

**Chapter 1 : Political Violence in Sri Lanka**

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When new social groups vied for access to state power, the establishment used repressive and violent force against them. Introduction August 04, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian The last six decades have witnessed many violent conflicts<sup>1</sup> across the world; only a few of which have been successfully resolved<sup>2</sup>. The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka continues to cause death, destruction and devastation, particularly to those living in the north and the east. History tells a different story. Unless the root causes of the conflict are genuinely addressed, political violence will continue to grow. The neo-colonial establishment not only carried forward the policies and practices of the exclusively colonial, mono-cultural and unitary administration, which were not only incongruent with the culturally and linguistically diverse nature of its inhabitants, but also their socio-economic, political and cultural expectations. The post-colonial Sri Lankan state never considered it significant to protect the dignity and security of marginalised and disadvantaged social groups. Domestic issues were viewed and dealt with in a mindset of a conflict paradigm<sup>3</sup>. The indignity and insecurity caused by such attacks on the physical and psychological integrity of individuals and communities thus motivated them to take up arms. This paper looks at aspects of political violence in Sri Lanka such as its complexity, the radicalisation of youth, responses of the state and the left, current developments, and the need to view and deal with it on an interactionist paradigm, if an end to this destructive conflict is genuinely sought. Complexity of the conflict The roots of political violence in Sri Lanka can be traced back to its colonial days and reflect many national and global dimensions. The island is strategically located in the South Asian region in a geo-political, mercantile, and militaristic sense. Trans-national capital is competitively seeking investments, cheap labour, and natural resources to maximise their profits in this region. Therefore, political violence occurring in Sri Lanka Alexander cannot be viewed in isolation. However, this paper is not an in depth study of the global aspects of the conflict. Yet, this needs to be kept in mind when reading this paper. Simplification and manipulation of the conflict Conventional simplifications of political violence in Sri Lanka to class, economic, cultural, ethnic, casteist, or military aspects seem inaccurate, since class boundaries are mixed up with other social caveats. Such simplifications prevent recognition and understanding of the internecine power struggles and manipulations that keep certain groups in control. Some intervene to block any form of power sharing, while others reject any devolution in the hope of achieving separation. The youth insurrection in is labelled as Sinhala, Buddhist, low caste, low class, anti-Tamil, anti-Indian, or terrorist, while the ongoing Tamil youth insurrection is labelled Tamil, Hindu or Christian , low caste, low- class, anti-Sinhala, anti-Indian, or terrorist. Political violence cannot be properly understood without recognizing the complex internecine establishment politics in Sri Lanka. Existing social divisions such as nationality, language, religion, caste are manipulated to establish and maintain the political power of the ruling elite. Interpretation of history Current tensions between the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities can be traced back to the fact that Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities have their own positivist interpretations of their historical roots. A sizable majority of Sinhalese believe their race is of Aryan stock dating back to the fifth century BC. The Tamils including Malaiyaha Tamils<sup>4</sup>, are of Dravidian origin. Tamil incursions from South India trace back to the first century A. The identity of Malaiyaha Tamils is shaped by their social, economic, political and cultural lives centred primarily on plantations. The reality, however, was that the wars between Sinhalese and Tamil kings were launched mainly for expanding their feudal territories. Another interpretation points to the privileged positions provided to Tamils under colonial and neo-colonial administrations “ that political violence was the eventual outcome of the Tamils losing those privileged positions. Nevertheless, these are often excuses used to blunt further analysis of majoritarian power politics. Besides, such approaches unashamedly justify and unconditionally support a policy of subjugation of opposing groups as adopted by the current ruling elite. Basis of analysis Political violence is not unique to Sri Lanka. The causes of political violence have been broadly categorised as caused by national fragmentation, inequitable development, cultural

clashes and liberation movements Steinbach These causes do not exist in isolation, but interact simultaneously leading to political violence. It is significant to note that in the post Sri Lanka, any major organised political violence was absent until Post-colonial socio-economic and political developments brought about new social forces, but their expectations remained unfulfilled. In the south these revolutionary practices materialised in the form of class mobilisations. The attempts in the north and east, however, took the form of nationalist aspirations. These origins reflect the dual character of the youth movements that later came into being. The post political establishment concentrated mainly on short term tactical electoral gains by engaging in nepotism, family bandyism and class collaboration. Political leaderships of all ethnicities in Sri Lanka have opportunistically used ethnicity as a bandwagon to establish, preserve and enhance their political, economic and social power, or to distract the people from the domestic policy and program failures of the establishment. Nevertheless, many analysts portray ethnicity as the central theme of the current conflict<sup>7</sup>. Though ethnicity is used as a label in the current conflict; politics based on economic manipulations is the root cause. Ethnic diversity has always existed in the Sri Lankan society and will continue to do so. Good governance, therefore, means having a society free from violence and based on equity, participative democracy and pluralism. Viewing conflicts in social behaviour through a positivist paradigmatic model conflict paradigm will be different to viewing it using a constructivist paradigmatic model interactionist paradigm. One model will assist in understanding what policies and activities have assisted to bring conflicts to a close, while other policies and activities have made some conflicts protracted. We are independent and non-profit.

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April JVP uprising: Not to make the same mistakes April 2, , 6: Perhaps they received the wrong instructions about the date. Those days unlike today, the armed forces were so small and the police was the main bastion of the State. Capturing power in that fashion by capturing police stations however was impossible by any imagination. More pertinent question was what they would have done in case they had managed to capture power. April 5th was a Monday and when I went for my lectures in the morning not even half of the students were attending. All the prominent JVP activists were absent. The whole Campus appeared deserted. As I belonged to a breakaway group from the LSSP at that time and quite aware of the JVP activities, it was not a secret for us that the JVP might attack the government at any time but exact date was not known. It was on Radio Ceylon for the midday news that the Wellawaya attack was announced. There was a stern warning from the police not to get involved in any subversive activities. Whether it was merely a tactic to first support and then attack or whether they actually got disillusioned within a year is a question of speculation. It could be both. While unemployment, including graduate unemployment, was exceedingly high without a proper plan or solution after the election, the state repression also was high even curtailing any leftwing or youth activity in the country. Compared to the previous radical or violent political events in the country, the uprising and its suppression were extraordinarily ferocious on both sides and created a chain of violent political cycles of which Sri Lanka has not yet been in a position to recover. Although the major insurrectionary events lasted only for three weeks in April, it took nearly three more months to completely eradicate the rebellion outposts in the jungles and remote villages. The official death toll was 1, but unofficial figures reliably estimated it to be around , The insurrection by its very nature was to capture state power in fairly a democratic country at least at that time. It was not a spontaneous rebellion by the youth facing unemployment or any such hardships. It was a planned insurrection by the JVP, working as an underground insurrectionary party, of course affected by and utilizing various socio-economic issues. If not for those socio-economic grievances large numbers of youth would not have joined the movement. In addition, the JVP considered the unemployed rural youth and university students as its political support base or vanguard. This theory resonated some of the New Left ideas of Herbert Marcuse or Jean Paul Sartre who sought new vanguards for contemporary social revolutions. No serious attempts however were made to appeal to the other sections of the society. There was no serious trade union wing under the JVP unlike today. Insurrection During the insurrection, altogether over 70 police stations were attacked and 40 of them were either captured or forced to abandon for security reasons. After assessing the security situation, when the army moved in, the revolution however failed. The insurrection did not produce anything tangibly positive. It left only a legacy. It however created a culture of political violence that has been the bane of the country since then. The standardization of university admissions in could be considered a distorted outcome of the insurrection, which on the other hand created grievances on the part of the Tamil youth. The insurrection was solely by the Sinhala rural youth. Or are we mixing up all the leftwing terminology to interpret the political history of the country upside down? Judging by the facts that the JVP itself supported the UF to come to power at the elections, and launched the insurrection within a year, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the objective result of the insurrection was the strengthening of the opposition in the country whether it was rightwing or not. The JVP, the party that launched the insurrection did not draw its lessons for posterity. They made bigger mistake in Even there can be doubts whether they have drawn the correct lessons judging by the type of politics or activities that some of them have been involved in later. There was some temporary admiration of the bravery of those who were involved in the insurrection by local and international commentators. Some of the local admirers came from unexpected quarters like Ian Goonetilleke or Yohan Devananda. They could have done a better service to the society or for social change if they were not lured to violence in that instance. Interpretations There were a plethora of literature or theories

that attempted to understand and explain the event and its causes. The most popular theories were in the sphere of sociology or political sociology that in fact argued for valid socio-economic and other reasons which supposedly led the leaders to lead the insurrection or the supporters to join the rebellion. There were around 16, who were supposed to have followed the movement directly and indirectly. The population explosion, dysfunctional education, stagnation in the economy, rural poverty and more precisely the unemployment and graduate unemployment were highlighted as the salient socio-economic factors behind the uprising. All these undoubtedly were objectively verifiable factors that remained more or less on the same level or ferocity throughout the years of 70s or 80s. Why then the insurrection took place in April was the question. There were several political scientists who went slightly deeper into investigate the political circumstances of the insurrection and the ideology of the JVP, but soon conveniently fell back into the socio-economic explanations and more or less concluded that there had been something wrong in the society that led to the insurrection. There had always been something wrong with the existing society no doubt. The left parties in the country were in fact were formed even prior to independence to fight against these injustices or inequalities. But to wage war against a government that was elected with their own support on those grievances or injustices was completely a different matter. While in the case of the insurrection, the first possibility was undoubtedly prevalent to a great extent, the second strand of motivation also cannot be ruled out. This subjectivity of the JVP ideology has been abundantly clear thereafter in their second failed attempt of insurrection in 1987. The frustration-aggression theory and the theories based on the same premises have failed to understand that frustration or underlying socio-economic grievances themselves would not automatically lead to aggression or rebellion without intermediary factors such as leadership, ideology and organization. This is common to both leftwing and rightwing movements. It is the leaderships, organization and ideology that instigate violence. This is what I mean by subjective factors in this article. Violence is not inherent; it is basically constructed, cultivated and taught, either by the society or by political movements. In the case of the JVP, its mastermind Rohana Wijeweera was instrumental in bringing a particular kind of violent political ideology to this country. It was during his studies at the Lumumba University in Moscow that he acquired, in my view, a distorted version of Marxism and revolution, like what Pol Pot of Cambodia acquired in France. Wijeweera did not acquire his theories from the Russian revolutionary literature but from some contemporary pseudo-revolutionary theories popular among his contemporaries like Kassim Hanga of Zanzibar and Che Guevara of Indonesia. The broad spectrum of the theory argued that revolutions are possible in different ways. The workers and peasants are not necessary. What is needed is the cultivation of a committed cadre organization. Armed struggle and simultaneous uprising was the strategy. Undoubtedly, the prevailing economic and social grievances helped the JVP to convince 2, to 3, cadres to participate in the insurrection and over 10, youth and others to help them. The ideology of the JVP at that time was a combination of a type of socialism and an extreme form of nationalism. The main thrust of the ideology was the justification of violence under different pretexts and reasons. There were of course excesses on the part of the counter-insurgency operations but they were limited or mild compared to many other situations in the contemporary world or later events in Sri Lanka. There were no mass graves uncovered like in Matale today related to the insurrection. The suppression of the communist insurrection in Indonesia in 1965 was also a contrast. But it cannot be denied that both the insurrectionary and counter-insurrectionary measures since early 1970s finally led to the April insurrection. Some of the measures, however, such as the declaration of emergency and arrest of suspects for security reasons left no option but Wijeweera to call for the insurrection somewhat carelessly on the 5th night of April. He was in jail and kept in Jaffna by that time. One objective of the insurrection was to rescue him from Jaffna jail by paralyzing the country. The rape and murder of Kataragama beauty queen, Premawathie Manamperi, was a high point of army excesses. I myself lost two of my friends who were active in the teachers union but did not have any connections with the JVP. It was later revealed that they were killed to avenge a personal grudge by a police officer. Conclusion Violence it appears contagious. It is like a horrible epidemic. The insurrection changed the mindset of many people, alas negatively, both in the authority and those who almost naturally opposed it, on both sides of the ethnic divide. The reasons for the distinction are not easy to figure. The insurrection opened the flood gates. Sri Lanka never could become the same. Recurrent cycles of violence

were to follow after small interlude after in almost all spheres of political life from elections to ethnic relations and political party competition. This has been the unfortunate saga of Sri Lanka for which collective solutions needs to be sought by all political parties, religious organizations and civil society movements. The JVP hopefully could play a major role in this process through their experience. The JVP has played many positive feats lately for example in bringing the 17th Amendment. In the midst of a need for a regime change today, whatever the temptation or provocation, it should stick to nonviolent and peaceful methods as they have exhibited capable in the last decade or so. The power of the mind and ideas might prove to be more successful than the power of the muscle or the arms. It only requires more discipline and more determination. It is the same path that the remaining rebels in the North should follow in Sri Lankan politics. Much worse would be the use of strong arm tactics against one sector of the society i.

**Chapter 3 : “ JVP insurrection - Wikipedia**

*Political Violence in Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, ^ Furtado, Christina S. "Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia."*

However, on the issues of torture they are undoubtedly substantive studies and would guide any investigation even into the links between the two. There are many roots to politics of terror or terrorism as researched by other academics throughout the world. At the same time, many biographical data shows that the victims of political torture most often emerge as the perpetrators of political terror. It is the conviction or the premise of the present author, however, that when political terror appears in magnified form there is no other way for the society rather than defeating it nevertheless through legitimate means. The legitimate means does not approve torture or the violation of human rights or international humanitarian law. Freedom from torture is a fundamental human right. The studies on politics of terror and politics of torture so far have remained mutually exclusive two distinct terrains. They have hardly come together. The present article however tries to bring them together for the benefit of understanding both phenomena in an interlinked fashion for the sake of the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance. There are of course close theoretical links between the two. Any proper definition of either terror or torture cannot exclude the common element of violence or torment from our understanding of the two. If violence or torment is abhorrent in one it should be abhorrent in the other. In addition, there are cyclical relations between the two like cause and effect in a spiral fashion and when they are unleashed there is no easy end unless and until the cycle is broken. The basis for this argument is the case of Sri Lanka. On the part of the author it is not the theory that led him to the argument between the link and the way-out from the menace, but the life experience. Therefore, the main argument and the exploration of the link between the two is presented in a narrative form in this article as largely experienced or observed by the author associated with other evidence and arguments. It is primarily understood as a political phenomenon. Among many definitions, let me quote Charles Ruby on the subject. Code as politically motivated violence perpetrated in a clandestine manner against noncombatants. Experts on terrorism also include another aspect in the definition: Neither interrogation by itself, nor lightly inspired fear correctly pertains to this edict. Since, therefore, torture is to be understood as force and torment, these are the things that determines its meaning. Early Observations I recollect the incident of a young man in our neighbourhood of Koralewella who was brutally assaulted by the police at Moratuwa somewhere in early He was allegedly involved in a petty theft. He was sitting on a chair in front of their tiny wooden house for the people to see. One hand was hanging from a shoulder- strap and he was smoking a cigarette from the other. He was without a shirt wearing a sarong and there were obvious bruises all over his chest and body. There were crowds to see the victim and two left-leaders in the area addressed the gathering. It was after few months in August a popular general strike called Hartal or uprising erupted in the country against the price increase of the rice ration led by the trade unions and left parties. Among several incidents, a train carrying people for work in Colombo was stopped and the passengers were asked to go back home. The railway tracks were damaged. It was rumoured that the youth who was assaulted by the police that I mentioned took the lead in the incidents. In this early period of post-independence social conflicts in the country there were no efforts to channel victim-grievances of police brutality or others into cohesive movements of democratic resistance. The traditional left did raise the issues in Parliament where they were well represented but there were no human rights related civil society organizations or NGOs to agitate; neither there were possibilities of filing fundamental rights cases like today. The grievances appear to accumulate. Another sphere of this accumulation was related to the emerging ethnic conflict. When the Federal Party leaders protested against the Sinhala Only Act in front of the Parliament in June and when they were assaulted by thugs, even the Prime Minister ridiculed them without consideration even for their blood stained wounds. The assault appeared state sanctioned. The wounds were more psychological than physical. More horrendous incidents took place during the communal riots in most of which are objectively documented by Tarzie Vittachi. Independent observers were of the view that the incidents were well planned by the ruling party related groups with state sanction.

The purpose has been to silence a community in their protest against inequality. The suffering, the pain and agony have been deep seated with tremendous future consequences. Deteriorating Conditions The judiciary in Sri Lanka traditionally served as a direct check on the police and administrative actions of the executive in general. But the situation started deteriorating after the change of the constitution in which gave way for political interferences in the judiciary. Other compounding factors were the population growth, increasing unemployment, worsening economic conditions, escalating crime rate and unrest among the youth. The police was the main instrument of social control. The JVP worked primarily in the rural areas where police-civil relations had been particularly adversarial. While the police were anathema for the youth, the youth were anathema for the police. The antagonism was mutual. It was after a series of confrontations between the police and the JVP activists, since late that the April insurrection erupted. By the time the leader of the movement, Rohana Wijeweera, was under arrest in a Jaffna prison. One of the objectives of the insurrection was to rescue the leader from prison. The insurrection was waged more in desperation than of a careful plan to capture state power. Wijeweera have had a traumatised childhood his father being a victim of election violence in with police involvement. The farther was disabled. Wijeweera revealed that he was kept in a dark room without clothes for days when he was in custody in and only a Tamil inmate gave him a sarong to wear after noticing him. It was not by accident that the JVP attacked over hundred police stations and captured around 40 for few days or weeks as the main outcome of the insurrection. The police-JVP or youth antagonism was the main catalyst for the insurrection. I was witnessed to four bodies hanging on a Tamarind tree in front of the police station at Hasalaka when I was travelling with a friend to inquire about another friend in Mahiyangana. Apparently the tortured bodies were demonstrated to terrorise the people in the area to prevent them from the insurrectionary activities. Those were the early days of the insurrection. The story came to be revealed later through two sources. A female teacher revealed that the two were taken away from the bus that they were travelling in at Rikillagaskada junction on their way to collect the salary from the Kandy education office in late April. An errand-boy who was working at that time at the police station revealed later that the two were brought to the police station and Gunadasa was severely assaulted and as a result he died. To prevent an eye witness to the event, Lakshman was taken behind the police station and was shot, sending both bodies on the river downstream. It was a known fact that many slain bodies were floating in rivers during the insurrection.

**Chapter 4 : Political violence in Sri Lanka – Part One – Sri Lanka Guardian**

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Zimmerman in found that if the victims of state violence suffering from pogroms, brutal repression, and other forms of state coercion were added, the figure would be more than double this. The discussion herein is limited to socio-structural conditions of political violence, their impact on society and the ideological tendencies such an impact compelled the Sri Lankan youth into. The short nature of this paper does not allow me to discuss the relevant historical international contexts. Political violence – pre-colonial and colonial days Political violence in Sri Lanka can be traced back to feudalism, as manifested in regular invasions by South Indian rulers, wars to expand feudal territories, and assassinations for the transfer of royal power, and aggression and terror colonialists committed against indigenous people. De Zoysa and Fernando refer to 32 types of torture practised in ancient Sri Lanka. As taught in history lessons, these torture methods included being trampled by an elephant, being impaled on a pointed iron pole, or being torn apart by letting loose two tensioned trees onto which victims were tightly bound. Torture was perceived as a legitimate means of obtaining confessions from political prisoners for convicting, banishing or executing them. From the Kandyan Wars in , , , etc. The Uva-Wellassa Rebellion of , led by Keppetipola Disawe and others against the British rule, was the most serious political-military attempt of the Kandyans to regain their independence. The military tactics of the British included setting fire to and laying waste the property of the Headmen Mills, The Kandyans were starved into submission. Their land was confiscated. Their dependents were debarred from the fruits of their ancestral wealth. Being forced to live in the jungles and mountains, they had lost their means of livelihood. The rebellion had collapsed by the end of October The Rebellion was drowned in blood. In the s, under the Wastelands Ordinance, the British expropriated the common land of the peasantry reducing them to extreme poverty. Despite the tremendous pressure the colonial state was exerting, the dispossessed peasantry refused to abandon their traditional subsistence holdings and become wage-slaves. Tens of thousands of them died both on the journey and on the plantations. Economic depression in Britain had drastically affected the local coffee and cinnamon industry. To alleviate a crisis, the state imposed an oppressive direct tax regime which included a tax on labour. In , a mass movement grew against the new tax regime. In an attempt to capture Kandy from the British, they attacked government buildings and destroyed some tax records. The Governor declared martial law, and the British army shot many people dead. Puran Appu was captured and executed. Gongalegoda Banda was arrested while in hiding and was sentenced to death by hanging. Later this was commuted to lashes and being deported to Malaysia. For the first time, in the Kandyan provinces, the leadership of the rebellion passed into the hands of ordinary peasants de Silva, Post political violence Political violence has been broadly categorised as being caused by national fragmentation, inequitable development, cultural clashes and liberation movements Steinbach These causes do not exist in isolation, but usually interact simultaneously. Short-term but major political and armed conflicts manifested in the south in and then in In the Tamil-dominated north and east of the island, militant ethnic nationalist groups emerged in the early s demanding autonomy. The democratic traditions including institutionalized checks and balances that allowed the disadvantaged and non-majoritarian voices to be heard and to effectively claim their democratic and human rights have been gradually made weaker. While it is impossible to sympathise entirely with the violence and methods used by groups in order to counter those trends, non-violent resistance to such trends also do not seem to have worked. One could say that many things have worsened with expanded armed forces, intensified violence and destruction, with increasingly intense opposition of a few to the material interests of the many in society. Political threats transformed into deadly violence in a seemingly endless spiral, in and mainly in the south, and in to in the north. Despite the public exposure of violence and systematic human rights violations committed by the parties involved, a lack of judicial accountability has continued to perpetuate pervasive mistrust that undermined civil society. It has become necessary to focus on the legacy of state violence and its effects on society, in terms of justice, truth and reconciliation. Radicalisation of the

Youth The basis for political violence by young people, particularly in the south, is linked to the post-colonial socio-economic and political developments. The colonial rulers made privileges available to the English-educated locals belonging to all communities, while treating the rest as slave labour, thus providing a fertile breeding ground for local nationalisms. The growing influence of the left in the south and the Jaffna Youth Congress JYC [2] in the north temporarily delayed the emergence of these radicalisations along ethno-nationalistic and linguistic lines. The failure of the ruling elite in Sri Lanka to make appropriate socio-economic and political change alienated the majority of young people. In the south, these revolutionary practices materialised in the form of class mobilisations. The attempts in the north and east, however, took the form of nationalist aspirations. The universal franchise and the lowering of the voting age allowed young people to take part in active electoral politics. Free education was introduced in , and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages in , which expanded higher educational opportunities available to youth. The JVP militancy predominantly represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Sinhala Buddhist constituency Samaranayake The Tamil militancy represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Tamil constituency from both Hindu and Christian religious backgrounds. The JVP successfully mobilised the southern youth, but committed strategic and tactical errors. It was brutally suppressed twice, but was able to regroup and rejuvenate, changing its focus from class to nationalism. The political aim of the JVP was to replace the existing establishment with a fairer one. The first JVP insurrection in occurred predominantly in the South, because the economic and social changes they expected from the United Front government that they helped to elect in were not forthcoming. Since , the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment. The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of and the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact of created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Sri Lankan Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The differences between the early militant Tamil political groups in the island were based on their different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism [4] , yet the idea of achieving a separate state subsequently subsumed their commitment to socialism. Following the communal riots of July , the government rushed through legislation to exclude from the parliament, any party that refused to swear allegiance to the unitary state. This effectively disenfranchised Tamils in the north east and significantly weakened and isolated the democratic Tamil opposition. The Tamil militant movement was provided with a fertile ground for new recruitment. During the elections, many young Sri Lankan Tamils began to engage in extra parliamentary and sometimes violent measures in their bid for a mandate for a separate state. Response of the state and counter-responses Since the s, younger generations from similar socio-economic backgrounds have revolted against the erosion of their economic, political and cultural rights. All governments regardless of their political hue have failed to see the underlying socio-political, economic and psychological causes of these revolts. The more repressive the state apparatus became the more violent the youth resistance became. Many socio-economic and political conditions that underpinned and contributed to the insurrections reflected the diverse, but significant and unfulfilled aspirations of the younger generations. The articulation and assertion of nationalistic and economic demands for justice by the youth underpinned the emergence of political violence. One aimed at the capture of state power and the other at autonomy from the existing state. The economic growth and its unequal distribution in the post era did not help placating these demands; and breaking down the barriers of ethnicity and class. Their violence was a cry of the younger generations for economic and cultural parity. Political violence has posed a serious challenge to the existing socio-economic order and the political institutions of the country. Therefore, successive governments have more often ruled the country under the draconian emergency regulations. The state has also used brutal counter-violence strategies to neutralise and discredit its opponents. It has also used material incentives to get groups and factions of its opponents to side with the state. Generally, the state makes use of supremacist or chauvinist ideologies to divide and distract the people. Regimes and politicians relied on committing political violence to inspire fear among their opponents and civil society, either to come to power or to maintain their power base. This vicious cycle affected all layers of society Jayatunge, It is significant that in post Sri Lanka, any major organised political violence was absent until In the s, the state used violence

to suppress peaceful protests by the Sri Lankan Tamil youth. Their parliamentary representatives could not achieve any positive outcomes for their constituents through peaceful, non-violent campaigns and this led to them demanding secession. This situation led to cycles of political violence and counter violence. As political violence manifested in the north and east, the responses of the state and the Tamil militants caused an extension of this radicalisation and alienation within and among the Sri Lankan Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities. So, class mobilisation in the south became totally based on social exclusion and economic deprivation. This sort of violent behaviour by the states has generated other forms of political violence including the use of terror. In addition, political leaderships of all ethnicities in Sri Lanka have opportunistically used ethnicity, language and religion as a bandwagon to establish, preserve and enhance their political, economic and social power, or to distract the people from the domestic policy and program failures of the establishment. Many analysts portray ethnicity as the central theme of the armed conflict [7] that ended in , though ethnicity and culture were used as labels, economics remained the root cause of this conflict.

**Causes of Violence** In the post phase of capitalism, lack of appropriate political and economic development, lack of equitable distribution of economic benefits, lack of equitable job opportunities, and lack of socially inclusive policy calculus provided the essential ingredients for the radicalisation of the youth in Sri Lanka. The post political establishment concentrated mainly on short term tactical electoral gains by engaging in nepotism, family bandyism and class collaboration. The elitist power structures have been used to achieve political control over the people. Such structures have been strengthened through various forms of patronage. The impact of these processes severely eroded whatever democratic traditions and values the country had. The changes introduced in in the form of neo-liberalism required a drastic change in the political system. The new economic and political model introduced many features that had been previously implemented under dictatorial regimes elsewhere. The new economic policy needed the apparatus of a very repressive form of governance. A new constitution was introduced in that led not only to an executive system with immense power concentrated in the hands of the president, but also made it almost impossible to abolish the new executive presidential system. However, many amendments to the Constitution have been made to concentrate more and more power in the hands of the executive presidency, the most recent being the 18th amendment. These measures were and are seen as necessary to ensure political stability and encourage foreign direct investment in the island. These changes that were introduced to ensure rapid economic growth, led to the alienation of generations of youth away from the establishment. Global capital, its structures and instruments will continue to use political violence through the machinery of the state and other subservient forces to repress any opposition or its likelihood by those who are marginalised by the process of neo-liberal economic restructuring. The marginalised will continue to resist against such violence, and such resistance may take the form political violence. Reports indicate that Sri Lankan Malayiyaha Tamil youth, particularly in the south, have been at the receiving end of racist attacks. The coming decades will be critical for these youth because without significant government intervention, the number of over-educated and under-employed young people will continue to grow.

**Chapter 5 : April JVP Uprising: Not To Make The Same Mistakes – Colombo Telegraph**

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Political Violence in Sri Lanka Oct 16, Political Violence and Fear Psychosis, that is affecting the aspirations of Sri Lankan society to live in a fear free environment. Fear psychosis President Mahinda Rajapakse has followed the abovementioned statement of Pandit Nehru and given the leadership to our armed forces to free the President Rajapakse and friends Sri Lankan Nation from three decades of fear psychosis created by the barbaric activities of the ruthless LTTE for which the entire Sri Lankan Nation is ever so grateful. The fear psychosis created by political violence appears to have replaced that created by the LTTE. Nonis, Registrar of the Council inter alia stated thus: The SLMC remains committed to this principle. Nonis is not just an assault on a private individual but constitutes an assault on the most cherished and basic tenets of the Rule of Law. Both notices called for an inquiry. The motivation for the attack and persons behind it are yet to be revealed in an impartial investigation. There is speculation that the motive may have been the refusal of the SLMC to recognize the private medical college set up at Malabe. Similar incidents of assault and even murder of journalists and editors of newspapers come to mind. Gun Battle in Mulleriyawa Last week another unfortunate incident occurred on the streets at Mulleriyawa, in which a presidential advisor and a few others met with their untimely deaths and another parliamentarian suffered grave head injuries which the doctors say would lead to hospitalization for a further three months. The gun battle that occurred involved some characters of the underworld, who were reported to be active in the drug trade as revealed in President Rajapakse investigations by the C. The manner in which such persons came to be in the company of parliamentarians is a mystery. The Inspector General of Police in his wisdom has ordered that all police officers engaged in security functions of the parliamentarians and other V. Ps must henceforth be clad in their official uniforms when they bear arms. The said gun battle was the result of the preferential vote system which leads to infighting among candidates of the same party. This system should be done away with. The presence of a large number of unlicensed weapons in the hands of the strongmen or unofficial bodyguards engaged by the parliamentarians poses a grave threat to the peace and tranquility of our society. The Inspector General of Police under the guidance of the Secretary of the Ministry of Defense should take the necessary action to remove such illegal weapons and prosecute the possessors under the law. The police officers providing security to parliamentarians should confine themselves to their assigned lawful functions and refrain from carrying out illegal orders given by such parliamentarians, which would result in the eradication or reduction of political violence. The supreme law of Sri Lanka is the Constitution, under which powers are granted to make all other laws. The second paragraph of the Preamble to the Constitution incorporates a pledge given by the Parliamentarians to the People of Sri Lanka thus: We, the freely elected representatives of the People of Sri Lanka in pursuance of such Mandate, humbly acknowledging our obligation to our People and gratefully remembering their heroic and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse and his buddy Duminda De Silva. Silva was involved in a shoot out in Mulleriyawa on October 8, which left several dead including Presidential advisor Baratha Lakshman Premachandra unremitting struggle to regain and preserve their rights and privileges so that the Dignity and Freedom of the Individual may be assured, Just, Social, Economic and Cultural Order attained, the Unity of the Country restored, and Concord established with other Nations, do hereby adopt and enact this Constitution the Supreme Law of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Thus it is seen that the Doctrine of Separation of Powers advocated by Dicey has been incorporated in our Constitution through the wisdom of its makers. Thus a politician cannot purport to assume judicial powers and hear, pass summary judgement and deliver instant punishment without even a right of appeal on any individual citizen of this country. Such an action constitutes a criminal offence and the Police who are the law enforcement officers should not permit such actions to take place in their presence making a mockery of our legal system resulting in the erosion of public confidence in the supremacy of the law which is detrimental to the maintenance of the pristine principle of the Rule of Law enshrined in our Constitution. Final result of such actions would be anarchy or the law of the jungle where the public would retaliate by attacking the police as seen in the recent spate of attacks on

police stations in Angulana, Katunayaka and Dompe caused due to police brutality and indiscipline discussed in this column last week. I wish to recount a story depicting the exemplary conduct of the politicians of a by gone era. As an officer of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation at that time, stationed at the Refinery in Sapugaskanda I had to get an endorsement on a letter from the Deputy Minister Hon. I met him on the platform where he kept the letter on his black leather brief case carried by all Government officers at that time, made the endorsement, applied his official seal and walked out got into a bus and went away. A galaxy of security officers or armed bodyguards and a limousine were conspicuous by their absence. The politicians of the by gone era were really the servants of the people while today the converse appears to be true. Violence is the preserve of the uneducated Violence is the preserve of uneducated, uncivilized people and abhorred by all right thinking civilized people. All great personages in the World including Lord Buddha, Jesus Christ, Mahatma Gandhi and others advocated the virtues of non violence. Civilized people settle their disputes through a process of consultation, compromise and consensus. Using of un-parliamentary language in the hallowed precincts of the Parliament was unheard of in the good old days when gentlemen debated matters, maintaining proper decorum and mutual respect. Criticism should be met with suitable response. People who tend to resort to violence display their inability to make a proper intelligent response to such criticism. Parliamentarians should be conscious of the fact that they have taken a pledge to preserve the dignity, freedom, rights and privileges of the individual citizen as stated in the Constitution recounted above. Yesterday we were campaigning The People look up to their President as their leader to establish a non violent political culture in our beautiful little island, the pearl of the Indian ocean. The rule of law has to be applied equally to all as no one is above the law. The President who has now embarked on the goal of economic prosperity to our country would no doubt take the necessary measures to create a peaceful non violent environment for our people to live in peace and tranquility. We hope and pray that our leader, His Excellency President Mahinda Rajapakse would have the necessary strength, courage and wisdom to achieve that goal too. Let me recount in lighter vein an episode involving Mahatma Gandhi and an Englishman thus: His soul arrives in heaven and is met by St. Peter at the entrance. Then you can choose where to spend eternity. Peter escorts him to the elevator and he goes down, down, down to hell. The doors open and he finds himself in the middle of a green golf course. In the distance is a clubhouse and standing in front of it are all his friends and other politicians who had worked with him. Everyone is very happy and in evening dress. They run to greet him, shake his hand, and reminisce about the good times they had while getting rich at the expense of the people. They play a friendly game of golf and then dine on lobster, caviar and champagne. They are having such a good time that before he realizes it, it is time to go. Everyone gives him a hearty farewell and waves while the elevator rises. The elevator goes up, up, up and the door reopens on heaven where St. Peter is waiting for him. They have a good time and, before he realizes it, the 24 hours have gone by and St. Now choose your eternity. He sees all his friends, dressed in rags, picking up the trash and putting it in black bags as more trash falls from above. The devil comes over to him and puts his arm around his shoulder. The Internet As Sir Ivor Jennings stated, the difference between a politician and a statesman is that politicians have the selfish motive of coming to power at the next election while statesmen think selflessly of the welfare of the next generation. When a former Prime Minister Hon. Dudley Senanayake passed away it was reported in the media that he had only Rs. Readers are most welcome to send in their valuable comments and further suggestions in their letters to the Editor.

**Chapter 6 : CiteSeerX " Political Violence in the Third World: A Case Study of Sri Lanka.**

*Political Violence in the Third World: A Case Study of Sri Lanka. ()*

The universal franchise and the lowering of the voting age allowed young people to take part in active electoral politics. Free education was introduced in , and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an expansion of higher educational opportunities. This was seen as a welcome relief to the rural youth, and a palliative to their high and increasing unemployment. Lack of opportunities to actively take part in social, economic and political life led to extremely tense situations, which in turn led to discontent amongst the youth, who started questioning the existing socio, political and ideological status quo and its value systems. This objectivity led them to subjectively perceive the necessity for revolutionary change. The failure of the ruling elite to introduce social, economic and political change and make them inclusive alienated the majority of young people. All governments regardless of their political hue failed to see the underlying socio-political, economic and psychological causes of these revolts. The more repressive the state apparatus became the more the youth rebelled. Since Sri Lanka has witnessed three major insurrections involving political violence mainly by its youth. Many socio-economic and political conditions that underpinned and contributed to these insurrections reflected the diverse, but significant and unfulfilled aspirations of the younger generations of Sri Lanka. Since the s, younger generations of Sinhalese and Tamils from similar socio-economic backgrounds have revolted against the erosion of their economic, political and cultural rights. The JVP militancy predominantly represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Sinhala Buddhist constituency Samaranayake The Tamil militancy represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Tamil constituency from Hindu and Christian religious backgrounds. As political violence became manifested in the north and east, the responses of the state and the Tamil militants caused an extension of this radicalisation and alienation within and among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka. Both fought back separately and uncompromisingly. The ideologies of both the JVP and the LTTE are not based on current realities but rather on the commitment to their own brands of nationalism. Malayaha youth, who had left plantations due to communal violence in the South and settled down in the LTTE-controlled areas, are at the receiving end of the parties to the conflict. Despite their diverse ethnic origins, Islam unites the Muslims in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, in the eighties some of the Muslim youth joined hands with Tamil militants. Later on as the Tamil political violence also turned against the Muslims, some of the Muslim groups allegedly sided with the government. The LTTE during the peace talks apologised for its acts against the Muslims, recognised that the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity, and accepted their right to represent their interests at any future negotiations The Sunday Times Since then, this agreement also collapsed. Muslims now are seeking constitutional safeguards and power sharing to protect their interests. This situation has radicalised the Muslim youth who also seems to have taken to political violence. The militant youth movements expressed their dissatisfaction with the state and their desire for change through political violence. The state was their common enemy; however, succumbing to their nationalistic politics of the glories of their respective feudal past, they saw each other as enemies; not allies. Radicalisation in the south Origins of the JVP can be traced back to the mid sixties. The JVP worked semi- clandestinely by publishing newspapers, conducting political classes and debates, contesting student council elections, and leading student strikes to shore up its support base. Its nationalistic element rested on the historic glory of the past Sinhala Kingdoms. Yet, their idea of socialism has been subsumed by its commitment to safeguard the unitary state, which is ironically a colonial construct. The JVP was able to successfully mobilize the southern youth, but committed strategic and tactical errors. It was brutally suppressed twice, but was able to regroup and rejuvenate changing its focus from class to nationalism. The first JVP insurrection in occurred predominantly in the South, because the economic and social changes they expected from the UF government they helped to elect in were not forthcoming. The political aim of the JVP was to violently replace the establishment with a fairer one. Whatever the limitations of the insurrection the reasons for the conflict points to major flaws in democratic institutions. However, it discarded these policies

just prior to the Black July riots of 1983. The JVP had now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that continues to vehemently oppose any devolution of power. Radicalisation in the north Since 1983, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment. The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1977 and the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1987 created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The politics of the Tamil youth groups in the 1980s were a mixture of Tamil nationalism and Marxist ideology. The nationalistic element rested on the historic glories of the Tamil Kingdom. Differences between diverse Tamil political groups were based on different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism<sup>16</sup>, but the idea of achieving a separate state subsumed their commitment to socialism. The post government policies on language, colonisation, university admission, and employment led to discontent of the Tamil youth. The state used violence to suppress peaceful protests by the Tamil movements. Their parliamentary representatives could not achieve any positive outcomes for their constituents. Thus Tamil youth demanded autonomy, which later on became one of secession. This situation led to cycles of political violence and counter violence. The LTTE has continued to carry out its violent campaign, though currently it seems to be on the defensive. Today the continuation of the conflict has created in the North East of Sri Lanka, the worst humanitarian disaster only second to the disaster in Darfur in Sudan. However, this paper does not focus on how such discriminatory practices affected the Sinhala working people. We are independent and non-profit.

**Chapter 7 : Political violence in Sri Lanka - Part Three - Sri Lanka Guardian**

*This is the summary of the book "Political Violence in Sri Lanka, ". The author(s) of the book is/are G.A. Samarasinghe.*

Perhaps they received the wrong instructions about the date. Those days unlike today, the armed forces were so small and the police was the main bastion of the State. Capturing power in that fashion by capturing police stations however was impossible by any imagination. More pertinent question was what they would have done in case they had managed to capture power. April 5th was a Monday and when I went for my lectures in the morning not even half of the students were attending. All the prominent JVP activists were absent. The whole Campus appeared deserted. As I belonged to a breakaway group from the LSSP at that time and quite aware of the JVP activities, it was not a secret for us that the JVP might attack the government at any time but exact date was not known. It was on Radio Ceylon for the midday news that the Wellawaya attack was announced. There was a stern warning from the police not to get involved in any subversive activities. Whether it was merely a tactic to first support and then attack or whether they actually got disillusioned within a year is a question of speculation. It could be both. While unemployment, including graduate unemployment, was exceedingly high without a proper plan or solution after the election, the state repression also was high even curtailing any leftwing or youth activity in the country. Compared to the previous radical or violent political events in the country, the uprising and its suppression were extraordinarily ferocious on both sides and created a chain of violent political cycles of which Sri Lanka has not yet been in a position to recover. Although the major insurrectionary events lasted only for three weeks in April, it took nearly three more months to completely eradicate the rebellion outposts in the jungles and remote villages. The official death toll was 1, but unofficial figures reliably estimated it to be around 1000. The insurrection by its very nature was to capture state power in fairly a democratic country at least at that time. It was not a spontaneous rebellion by the youth facing unemployment or any such hardships. It was a planned insurrection by the JVP, working as an underground insurrectionary party, of course affected by and utilizing various socio-economic issues. If not for those socio-economic grievances large numbers of youth would not have joined the movement. In addition, the JVP considered the unemployed rural youth and university students as its political support base or vanguard. This theory resonated some of the New Left ideas of Herbert Marcuse or Jean Paul Sartre who sought new vanguards for contemporary social revolutions. No serious attempts however were made to appeal to the other sections of the society. There was no serious trade union wing under the JVP unlike today. Insurrection During the insurrection, altogether over 70 police stations were attacked and 40 of them were either captured or forced to abandon for security reasons. After assessing the security situation, when the army moved in, the revolution however failed. The insurrection did not produce anything tangibly positive. It left only a legacy. It however created a culture of political violence that has been the bane of the country since then. The standardization of university admissions in could be considered a distorted outcome of the insurrection, which on the other hand created grievances on the part of the Tamil youth. The insurrection was solely by the Sinhala rural youth. Or are we mixing up all the leftwing terminology to interpret the political history of the country upside down? Judging by the facts that the JVP itself supported the UF to come to power at the elections, and launched the insurrection within a year, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the objective result of the insurrection was the strengthening of the opposition in the country whether it was rightwing or not. The JVP, the party that launched the insurrection did not draw its lessons for posterity. They made bigger mistake in Even there can be doubts whether they have drawn the correct lessons judging by the type of politics or activities that some of them have been involved in later. There was some temporary admiration of the bravery of those who were involved in the insurrection by local and international commentators. Some of the local admirers came from unexpected quarters like Ian Goonetilleke or Yohan Devananda. They could have done a better service to the society or for social change if they were not lured to violence in that instance. Interpretations There were a plethora of literature or theories that attempted to understand and explain the event and its causes. The most popular theories were in the sphere of sociology or

political sociology that in fact argued for valid socio-economic and other reasons which supposedly led the leaders to lead the insurrection or the supporters to join the rebellion. There were around 16, who were supposed to have followed the movement directly and indirectly. The population explosion, dysfunctional education, stagnation in the economy, rural poverty and more precisely the unemployment and graduate unemployment were highlighted as the salient socio-economic factors behind the uprising. All these undoubtedly were objectively verifiable factors that remained more or less on the same level or ferocity throughout the years of 70s or 80s. Why then the insurrection took place in April was the question. There were several political scientists who went slightly deeper into investigate the political circumstances of the insurrection and the ideology of the JVP, but soon conveniently fell back into the socio-economic explanations and more or less concluded that there had been something wrong in the society that led to the insurrection. There had always been something wrong with the existing society no doubt. The left parties in the country were in fact were formed even prior to independence to fight against these injustices or inequalities. But to wage war against a government that was elected with their own support on those grievances or injustices was completely a different matter. While in the case of the insurrection, the first possibility was undoubtedly prevalent to a great extent, the second strand of motivation also cannot be ruled out. This subjectivity of the JVP ideology has been abundantly clear thereafter in their second failed attempt of insurrection in 1987. The frustration-aggression theory and the theories based on the same premises have failed to understand that frustration or underlying socio-economic grievances themselves would not automatically lead to aggression or rebellion without intermediary factors such as leadership, ideology and organization. This is common to both leftwing and rightwing movements. It is the leaderships, organization and ideology that instigate violence. This is what I mean by subjective factors in this article. Violence is not inherent; it is basically constructed, cultivated and taught, either by the society or by political movements. In the case of the JVP, its mastermind Rohana Wijeweera was instrumental in bringing a particular kind of violent political ideology to this country. It was during his studies at the Lumumba University in Moscow that he acquired, in my view, a distorted version of Marxism and revolution, like what Pol Pot of Cambodia acquired in France. Wijeweera did not acquire his theories from the Russian revolutionary literature but from some contemporary pseudo-revolutionary theories popular among his contemporaries like Kassim Hanga of Zanzibar and Che Guevara of Indonesia. The broad spectrum of the theory argued that revolutions are possible in different ways. The workers and peasants are not necessary. What is needed is the cultivation of a committed cadre organization. Armed struggle and simultaneous uprising was the strategy. Undoubtedly, the prevailing economic and social grievances helped the JVP to convince 2, to 3, cadres to participate in the insurrection and over 10, youth and others to help them. The ideology of the JVP at that time was a combination of a type of socialism and an extreme form of nationalism. The main thrust of the ideology was the justification of violence under different pretexts and reasons. There were of course excesses on the part of the counter-insurgency operations but they were limited or mild compared to many other situations in the contemporary world or later events in Sri Lanka. There were no mass graves uncovered like in Matale today related to the insurrection. The suppression of the communist insurrection in Indonesia in 1965 was also a contrast. But it cannot be denied that both the insurrectionary and counter-insurrectionary measures since early 1971 finally led to the April insurrection. Some of the measures, however, such as the declaration of emergency and arrest of suspects for security reasons left no option but Wijeweera to call for the insurrection somewhat carelessly on the 5th night of April. He was in jail and kept in Jaffna by that time. One objective of the insurrection was to rescue him from Jaffna jail by paralyzing the country. The rape and murder of Kataragama beauty queen, Premawathie Manamperi, was a high point of army excesses. I myself lost two of my friends who were active in the teachers union but did not have any connections with the JVP. It was later revealed that they were killed to avenge a personal grudge by a police officer. Conclusion Violence it appears contagious. It is like a horrible epidemic. The insurrection changed the mindset of many people, alas negatively, both in the authority and those who almost naturally opposed it, on both sides of the ethnic divide. The reasons for the distinction are not easy to figure. The insurrection opened the flood gates. Sri Lanka never could become the same. Recurrent cycles of violence were to follow after small interlude after in almost all spheres of political life from elections to ethnic relations

and political party competition. This has been the unfortunate saga of Sri Lanka for which collective solutions needs to be sought by all political parties, religious organizations and civil society movements. The JVP hopefully could play a major role in this process through their experience. The JVP has played many positive feats lately for example in bringing the 17th Amendment. In the midst of a need for a regime change today, whatever the temptation or provocation, it should stick to nonviolent and peaceful methods as they have exhibited capable in the last decade or so. The power of the mind and ideas might prove to be more successful than the power of the muscle or the arms. It only requires more discipline and more determination. It is the same path that the remaining rebels in the North should follow in Sri Lankan politics. Much worse would be the use of strong arm tactics against one sector of the society i.

**Chapter 8 : clandestine political violence | Download eBook PDF/EPUB**

*Condition: New. This book is the revised version of his doctoral thesis on "Political Violence in the Third World: A Case Study of Sri Lanka: ". It is a systematic, empirical study of the left-wing insurrection by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in April and the ethnic insurrection by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.*

The universal franchise and the lowering of the voting age allowed young people to take part in active electoral politics. Free education was introduced in , and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an expansion of higher educational opportunities. This was seen as a welcome relief to the rural youth, and a palliative to their high and increasing unemployment. Lack of opportunities to actively take part in social, economic and political life led to extremely tense situations, which in turn led to discontent amongst the youth, who started questioning the existing socio, political and ideological status quo and its value systems. This objectivity led them to subjectively perceive the necessity for revolutionary change. The failure of the ruling elite to introduce social, economic and political change and make them inclusive alienated the majority of young people. All governments regardless of their political hue failed to see the underlying socio-political, economic and psychological causes of these revolts. The more repressive the state apparatus became the more the youth rebelled. Since Sri Lanka has witnessed three major insurrections involving political violence mainly by its youth. Many socio-economic and political conditions that underpinned and contributed to these insurrections reflected the diverse, but significant and unfulfilled aspirations of the younger generations of Sri Lanka. Since the s, younger generations of Sinhalese and Tamils from similar socio-economic backgrounds have revolted against the erosion of their economic, political and cultural rights. The JVP militancy predominantly represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Sinhala Buddhist constituency Samaranayake The Tamil militancy represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Tamil constituency from Hindu and Christian religious backgrounds. As political violence became manifested in the north and east, the responses of the state and the Tamil militants caused an extension of this radicalisation and alienation within and among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka. Both fought back separately and uncompromisingly. The ideologies of both the JVP and the LTTE are not based on current realities but rather on the commitment to their own brands of nationalism. Malaiyaha youth, who had left plantations due to communal violence in the South and settled down in the LTTE-controlled areas, are at the receiving end of the parties to the conflict. Despite their diverse ethnic origins, Islam unites the Muslims in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, in the eighties some of the Muslim youth joined hands with Tamil militants. Later on as the Tamil political violence also turned against the Muslims, some of the Muslim groups allegedly sided with the government. The LTTE during the peace talks apologised for its acts against the Muslims, recognised that the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity, and accepted their right to represent their interests at any future negotiations The Sunday Times Since then, this agreement also collapsed. Muslims now are seeking constitutional safeguards and power sharing to protect their interests. This situation has radicalised the Muslim youth who also seems to have taken to political violence. The militant youth movements expressed their dissatisfaction with the state and their desire for change through political violence. The state was their common enemy; however, succumbing to their nationalistic politics of the glories of their respective feudal past, they saw each other as enemies; not allies. Radicalisation in the south Origins of the JVP can be traced back to the mid sixties. The JVP worked semi- clandestinely by publishing newspapers, conducting political classes and debates, contesting student council elections, and leading student strikes to shore up its support base. Its nationalistic element rested on the historic glory of the past Sinhala Kingdoms. Yet, their idea of socialism has been subsumed by its commitment to safeguard the unitary state, which is ironically a colonial construct. The JVP was able to successfully mobilize the southern youth, but committed strategic and tactical errors. It was brutally suppressed twice, but was able to regroup and rejuvenate changing its focus from class to nationalism. The first JVP insurrection in occurred predominantly in the South, because the economic and social changes they expected from the UF government they helped to elect in were not forthcoming. The political aim of the JVP

was to violently replace the establishment with a fairer one. Whatever the limitations of the insurrection the reasons for the conflict points to major flaws in democratic institutions. However, it discarded these policies just prior to the Black July riots of 1983. The JVP had now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that continues to vehemently oppose any devolution of power. Radicalisation in the north Since 1983, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment. The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1977 and the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1985 created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The politics of the Tamil youth groups in the 1970s were a mixture of Tamil nationalism and Marxist ideology. The nationalistic element rested on the historic glories of the Tamil Kingdom. Differences between diverse Tamil political groups were based on different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism<sup>16</sup>, but the idea of achieving a separate state subsumed their commitment to socialism. The post government policies on language, colonisation, university admission, and employment led to discontent of the Tamil youth. The state used violence to suppress peaceful protests by the Tamil movements. Their parliamentary representatives could not achieve any positive outcomes for their constituents. Thus Tamil youth demanded autonomy, which later on became one of secession. This situation led to cycles of political violence and counter violence. The LTTE has continued to carry out its violent campaign, though currently it seems to be on the defensive. Today the continuation of the conflict has created in the North East of Sri Lanka, the worst humanitarian disaster only second to the disaster in Darfur in Sudan. However, this paper does not focus on how such discriminatory practices affected the Sinhala working people.

#### Chapter 9 : Political violence in Sri Lanka – Part Three – Sri Lanka Guardian

*Political Violence in Sri Lanka, von Samaranayake S.V.D. Gamini und eine groÙe Auswahl von Ãhnlichen neuen, gebrauchten und antiquarischen BÃchern ist jetzt verfÃgbar bei calendrierdelascience.com*