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Chapter 1 : Manners of Interpretation

3 Open Questions, Confirmation Questions, and how to Choose which Sentence-type to Use when Asking them 4 Quantifiers, Wh-expressions, and Manners of Interpretation 5 Syntactic Structure.

Quantifiers are used at the beginning of noun phrases: However, the quantifiers alland both are found immediately before the or a possessive pronoun: You will also see the following combinations of quantifiers: Many andmuch tend to be rather formal in use and are therefore often found in legal documents, academic papers and so on; in speech we often use phrases like a lot of, loads of, tons of, hundreds of. Few, little Again, the meaning of these two words is similar since they both refer to small quantities, except that few is found with C nouns and little with U nouns. If they are used without the indefinite article, a, they have the sense of not enough and are negative in feeling few events, little interest but these are quite formal and we would normally prefer not many events and not much interest. When few and little are used witha they simply mean a small quantity with no extra negative overtones: Any Any can be used before countable and uncountable nouns usually in questions and negativesentences: Are you bringing any friends with you? Do you have any coffee? If we stress the word any heavily when speaking, we are suggesting an unlimited choice from a range of things or an unrestricted quantity; in this case its use is not confined to just questions and negatives: Help yourself to any sandwiches. I have some coffee. Like any it is used before both C and U nouns, and means an indefinite quantity but not a large amount. The general rule given above for the use of any in negative sentences and questions does not always hold in requests and offers where we often use some to mean a small amount of a known quantity: Would you like some cake? Could I have some biscuits instead? I like some Beatles songs. But certainly not all! I can see some difference. But not a lot!

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Chapter 2 : Asking Questions - Robert Fiengo - Oxford University Press

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Classical Quantificational Logic What is now a commonplace treatment of quantification began with Frege , where the German philosopher and mathematician, Gottlob Frege, devised a formal language equipped with quantifier symbols, which bound different styles of variables. He formulated axioms and rules of inference, which allowed him to represent a remarkable range of mathematical argumentation. The vocabulary of classical quantificational logic is often supplemented with an identity predicate to yield the classical theory of quantification with identity. It contains predicate letters of various sorts: Sentence letters are 0-place predicates. There is, in addition to this, an infinite stock of variables with or without subscripts: The definition of a formula of the language of pure quantificational logic proceeds recursively as follows. In fact, we will often write that they lie within the scope of the initial quantifier. A sentence is a closed formula of the language. For Frege, objects are the appropriate values for singular variables, and a concept is what is referred to by a predicate. In particular, concepts are functions, which map objects into truth values. In what follows, we look at what is now a common axiomatization of pure quantificational logic. This axiom system adopts all tautologies of propositional logic as axioms and modus ponens as a rule of inference, and it supplements them with two more axiom schemata and a rule of universal generalization. The first two axiom schemata are: To complete the axiomatization, we need to add a rule of universal generalization: This principle is not without consequence. Some have found these consequences objectionable on the grounds that the existence of an object should not be derivable from logic alone. Alfred Tarski developed what is now known as a model theory for a wide range of formal languages. We recall some definitions from the entry on model theory. Truth in a model is then defined in terms of satisfaction. Since the axioms of pure quantificational logic are valid and the rules of inference preserve validity, all theorems of pure quantificational logic are valid. The entry on classical logic outlines a proof. This is a simple corollary of Completeness. There is a generalized form as well. Model-theoretic interpretations are sets: But since modern set theory proves that there is no universal set, no model can ever interpret the quantifiers by means of a universal domain of discourse. It may seem, then, that there are interpretations of the language of pure quantificational logic to which no model corresponds. And this raises the question of whether truth in all models may fall short of truth under all interpretations of the language. Fortunately, there is an elegant argument due to Georg Kreisel , which tells us that we can safely restrict attention to set-based models for the specification of the set of validities of pure quantificational logic: The argument is a simple application of Completeness. The challenge, however, is to argue for the converse. There are, first, individual constants, and, second, singular terms, which result from the combination of a function symbol with an appropriate number of singular terms. In addition to this, classical quantificational logic with identity makes provision for a special identity predicate. Before we modify the definition of formula for the expanded language, we may give a recursive definition of a term of the language of the classical theory of quantification and identity. At this point, we may adapt the usual recursive definition of formula for the expanded language. The axioms of classical quantificational logic with identity include axioms for quantification and axioms for identity. The other set of axioms concerns identity. In particular, we will supplement the axioms for quantification with an axiom, I1 , and an axiom schema, I2 , designed to govern the identity predicate: When combined, they enable one to derive the symmetry and transitivity of identity as immediate consequences. We now define satisfaction in terms of denotation. The definitions of truth in a model and validity carry over from pure quantificational logic. The entry on first-order model theory offers an in-depth examination of these and other meta-theoretic results for classical quantificational logic with identity. Departures from Classical Quantificational Logic In what follows, we look at three rival accounts of quantification in modern logic. They are departures from classical quantification logic because they reject some of classical axioms of quantification or because they question some aspect of the Tarskian model theory we have used to interpret the language of classical quantification logic. To the extent to which logic should remain neutral in ontological matters, the axioms of pure quantificational logic should not by themselves be able to prove that there is something rather than nothing. From a model-theoretic perspective, the exclusion of the empty domain as an eligible domain for a model may likewise seem artificial. In the absence of identity, by itself, this change results in an inadequate axiomatization of pure quantificational logic, one which cannot yield every instance of a permutation principle discussed by Fine The permutation principle, however, becomes redundant in the presence of axioms for identity. The axiomatization of classical quantification logic with identity that emerges from the substitution is discussed by Lambert with a different motivation in mind: This motivation has given rise to a variety of alternatives to the classical theory of quantification and identity that are generally subsumed under the label free logic. Some free logics qualify as inclusive quantificational logics, but not all do. To the extent to which the motivations are different, such differences are only to be expected. The entry on free logic discusses a variety of options for free logic. Despite the differences in interpretation, there is an important connection between intuitionistic and classical propositional logic. For a summary of this and related facts, the reader may consult the entry on intuitionistic logic. Now, intuitionistic quantificational logic may be motivated by the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of the quantifiers: Indeed, the two quantifiers must remain part of the primitive vocabulary of intuitionistic quantificational logic. The intuitionistic axioms of quantification include counterparts of the classical axioms of universal instantiation and existential generalization: We have a rule of universal generalization: Details are given in Moschovakis For a taste of what Kripke models can do, consider: So, i is not intuitionistically valid. It follows that ii is not intuitionistically valid either. These and similar examples are discussed in Burgess This characterization of substitutional quantification allows for substitutional variables of different syntactic categories, whether singular terms, predicates or sentences. Indeed, substitutional quantification is often used to mimic quantification into predicate and sentence position of the kinds discussed later in this entry. Early work on substitutional quantification was developed in Marcus but it soon became the subject of debate in the next two decades as philosophers made use of substitutional quantification in ontology and the philosophy of language and mathematics. Belnap and Dunn , Parsons , and Kripke are some of the relevant papers in the debate. For a sense of some of the purported applications of substitutional quantification, the reader may consult the essays collected in Gottlieb For additional discussion, see Hand But in this respect, however, the language of arithmetic is the exception and not the rule. In real analysis, for example, there are too many objects in the domain to have a name in a countable language. To acknowledge this is of course not to claim that the intended interpretation of substitutional quantification is one on which it is merely objectual quantification over linguistic expressions. But just what the intended interpretation of the substitutional quantifier might be has been the subject of intense controversy. Indeed, van Inwagen and Fine , for example, have each argued that there is no separate intended interpretation we can understand independently from our grasp of objectual quantification over linguistic expressions of the relevant sort. A form is an atomic preformula, where the replacement of its substitutional variables with terms yields back a sentence. In particular, Kripke notes that when the quantifiers of a valid sentence of pure quantificational logic are suitably rewritten as substitutional quantifiers, we obtain a valid sentence in the language of pure substitutional quantificational logic. Extensions of Classical Quantificational Logic Each departure from classical quantificational logic we have considered originated from an objection to either axioms of pure quantificational logic or the Tarskian definition of satisfaction in a model by an assignment of objects to the variables of the language. We now take both for granted and look at proposed extensions of classical quantificational logic with new styles of quantification. Each extension will generally require us to add new axioms for the new styles of quantification and to expand the Tarskian definition of truth in a model in terms of satisfaction. Other cardinality quantifiers, however, do increase the expressive power of classical quantifical logic. Two more cardinality quantifiers that have been studied in the literature are the Chang quantifier and the

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Rescher quantifier: Of special interest in the philosophy of language is the case of Russellian definite descriptions, which can be subsumed under the category of a binary quantifier: In arithmetic, for example, we may want to be able to quantify over natural numbers and sets thereof and we may find it convenient to classify the individual variables of the language into at least two categories. In a many-sorted language with functional symbols and individual constants, each singular term would be assigned a single sort. If we want identity, we need to include an identity predicate for each sort of a variable and insist on each such predicate to be flanked only by singular terms of the appropriate sort. To accommodate the new styles of variables in the model theory for many-sorted logic, we may add a domain for each style of variable. The metatheory for many-sorted logic is closely related to the metatheory for classical quantificational logic. Details may be found in Enderton However, the move to a many-sorted language is largely a matter of convenience. Many-sorted quantification may be analyzed in terms of restricted one-sorted quantification. We may set out to translate each formula of the many-sorted language into a formula of the one-sorted language: Still, even if there is no real gain in expressive power, one reason to flag the availability of many-sorted quantification is because some of the extensions of classical quantificational logic to be examined below are closely related to certain theories couched in the language of two-sorted logic. In particular, second-order logic and the theory of plural quantification will be each closely related to two first-order two-sorted theories, which lack the expressive resources often attributed to each extension of classical quantificational logic. The second-order version of universal generalization becomes: To make sure, we may rely on an axiom of second-order comprehension: The definitions of truth in a model and validity proceed exactly as in the first-order case. The entry on second-order and higher-order logic provides more detail and gives some indication of the complexity of the set of valid second-order formulas in the standard model theory for second-order logic. The entry on second-order and higher-order logic provides concrete illustrations of these facts.

Chapter 3 : Quantifiers - English Grammar

Manners of Interpretation is an essay on ways of ending interpretations in literary studies as well as on patterns of controversy and consensus in the humanities. Tamen examines two major families of indisputable arguments in post-Enlightenment literary criticism and addresses the question of how one recognizes the proper time to use a given argument, especially and specifically an indisputable argument.

Chapter 4 : Asking Questions : Robert Fiengo :

Asking Questions examines a central phenomenon of language -- the use of sentences to ask questions. Although there is a sizable literature on the syntax and semantics of interrogatives, the logic of questions, and the speech act of questioning, no one has tried to put the syntax and semantics together with the speech acts over the full range of phenomena we pretheoretically think of as asking.

Chapter 5 : BBC Bitesize - GCSE French - Expressions of quantity - quantifiers and intensifiers - Revision :

First, regarding (1) noncount means, phrasal quantifiers provide a means of imposing countability on noncount nouns as the following partitive expressions illustrate: general partitives, as in plenty of, a lot of, lots of, a great/good deal of, a large/small quantity/amount of, a great/large/good number of.

Chapter 6 : Asking questions : using meaningful structures to imply ignorance (eBook,) [calendrierdelascie

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the kinds of ignorance, including the kind of ignorance addressed by asking an open question and the kind addressed by asking a confirmation question.

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Chapter 7 : Quantifier (logic) - Wikipedia

We use the quantifiers much, many, a lot of, lots of to talk about quantities, amounts and degree. We can use them with a noun (as a determiner) or without a noun (as a pronoun). We can use them with a noun (as a determiner) or without a noun (as a pronoun).

Chapter 8 : 29 FREE ESL manners worksheets

'Asking Questions' advances our understanding of a wide range of issues in a number of important respects. Scholars and students of linguistics and philosophy will find plenty to interest them in this pioneering work.

Chapter 9 : Table of contents for Asking questions

Asking Questions examines a central phenomenon of language - the use of sentences to ask questions. Although there is a sizable literature on the syntax and semantics of interrogatives, the logic of "questions", and the speech act of questioning, no one has tried to put the syntax and semantics together with the speech acts over the full range of phenomena we pretheoretically think of as.