation. Similarly the PML-N government in Punjab is also accused of bad governance and arbitrary use of power. One big question agitating concerned minds is how the government will push its finance bill in June. How soon will the Sharifs pull the trigger and force fresh elections. Both parties are threatening the government over popular issues such as the petroleum prices. But how will they eventually behave and whether they find any common cause with the PML-N remains to be seen. Please follow and like us: More from this author.

Chapter 5 : Political Elite: Concept, Orientations and Role in Social Change

recounting the pages of political history, Punjab also witnessed the materialization of an authoritative segment in polity and society. This section, armed with landed resources and later on education.

Bring fact-checked results to the top of your browser search. Government and society In the newly independent Pakistan consisted of two distinct parts: However, in , after the country had experienced more than two decades of turbulent politics, the eastern region seceded and established itself as the independent state of Bangladesh. In the aftermath of that event, Pakistan now reduced to the former West Pakistan faced a number of political and economic problems and uncertainties about its future. Several seemingly irreconcilable domestic conflicts have left their mark on the politics of Pakistan. The first of these occurred at the highest levels of leadership, involving the key political actors from the political parties, the higher bureaucracy , and the upper echelon of the armed forces notably the Pakistani army. Constitutions in Pakistan have been less about limiting the power of authority and more a legal justification for arbitrary action. The viceregalism of the colonial past has haunted Pakistan from its inception, and struggles for power are therefore more personal than constitutional. The result has been several military administrations 1969, 1971, 1988, and 1999 , which ruled Pakistan for roughly half of its history. A second conflict has taken place between regional groups. The regions that originally made up Pakistan had to be fitted into a design not of their own choosing. Even after that event, Pakistan has had difficulty reconciling rival claims. Punjab , being the largest and most significant province, has always been perceived as imposing its will on the others, and even attempts at establishing quotas for governmental and nongovernmental opportunities and resources have not satisfied the discontented. The demands for an independent Sindh for the Sindhis and a Pakhtunistan for the Pathans, and the violently rebellious circumstances in Balochistan in the 1950s and since 1973 , illustrate the nature and depth of the problem of national integration. Because these various struggles have been directed against centralized authority, they have merged with the democratic struggle. But their express aims have been to secure greater regional representation in the bureaucratic and military establishment, especially in the higher echelons, and to achieve effective decentralization of powers within the federal system by emphasizing regional autonomy. A third conflict sprang from the struggle over economic resources and development funds among the more-deprived regions and strata of the population. This resulted in a number of violent confrontations between the less-privileged segments of society and the state. Some of these confrontations, such as those in 1953 and 1958 , led to the fall of constitutional government and the imposition of martial law. One manifestation of this conflict was the struggle that broke out between Punjab provincial leaders and federal authorities in the late 1950s. Under the Islamic Democratic Alliance , the Punjab government continued to back the interests of the landed aristocracy, while the national government headed by Benazir Bhutto , with a more liberal bent and a wider base of support espoused the economic and social interests of urban groups and non-propertied classes. The two governments often clashed in the late 1980s, creating serious economic management problems. Issues regarding power sharing between the federal and provincial governments were largely ignored during the period of military rule in 1999. However, in the 21st century the success of any government in Pakistan civilian or military appeared to rest on the handling of what might be considered a fifth area of major conflict. Since the country has been confronted by a campaign of ceaseless terror , generally but not exclusively cast in religious terms, that has been mounted by religious forces opposed to secular modernism in all its forms. Government has always been mindful of the need to placate the religiously motivated populace, but finding a balance between those envisioning Pakistan as a theocratic state and those determined to pursue a liberal, progressive agenda has proved to be the most significant test. A climate of virtually irreconcilable forces has emerged, much of it manifested by external militant Islamic elements led by the al-Qaeda organization and a revived Afghan Taliban. Constitutional framework The task of framing a constitution was entrusted in 1973 to a Constituent Assembly that was also to function as the interim legislature under the Government of India Act 1952 , which was to be the interim constitution. It followed the form of the act, allowing the president far-reaching powers to suspend federal and provincial parliamentary government

emphasizing the viceregal tradition of British India. A major factor in the political crisis of 1971 was abandonment of the parity formula and adoption of representation by population, giving East Pakistan an absolute majority in the National Assembly. In the constitution was abrogated, and martial law was instituted. A new constitution, promulgated in 1973, provided for the election of the president and national and provincial assemblies by something similar to an electoral college, composed of members of local councils. Although a federal form of government was retained, the assemblies had little power, which was, in effect, centralized through the authority of governors acting under the president. In March a Provisional Constitutional Order was promulgated, providing a framework for government under martial law. Four years later a process was initiated for reinstating the constitution of 1973. By October a newly elected National Assembly had amended the constitution, giving extraordinary powers to the president, including the authority to appoint any member of the National Assembly as prime minister. With the end of military rule in 1985 and following elections to the National Assembly held in November of that year, the new president used those powers to appoint a prime minister to form a civilian government under the amended constitution. In the prime minister pushed through two significant changes to the constitution. In a military government again came to power, and the constitution was suspended. The chief executive of that government initially ruled by decree and was made president in 1993. In the constitution was reinstated following a national referendum, though it included provisions under the name Legal Framework order [LFO] that restored presidential powers removed in 1985; most provisions of the LFO were formally incorporated into the constitution in 1995. The amended constitution provides for a president as head of state and a prime minister as head of government; both must be Muslims. According to the constitution, the president is elected for a term of five years by the National Assembly, the Senate, and the four provincial assemblies. The prime minister is elected by the National Assembly. The president acts on the advice of the prime minister. Universal adult suffrage is practiced. The National Assembly has 343 members, each of whom serves a five-year term. Of these, 233 seats are filled by direct popular election; 100 are for Muslim candidates, and 10 are for non-Muslims. Of the remaining seats, 60 are reserved for women, who are chosen by the major parties; in the assembly elected its first female speaker. The Senate has 100 members, each serving a six-year term. A portion of the senators are chosen by the provincial assemblies; others are appointed. One-third of the senators relinquish their seats every two years. These units are run by a hierarchy of administrators, such as the divisional commissioner, the deputy commissioner at the district level, and the subdivisional magistrate, subdivisional officer, or tehsildar at the tehsil level. The key level is that of the district, where the deputy commissioner, although in charge of all branches of government, shares power with the elected chairman of the district council. During the period of British rule, the deputy commissioner was both the symbol and embodiment of the central government in remote locations. Those multiple roles have varied little since independence, but increasing emphasis has been placed on self-help programs for the rural populace. In addition to the provinces, Pakistan has the Federally Administered Tribal Areas seven agencies along the Afghan border, adjacent to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which ostensibly are overseen by agents responsible to the federal government; the Islamabad Capital Territory; and a number of tribal areas that are administered by the provincial governments. The areas of Kashmir under Pakistani control are administered directly by the central government. Justice Under the constitution there is a formal division between the judiciary and the executive branches of government. The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the provincial high courts, and under their jurisdiction and supervision district courts that hear civil cases and sessions courts that hear criminal cases. There is also a magistracy that deals with cases brought by the police. The district magistrate who, as deputy commissioner, also controls the police hears appeals from magistrates under him; appeals may go from him to the sessions judge. The Supreme Court is a court of record. It has original, appellate, and advisory jurisdictions and is the highest court in the land. At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited legal codes and acts that have remained in force, subject to amendment. The independence of the judiciary has been tested at times, most notably in 1999, when Pres. Pervez Musharraf replaced the chief justice and several other Supreme Court justices who challenged his constitutional legitimacy. The judicial system also has a religious dimension; a reorientation to Islamic tenets and values was designed to make legal redress inexpensive and accessible to all persons. Political process The role of Islam in the political and cultural unification of Pakistan

has been controversial. Opposing factions have argued that the insistence on Islamic ideology, in opposition to regional demands expressed in secular and cultural idiom, has alienated regional groups and eroded national unity. Following the disruption of the ensuing war, which produced the independent country of Bangladesh from East Pakistan, Bhutto was called to form a government in 1973. In 1973, after the nine-year period of military rule, the party joined in a civilian coalition government. The Muslim League, formed in 1947 in what is now Bangladesh, had spearheaded the Pakistan independence movement under Mohammed Ali Jinnah. However, by the time of the military coup in 1973 it had endured many setbacks and much fragmentation, and in 1973 it splintered into two parts, the Conventionist Pakistan Muslim League and the Council Muslim League. Since then, Muslim League factions have been associated with powerful personalities.

The military consists of an army, the largest of the uniformed services, air force, and navy, as well as various paramilitary forces. Each of the services is headed by a chief of staff, and the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff is the senior officer of the military hierarchy. The Pakistani military is one of the largest and best-trained in the world. Troops serve on a voluntary basis, and there is seldom a shortage of manpower. Military life in Pakistan is viewed as prestigious, and soldiers both active and retired can expect numerous perks and benefits from service. The army is extremely well supplied, having devoted much of its considerable resources to the domestic production of weapons. The army has several thousand main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces both towed and self-propelled. The army also fields multiple-launch rocket systems and several short-range missile systems. The naval fleet consists of a variety of relatively small surface crafts: destroyers, frigates, missile craft, and patrol boats, as well as a small submarine fleet and an air arm. The air force flies several squadrons of high-performance fighter and ground-attack aircraft and a number of support and cargo planes. The country has developed its own main battle tanks and surface naval craft—generally on designs contracted from foreign corporations—and has fielded its own missile systems, several of which appear capable of delivering unconventional payloads. Pakistan announced its status as a country with nuclear weapons by detonating several devices in 1998. The nuclear-weapons program has always been the special preserve of the Pakistani army, although its scientists and technicians are drawn primarily from civilian life. Internal security is provided by a variety of local and provincial police departments, as well as by paramilitary forces such as the Pakistan Rangers, whose task is largely to provide border security. A number of paramilitary groups, such as the fabled Khyber Rifles, are officially part of the army but frequently engage in security work, such as combating terrorists.

Health and welfare Although Pakistan has made progress in improving health conditions, a large part of the population does not receive modern medical care. There are insufficient numbers of doctors and nurses, especially in rural areas. Sanitation facilities are also inadequate; only a small percentage of the population has access to safe drinking water and sanitary sewage disposal facilities. Malaria, tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases, and intestinal diseases are among the leading causes of death. Drug addiction is an increasingly serious problem; although drug use is reported most commonly among urban literate males, many others for whom documentation is more difficult to compile are also abusers. Pakistan was among the first developing countries to establish a state-funded family planning program, which began in the early 1960s. The program ran into political difficulties in the late 1970s as a result of opposition by Islamic groups. The development of a number of nongovernmental organizations in the country and the increasing use of private religious endowments to assist the needy have been increasing. Those efforts have been most notable in the fields of education and basic health care.

Etiquette is all in Punjab Club as political intrigues reach crescendo This is where the cream of the country's elite exchange high-society gossip over single malt and cigars in the.

Wright Mills wrote of the "elite" in his book *The Power Elite* as "those political, economic, and military circles, which as an intricate set of overlapping small but dominant groups share decisions having at least national consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them". These memberships in turn pave the way to the prominent social clubs located in all major cities and serving as sites for important business contacts". Mills contended that since the end of World War II, corporate leaders had become more prominent in the political process, with a decline in central decision-making for professional politicians. Most prominent corporate leaders and politicians were strong proponents of military spending. According to Mills, in the s when the military emphasis was pronounced, it was corporate leaders working with prominent military officers who dominated the development of policies. These two groups tended to be mutually supportive. According to Mills, the power elite rose from "the managerial reorganization of the propertied classes into the more or less unified stratum of the corporate rich". Instead, class rule is manifested through the activities of a wide variety of organizations and institutions Leaders within the upper class join with high-level employees in the organizations they control to make up what will be called the power elite". Wright Mills to describe a relatively small, loosely connected group of individuals who dominate American policy making. This group includes bureaucratic, corporate, intellectual, military, media, and government elites who control the principal institutions in the United States and whose opinions and actions influence the decisions of the policymakers. Bush in office identified 7, institutional positions of power encompassing 5, individuals. Age Corporate leaders aged about 60; heads of foundations, law, education, and civic organizations aged around 62; government employees aged about In the economic denomination, as of October [update], only 32 6. Social clubs Most holders of top positions in the power elite possess exclusive membership to one or more social clubs. About a third belong to a small number of especially prestigious clubs in major cities like London, New York City, Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D. Sociologist Christopher Doob gives a hypothetical alternative, stating that these elite individuals would consider themselves the overseers of the national economy. Also appreciating that it is not only a moral, but a practical necessity to focus beyond their group interests. Doing so would hopefully alleviate various destructive conditions affecting large numbers of less affluent citizens. They therefore, have a wide range of knowledge and interests in many influential organizations, and are, as Mills describes, "professional go-betweens of economic, political, and military affairs". Sociologist Manuel Castells writes in *The Rise of the Network Society* that contemporary globalization does not mean that "everything in the global economy is global".

Chapter 7 : Elite - Wikipedia

First, the numbers in parliament that Punjab holds and which determine the fortunes of political parties and their leaders. Since Punjab is the centre of power, it will be the primary arena of.

Concept, Orientations and Role in Social Change! Concept of Political Elite: Who are the elite? Elite are the most influential and prestigious stratum in a society. The members of an elite group have important influence in shaping the values and attitudes held by their segment of society. Lastly, elite is a relative term. If we were to operationalise this term, we could say, political elite include those: This change can be analysed by classifying the political elite in five phases: Vajpayee March to April Who were the elite in the first phase? These elite were those who had a stable economic background though politics was not their profession for earning their livelihood, were highly educated, mostly belonged to the upper castes, and were committed to societal interests. Their socio-political ideology was based on nationalism, liberalism and religio-cultural reforms. They wanted rewards in the form of a political office for participating in the national struggle for independence. These elite were not as highly politicized as their older counterparts. They thought that since they could trust the integrity of old professional politicians, they need not concern themselves quite so directly with politics. There was thus toleration on the part of the new and accommodation on the part of the old elite. They believed more in using the ties of kinship, caste and language to smoothen the way through the corridors of power. They posed as democrats; even their slogans were democratic but their actions belied their utterances. Ideologically, there were four types of elite functioning in , , and phases: The second and the third types had two sub-variations: Since these elite with different ideologies functioned within the party, the variation in their ideologies led to segmentation of the party which affected the functioning of both the party and its elite at various levels. Even the BJP-led government of A. Vajpayee which came in power in March proved unstable because of constant threats from 3 or 4 of its constituent parties. Their political affiliations are guided more by their particularistic loyalty rather than by their ideology commitment. Barring a few activist elite, most of the present elite do not believe in militating against the status quo. As such, the task of social engineering becomes far more difficult for those few activist revolutionary elite who are really committed to modernisation and believe in economic radicalism, political democratisation and social growth. Referring to changing eliteship in India, Yogendra Singh has averred: All of them came from upper castes and had an urban, middle-class background of English education. The top group was exposed to foreign culture and was educated there; hence their self-image in terms of expected roles was also that of a generalist rather than a specialist. Following independence, this pattern of elite composition has considerably changed. And what was stated by Yogendra Singh 25 years ago is true even today. Typology of Political Elite: We can term these four types as indifferent, manipulative, progressive, and rationalist elite respectively. In this classification, though both the progressive and the rationalist elite work for public interest, the former believe that the course of progress moves on automatically regardless of the interference of men and is not subject to human control while the latter believe that progress rests upon conscious control. Circulation of Political Elite: Once these elite rise from state or district level, they never go back to the old level but continue to function at the higher political level as long as they remain active in politics. This, however, does not mean that they cease to take interest in politics at the level from which they have moved up in the hierarchy. This means, there is no circulation but only an upward movement of the elite. My study of political elite revealed two types of movements not circulations: This elite mobility may be explained in terms of: Schumpeter also believed that both the individual qualities and the social factors are important in the circulation of elite. We have to use different approach for analysing the recruitment and the changing structure of elite in India. Political Elite, Social Change and Modernisation: The former seek to reconstruct society by attempting to mobilise and tap available resources and political energies. The political party or governmental apparatus serves for them as the central instrument for modernisation. They create new institutions or change old institutions to remove obstacles to economic and social growth. They believe in compromise among competing political and interest groups. The elite of this system are characterised by multiple loyalties, tactical flexibility, acceptance of

compromise and ideological diffuseness. Thus, power elite in the maintenance system have a much more limited scope of action, and a wider variety of constraints operates on their development policies. In the Leninist variant of Marxism, they have failed to convert the masses from automatically separated inchoate individuals into conscious and disciplined agents of total social change. We in this country can understand this better if we could know first the goals we had set for ourselves in economic, social and political fields after independence and then find out the extent to which our political elite have attempted to achieve these goals and ideals. Our goals in the economic field are: But have we achieved these goals? Nobody would deny that we have made progress in different fields. But this also is a fact that if our country has as yet reached only its half-way point, it is because our political elite have proved to be a barrier in the process of modernisation of our society in several ways. Can an average Indian be a beneficiary of programmes and policies which are motivated by monopoly-dominated and by powerful pressure per capita consumer expenditure of a few rupees a day? Words and promises can never raise the standards of living of an impoverished people. It should not be a snowballing of public opinion. Campaigns should not be based on advertising gimmicks. The elite are not selling any commodity; they are trying to sell people pipe dreams about their whole life. This requires a different kind of insight. Barriers for Political Elite: There are some oligarchic activist elite who do possess this insight and who are committed to development, but they too have not been able to do much in our country because of several problems they face in their functioning. The main problems they face are: When it becomes difficult to find a solvent to dissolve political and ideological divergences, some members either become apolitical or start encouraging centrifugal forces in the country or in the state or quit the party and join some other party which may offer them some public office. We could say that the ideologically-oriented elite occupy the political left and right while the office-seeking elite pre-empt the centre. The upper-stratum elite accuse lower-stratum elite of casteism, regionalism, linguistic divisions and communalism while the lower-rung elite blame the ruling elite for parochialism, corruption and slow progress of the country. Dahrendorf has also maintained that mutual suspicion and differential distribution of authority invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflicts. The oligarchic elite and the subjacent elite do not find a common set of goals. The subjacent elite are also unable to articulate their desire for economic improvement and social development or for getting higher offices, much less to organise themselves to obtain them. As long as the subjacent elite remain inarticulate and thus incapable of holding the oligarchic elite responsible for their suppression, both the big as well as small political cultural groups will continue to be dominated by the oligarchic elite and they will continue to deny political legitimacy to the leaders of the lower rung as well as to the new entrants. To understand modernisation at a macrocosmic level in India, we have to assess the pattern of economic, social and political development at microcosmic level in its constituent states, and have also to examine the relations between the elite functioning at two different levels, viz. The higher the monopolies at the higher political cultural base, the lesser are the elite to participate in public welfare issues at lower political cultural base. This is because the greater monopoly of elite at the national level discourages the oligarchic elite at the state level in expressing their views freely and frankly. The underlying assumption here is that the active oligarchic elite at the state level are likely to be those who aspire to play a significant role not only in the state political culture but also in the larger national political culture. As such, criticism of the oligarchic elite at the national level decreases among the oligarchic political activists at the state level since they are aware of the fact that compliance with the norms of monopolists at the centre has greater relevance to the political roles they hope to play at the country level. This tendency of the activists creates discontent among the non-activists because of which they refuse to cooperate with the activist elite in the state. As an illustration, we can cite one case. I would say that the elite—the politicians, the intellectuals, the bureaucrats and even the elite in the judiciary—instead of exposing the megalomaniac leaders and the monstrous coercion, corruption and unscrupulousness to the public—became victims of their own prejudice and subconsciously saw in one individual leader the protector of its narrow class interests. During 19 months, the elite cheered like a mob and abdicated its responsibility of giving sober counsel to the government and to the nation. How is it that the decisions of the emergency passed muster with all types of political decision-makers in parliament? Are we to understand that when laws were passed in Parliament in conditions so blatantly

malafide, the activist political elite had no remedy? These are questions that the political elite had best ask of themselves. The point that is being made is that the activist political elite in power fail to perform their roles in a crisis of vast dimensions and delivery in the interests of the society. I would as well maintain that even after the historic national and state elections of November and again in May and February , though the new political elite got an opportunity to exercise their judgement, yet, unfortunately, they wasted this opportunity. We can now reiterate what was said earlier:

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Punjab as presented in Punjabi literature during mid 18 th and mid 19 th centuries. It is a It is a pioneering work on the subject based on secular Punjabi literature.