

Chapter 1 : The War of Ideologies in the Arab World

*Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation (Cambridge Middle East Studies) [Michaëlle L. Browers] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Arab nationalism and Islamism have been the two most potent ideological forces in the Arab region across the twentieth century.*

German Now a similar mistake is being made by U. Clerics on satellite channels who directly incite terrorist acts must be should be held responsible as criminals. Terrorism cannot be defeated only by killing extremist leaders and holding premature elections. Radical Islamist ideology must be analyzed and challenged. If one were to ask an Arab what has happened to the Arab countries, and why the terrorism and extremism we see today did not exist in the s and s, the answer would probably point to the frustrations and struggles of dual identities: Arab nationalism and Islamism. After the collapse of Arab nationalism, Islamist movements and ideologies emerged to fill the void. The two developments that exposed the dangerous turn to extremism the Islamist movements had taken were the attacks of September 11, and the recent Arab uprisings, called the "Arab Spring. Concepts such as that of a "new Middle East" and support for democracies rather than tyrants became prominent rhetorically. But do leaders in the West realize how rivalries and distrust persist among Muslims, between Muslims, and against other, non-Muslim minorities? Do the values of a moderate and pluralist Islam exist today or have they disappeared completely? If they exist, how can the West support such examples of moderate Islam? Suspicion among Muslims and toward non-Muslim minorities has a long history, but has become aggravated especially now. Sunnis do not trust Shias and Islamists are suspicious of liberals, and tension is mutual, as each group reacts to the other. Many who do not belong to Islamist parties and who represent minority groups in Egypt and Tunisia are terrified of the Muslim Brotherhood and their more extreme counterparts, the so-called "Salafis" imitators of the Saudi Wahhabis. An Islamist state could not be expected to guarantee liberty for everyone. Shias, for their part, are anxious about the power of political Sunnism and its impact on them. Extremist and terrorist ideological networks are present throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The recent terrorist attack on Algeria, in which foreign hostages from Japan, Philippines, Romania, Britain and the United States were killed, is connected to the terrorist invasion of nearby northern Mali. Absence of security, arms smuggling from a collapsed Libya, and rising instability are aggravated, not resolved, by Islamists in power around the region. The horrible situation in Syria, with continued fighting between the regime and armed groups, is a breeding ground for terrorism. Lack of security and stability have spread in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon no less than Tunisia and Egypt. This shift to extremism in the Arab world did not happen overnight. After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire beginning in the nineteenth century, Pan-Arabism came forward with a vision of resistance to outside rule through a "new" social order, conceived along Islamic lines. Some Egyptian and the Syrian representatives of Pan-Arab nationalism believed in an authoritarian state that would unify the heterogeneous Arabs into a single nation and creed. Aflaq, a Christian, said that Islam could not be dissociated from an Arab nationalist identity, but that the state must be separate from religious institutions. As cited by Kanan Makiya in his book Republic of Fear, Aflaq wrote, "We wish that a full awakening of Arab Christians takes place, so that they can see in Islam a nationalist education for themselves. But enthusiasm for this identity did not liberate the Arab nation from foreign hegemony; nor did it generate the freedom, development and democracy that the people and especially the youth desired. Arab leaders in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, as extreme ultranationalists, disregarded the principles of freedom and democracy. One of the main causes of the decline of nationalist ideology seems to have been the Arab defeat in the Egyptian-led war against Israel. The failure of, and disappointment in, nationalism allowed Islamists to gain new ground. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, Muslim thought was occupied by the critical, philosophical views of reformers such as the Iranian Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani , the Egyptians Muhammad Abduh and Ali Abderraziq as well as others who favoured adoption of Western cultural achievements while preserving Islamic belief. The advocates of that version of reform called themselves "Salafis," or imitators of the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of his companions and successors. They resisted the weight of Islamic law on Arab society â€” a

burden much lighter in the Ottoman, Persian, and Indian Muslim empires” and questioned the spiritual tradition of Sufism. But they did not try to expel their opponents from the body of Muslim believers or advocate armed attacks on the West. These 19th century "Salafis" were superseded, in the consciousness of many discontented Arabs, by the ultrafundamentalist Wahhabis from the Arabian Peninsula, who later usurped the term "Salafi;" and then by Hassan al-Banna , the Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mohammed Arkoun , an Algerian scholar of Islamic studies, wrote in his Arabic-language *Toward a Comparative History of Monotheistic Religions* that this happened for two reasons. First, intellectual capital was absent from Arab world centers such as Baghdad or Cairo; second, an indigenous Arab business class, that would presumably support critical attitudes, had disappeared. Then, after the victory of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in , and particularly following the increase in Saudi energy income, Wahhabi-inspired radical thinking enjoyed huge funding and support. He points out that once Nasser in Egypt and his Syrian allies, whose influence grew in Damascus in the s, began opposing the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood travelled to Saudi Arabia, where its members worked mostly in education and the media. The doctrines of violent, anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood figures, such as Sayyid Qutb , identified as the intellectual paragon of the movement, then reshaped the religious curriculum in Saudi schools and universities. However, while these textbooks were edited by Muslim Brotherhood members, who differ from the Wahhabis in favoring participation in electoral politics, they were formulated to serve the Wahhabi context. After the founding of "Al Islah" "Reform" , a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE in , the Brotherhood penetrated the education sector through formulation of curricula and control of student activities. Delegates from the Gulf states collect funds for the Brotherhood internationally. The Iranian Revolution in , even though it occurred in a non-Arab country, reinforced the appeal of Islamist ideology across the Middle East and North Africa. Khomeini made no secret of his wish to overthrow the Saudi authorities; Radio Tehran broadcast regular appeals to Saudi Shias to rise up against their oppressors. The Iranian regime pursues the same strategy today, revealed in its support for protests in Bahrain, especially on Al-Alam, an Arabic news channel broadcasting from Iran and owned by the state media corporation, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting IRIB. Greater rigidity was applied to all aspects of Saudi society, including media, education and women. As-Sahwah expanded into being more than a religious movement: Western politicians saw Wahhabi and South Asian jihadis as foot soldiers available to challenge Soviet power. S supported Pakistan-based jihadis against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without understanding that a failure to distinguish between the Islamic fighters would have consequences, made worse by the abandonment of Afghanistan by the West after the Russians were driven out. Now a similar mistake is being made by U. Elected leaders in Washington may believe the Muslim Brotherhood to be a moderate movement. Elections and democracy are not the same; and it is often insufficient to have elections without first developing well-established, functioning pillars of democracy, such as freedom of speech and the press, equal justice before the law, property rights, and critically-oriented education that encourages questioning. Previously operating in the background, the elected Muslim Brotherhood now dominates Egypt. In so violating democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates its need to dominate the state. A thirst for power and control is not a sign of moderation and compromise. Avoiding another September 11 will not be made possible by embracing Islamists or pursuing a truce: A better safeguard against extremism is the disentanglement of Islam from radical ideologies through the encouragement of enlightened, rational scholarship. This will come about with a transformation of school and university curricula, and the introduction of a humanities curriculum alongside studies of comparative religion and philosophy, in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt, where these topics are absent or restricted. Moreover, books by Ibn Taymiyyah , Sayyid Qutb and others, which reject pluralism and promote extremism, should be studied in context, alongside works by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Ali Abderraziq, and other, more modern and open-minded commentators. The Shias in Sunni-majority countries should also be given more equal opportunities and should have the right to study moderate Shia scholars such as the Iraqis Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr and Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei , who favor separation of clerical and state authority. This may help protect Arab Shias from exploitation by the Iranian regime. Clerics on satellite channels who directly incite terrorist acts should be held responsible as criminals, and those who promulgate

extremist views must be answered on the same or other platforms. Otherwise the fight against terrorism “ especially after the impending destruction of Sunni Syria ” will have no end. She can be reached at: The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute. Get Free Exclusive Gatestone Content:

Chapter 2 : Islamism: Political Ideology and Movement

Political Ideology in the Arab World Arab nationalism and Islamism have been the two most potent ideological forces in the Arab region across the twentieth century.

November 21, Author: The crises in the Arab world are as much about competing political ideologies as they are about resources, territorial ambition, tribalism and religion. Many in the west claim to speak against various Arab ideologies without actually knowing what they are speaking against. It is important not to deprive Arabs of their voice in the wider battle of ideologies that many other peoples have dealt with throughout history. Here is a list of important political ideologies in the Arab world. Aflaq himself was a Christian. In Syria things were if anything, more chaotic. Jadid increased the militancy of the movement and fully abandoned notions of Nasserism. Nasserism encourages a mixed economy of state-ownership of major industry and a regulated agricultural sector with local free enterprise. Nasser can in many ways lay claim to striking what would be the decisive blow against British Imperial power. This, however, was not to be. The republican Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qasim opposed such a union. Nasser had a final minor victory when his republican forces toppled the Saudi, Jordanian and western back Yemeni royalists in the North Yemen Civil War which began in 1962. For many Arabs, he represented the first and last best hope of a secular, modern, mixed economic Arab nationalist. Few figures as powerful as Nasser have emerged in the decades subsequent to his early death in 1970. Communist parties were once deeply influential forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Muammar Gaddafi was the most potent and original intellectual force in Arab politics since the death of Nasser. His Green Book outlined how repressed peoples could liberate themselves from colonialism and build a society that rejected the dogmas of both capitalism and communism. The Green book is deeply communitarian in its values and economic organisation. Initially, Gaddafi sought to unite the Arab world under the Third International Theory, but when Arabs of all political backgrounds proved to be increasingly intransigent, he focused on promulgating his theories in Africa where many post-colonial and under-developed countries were often receptive. Nelson Mandela was a staunch admirer of Gaddafi throughout his life. Third International Theory is part revolutionary, part socialist, part secular and part spiritual. It is a hybrid ideology that is unique to history. Whilst royalism generally only becomes ideological when it is forced to compete against another ideology, one can attempt to look for exceptions in the Arab world. Some monarchs like the Hashemites are seen as a stabilising force because of their blood-relation to the Prophet Muhammad. Other monarchies like Saudi Arabia are so deeply immoderate that they cannot be called anything but a force for evil. Islamic politics in the Middle East have become more prominent in the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century. The oldest such organisation is the Muslim Brotherhood which was founded in Egypt in 1912. Islamism in general, rejects many aspects of the modern world and is violently hostile to secularism. Recently, the extremist Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and Qatar have funded Islamist groups including and especially terrorist groups in otherwise secular Arab states. Europe generally has conservative, liberal and socialist parties. America has the Republicans and Democrats. The Arabs have their versions of ideologies which suit them, but internal squabbling has made progress difficult. If Islam fills this gap, the Arab world may not recover for generations.

Chapter 3 : Arab world - Wikipedia

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Granted that there is a multitude of ways in which the term is read and used, P. Vatikiotis in his book *Nasser and his Generation* [1] argues that Nasserism had the limited political connotation of a phenomenon of "personal charismatic leadership, not to a movement or ideology". To this end, Nasser frequently addressed masses on both radio and television as well as in huge rallies, with a "repeated hypnotic incantation of "imperialism" and "agents of imperialism", "reactionaries", "revenge", "dignity and self-respect", " Zionism " and " Arabism ". Crowds were galvanized to hysteria as Nasser excited them with hopes and aspirations of strong leadership and Arab unity. According to them, "Western social scientists in the s and s, perceived Nasserism as a modernization movement and Nasser as a modernizing leaderâ€Egypt was seen as a typical Third World country undergoing a process of decolonization and, under new revolutionary leadership, aspiring to national prosperity through modernization. Thus, Nasserism was perceived as an attempt to transform Egyptian traditional society through the modernization of its economy and society". Yet another insight into Nasserism is provided in *Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent* by Walid Khalidi, [3] who discusses it as not an ideological movement, rather an "attitude of mind" that is "eclectic, empirical, radical, and yet conservative". According to Walidi, Nasserism was able to attract support in the Arab world because it "transferred, if only partially, to the Arab world itself, the center of decisions concerning the future of that world". Khalidi asserts that this change inspired self-confidence in the Arab community, which was particularly welcome after the recent shock over the loss of Palestine. Though opposed ideologically to Western capitalism , Arab socialism also developed as a rejection of communism , which was seen as incompatible with Arab traditions and the religious underpinnings of Arab society. As a consequence, Nasserists from the s to the s sought to prevent the rise of communism in the Arab world and advocated harsh penalties for individuals and organizations identified as attempting to spread communism within the region. Nasserists espouse an end to Western interference in Arab affairs, developing world solidarity, international non-alignment, modernisation and industrialisation. Nasser himself was opposed vehemently to Western imperialism , sharing the commonly held Arab view that Zionism was an extension of European colonialism on Arab soil. The same was true for other revolutionary Arab governments, which although repressive of communism within Arab borders, entered into strong longstanding relationships with communist states outside the Arab world. Today[edit] Nasserism remains a political force throughout the Arab world, but in a markedly different manner than in its heyday. Whereas in the s and s Nasserism existed as a revolutionary and dynamic movement with definite political and social goals, by the s it had become a much less pronounced and distinct ideology. Today, many more Arabs are informed by Nasserism in a general sense than actually espouse its specific ideals and objectives. Nasserist movements were largely overshadowed by Islamic political organisations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. This was a part of an overall trend within Egypt and the Arab world of Arab nationalism being overshadowed, and even eclipsed by political Islam. However, as with all opposition parties in Egypt, their activities was severely limited by the Mubarak regime prior to the Egyptian revolution of Influence outside the Arab World[edit] Nasser and Che Guevara in Despite being a quintessentially Arab ideology, Nasserism influenced to a degree left-wing movements in other parts of the developing world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Under Nasser, the Egyptian government gave support both moral and material to Sub-Saharan liberation movements fighting European imperialism. Nelson Mandela , the former South African President and Leader of the African National Congress , remarked that this support was crucial in helping sustain the morale of such movements, including in South Africa. I told him that I was optimistic, because the ideas of Nasser are still alive. Nasser was one of the greatest people of Arab history. To say the least, I am a Nasserist, ever since I was a young soldier".

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The Arab world's disunity is partly due to disagreements over a suitable ideology or group of competing ideologies around which Arab political regimes and movements can be structured. Europe generally has conservative, liberal and socialist parties.

From Rabat to Riyadh, from one end of the Arab world to the other, this is a generation which is sceptical towards any ideology, including that of Islamism. An analysis by Volker Perthes The Arab uprising is revolutionary and has affected the whole region. But it has not yet come to an end, and it will be more difficult to complete than the overthrow of the system in Eastern Europe; it will be bloodier and it will take longer. So far, only three autocrats have actually been overthrown, but no state in the Arab world has been able to avoid entirely the pressure of this political movement. The process will have not have the same effects throughout the region, and the differences between the various Arab countries may well become even clearer than they are now, at least initially – even if the citizens of the various countries have doubtlessly come closer as a result of the process. The big task of building new, democratic political systems in the Middle East – or at least systems which are more representative, more responsible and better ruled – is sure to take a decade or even longer. And there are no guarantees. It would be a fair generalisation to say that the political and social situation in these states was marked by extremely poor government, with obvious abuses of human rights and human dignity, with corruption and increasing social inequality, and with discrimination against women and young people. And throughout the region, the countries are, or were, ruled by authoritarian, or at least undemocratic, political regimes. One might well say that this is not really the task of the West or of any other outside player, but Europe and the USA have always spoken of promoting democracy. And, indeed, that was an aim which, in many cases, was meant perfectly seriously. But democratisation is a term which has also suffered much abuse: There are some people who, with a certain degree of shamelessness, continue to do so, claiming, for example, that the American troops who brought about the fall of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein provided an impulse which led to the revolutions of Iraq sank into years of civil war, and the democratic institutions set up by the occupying powers are still not working particularly effectively. The Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, is not the only leader who has repeatedly pointed to the bloody chaos across the border in Iraq in order to make it clear to his citizens that they were better off under his authoritarian rule than under Western-exported democracy. What is more important is that, ever since and especially since , the US and the European states Russia and China, which never championed democratisation, played no role have been mainly looking for partners to support them in the "war against terror", and to help guarantee stability in the region. Arab governments may have been regularly told to implement political reforms and respect human rights, but the message which came across – in Cairo and Tunis, as well as in Riyadh, Rabat, Ramallah or Damascus – was a different one: Islamism or Chaos The rulers in the Arab world played along happily. There were many factors which contributed to the sudden movement in the fossilised political situation in the region which began at the start of Among them were technology, global economics, politics and aspects of the social structures: But perhaps the most important aspect which can explain the uprising is demography. The Arab revolt of is above all an uprising by the youth. The to year-olds, those born between and , make up more than 30 percent of the population across the Arab world. It comes as no surprise that it is members of this generation who have been the main actors in the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and the other Arab countries: This is above a result of the expansion of the education system which the Arab states have implemented over the past decades. But one effect of this has been that youth unemployment is higher in the Arab states than in other parts of the world. The youth rises up It is remarkable how far the to year-olds in the Arab world are a generation which has been characterised by common experiences. To oversimplify only a little: They experience an inequality of income which is growing, and they learn that politics is the business of elites and often it is truly a business to which they have no access, unless they belong to one of the families which are allied with those elites. They go into the internet daily, where they can read in Wikileaks how corrupt US diplomats think their rulers are. They often have their own experience of

the arbitrary way in which the police and the authorities use their power against the young, against rural people, workers or dissidents. If these common experiences have made this age-group into a "generation", the uprising in Tunisia and the revolts which followed have made them into a political generation, which sees itself as a player in the political events, and is seen as such by others. As a result, the demands made by the protest movements are much the same everywhere – although they are different from the slogans which one could hear in Europe in the angry protests of the 80s and 90s of the last century. With rare exceptions, we have not been hearing "Islam is the solution", or "Down with imperialism and Zionism". Unlike earlier revolts in Arab countries, these uprisings have been non-ideological, and, as the French Islam expert Olivier Roy puts it, "post-Islamist". They did not seem to need any of the ideologies which have traditionally been available in the Arab world, such as Islamism or Arab nationalism. Islam as a religion, not an ideology. Nowhere, even to the slightest extent, were the Arab uprisings of an Islamic revolution. It is sceptical towards any ideology, including that of Islamism. Many of its members are religious, but they see Islam as a religion, not as an ideology. Above all, this generation does not believe what the official propaganda put out by the authoritarian systems proclaims. And why should they? They have had their own experience of the cynicism of their parents and teachers and how they dealt with the public declarations of loyalty required by the government. Everyone knew that voting in presidential elections in countries like Syria, Egypt and Tunisia – elections which were described in the official media as "acts of homage" towards the incumbent – made no difference to the result. Governments and ruling parties called themselves "democratic", although they merely guaranteed the power of a small clique. Anti-corruption campaigns always failed to have any effect on those favoured by the regime. There was always talk of Arab solidarity and support for the Palestinians, even though the largest Arab state, Egypt, kept its border with the Gaza strip closed and thus supported the Israeli blockade. And the regimes always glorified their past achievements, even though they had no relevance to the life lived by the people. Nowhere, even to the slightest extent, were the Arab uprisings of an Islamic revolution. Even so, political Islam will play a role in the future. But even here, the variety on offer will increase. The opening of the political systems will also force political Islam to become more pluralist. That can already be seen in Egypt with the divisions and spin-offs of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members are no longer welded together by the pressure of persecution. Such a differentiation in the spectrum of political Islam is basically a healthy process which will divide the pragmatists and the reformers from the fundamentalists. Rejection of the terrorist Jihad One of the really good aspects of the Arab revolts and revolutions has been that they have also included a rejection of the ideology of violent, terrorist Jihad, as represented by Al Qaeda. The demands of the protesters for individual freedom and democracy are directly opposed to the ideology of Al Qaeda. It was a message which obviously met with little resonance. The power of the people, and their desire for change, is more attractive than terrorist violence. Translated from the German by Michael Lawton Editor:

Chapter 5 : Michaëlle L. Browsers: Political Ideology in the Arab World (PDF) - ebook download - english

This dissertation explores the structure of political attitudes on the political parties', as well as mass public levels in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. I present the dimensionality, nature and structuration of political ideologies in these countries.

Political Ideology and Movement Beginning with the invasion of Egypt by the armies of Napoleon in 1798, which began the modern involvement of the West in the Arab world, until the present, Arab-Islamic nationalism has assumed three successive, though somewhat overlapping, forms: Liberal nationalism as a political movement was epitomized by the statist, national-development regime of Muhammed Ali in Egypt, with its goal of overturning "Oriental feudalism," and its ultimately failed project of modernization, and capitalization. What is significant about these ideologies and political projects is that they were integrally linked to the process of capitalization which had spread from Europe to the Islamic world; that they were inseparable from the project of bourgeois revolution, anti-feudalism and national economic development, that was the hallmark of ascendant capitalism. That compromise demonstrated that the project of capitalization and industrialization in predominantly agrarian societies, like those of the Islamic world, would henceforth break with the liberalism of the Arab-Islamic nationalists of the ascendant phase of capitalism. The Arab nation, not the Muslim umma, provided the social base which these movements sought to mobilize in the interests of the statist-developmental model that they instantiated. It yielded neither national economic development, nor the elimination of Western imperialism from the Arab-Islamic world. Into the void created by the bankruptcy of Arab socialism there stepped a new political ideology and movement: While Khomeini sought to rally the Shia of the Arab world to his cause, the fact that the Shia were a minority, scorned and hated in the majority Sunni world of Islam, severely limited the success of Khomeini and the Iranians. New, Sunni, versions of Islamism, would prove more successful in mobilizing masses of Muslims in both the Arab world and in Central and South Asia: While Islamism appears to be an ideology and political movement that is adamantly opposed to modernity, and which seeks to reinvigorate traditional Islamic beliefs and institutions, it is very much the product of the destruction of the pre-capitalist Arab-Islamic world, and both as ideology and political project is irretrievably stamped with the imprint of modernity and capitalism. In this respect, Islamism has much in common with Nazism, with its ideological recourse to a pre-capitalist *Gemeinschaft*, and Aryan religion, even while it instantiated the most brutal realities of capitalism and imperialism in its social relations and political project. This integral connection between Islamism and capitalism can be seen in the two dimensions of Islamism as ideology and political project. Despite its appeals to Islamic tradition, Islamism constitutes a form of proto-state or state racism. Here, we are not speaking of racism in the ordinary language sense, where it is a matter of color blacks, whites, etc. The misogynistic vision of women as biologically inferior, integral to the ideology of the Taliban and al Qaeda and which has no basis in traditional Islam, the yellow badge that the Taliban regime imposed on the Hindu minority in Afghanistan, the reconceptualization of the umma on genetical-biological bases, as opposed to a community of belief, which is integral to the world view of bin Laden and Islamism, all attest to a racialization of Islam at the core of this ideology. The discourses of purification which characterize Islamism, are themselves the ante-chamber to ethnic cleansing and genocide. This state racism, and biologization of social relations, are features of one dimension of capitalist modernity, its dark side, epitomized by Auschwitz, Babi Yar, Dresden and Hiroshima, all the quintessential products of high capitalist civilization, and inseparable from it. The development of Islamism attests to the spread to the Arab-Islamic world of the same capitalist social relations and ideologies, albeit in historically and culturally specific forms, that have shaped the capitalist world in its phase of decadence. Despite its claim that its political project is simply to effect the withdrawal of the West from the soil of the "Muslim nation" now re-conceived biologically, and its subsequent purification, Islamism can only hope to achieve that goal futile though it is by attempting to compete with its Western enemy economically and militarily. Such a project means not the halt to the capitalization of the Islamic world, but its completion, its apotheosis, by Islamist regimes themselves. Thus the Khomeini regime in Iran, after the overthrow of the

Shah, has developed the oil industry, integrally linked to the global capitalist economy, and necessitating a brutal regime of exploitation of the proletariat, and developed industries and scientific institutes for the production of weapons of mass destruction to elevate it to the status of a major regional imperialist power. The Ayatollahs have taken the path of capitalist scientific, technological, economic and military development, which, despite their protests of Islamic purity, will complete the destruction of the traditional Islamic world of the Iranian past. The same imperatives are at work in the Sunni branch of Islamism represented by al-Qaeda -- though it is still only a proto-state. The question is not the probability of the success of this project probably minimal, but rather its inherently capitalist nature or class content. A nuclear capability an Islamic bomb, and control of oil, require the very capitalist technology, science, and social relations, against which the Islamists verbally rail, but which is inseparable from Islamism as a political movement and project. In analyzing Islamism as a political phenomenon it is necessary to focus on three distinct, but inter-related elements: The socio-economic conditions that provide the fertile soil within which such an ideology and political movement can take hold and win popular support; the social classes and strata that are the bearers of this ideology and the cadre and leadership of this movement; the class content of this socio-political phenomenon. The socio-economic conditions that breed Islamism are the impoverishment and desperation of masses of people uprooted from a pre-capitalist or village and artisanal existence by the development of capitalism, even as this latter is incapable of providing employment for a newly urbanized and rapidly growing population condemned to inhabit the shanty-towns around the sprawling capitalist metropoli -- a mass of people lacking the education without which a life of quasi-permanent unemployment and marginalization is all they have to look forward to. This is the outcome of the trajectory of capitalism in the Third World in general, and the Arab-Islamic world in particular, and it provides the socio-economic conditions for the spread of Islamism. The classes and strata that provide the cadre and leadership of Islamist movements are the petty-bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. While the popular support for Islamism comes from the very poor, the leadership and cadre of this movement is highly educated, a product of the secular world of medicine and engineering, for example. Yet the class provenance of the cadre or leadership of a political movement, does not determine its class content. That most crucial element for an analysis of Islamism, as we have argued above, is capitalist in its class nature; an expression or manifestation of capitalism in determinate historical and cultural conditions: Islamism is the violent and brutal reaction to that hegemony, one that portends mass death or brutal oppression for the populations of that world, an outcome that can only be averted by a class struggle to overthrow the very capitalist social relations that have generated it and of which Islamism is the current local manifestation.

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Chapter 7 : "An Overview of Competing Ideologies in the Arab World" GRNN

The War of Ideologies in the Arab World. by Najat AlSaied February 25, at am This shift to extremism in the Arab world did not happen overnight. a former professor of political.

Chapter 8 : Nasserism - Wikipedia

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Chapter 9 : An overview of competing ideologies in the Arab world

At a time when Islamic movements seem to set the tone for much of the political discourse in the Arab world, it is worth being reminded that many other ideologies have competed with political Islam in recent years. This finely crafted work is more than a history of ideas. The author centers the.