Chapter 1 : Friendship and Politics in Post-Revolutionary France By Sarah Horowitz

Untitled (Jannis Kounellis,) The following text is Rossanda's opening address to the "Power and Opposition in Post-revolutionary Societies" conference held in Venice, from November ,

To access this free electronic edition click here. Print editions are also available. In Friendship and Politics in Post-Revolutionary France, Sarah Horowitz brings together the political and cultural history of post-revolutionary France to illuminate how French society responded to and recovered from the upheaval of the French Revolution. The Revolution led to a heightened sense of distrust and divided the nation along ideological lines. In the wake of the Terror, many began to express concerns about the atomization of French society. Friendship, though, was regarded as one bond that could restore trust and cohesion. Friends relied on each other to serve as confidants; men and women described friendship as a site of both pleasure and connection. Because trust and cohesion were necessary to the functioning of post-revolutionary parliamentary life, politicians turned to friends and ideas about friendship to create this solidarity. While the book emphasizes the interconnectedness of the public and private spheres, Sarah Horowitz takes a balanced approach on this matter. In demonstrating how elite women and men understood friendship and politics in this period, the work makes a significant and original contribution to existing scholarship on early nineteenth-century France. The language and rituals of friendship suffused relations between politicians, played a vital role in building social networks, and helped soften the impact of ideological divisions. Erudite, lucid, and highly readable, her book engages with questions of broader relevance about how political trust is rebuilt in the wake of revolution, and about the role of the emotions in political life. Her subtle reading of the historical record is complemented by a masterful implementation of social network analysis, revealing the extent to which ideology and friendship interacted in this time of shifting political allegiances. In effect Horowitz brings the world of Facebook into the realm of post-revolutionary France, illustrating in straightforward visualizations and clear argumentation the complex intersections between friendship and politics. In so doing, she not only shows just how illuminating social network analysis can be as a methodology for historical research, but also adds an important new dimension to our understanding of the instability of politics and friendship. Horowitz is never naive about her subject. Through careful analysis of the language of friendship as it appeared in elite correspondence, Horowitz demonstrates how professions of friendship served to structure professional and political relationships, acting as markers of trust, indebtedness, and good will; but also how they risked degenerating into mere pro forma gestures, easily and endlessly imitated, by means of which the purity of the affective realm might be compromised by the grubby faithlessness of politics. Neither man is particularly well-known today but the two were famous in their time. Manuel, his best friend, was a member of the liberal opposition during the Restoration and one of its chief orators in the Chamber of Deputies until , when he was expelled from the Chamber for a speech that condoned regicide. Choosing to be buried in the same tomb as Manuel was another demonstration of his lifelong devotion. Of course, it is impossible to reconstruct the exact nature of their feelings for each other or know what they did in the privacy of their home. But the fact that two men could be so open about their love is significant. This was an era when there was not necessarily a sharp boundary between romantic love and platonic affection and when male affection was celebrated. Conduct manuals for young men and women also reiterated the importance of this bond; without friends, one could not be happy, and friends were trusted confidantes and endlessly loyal. When Barante died in , he stated the following in his will about Broglie and Guizot: All three men had been friends and allies since the early years of the Restoration, when they sought to stabilize and liberalize the regime. Yet, despite revolutions and changing political tides, these men remained loyal to one another until death. This book takes as its subject precisely this intermingling of friendship and politics among members of the post-revolutionary political class. Ideological commitments shaped the social networks of political figures, just as friendship was central to the practice of politics during the Restoration

and July Monarchy. In looking at the effect of political divisions on interpersonal ties, this work highlights how the upheaval of the Revolution affected a segment of French society and remade their personal relations. While the Revolution strained the social fabric of France and divided the nation along ideological lines, friendship helped restore trust and cohesion. It became critical to the new parliamentary regime of the era and helped the French state and the political class recover from the trauma of the Revolution. Despite the model of a strict separation between public and private that emerged in the nineteenth century, personal ties were both shaped by and crucial to the political life of the time. Likewise, although women were officially excluded from politics, in practice female friends played vital roles in parliamentary life and rebuilt the trust that allowed the political system to function. In a very real sense, then, the personal was the political in the post-revolutionary era. This project began with the idea that studying conceptions and practices of friendship in the early nineteenth century would be an interesting way to examine how social relations were remade in an era of liberty, equality, and individualism. Historians have frequently asserted that marriage and the family were vital sources of cohesion in the nineteenth century and served as bulwarks against anomie—and that the family was the central social formation of the era. While I do not deny the importance of familial ties—and while they could have a political significance—I argue that friendship was another crucial configuration. Friendship was meaningful to individuals on a personal level, but also had political functions and became a way to understand how solidarity could be reconstructed in the wake of the Revolution. Indeed, as a source of cohesion, friendship had particular advantages. Friendship is a bond based on free choice, in contrast to kinship ties, and is thus an individualistic relationship; it is also typically considered a tie among equals, unlike clientage or patronage. It was thus well suited to serve as a force for cohesion among free citizens. Beyond the issue of social cohesion, the story of friendship in the early nineteenth century also highlights how the French grappled with other legacies of the Revolution: In part, this was just another manifestation of the problem of individualism, as political elites needed to practice parliamentary politics without official political parties, a strong associational life, or the structures of lineage and corporate privilege that had been central to Old Regime politics. Yet revolutionary politics also divided the nation and complicated interpersonal ties. When Napoleon returned to France in , many prominent citizens switched their loyalties from the monarchy to the Empire; these rapidly shifting allegiances led to a suspicion about the trustworthiness of political actors. Fears about loyalty led individuals to denounce one another and led the state to conduct extensive surveillance of its citizens. In turn, these policing and self-policing practices made individuals wary of those around them, as they learned to fear the spies and denouncers who were circulating in their midst. The intense factionalism of the era shaped the social networks of politically engaged men. Shared political views led to the formation of lifelong friendships, and men found it difficult to be friends with those with whom they did not agree. Crucially, women did not experience this difficulty to the same degree. The personal networks of elite women spanned factional divisions, and they connected different political and social groupings to one another. Factional hostilities lessened with the advent of the July Monarchy in , but the social fabric of France was still regarded as strained. With the emergence of new social antagonisms, many began to fear that the pursuit of self-interest was destroying personal ties and spreading distrust. Politics was still understood to be a brutal realm where loyalty was impossible and betrayal imminent. Thus the period of parliamentary monarchy that lasted from to was a time when politics was often divisive and when social relations—and particularly those in the public realm—were regarded as profoundly troubled. However, polities and societies need trust and cohesion in order to function effectively. Both were particularly necessary in the context of the political systems of the Restoration and the July Monarchy, given the necessity of alliances to parliamentary maneuvers and the lack of official political parties. Where, then, were trust and solidarity to be found? The answer was friendship. Because public life was seen as atomizing, political figures turned to their personal relations and to the women around them to serve as political facilitators as they had during the Old Regime. Thus politicians relied on a language of sentiment and friendship, one that had pervaded early modern political discourse, to establish norms of interpersonal behavior. This was both an adaptation and a transformation of old practices,

as new ideas about gender and the emotions gave rise to the particular uses of friends in politics. Politicians relied on their male friends to serve as proxies in elections and ministerial cabinets because they understood male friendship as creating trust in the form of loyalty. Men were to act in solidarity with one another and be faithful to their commitments to their friends. Because women had special access to the emotions and interiority of the men around them and were also less factionalized than men, female friends were essential political brokers who negotiated alliances, managed political relationships, and ensured that factions remained united. Many of these tactics of political practice were not unique to France; personal ties and elite sociability were vital to the political systems of Britain and America, and in both countries women were important political facilitators. However, Anglo-American political elites did not face the problem of cohesion and trust to the extent that their French counterparts did. As a result, these structures of political support were particularly crucial in the French context. Yet while friendship helped the parliamentary system function after the Revolution, in the long run it was not particularly good at stabilizing either the Restoration or the July Monarchy. A political culture based on friendship could not force compromise among groups and so could not prevent revolutions. The centrality of personal ties to politics opened these regimes up to charges of corruption. Nevertheless, the intertwining of friendship and politics in the post-revolutionary era left a considerable legacy for French political culture. Politics have continued to be a source of social division in France, while at the same time elites have often relied on their friendship networks to transact politics. Contributions The question of how France recovered from the Revolution has become increasingly interesting to scholars in recent decades. For many years, the Restoration and the July Monarchy were relative backwaters for historians, attracting considerably less attention than the histories of the First, Second, and Third Republics. But in the postâ€"Cold War and postâ€"September 11 world, questions about the transition from authoritarian regimes to representative ones have come to the fore, as have discussions about recovery from trauma. For those interested in the issue of democratization, the period from to is regarded as a laboratory in which French political thinkers and the French polity grappled with the legacy of the Revolution. Historians have thus studied how the post-revolutionary monarchies sought to legitimate themselves, as well as how questions about ideological difference, party organization, and popular participation in politics played out. It shows that ideological divisions hardly remained confined to the political realm, but instead shaped personal ties. It also uncovers how the politicians of the post-revolutionary era relied on old ways of transacting politics as they sorted out the new practices of parliamentary life: And while the problems of trust, affiliation, and cooperation were particularly acute in the first half of the nineteenth century, the political figures of the Third Republic would continue to use some of the same tactics as their forebears, just as the pre-party politics of the Restoration and July Monarchy would influence late nineteenth-century party formation. As an examination of political culture, this work looks less at ideas and more at questions of practiceâ€"the customs, for instance, involved in behind-the-scenes negotiations, and the assumptions that underpinned cabinet formation. In this respect, it opens up new ways to investigate political culture by taking an almost anthropological approach to political transactions. Alongside questions about the nature of post-revolutionary politics, historians have examined the cultural history of the early nineteenth century and how new ideas about the family, the emotions, and individual psychology helped stabilize France after the Revolution. Friendship and Politics in Post-Revolutionary France challenges one historiographical model that appears in many of these works: The narrative of separate spheres is a powerful one. But it was not just women who were privatized. Emotions, too, were relegated to the private realm, as politics was to be an arena of rational debate among men. This work does not contest the fact that notions of a separation between public and private and the domestication of women were powerful norms in the early nineteenth century. Guizot, for instance, stated that he thought that women had no place in political life, and he frequently described the distinction between his public life as a politician and his private life with his family and loved ones. Indeed, ideas about the private nature of women and the public nature of men profoundly shaped the practices of friendship, including patterns of epistolary communication. In practice, politicians used a language of emotion to discuss political allegiance and

routinely relied on their friends, both male and female, in the political realm. Notably, women helped express and channel politically useful emotions. Guizot, for instance, never showed any hesitation about using the women to whom he was close to serve his political ends. Scholars have inserted women into the public sphere of post-revolutionary France by looking at arenas such as urban culture, philanthropy, literary production, and education. Women may not have been able to vote, speak in front of the Chambers, or hold office, but if one broadens the notion of the political to include political sociability and advocacy, it is clear that women were important political figures in the early nineteenth century. They were, for instance, crucial behind-the-scenes actors and hosted the spaces where extra-parliamentary politicking occurred. Their access to the emotions, male interiority, and social relationsâ€"all coded as privateâ€"made them powerful political brokers uniquely positioned to build cohesion between politicians and factions.

Chapter 2 : Project MUSE - Iran's Young Opposition: Youth in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Power and Opposition in Post-revolutionary Societies The question of political power in post-revolutionary societies is and remains one of the most neglected areas of Marxist theory.

The two revolutions came at the same time, and the excesses of one caused problems for the other - the embryonic republican and democratic movements within England were heavily suppressed after the bloody executions in Paris of It thus had a negative effect in England, enabling the emerging Industrial Barons to ruthlessly and cruelly exploit the poor without a whisper of criticism or redress from the State. Dr Hahnemann Goes to Paris The unlikely-sounding title to this essay should not alarm us too much. When the 80 year old Dr Hahnemann entered France in June he must have known and maybe even delighted in the thought? Indeed, there was revolution in Paris as late as , only 5 years before Hahnemann moved there, and again in , only 5 years after his death. Thus it is perfectly valid for us to regard France throughout the first half of the last century as politically very volatile and revolutionary. Furthermore, as a fluent French speaker and reader, he will have kept abreast of these alarming developments from his beloved Saxony, as the disturbing events in France unfolded before the gaze of a horrified Europe. For the most respectable, established and propertied men and women, the main ingredient of that memory was fear Why was it necessary? What were its aims? Were they all living in a society that had had its day? Were these the last twitches of the feudal dinosaur? What had gone wrong? Hahnemann will also have read of the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in Moscow in and the subsequent return of the tattered remnants of his army through Saxony. And much closer to home was the Battle of Leipzig in October It would surely be very naive for us to believe that Hahnemann was ignorant of these major political events of the day. Indeed, many of the earliest successful tests of homoeopathy against Cholera and Typhus were made upon members of that army. There are broadly two aspects to our theme: What kind of medicine should France, or indeed any Republican country, adopt? The problem for France, having disposed of its entire aristocracy in the Revolution, was how this model of medicine was to be viewed and revised in post-revolutionary times? And what form of medicine did they wish to create? We will not be able to answer very fully all these questions, but hopefully, we can make a start and carve out some answers to some of the important questions we have raised. Post-Revolutionary France The probability remains that Hahnemann, through living in Paris for the last 8 years of his long life, caused homoeopathy to acquire certain lasting revolutionary French features. Chief amongst these were the concepts of free treatment for the poor and universal medical care, both of which became, for example, central aspects of the National Health Service in Britain from onwards. It is my contention here that those traits can in their turn be traced back to those revolutionary times. The question then becomes: Believing in human dignity, equality, and fraternity, the republicans tried to make these beliefs part of the fabric of French life They proclaimed their faith in free public education. They discouraged the use of aristocratic words Yet from our standpoint in the late twentieth century, many of these features of late eighteenth century life are not obvious, but somewhat obscure. Though the French Revolution was, like its Russian successor, a particularly bloody and brutal form of revolution, yet the shared underlying aims sound reasonable enough to us today -- that men and women should decide their own futures and their own political systems and must if necessary overthrow by force what they see as the encrusted and fossilised, oppressive political systems of the past; of a privileged, elite ruling class and of unfair, inherited systems of patronage. Such systems dominated Europe at that time and were some of the last tangible vestiges of medieaval feudalism. The expressed objectives of the College were outlined by Dr Croserio in a letter to Dr Neidhard of Philadelphia as follows: To what extent they actually believed this, or whether they were just posturing to the fashion of their day, remains open to question. Points 9 and 10 also invite anyone from foreign countries to come to France and use homoeopathy at their leisure. All of this is either consciously or unconsciously couched in the revolutionary language of the times, or had been written by someone who genuinely believed these sentiments, more probably the latter. English Homoeopathy By

contrast, in a previous article, I made the following observation about the founders of English homoeopathy: And how correspondingly impoverished we have therefore been ever since. Britain was a proud monarchy that fiercely clung to its distinctive and long-established, stratified class structure. The British did not believe in revolutionary change, but at best in slow piecemeal reform. That is more or less still the case today. They did not want a revolution and could see little point in France having one. So that by, say , Britain could be, and was, justly regarded as the most liberal country in Europe. A position it shared with the other Protestant regions - Scandinavia, Holland and Germany. That created in its wake a more liberal and tolerant society that allowed people within the limits of decency to indulge their interests in weird subjects if they so wished. A pleasure that was denied most of the rest of Europe still under the iron-grip of the Pope and his Cardinals for two further centuries. All of this, of course, can be traced back to Martin Luther who first set the Reformation going in and who can, with some justice, be regarded as the founder of the modern world. In order to successfully import homoeopathy into Britain, Quin knew, therefore, that it would have to be done by stealth. It would have to blend in with, rather than openly challenge, the deeply conventionalised and long-cherished belief-patterns and social structures of Britain itself. Like the introduction of anything alien into any culture, in order to become quickly established and accepted with a minimum of fuss, the new should always make some attempts to blend in with the old and strive to create more friends than enemies. All of the above considerations are vitally important when we come to assess the importation of homoeopathy into Britain, the way it was presented to the British people and the standing and class of the man who did that - Dr Quin. Our understanding of the progress of homoeopathy in Britain in its first 30 years or so, is also greatly deepened and enriched when we consider that homoeopathy came from revolutionary France, was imported by a member of the British aristocracy and that he introduced homoeopathy not as a component part of any French revolutionary political agenda, nor as containing any overt or veiled challenge to traditional British values, but merely as a revolutionary medical system that in his view was superior to strong drugging. The strong German links and his own aristocratic background would have also served to greatly dampen down any remaining vestiges of anti-French paranoia. Chartism and how they often became entangled with certain popular medical movements of the time, all of which became loosely connected with the working class movement, and thus were perceived by some as other aspects of their struggle against the new industrial barons Barrow, Such otherwise inexplicable, and apparently uncharitable, aspects of the early history of homoeopathy in Britain and of Quin himself suddenly assume much greater significance, through considerations of the type we have made above. Botanic medicine also spread through the poor industrial towns of the north and midlands, with breathtaking speed and popularity. These factors undoubtedly strongly assisted the initial spread of homeopathy as a cause of curiosity and interest. The strong patronage by royals and aristocrats also greatly assisted its adoption in what was a typically European feudal hierarchy, and utterly class-ridden society! Complex and ever-shifting allegiances were also formed then broken and then re-formed in Britain between medical reformers, religious non-conformists and those struggling for social and parliamentary reform. All were seen as intimately interconnected for some people eg. John Epps, , while others emphasised only the medical aspect eg. Spencer T Hall, The fact is that during the period homoeopathy became established in the UK at the same time as other political and medical reforms and religious struggles were taking place. Some of these were overtly connected, others less clearly related to one another. Much further research is needed to say any more than that at this stage. However, the excesses of the revolutionists soon aroused the hostility of the English public and caused the government to suppress all radical societies and writings and to frown on anything that savoured of reform. This was especially true after the French had deposed and executed their King and established a republic. In spite of his own frequent and extensive travels throughout Europe mainly in France and Italy , he must have been very keenly aware of the strong feelings in Britain and elsewhere against the French Revolution and thus their opposition to most things French and anything even vaguely radical, reformist or proletarian. Indeed, it is true to say that so profoundly did the English feel betrayed by the French when they executed their King in Jan , that it was seen not only as a betrayal of reasonableness and

justice, but a betrayal of the very heart of the English way of life - the monarchy. It left England with no choice but to dissociate itself completely from the French Republic and sever all ties, which it very rapidly did. This was a disagreement strong enough for England to trump up any excuse for a war with France. The subsequent invasion of Holland by the French provided just the excuse for which they had been waiting. Quin set up his first London practice in sept , 3 years before Hahnemann even went to Paris with Melanie. Another source of friction were the anti-Poor Law riots of and which were certainly regarded by the establishment as uprisings inspired by the French Revolution. And by everyone knew that Hahnemann was living and working contentedly in Paris. These facts might have caused Quin to wince once or twice about the French links of homeopathy. Stated simply, no other strategy would have worked in a Britain which had been completely outraged by the Revolution, and the imprisonment and subsequent execution of the French King. And by the end of the decade it seemed as if the entire agitation had been dispersed. The London Corresponding Society had been outlawed. To some - the working classes - it seemed to offer the prospect almost as quickly snuffed out of a new future based on democracy, fairness and the release from centuries of tyranny. To others - the reactionary ruling classes, merchants and royalists - it presaged a nightmarish vision of chaos and anarchy that was uncivilised, unwanted and unthinkable. The British reaction was to suppress all forms of revolt and radicalism, even to the extent of turning a blind eye to the terrible brutalities in the newly emerging factories and the squalor of the lower classes, which were consequently officially ignored for most of the first half of the nineteenth century. While undoubtedly Quin was right, and the British class structure worked to the advantage of establishing homoeopathy in those early days, in the sense that it helped to smooth its passage, later it seemed to become a burdensome disadvantage: This should not surprise or alarm us too much - he was above all a caring and compassionate man. Indeed, such beliefs will have permeated and saturated Paris culture so completely, as to have become commonplace and entirely unchallenged aphorisms about how life should certainly be. By returning to live in Paris, Melanie and Hahnemann quite clearly chose, therefore, to immerse themselves in, and identify themselves with, that culture. To what extent they discussed this is unknown. In all probability she will have indicated to him what to expect and discussed with him at length the politics of her native country. Oh, to have been aboard that carriage as it sped to France in June ! And to have been party to their discussions. My impression is that Hahnemann was as excited as a young child with the whole forthcoming adventure. In Paris, we find him entertaining company and accepting invitations; frequenting the opera, and partaking moderately of the dissipations of the gay capital, and no longer confining his medical practice to the consultations at his own house, but visiting patients at their residences, like any other practitioner, which he had not done in Germany for more than twenty years previously. He seems to have entered on this novel course with great zest; and his new wife, to judge from his letters and the testimony of observers, rendered the latter years of his life extremely happy. Hahnemann submitted himself to the second [wife] in his profession. She became not only his wife and companion, but also his student, his only assistant,and finally the undisputed organiser of his professional work in his final years. He was thoroughly non-political He regarded the incidents of war merely as obstacles in the way of his work of reform He longs for them to end but takes no side.. He is most outspoken after the downfall of Napoleon, whom he regarded as a the cause of oppression and of all evils.

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Women in pre-revolutionary, revolutionary and post-revolutionary Iran By: Monique Girgis, Page: Pre-revolutionary Iran Pre-revolutionary Iran was a complicated time, one that included much change and conflict. Many of their reforms centered around women, placing them in the public eye. This examination will encompass several different areas, including family life, veiling and socioeconomic factors. Girl cadets of the police academy in graduation ceremony, circa Pre-revolutionary Iran saw a lot of modifications to both the structure and life-styles of the people. Reza Shah rose to power and took over the leadership of Iran between and , ushering in the Pahlavi regime. With the rise of Adolf Hitler in , the Shah saw a possible ally. Upon his abdication, his son, Muhammed Reza Shah, took over the leadership of Iran. The White Revolution was officially announced in , which was basically a six part program including major land reforms, nationalization of forests, electoral changes to franchise women, the sale of state owned enterprises to private interests and profit sharing in industry. A significant part of the ulama were opposed to the land reforms, which was increased by the attempts of the Shah and the government to intimidate their religious opposition. Although Nesta Ramazani argues that there was actually a pragmatic section of the ulama that supported the more moderate reforms. It was actually detrimental to most of the classes it was intending to help, only benefiting the already wealthy landowners. The economic reforms gave few peasants any land, and even those that received land were not given any grain, farming tools or a foundation upon which to build an agricultural enterprise. The landowners, however, had their land bought out from them by the government and were able to invest in more lucrative fields. Even though the constitution was constantly referred to in speeches and bazaar debates, it had little effect upon the Iranian people. Rather, the constitution was used as a symbol of Westernism. Their social origins ranged from rural workers to merchants and large landholders. With this variation in social backgrounds came one in income and education. Many of the clerics were in fact uneducated, or semi-educated. Due to the misguided leadership of the Shah, Iranians grew increasingly dissatisfied with their government. As displeasure escalated, three men emerged as the leaders of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement that would soon take control of Iran. Khomeini stood for a very conservative approach to Islam, wanting to return to the old values and traditions of the Koran. Shariati was a more liberal in his ideas than Khomeini. He believed that through knowledge a person becomes responsible for his or her actions. Shariati emphasized both a historical and religious approach to Islam, encouraging Muslims to learn the history of Islam in addition to the Koran. He viewed the Koran as something to be comprehended by each generation as time changed. Shariati condemned the reactionary segments of Islam, preferring to follow a reformist Islam. He tried to prove to the people of Iran that Islam could be progressive and that emancipation was possible for women in original Islam as opposed to the more prevalent chauvinistic interpretations of Islam, Fatima Mernissi is a good example of this argument. Four years later, in June of , he was released and was sent into exile. Shariati died very soon thereafter in England. Many believed that he died from the torturing he was subjected to while in jail. Motahari was one of the other great influences of this time. Motahari also wrote of reasserting Islamic values in a changing social atmosphere and his writings were in response to reformist intellectuals who were pushing a Western lifestyle. Women are weaker and more easily excited, whereas men are slaves to their sexual drives. Motahari also believed that the chadur the veil was indispensable for the good of society. The chadur strengthens the institute of marriage, for it encourages youth to marry young and fulfill their sexual desires by increasing sexual tension. Islamic Fundamentalism was growing rapidly, spreading across Iran. From late to latent confrontation between the ulama and the regime became more intense. The conflict finally came to a head in , and mass urban demonstrations began in

opposition to the regime. A mere three days after his departure, the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran. The only difference was that marriages now had to be registered, the minimum marriage age for women was set at 15, and women were allowed to include the right to divorce in their marriage contracts. None of these changes questioned either the treatment of women or the cultural beliefs surrounding marriage. The Shah was not ready to risk the anger the ulama and religious factions of Iran by totally departing from Islamic law. Although a lot of legal changes were made during the Pahlavi era, as we will see they actually brought about little change to Iran, specifically women. In the Shah issued a law forcing Iranians to wear more Western clothing, which was followed by another law in requiring European hats. Reza Shah took this law one step further in , banning women from wearing the chadur. Reza Shah implemented his unveiling plan with caution, taking several steps to prepare the public for it. Although he had been toying with the idea of abolishing the chadur as far back as , he waited until February 1, to proceed with his plan. Ataturk also enacted similar unveiling laws in Turkey, but the difference between the two was while the Shah used coercion and force to unveil women, Ataturk used a method of encouragement, requesting that women remove their chadur, not requiring it. To these women it signified backwardness and subjugation. The magazines were only publishing the opinions of one specific group of women. For many women, however, the chadur was not a sign of oppression, but protection from strange eyes. The unveiling had negative effects for certain groups of Iranian women, especially older women. It was unthinkable for them to go out in public unveiled, and many women became isolated in their homes. Being unveiled, to them, was equal to nudity. They became dependent on their family members to run their errands and do all their tasks that required being in the public eye. The unveiling law was short lived, however, diminishing when the Shah left Iran in The women who chose to reveil did so for several reasons. For one, the waning of the law was not caused by a lack of enforcement, but rather a lack of a socialization process to discard the wearing of the veil. A second reason women chose to reveil themselves ties into the first. Many women were forced to reveil themselves because of the strong social pressures that had developed as the people of Iran never came to accept the unveiling policies that were implemented. The FPA was meant to put all family issues through the courts, rather than having them handled personally. It made changes in several different fields, including divorce, marriage and sigeh temporary marriage. The FPA laws of did not expressly repeal any articles of the Civil Code, but prevailed when a conflict arouse. One of the most radical changes that the FPA made was raising the minimum marriage age of men and women to twenty and eighteen respectively. According to a ten year study of the Iran Fertility Survey conducted in , more than 50 percent of Iranian women marry before the age of 17 and the remaining 50 percent are mostly married by the age of Only 6 percent were married between the ages of 19 and Under Islamic law a man is allowed to take up to four wives, so long as he is able to treat his wives equally. The FPA made some slight amendments to this law. According to the FPA of a man could not take a second wife without the permission of the courts. In the revised FPA added a second stipulation, requiring the permission of the first wife also be obtained. Under the FPA polygamy became a state more legally difficult to achieve, since men could no longer marry a second wife without the consent of the courts or his first wife. This law had little impact on women for three reasons. The new FPA version of polygamy also did not differ all that much from Koranic law. Behnaz Pakizegi writes that, Owing primarily to financial and social dependency, the first wife often feels that she has no choice but to consent. Through various threats and pressures, the husband often gets his way. The worst threat is often that he will divorce her to marry the other, and few women want to be divorced, left unsupported, and suffer the resulting social stigma. The second reason that the restrictions on polygamy were ineffective is because polygamy was not widely practiced; in fact it was quite rare. The changes only affected a minute group of people in Iran. They followed the Koran, IV, 3, which states, "if you fear you will not be equitable, then only one. The FPA also put more restrictions on sigeh. Since all marriages had to be registered under the new Family Protection Acts, any temporary marriages were not acknowledged. Divorce was another important issue that was tackled. Under Koranic law Muslim men could unilaterally divorce their wives. Two witnesses had to be present at the divorce to try to reconcile the couple, but this

practice was rarely enforced. Women, however, could only apply for divorce under very limited circumstances. Under the FPA laws divorce was only granted through the courts, and only when it was apparent that no reconciliation could be achieved. Five other stipulations for divorce were also added; imprisonment of either the husband or wife for a specific duration, addiction, remarriage of the husband without permission of the wife, abandonment, or a court decision that either spouse might hurt the family prestige on either side. Although this did add more grounds under which a woman could be divorced, the laws now also held true for husbands. This is an example of another area where the Shah was making a compromise. He was unwilling to give women any independent rights of men. The FPA laws were also not very revolutionary, since they mimicked Islamic law. Article 16, of the FPA, is another law which was not altered to reflect the modernization that Reza Shah was looking for. But the divorce statistics indicate otherwise.

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Abdesselem Mahmoud Sciknow Publications Ltd. OJSSR , 2 2: Public sphere is steadily growing but seems barely auto- nomous with regard to the State hegemony on society. The hegemony of patriarchal mentality makes public sphere subjugated to the former regime authoritarian institutions. There is antinomy conflict between communitarian social bonds and liberal indi- vidualism, and somewhat, between the local culture and modern universal values. We wonder if achieving a new constitution and implementing the road map requisitesunderpina steady democracy? Otherwise, economic downturn and unsustainable devel- opment would entail the democratic process failure. Obedience, allegiance and subjugation to the ruling power are broken by the social uprising and have paved the way to the development of a public sphere, advocating free discourse. Though, civil society activists claim neutralizing State institutions, separation and balance of powers in order to ensure a suc- cessful democratic transition by fair and free elections. The opposition parties and independent civil society power networks called for a national debate on the second phase of the democratic transitional process. Although, Tunisia succeeded to implement a con- sensus in drafting a final constitution approved by both secularists and Islamists. However, the democratic process is still vul- nerable and exposed to reversibility toward a new authoritarianism form of government. A real democratization needs a sus- tainable economic and social development along with a free public sphere. The modernization movement of Tunisian State and math of the December 17th, s and January 14th, the enlightened elite Keireddine Pachaiv, Tahar Haddadv, revolution, is not a trivial task. As an arena of free critical and Habib Bourguiba vi impregnated social, cultural and speech, public sphere should be approached without preju- political life. The question of identity emerged and came to dices or other common held conceptions in the public mind. I, therefore, do not mean by Moreover, we not only fail to understand the public sphere identity a sense of essential belonging, but rather an attempt to through relevant traditional writings, but we also fail to un- understand it in its plurality and multiculturalism Tay- derstand it from an essential point of view, reducing it to a lor, It is, in fact, a social and cultural construction. Both approaches matter in The traditional separation of public polis or roman Res tackling the ultimate significance of public sphere. Publicas and private oikos household , between intimate and public concerns, is over. The modernization process in Tunisia had broken this dichotomy. Modernism, as a philos- 1. Introduction ophy advocated by the enlightened elite of the eighteenth The dearth of studies on public sphere and power is due to the century, had certainly its impact on the Arab world. As I said lack of freedom under the former regime. In Tunisia, tradi- above, the modernization project dates from the nineteenth century reforms of Kheireddine Pacha. So, we cannot apply Open Journal of Social Science Research 53 blindly the Greek or roman schema of public sphere to Tuni- We will explain how Tunisian women liberation movement sia; it could be relevant in our analyses of the topic but they evolved from nationalist concerns to the struggle for more are not sufficient if we neglect the endogenous, ethnographic social, economic and cultural rights until nineties when fe- and anthropologic factors. They are valuable for analyzing the public sphere in Tunisia, but also the cultural identity and the historic process of Arab and 2. Public space was characterized by rift in public matters very much in addressing power and public sphere. Civil society, as a counter power, was Many incentives exist in Tunisia to achieve modernity and closely controlled and denied the freedom of expression and exclusive democracy. Does Islam represent an anti democracy demonstration in public. Seyla Abderrahmane IbnKhaldoundefined power as a reign, Benhabib stated in an online article: IbnKhaldoun stressed also free judgment wonder who rejoices that Arab revolutions fail? A member is inferior to that of the second generation; in ; Foucault,;Bourdieu, to name but a few. Did as much the one who relies blindly on tradition is thought to the

old forms of hegemony, authority and power disappear in be inferior to that who exercises independent judgment. Should political legiti- Seemingly, Social change in Tunisian society witnessed a macy come from elections or consensus? Tunisia succeeded shift from a tribal community to a modern one characterized to achieve a new constitution. Is it a guarantee that process by urban growth 67 per cent in Though, involve a free public sphere in Tunisia. In fact, public sphere authoritarian hegemony of political power marked public life. Tunisian modern State is deeply rooted in history. While It is, then, a discursive and communicative one; continually some religious figures consider it to be intrusive in Islamic critical. Benhabib, The liberal model Rawls,; societies, the State continues to exist. The exercise of power ciently relevant to better understand the public sphere. Some scholars in Tunisia and elsewhere won- tells, Cyberspace has been blurring along rized by sharing allegiance and obedience between State with physical one, as do religion and secularism. The plethoric hegemony of the one party system and its when it is a matter of democratic States in the Islamic world. Despite Third, gender issue matters too much in the public sphere. The main reason of this is unequal economic devel- without the help of the social mechanisms capable of pro- opment between regions and social groups. In fact, there is a ducing this complicity based on misrecognition, which is the significant gap between the mainland and the coastal areas basis of all authority. The attempt, in Weberian terms, failed and we observe today a hegemony is also symbolic. The revolutionary process entails emergence of a new authoritarianism specter. RachedGhannouchi Ennahdha leader witnesses the conti- In Tunisia, public debate was focusing on the legitimacy nuity of patriarchal power, nepotism, and a-historical vision of the new power in the new constitution drafts. The issue of social changes processes. Is Khaldounian model of power opposed religious and secularists political actors. This ter- seems, somehow, still operative to understand post revolution minological dichotomy seems to lack sufficient validity to ruling power in Tunisia. For the formers, Tunisian State sufficient to understand the power phenomenon in Tunisia. A no separation between the sacral and the profane in Islam. The big and strong tribe having certain qualities such as promi- latters claim a strict separation of religion and State. Religion nence, bravery, harshness, etc. This debate tribes and took power. The reign evolves over gen- erations, representing the natural age of person at that time 3. Public Sphere, Civil Society: During four phases, the reign is born, flourishes, and Flows weakens and ultimately collapses. Max Weber analyzed the To be free, the public sphere must be continually critical. This domination by social honor regimes. As tance, regardless of the basis on which this probability Manuel Castells argued: This is because triarchal totalitarian forms of power spreading out within state autonomy can only be insured by the capacity to organize in institutions. According to Michel Foucault, power is exerted the free space of communication networks, but at the same on people to subject and discipline them. The space of autonomy is the places of marginalization and disciplinary institutions Fou- new spatial form of networked social movements. The traditional and symbolic powers of religious The In a globalized network society, information and com- collective imaginary, encompassing myths and symbols, feed munication roles matter too much in social movements. Cas- the political discourse. The first con- would govern as the sixth caliph Omar IbnAbdelaziz ix. The latter was a trigger that set off protests that Salafists x remind him of his youth. The occupying movement is the ultimo of communicative action, rather than its basis. In the aftermath of Tunisian revolution, the public against the powerful ruling minority. We can deduce that in the era of globalization and infor- Aziz Amamou et Sabri ben Mlouka bloggers accused of drug mational society, the powers by-pass Nation-state and many consumption. It considers bloggers activism as disorderly transnational urban nodes of flows involved the network conducts. The court had pleaded not guilty. The activists were powers centralized in main metropolises Sassen, and freed thanks to civil society action. Street movements nineteenth century when Kheireddine Pacha undertook re- are in fact tributary to the information flows when space is forms within the State. Tahar Haddad wrote and fought for conceived, perceived and lived. Since sixties, nationalists, communists, and Islamists movements opposed against Bourguiba authoritarian policies. Islam and Public sphere in Tunisia In the aftermath of the revolution, political forces express It is a known fact that Islam regulates the public sphere of its freely and public sphere is growing but the latter is not com- followers,

including Arab societies. Public discourse blurred pletely independent from the government power hegemony. Secularism does not contradict religion The Zine al Abidine Ben Ali authoritarian regime entailed in the public sphere Habermas, ; Calhoun, ; Ben- outrage of many powerlessness people. The traditional and habib, ; Taylor, to cite but a few. The immigration from Hence, among many Tunisians living in diaspora, begun a Mecca to Medina marked a transition from Bedouin to urban twitter and Facebook bloggers movement criticizing the Islam. Many inde- main sources of Islam. Two main sects exist in the Muslim pendent civil society activists dared to oppose against Ben community Umma: He dared to criticize dictatorship of Zine El Abidine nity has difficulty to adapt to the new planetarium civiliza- Ben Ali. The authorities strengthen and tighten their control tional conditions. The author distinguishes on Internet. Many bloggers used proxy driver to protect their between two levels: Some youth engagement and action. The tion Kerrou, s. The uprising had grown since Mohamed author advocates using hermeneutic in interpreting the Quran. Bouazizi set himself in fire in December 17th, s at his In matter of Islam, Islamists admit that there is no dis- hometown SidiBouzid because a woman police agent con- tinction between faith and action, either between sacral and fiscated his vegetables pushcart. The outrage overspread all profane.

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