

Chapter 1 : Newest 'vsepr-theory' Questions - Chemistry Stack Exchange

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Steve de Shazer and Berg, primary developers of the approach, co-authored an update of SFBT in , [3] shortly before their respective deaths. The solution-focused approach was developed inductively rather than deductively; Berg, de Shazer and their team [7] spent thousands of hours carefully observing live and recorded therapy sessions. Any behaviors or words on the part of the therapist that reliably led to positive therapeutic change on the part of the clients were painstakingly noted and incorporated into the SFBT approach. Solution-focused therapists see the therapeutic change process quite differently. Informed by the observations of Steve de Shazer, [8] recognizing that although "causes of problems may be extremely complex, their solutions do not necessarily need to be". SF therapists and counselors deliberately refrain from making interpretations [3] and rarely confront their clients. To support this approach, detailed questions are asked about how the client managed to achieve or maintain the current level of progress, any recent positive changes and how the client developed new and existing strengths, resources, and positive traits; [2] [3] and especially, about any exceptions to client-perceived problems. Solution-focused therapists believe personal change is already constant. Differences and similarities between the two occasions are examined. By bringing small successes to awareness, and supporting clients to repeat their successful choices and behaviors, when the problem is not there or less severe, therapist facilitate client movement towards goals and preferred futures they have identified. There have been 77 empirical studies on the effectiveness of SFBT, There are been 2 meta-analyses Kim, ; [14] Stams, et al, [15] , 2 systematic reviews. There is a combined effectiveness data from over cases. Research was all done in "real world" settings "effectiveness" vs. SFBT is equally effective for all social classes. Effect-sizes are in the low to moderate range, the same that are found in meta-analyses for other evidence-based practices, such as CBT and IPT. That is, the more collegial and collaborative approach of SFBT does not involve confrontation or interpretation, nor does it even require the acceptance of the underlying tenets, as do most other models of psychotherapy. Given its equivalent effectiveness, shorter duration, and more benign approach, SFBT is considered to be an excellent first-choice evidenced-based psychotherapy approach for most psychological, behavioral, and relational problems. A traditional version of the miracle question would go like this: The strange question is this: It will be time to go to bed. Everybody in your household is quiet, and you are sleeping in peace. In the middle of the night, a miracle happens and the problem that prompted you to talk to me today is solved! But because this happens while you are sleeping, you have no way of knowing that there was an overnight miracle that solved the problem. Where are you now? What will be the first things that will let you know you are 1 point higher? In this way the miracle question is not so much a question as a series of questions. There are many different versions of the miracle question depending on the context and the client. In a specific situation, the counselor may ask, "If you woke up tomorrow, and a miracle happened so that you no longer easily lost your temper, what would you see differently? So, the counselor may ask the client, "What will you be doing instead when someone calls you names? Scaling and measuring are useful tools to identify differences for clients. Goals and progress towards goals are often facilitated by subjective measuring and scaling. SFBT is famous for inviting clients to get very specific about such subjective measuring and scaling; for example, by asking questions that invite clients to establish their own polarity; and then, measure their progress "forwards and backwards" towards the more desirable pole. SFBT innovated language to make this invitation to more internal rigor sound natural to clients: What is "the worst the problem has ever been? What is "the best things could ever possibly be? The client is asked to rate their current position on their own scale. Questions are used to elicit useful details of behavior to measure by, resources and support e. Clients are then invited to calibrate their own progress precisely e. What would a day at that point on the scale feel like; what would you do differently? The counselor seeks to encourage the client to identify these occurrences and maximize their frequency. What

happened that was different? What did you do that was different? The goal is for clients to repeat what has worked in the past, and support confidence in taking more and more "baby steps" towards their ideal scenes. This concept and practice was influenced by Milton Erickson. Coping questions[edit] Coping questions are designed to elicit information about client resources that will have gone unnoticed by them. Even the most hopeless story has within it examples of coping that can be drawn out: How do you do that? An initial summary "I can see how things have been really difficult for you" is for them true and validates their story. The second part "you manage to get up each morning etc. Undeniably, they cope and coping questions start to gently and supportively challenge the problem-focused narrative. Problem-free talk[edit] Solution-focused therapists attempt to create a judgement-free zone for clients where what is going well, what areas of life are problem-free are discussed. Problem-free talk can be useful for uncovering hidden resources, to help the person relax, or become more naturally pro-active, for example. Solution-focused therapists may talk about seemingly irrelevant life experiences such as leisure activities, meeting with friends, relaxing and managing conflict. This often uncovers client values, beliefs and strengths. From this discussion the therapist can use these strengths and resources to move the therapy forward. For example; if a client wants to be more assertive it may be that under certain life situations they are assertive. This strength from one part of their life can then be transferred-generalized to another area where new behavior is desired. Perhaps a client is struggling with their child because the child gets aggressive and calls the parent names. This could lead to discussion of using kindness, patience and consistency to create healthy boundaries the child might cooperate with. Dan Jones, in his *Becoming a Brief Therapist* book writes: It also relaxes them and helps build rapport, and it can give you ideas to use for treatment Everybody has natural resources that can be utilised. These might be events The idea behind accessing resources is that it gives you something to work with that you can use to help the client to achieve their goal This focus helps the client construct narratives as internally competent and externally supported. Expanding language here often identifies new ways to bring existing resources to bear upon present problems. Therapists empower clients to identify their own resources by way of scaling questions, problem-free talk, and during exception-seeking. Resources can be Internal: History[edit] Solution-focused brief therapy is one of a family of approaches, known as systems therapies, that have been developed over the past 50 years or so, first in the US, and eventually evolving around the world, including Europe. Many of the concepts of brief therapy were independently discovered by several therapists, in their own practices, over several decades in the s notably Milton Erickson , as described by authors such as Haley, and became popularized in the s and s. Solution-focused brief therapy has branched out in numerous spectrums â€” indeed, the approach is now known in other fields as simply solution focus or solutions-oriented therapy. Most notably, the field of addiction counseling has taken up SFBT as one of the most cost-effective means to treat problem drinking. Johns Hopkins University , the Center for Solutions in Cando, ND, and notable others, have implemented SFBT as part of their program, where they use it as part of a partial hospitalization and in residential treatment facility for both adolescents and adults. The field of Christian pastoral counseling has also seen solution-focused brief therapy make inroads into its practices where it is referred to as solution-focused pastoral counseling [19] or brief pastoral counseling. What are grounds for optimism? When does your perfect future happen, even a little bit? How did you make that happen? Where in your life have you overcome similar problems? Who believes you could do this? What other resources do you have that can help? Supposed the problem went away overnight: How would you know? What would you notice was different? Describe concrete observable behaviours â€” from different points of view: What would you like to happen? What was the best you ever did at this thing? What would your family, your partner, your friends and strangers notice is different about you? What will be difference since your last catch up with me? Counseling[edit] Solution-focused counseling is a solution-focused brief therapy model. Various similar, yet distinct, models have been referred to as solution-focused counseling. For example, Jeffrey Guterman developed a solution-focused approach to counseling in the s. This model is an integration of solution-focused principles and techniques, postmodern theories, and a strategic approach to eclecticism. Consulting[edit] Solution-focused consulting is an approach to organizational change management that is built upon the principles and practices of solution-focused therapy. While therapy is for individuals and families,

solution-focused consulting is being used as a change process for organizational groups of every size, from small teams to large business units. Hypnotherapy[edit] A contemporary therapy linking the solution-focused brief therapy model back to the hypnotherapy of Milton H Erickson, the hypnotherapist who inspired Steve de Shazer and Insoo Kim Berg.

Chapter 2 : Theory-theory - Wikipedia

Another notable development is Skow , which begins with two key ideas: first, that a theory of explanation ought to be a theory of answers to why-questions, and, second, that a theory of answers to why-questions is a theory of reasons-why.

The Jewish people has suffered so much that greater affliction is inconceivable. Regarded objectively, our situation today, compared with the suffering experienced by our forefathers, can almost be envied, and there is every reason to believe that as time goes by our troubles will diminish. This gives support to the optimists among us, who take a hopeful view of the future in their opposition to Zionist action that aims to bring about a radical change in our situation and to put an end to the Galut episode with all its achievements. These optimists, since they value these achievements, try to prove to us that there is no need to be alarmed by the slowness of progress, on which they pin rosy hopes. Objectively speaking, our position is already assured in a number of respects. The Inquisition“it is safe to assume“will not be renewed. Nor will mass expulsions ever occur again. But can the same be said when the question is viewed subjectively? On the basis of numerous experiments, psychologists have laid down the so-called Weber-Fechner Law, according to which the intensity of a sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus. If we translate this law from the language of mathematics to the language of life, it means that sensation increases at a much slower rate than the changes that take place in the environment, that as time goes by the individual pays less and less attention to these changes. This explains the well-known fact that the most oppressed people are the least sensitive to their plight; they are content with their lot and only rarely complain. The surest way of making a slave dissatisfied and demanding is to alleviate the harshness of his lot. Some claim that our position has improved. But this very improvement has made us more sensitive: The hostility of the environment, the restriction of civil rights, the pogroms, which in the past were facts of life we learned to live with, now strike us as horrible disasters. Our optimists fail to grasp this; for them progress has the brightness of the sun. But in reality, through the hazy glass of the Weber-Fechner Law, its light is becoming ever dimmer. We have acquired more culture; we have lost our earlier faith in the world to come, in redemption by the Messiah, in our divine election“by virtue of which we allowed ourselves to look down on other nations, ignore their humiliating attitude, and regard it as conduct of creatures greatly inferior to us; hence they were unable, even by their most barbarous deeds, to upset our composure. One does not despair or lose his self-confidence just because he has been bitten by a dog. Today it is no longer a dog but ourselves who bite us, and his insults injure our honor. Formerly, religion and the ghetto constituted a wall that protected us against the enemy; but that protective wall has been undermined, and like all peoples of culture we have become sensitive to every affront to our rights, while externally our situation is much more difficult than theirs. Our optimists advise us to wait, to join forces with the progressive elements among the other nations, to help them in their struggle for the universal human ideal; they promise us and them victory over the reaction that oppresses us all. But we Jews must not wait“and we Zionists cannot wait Some among us fear that in the course of time, as a result of our stay in the Galut and the destructive effects of progress, the Jews will disintegrate and lose their national selfhood and national distinctiveness. Others say that the persecutions will not cease and the forces threatening us will assault us again after a short interval“half a century at the most“when they will attack with even greater ferocity. Finally, there are those who, disregarding these apprehensions and dangers, think that this is the most opportune time for the Jews in their struggle for self-expression and national distinctiveness to pass from the purely passive resistance they have practiced for eighteen centuries to concrete, territorial creation. In any event, all of us regard our position in the Galut as unstable and our prospects gloomy, not only from a subjective viewpoint but even from an objective-historical one. Be that as it may, it is our deep conviction that in the Galut there is no salvation for the Jewish people. We do not rely on progress; we know that its overpious proponents inflate its achievements out of all proportion. Progress is an important factor in the rapid development of technology, science, perhaps even of the arts, but certainly in the development of neurosis, hysteria, and prostitution. Of the moral progress of nations, of the end of the national egoism that is destroying“it is too soon about these. Progress is a two-edged sword. If the good angel in a man advances,

the Satan within him advances too. It is hard to say which is the more amazing in our optimists: They continue to sing hymns of praise to progress at a time when "cultured" England is cruelly grabbing from the Boers their last possessions—to the thunder of cannon and the applause of all classes of the English people; when "cultured" America is guilty of wanton despoliation of the Negroes; when Germany is threatening the entire world with its arrogant militarism; when the strong nations are prepared to trample one another for a piece of land in Turkey or China; while the weak nations groan in the world of the strong, yet pass up no opportunity to steal from one another or to demonstrate their might to peoples even weaker than they are. Most important, however, is that no one has yet succeeded in proving that he is right in trusting in the saving power of progress and in its real value. It has not yet been proved that the historical process, the development of nations and society, is progress. Is it not improper, when no one has yet succeeded in convincing us that such a thing actually exists. But let us assume that it is true that all of mankind—including inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, the Fiji Islanders, the Japanese and the Kurds, and the anti-Semites of all varieties—will all be pacified and accept the peaceful reign of progress. But even you will not deny that such happiness cannot be attained without war and battled, you know that this war, which began some time ago, has cost and will cost mankind much blood and tears. What, then, is the price that we Jews will have to pay for it? Let us take a small community, such as the Jews of Morocco. There are , Jews there, descendents of the exiles of Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of the stock which gave to Judaism generations of distinguished personalities—scholars, poets, philosophers, and rabbis. A group of such superior descent deserves particular attention. But if the achievements of your progress must be attained by rivers of blood, by the degradation and torture of those Jews, is not the price of this boundlessly cruel idol of yours too high? For whom is the progress of Morocco desired? For those very Moroccans who drank the blood of the Jews with such lust in the pogroms of and who violently abused women and children? The scraps of information available from the press show that the Moroccans have proved beyond any doubt that no upheaval will take place among them without bringing catastrophe to the Jews. Certainly, progress cannot pass Morocco by: European states have already laid their predatory hands on that primitive country. Is it conceivable that the achievements of civilization will not arouse the hostility of the Moroccan masses, who hate everything foreign or European? Will such a revolution not be the end of the Jews in that country? Will nationalist hatred not be directed against the defenseless Jews because it cannot be directed against the well-protected predators of Europe? And will the Moroccan authorities be able to prevent this bloodshed, even if they should want to come to the aid of the Jews? Will they even want to? Will they not be pleased to divert the national passions away from themselves to the line of least resistance? Remember that even during the civil war over the throne, the Jews served as an excellent lightning rod the moment popular resentment threatened to burst over the heads of the pretenders to the throne. The same fate awaits the Jews of Persia and the other Eastern countries. These Jews will pay with their lives for the first steps of militant progress. Meanwhile, the Jews of the Moslem countries are sitting on a volcano, and those wise enough to foresee the future, who have joined the Zionist movement, are well aware of the horror of the situation. This is another reason why the Zionists cannot—have no right—to wait. Certainly, let all the nations enjoy the fruits of progress, but we do not wish to be their scapegoat. Even if we lave the Galut mankind will pay in blood and tears for every upheaval that occurs in its history, except that Jewish blood is not taken into account—it only serves as amusement for the raging mob. There are thousands of Moslem and hundreds of thousands of Jews; let progress be content with the thousands of Moslems. It will be said that these fears are unreal. Such fears cannot arouse or give direction to a solid national movement, first because passing phenomena are liable to give rise to spontaneous eruptions rather than to conscious activity, and second, because a solid movement cannot expect quick success when immediate rescue from danger is called for. I agree with that entirely. I will go even further and say that the Jews in the past have been saved from graver dangers; they may have lost a tooth or an eye, but they have nevertheless been capable of a new and higher development. We are experienced in the tribulations of bondage. And it is not my intention, nor that of any thinking Zionist, to tie the need for the realization of our goal exclusively to the possibility of outbreaks of anti-Semitism. I trust I have shown how little good we are promised from this much-heralded progress. Now let us examine how our fate is affected by certain laws that

operate in society. One fundamental and practically unique impulse in the life of society is egoism. If, with the respect to the individual, there are grounds for arguing that man is not the miserly egoist depicted in certain ethical theories, the egoism of this group cannot be denied. On the other hand, nothing is done in the life of the society that is not to the advantage of the dominant classes who are in full control and have the power to forbid or permit. I do not mean to say that this unfair demarcation will exist forever, but no one can prove it is destined to change in the foreseeable future. For the time being it is a fact of life; although its force is gradually weakening, it still must be taken into account. This pure desire, which has nothing to do with the seeking of advantage, the desire to spread ideas, to impart feelings or ideals, is found in every person who related to his existence with any degree of religious feeling or awe, and who appreciates their value not for himself alone. A man scatters his spiritual treasures willingly, and in this respect often reveals a degree of generosity that borders on heroism. Those whose ideas are being persecuted, are prepared for any suffering and sacrifice that will provide them with victory. And those whose views already hold sway over the consciousness of the masses—even though they are incapable of attaining such spiritual heights—are zealous in making converts, and their generosity is tremendous. But my advice is to avoid becoming enthusiastic about such generosity; for spiritual possessions are not expropriable, and thus not only do not perish from this prodigality but even increase and improve in the process of preaching. By letting you share in my faith I may be giving you much, but I am still not depriving myself of anything. This is not the case with material or earthly possessions, measurable or not. Here man is generally not at all a squanderer, and social groups are even less so. It follows that every group is ready and willing to assimilate outsiders so long as it does not thereby surrender anything of its own, but faced with sharing material possessions with outsiders, no social group has as yet proved itself capable of such generosity. Let us examine the meaning of this ambition, so often encountered in history, on the part of some nations to assimilate others, and the national conflicts that result. Every living creature that wishes to live requires food to replace the energy lost in every motion. For this purpose, this body acquires its food. And just as the living creature, striving to expand its sphere of independent life draws and assimilates from without whatever he can swallow, without distinguishing between nonorganic parts and compounds on the one hand, and animals like itself on the other—so it is with society. Society, all of whose functions are designed to expand its patterns of life, imbibes energy both from the nonsocial area and from other national groups, and is limited only by its ability to conquer and incorporate them within its own flesh and blood. These foreign people have no importance in themselves for the society that assimilates them. All it requires of them is their possessions and functions. There have been groups, including some quite developed ones—not to mention tribes of ancient times—who would kill babies born with a defect that made it unlikely that they would ever be able to bring any benefit to the society. This was the practice in Sparta, for example. The direct assimilation of other peoples by swallowing up their possessions—their land and the culture that flourished there—is still the ambition of all peoples, even in our day. And it is not so long ago that nations also strove to assimilate the functions of weak groups by making slaves out of them, forcing them to serve without any hope of taking part in the division of the assets accumulated by the enslavers. For a contemporary example, it is enough to cite the minor fact that the enlightened Americans bar the gates of their land to immigrants who are ill or unable to work. There is no need to mention the base exploitation of the Indians by England. Here we must take account of the distinction between two cases so different from one another that the widespread failure to distinguish between them is enough to account for the current confusion concerning this matter.

Chapter 3 : Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and Emerging Issues

Questions of Modern Chess Theory is the lost masterpiece of Soviet chess literature. It was written by a double Ukrainian Champion, and published in the Soviet Union in

In both systems, the meaning of a question is a function from worlds to sets of propositions. As acknowledged by Karttunen, 10, the difference is inessential. In both cases, the meaning of a question is fully determined by—and could be identified with—the set of all propositions that correspond to a possible answer. Of course, they do provide a compositional semantics for a fragment of English, and thereby specify what they take to be the possible answers to the questions in that fragment. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: Only Paul and Nina are coming. Some girls from my class are coming. In principle, all the responses in 8a–d could be seen as possible answers to 8. For Hamblin and Karttunen, only 8a counts as such. However, it is not clear what the precise criteria are for being considered a possible answer, and on which grounds 8a is to be distinguished from 8b–d. The meaning of a question, then, is a function from worlds to propositions. These propositions have two special properties: So the meaning of a question can be identified with a set of propositions which form a partition of the logical space. This means that a partition semantics can in many cases be tested against clear intuitions, unlike a Hamblin semantics. It is not quite clear pre-theoretically which of these two options is more suitable. This may be considered a reason to pick the first option instead. However, this line of reasoning is purely theory-internal; it seems impossible to decide on theory-external grounds what the true exhaustive answers to a conditional question should be taken to be. Conditional questions like 9 also present another challenge for a partition semantics, concerning answers that deny the antecedent of the conditional in this case the answer that Ann is not coming. Intuitively, such answers dispel the issue raised by the question, but do not resolve the issue as intended. Their status differs from answers that do resolve the issue as intended in this case the answer that Bill is coming if Ann is coming, and the answer that Bill is not coming if Ann is coming. In a basic partition semantics it is impossible to capture this. In worlds where Ann is not coming, the answer that Ann is not coming presumably is the true exhaustive answer. Its special status, however, cannot be captured. A similar problem arises with alternative questions like In this case, the answer that neither Ann nor Bill is coming and the answer that Ann and Bill are both coming have a different status than the answer that only Ann is coming and the answer that only Bill is coming. Again, this difference in status cannot be captured in a simple partition semantics. All these theories essentially reformulate the partition theory of questions in the format of an update semantics Veltman This means that they explicitly identify meanings with context change potentials, i. However, unlike a simple update semantics where discourse contexts are modeled as sets of worlds—embodying the information established in the discourse so far—these theories provide a more refined model of discourse contexts, one that also embodies the issues that have been raised so far. Both assertions and questions can then be taken to have the potential to change the context in which they are uttered. Questions disconnect worlds, i. However, the framework inherits several issues from the classical partition theory of questions, in particular those discussed above concerning conditional and alternative questions. The overall architecture of their system is very much like that of the early dynamic systems discussed above, only indifference relations are no longer defined as equivalence relations, but rather as reflexive and symmetric not necessarily transitive relations. Groenendijk and Mascarenhas argued that this adjustment, besides addressing the conceptual issue concerning indifference relations discussed above, also allows for a better analysis of conditional questions and alternative questions. However, Ciardelli and Ciardelli and Roelofsen show that, although the proposed system indeed behaves better for simple cases, it does not scale up to more complex cases in a suitable way. In particular, whereas alternative questions with two disjuncts, like 10 above, are dealt with satisfactorily, or at least more satisfactorily than in a partition semantics, alternative questions with three or more disjuncts are still problematic. The gist of the problem can be illustrated with a simple example. Note that in this information state none of the atomic sentences is known to hold. Now consider an issue which is resolved just in case at least one of the atomic sentences is established, i. An issue that cannot be represented in the pair-semantics.

The problem with the system of Groenendijk and Mascarenhas is manifested by the fact that this issue cannot be represented by means of an indifference relation. In either case, however, the resulting issue does not correspond to the one depicted in Figure 1. The general conclusion that has been drawn from this problem, as discussed in detail by Ciardelli and Roelofsen, is that question meanings cannot be suitably modeled in terms of indifference relations, even if these indifference relations are allowed to be non-transitive. This insight has led to the development of an alternative logical notion of question meanings, which forms the cornerstone of the framework of inquisitive semantics, to be discussed below. Partition semantics Groenendijk and Stokhof does specify explicitly which responses should count as possible answers, namely only those that are true and exhaustive. In many cases, it is clear what the true and exhaustive responses to a given question are. However, this is not always the case, as witnessed by conditional and alternative questions. A natural way to proceed, then, is to consider another criterion for what should count as a possible answer. One natural criterion is the following. We could say that a response to a question counts as a proper answer just in case it resolves the issue that the question raises. If we adopt this criterion then we also have to impose a certain condition on question-meanings. That is, question-meanings cannot just be defined as arbitrary sets of propositions, as in the theories of Hamblin and Karttunen. Rather, they should be defined as downward closed sets of propositions. In this system, question meanings are defined as downward closed sets of propositions that together cover the entire logical space. There are many inquisitive question meanings that do not have this special property. The interested reader is referred to Ciardelli et al. Thus, the basic connectives disjunction, conjunction, implication, and negation can be associated with the basic algebraic operations on meanings join, meet, and relative pseudo-complementation, just as in classical logic. Below are pointers to some of these extensions. Such a notion of meaning is needed to suitably deal with alternative questions and which-questions. Roelofsen and Farkas develop an inquisitive semantics in which the meaning of a question does not only capture what is needed to resolve the issue raised by that question, but also which propositions are made available by the question for subsequent anaphoric reference. These propositions may serve as antecedents for polarity particles *e*. Finally, Ciardelli and Roelofsen, Ciardelli, and van Gessel develop a system that integrates inquisitive semantics with dynamic epistemic logic van Ditmarsch et al. It has been argued that question meanings as construed by proposition set theories are all too coarse-grained to account for certain linguistic phenomena. In order to address this issue, several theories have been developed that adopt more fine-grained, structured notions of question meanings. Such theories have been couched in different semantic frameworks, which are all more fine-grained than the standard possible world framework. For instance, the proposal of Krifka is couched in a structured meanings framework, that of Ginzburg and Sag in situation semantics, that of Ginzburg, Cooper and Ginzburg in type theory with records, that of Aloni et al. We will illustrate the general approach here by focusing on the proposal of Krifka, which in turn has its roots in earlier work of Hull, Tichy, Hausser, von Stechow and Zimmermann, von Stechow, and Ginzburg. For instance, the meaning assigned to 11a is 11b: It is not possible to go in the other direction, which means that structured question meanings have strictly more expressive power than proposition set meanings *e*. This additional expressive power is needed to account for certain phenomena. In a structured-meanings approach, the two questions are semantically distinguishable. This additional semantic fine-grainedness forms the basis for an account of polarity particle responses. Note that some of the extended implementations of inquisitive semantics *e*. As mentioned above, in these implementations the meaning of a question does not only capture what is needed to resolve the issue that the question raises, but also which propositions are made available by the question for subsequent anaphoric reference, for instance by polarity particles. In effect, capturing anaphoric potential also adds structure to question meanings. Thus, these implementations maintain a proposition set perspective, but at the same time address the need for richer semantic structures as well. Such a synthesis is also achieved in Aloni et al. There are a number of excellent recent handbook articles, each focusing on different aspects. For comparison of the latter approach with inquisitive semantics, see Ciardelli and Roelofsen and Ciardelli. Finally, Krifka provides an overview of the classical proposition set accounts, early implementations of inquisitive semantics, and the structured meanings approach, taking a more linguistic perspective than other overview articles. Krifka does not only discuss the semantics of questions, but also their

possible syntactic configurations and intonation patterns, supplying examples from a wide range of languages.

Why-questions For whether-questions indeed, for all elementary questions in the view of some, the question-answer relationship can be defined in purely formal terms. One approach to why-questions is to try to make the question-answer relationship formal in that case, too, or at least as formal as possible. The main proponent of this approach is Bromberger, whose account is also the first influential account of why-questions. Van Fraassen takes an opposite view, theorizing that the question-answer relationship is almost purely pragmatic. We consider both theories in some detail below. Bromberger introduces several concepts for use in his account: Bromberger supposes that 15 is the general form of a why-question: A general rule is a true or false law-like statement of the form: A special abnormic law is a true, law-like statement of the form: Special abnormic laws satisfy five additional conditions of non-triviality and non-redundancy that we need not get into, and Bromberger, 98 introduces the more complicated notion of a general abnormic law, which we may also ignore for present purposes. Bromberger, 98 illustrates the concept of an abnormic law with the following example: No sample of gas expands unless its temperature is kept constant but its pressure decreases, or its pressure is kept constant but its temperature increases, or its absolute temperature increases by a larger factor than its pressure, or its pressure decreases by a larger factor than its absolute temperature. Now consider the question: For example, consider a straight, foot high utility pole standing perpendicular to the ground. A taut foot wire is fastened to the top of the pole and to a point on the ground 30 feet from the base of the pole. Bromberger, argues that 22 does not count as a correct answer to 21 on his theory in part because the following is not an abnormic law: Rather, an explanation is just a description of reality that serves a contextually determined purpose, namely that of answering a why-question. He offers this theory in the context of developing his account of Constructive Empiricism.

Chapter 4 : Newest 'group-theory' Questions - Mathematics Stack Exchange

Interview candidates at Theory rate the interview process an overall positive experience. Interview candidates say the interview experience difficulty for Theory is average. Some recently asked Theory interview questions were, "Are you okay with taking charge in meetings and providing structure in chaos."

During the last decade social psychologists have debated about the development of the field. Much of this debate has focused on the theoretical integration or lack thereof which characterizes the discipline e. Discuss the nature of this debate and assess its relevance for the discipline. Compare and contrast the following: What are the central propositions or key concepts of each theory? What does each theory say are the primary influences on, or determinants of, behavior? Attitudes and behavior Discussion questions: Dissonance theory has been extremely important in shaping the field of social psychology. What are the central propositions of the theory? Under what circumstances do we expect cognitive dissonance to occur? Give an example of how you might use the theory to persuade a friend to agree with your opinion of a political candidate. Finally, if your friend did not change his or her opinion, how might that fact still be explained within the theory? Few teenagers intend to get pregnant, yet many do. How might attitude-behavior theory account for these discrepancies? Social influence and persuasion Discussion questions: Next semester, Notre Dame will co-sponsor Christmas in April. This one-day project will use volunteers to fix up the homes of the disadvantaged and elderly living in neighborhoods near the campus. Notre Dame is searching for ways to persuade students to participate in this project. Naturally, the administration has come to you, to get the benefit of your expert advice. Heuristic processes b Discuss how your chosen theory can be applied to this particular problem. Be sure to make it clear what things the theory says you should focus on, and specific strategies that the theory suggests. Explain how the theory might account for this. Notre Dame wants to set up a program to discourage drinking and drunken driving among undergraduate students. Using your knowledge of social influence and persuasion, advise the administration on each of the following: What can be done to make the sources most effective? What kinds of messages should be avoided? Be sure to discuss the possible uses of fear and attribution strategies. Language and communication Note: The students presenting will decide on any discussion questions and additional readings. I have never covered this topic before part of the reason I ma assigning it to students but it ties in with many of the previous topics, e. I have never covered this topic before, although it does have clear ties to many of the other topics discussed in this course. Compare and contrast the processes and outcomes of childhood socialization as conceptualized by cognitive-developmental theories and behavioral theories e. Describe in detail the social and psychological mechanisms by which the outlooks and behaviors of children are transformed and the ways in which socialization agents operate. Attribution theory Discussion questions: The literature on attribution processes identifies a number of "biases" in the processes by which we perceive other persons. In particular, to what extent and in what ways do these biases influence our perceptions of the identities and goals of those with whom we interact? Be sure to discuss the ways in which motivational and cognitive factors possibly affect attributions. What are some of the social and individual consequences of the types of attributions we make? According to your chosen theorys, what types of attributions do we make, and what determines why we make them? Explain how cognitive and motivational factors can cause us to be biased when making attributions. Stanley Milgram has said that "the most fundamental lesson of our study is that ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process. What insights does the research on conformity and obedience give us on why the atrocities of Nazi Germany occurred? To answer this question, you will want to consider what we now know about why and when people conform. You will then want to speculate about how the circumstances of the time or situation made possible the atrocities you are discussing. You can substitute other incidents from history if you prefer - for example, My Lai, the Stalinist purges, etc. Research on conformity and obedience has produced some of the most shocking results in social psychology. How and why do normative and information influence affect conformity? What are three or four of the most important factors that have been found to increase or decrease conformity? Group decision making Discussion

questions: Drawing on your knowledge of group decision-making processes, discuss the following: How might "groupthink" account for the real or alleged mistakes that were made? That is, what symptoms of groupthink appeared to be present? Look for evidence of such things as group polarization, conformity pressures, self-censoring, mindguards, etc. How could groupthink have been prevented? That is, what are some changes that could have been made in the decision-making process that might have led to better results? Lissa VanBebber will give a guest presentation on this topic. Discuss how two of the following are related to group productivity, and why. Pay particular attention to how these factors are related to increases or decreases in group productivity, and under what conditions. Depending on your choices, you will probably want to include in your discussion some consideration of how group norms and the nature of the task affect the relationship between these variables and productivity. Group size What makes for a "good leader? Why will a leader succeed under one set of circumstances but fail under another? Altruism and aggression Discussion questions: Compare and contrast two of these six perspectives on altruism and aggression: According to your two chosen perspectives, why do people behave in an altruistic or aggressive manner? How do the perspectives account for the fact that people are not always consistent in their altruistic or aggressive behavior? That is, why are individuals altruistic or aggressive at one time and situation but not another? Be sure to note any major conflicts between the two perspectives, and how the perspectives account for both altruism and aggression. Choose two theoretical perspectives on deviance that you feel sharply differ from each other. Then discuss the following: What are the major propositions of the theories? Choose one deviant behavior from list 1 and one deviant behavior from list 2. Discuss how your two theories would account for the behaviors. Be sure to make it clear how your theories differ in their explanations, and why.

Chapter 5 : Quiz: The Cell Theory

This set of Basic Automata Theory Questions and Answers focuses on "From Grammars to Push Down Automata". 1. The production of the form $A \rightarrow B$, where A and B are non terminals is called.

Please, make sure of at least browsing over them before asking a new question here. If you read those pages and still have a question, you can also follow a very simple process before asking. It is located near the top, just below the post for the e-book of contemporary dance history. A new page will open with several results. Now you can read about what you are looking for. It is very possible that you will find the answer to your query. If after reading the above information you still have a question, please feel free to ask. The only thing I ask in exchange is that you leave me your e-mail address. I will not use it to send you ads or spam. The reason for this is that I have too many submissions. I need your e-mails to handle all this questions better, otherwise this is an endless work. Now just follow these steps: You might find that the answer is already here for you! If your question has not been asked yet: I will not answer to repeated questions but I will contact you to tell you where the answer can be found. By providing your e-mail you will also instantly know when my answer, or comments from other visitors, have been posted. Feel free to ask as many questions as you like, but only one question per submission. If you ask a question about another type of dance, it might not be included on this page or take much longer to be answered. And this is the section for contemporary dance questions about theory and history. Ask your question here: Remember that this is a website about contemporary dance. Out of topic questions will not be replied. Give your question a title. Write your question here:

Chapter 6 : Questions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

This theory test is provided to familiarise you with the format of the official test. You are advised to study the highway code before attempting the test. The test consists of 50 questions and you need to answer at least 43 correctly to pass.

The Problems of Personal Identity There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a wide range of questions that are at best loosely connected. Here are the most familiar: The precise meaning of these phrases is hard to pin down. It may be, for instance, that being a philosopher and loving music belong to my identity, whereas being a man and living in Yorkshire do not. Someone else could have the same four properties but feel differently towards them, so that being a man and living in Yorkshire belong to his identity but not being a philosopher or loving music. It contrasts with ethnic or national identity, which consists roughly of the ethnic group or nation one takes oneself to belong to and the importance one attaches to this. Ludwig is a typical discussion of this topic. What is it to be a person? What is necessary, and what suffices, for something to count as a person, as opposed to a nonperson? The most common answer is that to be a person at a time is to have certain special mental properties then e. Others propose a less direct connection between personhood and mental properties Chisholm What does it take for a person to persist from one time to anotherâ€”to continue existing rather than cease to exist? What determines which past or future being is you? What is it about the way she relates then to you as you are now that makes her you? For that matter, what makes it the case that anyone at all who existed back then is you? This is sometimes called the question of personal identity over time. An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions. Imagine that after your death there really will be someone, in this world or the next, who resembles you in certain ways. How would that being have to relate to you as you are now in order to be you, rather than someone else? What would the Higher Powers have to do to keep you in existence after your death? Or is there anything they could do? The answer to these questions depends on the answer to the persistence question. How do we find out who is who? What evidence bears on the question of whether the person here now is the one who was here yesterday? One source of evidence is first-person memory: Another source is physical continuity: Which of these sources is more fundamental? Does first-person memory count as evidence all by itself, for instance, or only insofar as we can check it against publicly available physical facts? What should we do when they support opposing verdicts? Ought we to conclude, on the basis of memory evidence, that the resulting person is not Charlie but Guy Fawkes brought back to life, or ought we instead to infer from the absence of physical continuity that he is simply Charlie with memory loss? What principle would answer this question? The evidence question dominated the literature on personal identity from the s to the s good examples include Shoemaker , and Penelhum , It is important to distinguish it from the persistence question. What it takes for you to persist through time is one thing; how we might find out whether you have is another. If the criminal had fingerprints just like yours, the courts may conclude that he is you. But even if that is conclusive evidence, having your fingerprints is not what it is for a past or future being to be you: If the persistence question asks which of the characters introduced at the beginning of a story have survived to become those at the end of it, we may also ask how many are on the stage at any one time. What determines how many of us there are now? If there are some seven billion people on the earth at present, what factsâ€”biological, psychological, or what have youâ€”make that the right number? The question is not what causes there to be a certain number of people at a given time, but what there being that number consists in. It is like asking what sort of configuration of pieces amounts to winning a game of chess, rather than what sorts of moves typically lead to winning. But this is disputed. Some say that cutting the main connections between the cerebral hemispheres results in radical disunity of consciousness, and that because of this, two people share a single organism see e. Nagel ; Puccetti argues that there are two people within the skin of each normal human being. Others say that a human being with split personality could literally be the home of two or more thinking beings Wilkes Still others argue that two people can share an organism in cases of conjoined twinning Campbell and McMahan ; see also Olson These terms need careful handling, however. They are apt to give the mistaken impression that identity comes in two kinds, synchronic and diachronic. The truth is simply that there are two kinds of situations where we

can ask how many people or other things there are: What sort of things, metaphysically speaking, are you and I and other human people? What are our fundamental properties, in addition to those that make us people? What, for instance, are we made of? Are we composed entirely of matter, as stones are, or are we partly or wholly immaterial? Where do our spatial boundaries lie, if we are spatially extended at all? Do we extend all the way out to our skin and no further, for instance? If so, what fixes those boundaries? Are we substances—metaphysically independent beings—or is each of us a state or an aspect of something else, or perhaps some sort of process or event? Here are some of the main proposed answers Olson, Snowdon, van Inwagen, Olson, a. We are temporal parts of animals: We are spatial parts of animals: We are partless immaterial substances—souls—or compound things made up of an immaterial soul and a material body Swinburne We are collections of mental states or events: There is nothing that we are: There is no consensus or even a dominant view on this question. What matters in identity? What is the practical importance of facts about our persistence? Why does it matter? What reason have you to care whether you yourself continue to exist, rather than someone else just like you existing in your place? Imagine that surgeons are going to put your brain into my head and that neither of us has any choice about this. Suppose the resulting person will be in terrible pain after the operation unless one of us pays a large sum in advance. If we were both entirely selfish, which of us would have a reason to pay? Will the resulting person—who will presumably think he is you—be responsible for your actions or for mine? Or both, or neither? The answer may seem to turn entirely on whether the resulting person would be you or I. Only I can be responsible for my actions. The fact that some person is me, by itself, gives me a reason to care about him. Identity itself matters practically. Perhaps what gives me a reason to care about what happens to the man people will call by my name tomorrow is not that he is me, but that he is then psychologically continuous with me as I am now see Section 4, or because he relates to me in some other way that does not imply that we are the same person. If someone other than me were psychologically continuous tomorrow with me as I am now, he would have what matters to me, and I ought to transfer my selfish concern to him. Likewise, someone else could be responsible for my actions, and not for his own. Identity itself has no practical importance. That completes our survey. Though some of these questions may bear on others, they are to a large extent independent. It is important not to confuse them.

Understanding the Persistence Question We turn now to the persistence question. Few concepts have been the source of more misunderstanding than identity over time. The Persistence Question is often confused with other questions, or stated in a tendentious way. The question is roughly what is necessary and sufficient for a past or future being to be someone existing now. Suppose we point to you now, and then describe someone or something existing at another time. Then we can ask whether we are referring twice to one thing, or once to each of two things. The persistence question asks what determines the answer to specific queries like this one. There are precisely analogous questions about the persistence of other objects, such as dogs. Some take the persistence question to ask what it means to say that a past or future being is you. The answer would be knowable a priori if at all. It would also imply that necessarily all people have the same persistence conditions—that the answer to the question is the same no matter what sort of people we considered. Though some endorse these claims Noonan What it takes for us to persist might depend on whether we are biological organisms, which is something we cannot know a priori. And if there could be immaterial people, such as gods or angels, what it takes for them to persist might differ from what it takes for a human person to persist.

Chapter 7 : Newest 'number-theory' Questions - Mathematics Stack Exchange

Network Theory Questions and Answers Our + Network Theory questions and answers focuses on all areas of Network Theory subject covering + topics in Network Theory. These topics are chosen from a collection of most authoritative and best reference books on Network Theory.

Abstract Emotion feeling is a phase of neurobiological activity, the key component of emotions and emotion-cognition interactions. Emotions play a critical role in the evolution of consciousness and the operations of all mental processes. Types of emotion relate differentially to types or levels of consciousness. Unbridled imagination and the ability for sympathetic regulation of empathy may represent both potential gains and losses from the evolution and ontogeny of emotion processes and consciousness. The relation of memes and the mirror neuron system to empathy, sympathy, and cultural influences on the development of socioemotional skills are unresolved issues destined to attract future research. To help counterbalance the effects of such influences on this article and provide some perspective on its contents, I present below the major theses that have emerged in my theorizing and research on emotions. They change primarily because of advances in methodology and research. They may also change as a result of theoretical debates that highlight the need for some clarifications and distinctions among constructs. The ongoing reformulations of DET principles are facilitated by advances in emotion science, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental clinical science, as well as in social and personality psychology. For the present article, the seven principles below guided the choice of topics and the selective review of the literature on emotions and their relations to cognition, action, and consciousness. They led to a new perspective on emotion-related gains and losses from evolution and opened the door to theoretical development and research on emerging topics such as the role of the mirror neuron system in emotion experiences, empathy, and sympathy and memes and their relations to emotion schemas. An overarching aspect of the theoretical perspective represented in the following principles and in this article is that emotion and cognition, though often treated correctly as having functionally separate features and influences e. Lewis , Pessoa , Phelps I hypothesize that emotion will have substantial and measurable effects on cognition and action when the stimulus or situation is a personally or socially significant one. The foregoing general thesis and the more specific hypothesis seem to run counter to extreme constructivist positions. The present position may bear some similarity to componentialâ€™dynamic approaches, at least in terms of continuously changing aspects or configurations of mental processes e. However, the present position may differ from the latter in viewing emotion and cognition as always interacting and thus normally precluding pure cognitive and emotion states. Emotions play a central role in the evolution of consciousness, influence the emergence of higher levels of awareness during ontogeny, and largely determine the contents and focus of consciousness throughout the life span. Emotions are motivational and informational, primarily by virtue of their experiential or feeling component. Emotion feelings constitute the primary motivational component of mental operations and overt behavior. Basic emotion feelings help organize and motivate rapid and often more-or-less automatic though malleable actions that are critical for adaptive responses to immediate challenges to survival or wellbeing. In emotion schemas, the neural systems and mental processes involved in emotion feelings, perception, and cognition interact continually and dynamically in generating and monitoring thought and action. These dynamic interactions which range from momentary processes to traits or trait-like phenomena can generate innumerable emotion-specific experiences e. Emotion schemas become maladaptive and may lead to psychopathology when learning results in the development of connections among emotion feelings and maladaptive cognition and action. The emotion of interest is continually present in the normal mind under normal conditions, and it is the central motivation for engagement in creative and constructive endeavors and for the sense of well-being. Interest and its interaction with other emotions account for selective attention, which in turn influences all other mental processes. Elaboration and empirical support for principles 1â€™6 can be found in the following sources and their reference lists Ackerman et al. Principles 1â€™3 apply to all emotions, and 4â€™6 primarily concern emotion schemas. Principle 7 consists of propositions about the most ubiquitous of all human

emotionsâ€™ interest-excitement. Specific empirical support does not exist for the hypothesis of continual interest in the normal mind. This article addresses a critical need for clear distinctions between basic positive and basic negative emotions and particularly between brief basic emotion episodes and emotion schemas. Unlike basic negative emotions that occur in brief episodes and involve very little cognition beyond minimal perceptual processes, emotion schemas involve emotion and cognition frequently higher-order cognition in dynamic interactions Izard , ; cf. This article also contrasts phenomenal primary and access reflective consciousness, considers the construct of levels of consciousness, and questions the integrity of current conceptualizations of the unconscious mind. Typically, psychologists ignore the concepts of phenomenal consciousness and levels of consciousness and do not distinguish these constructs from the unconscious. I conclude by identifying some unanswered questions and briefly comment on a few emerging topicsâ€™ continuous emotion-cognition interactions, memes and emotions, and the mirror neuron system and empathyâ€™ that seem destined to become more prominent in psychological science in the coming years. Yet, I dare once again to raise the year-old storied question asked by James It happens that the answer James gave to his own question has a rather popular reprieve in the annals of contemporary neuroscience. Like James, Damasio argued that brain responses constitute emotion or the body expression of emotion and that emotion feeling is a consequence of the neurobiological body expression. In contrast, I propose that emotion feeling should be viewed as a phase not a consequence of the neurobiological activity or body expression of emotion cf. In contrast, I have maintained that a discrete emotion or pattern of interacting emotions are always present though not necessarily labeled or articulated in the conscious brain Izard , ch. Izard , ch. So, perceptual and conceptual processes and consciousness itself are more like effects of emotions than sources of their origin. Discrete emotion experiences emerge in ontogeny well before children acquire language or the conceptual structures that adequately frame the qualia we know as discrete emotion feelings. Moreover, acquiring language does not guarantee that emotion experiences can always be identified and communicated verbally. Even adults have great difficulty articulating a precise description of their emotion feelings cf. Thus, emotion feelings can be activated and influenced by perceptual, appraisal, conceptual, and noncognitive processes Izard , but cannot be created by them. It is sensed and expressed even in children without a cerebral cortex Merker This component of emotion is always experienced or felt, though not necessarily labeled or articulated or present in access consciousness. Emotion feeling, like any other neurobiological activity, varies from low to high levels of intensity. The autonomic nervous system may modulate the emotion feeling but does not change its quality or valence cf. Tomkins , Neither a moderate nor a high level of autonomic nervous system activity is necessary for the emergence of emotion feelings. The conscious mind is capable of detecting and discriminating among slight changes in neurobiological activity and among the resultant qualia Edelman that include emotion feelings. Damasio ; Lane et al. Levels of emotion feelings, like other neurobiological activities, range from low and subtle to high and extreme. Current theory and evidence suggest that the feeling component of emotions contributed to the evolution of consciousness and to the affective, cognitive, and action processes involved in goal-oriented behavior. Defining emotion feeling as a phase of a neurobiological process circumvents the argument that feeling is nonphysical and hence cannot be causal. A counterargument, though, is that at best, feelings are only the qualia of neurobiological processes and not neurobiological activity per se. However, even if this were true, Edelman maintains that qualia could still be described as causal because they are true representations of core thalamo-cortical activity. Thus, whether or not one accepts the present proposal that feelings are a phase of neurobiological activity, they can still be conceived as causal processes. The present formulation of the origins and nature of emotion feelings differs from those that describe emotion feeling and emotion state or emotion-related neurobiological activity as separate and independent e. Moreover, the view of emotion feeling as a phase of the neurobiological activity or body expression of emotion differs from the idea that neurobiological or body expression must precede emotion feeling Damasio , p. The current description of emotion feeling is tantamount to saying that it is evolved and unlearned neurobiological activity. For those who think that the idea of emotion feelings as evolved neurobiological processes is strange or unfounded, the tough questions are: Where else could emotion feelings come from? What else could they be? Feeling is the Key Psychological Aspect of Emotion: Motivation and

Information Feeling is the dynamic component in emotion cf. Panksepp a , b and in two related psychobiological processesâ€”entrainment and individuation cf. The motivational, cue-producing, and informational functions of feelings enable them to entrain, or simplify and organize, what might become particularly in challenging situations an overwhelming number of impulses into focused cognitive processes and a few adaptive actions cf. Such feeling-mediated entrainment of impulses across situations and developmental time facilitates the formation of feeling-cognition-action patterns that constitute individuationâ€”the organization of traits and their assembly into a unique personality. However, feeling an emotion does not guarantee that it will be labeled, articulated, or sensed in reflective consciousness or at a high level of awareness. The level of awareness of an emotion feeling depends in part on its intensity and expression, and after language acquisition, on labeling, articulating, and acknowledging the emotion experience. These capacities, critical to personality and social development, depend on the neural activity and resultant processes involved in symbolization and language. Infants experience and express basic emotions long before they can provide any evidence of a self-concept Izard et al. Motivational and cue-producing emotion-feeling provides information relevant to cognition and action Izard , p. Others have conceptualized emotion as information, and the topic has inspired a considerable body of related research Clore et al. Consistent with the idea that emotion feelings are cue-producing and informational phenomena, they may also afford a kind of prescience. Feelings may predict the effect of future stimulations by anticipating the link between future critical situations and subsequent emotion experiences and needs, e. Although an emotion feeling may begin to form reciprocal relations with perception or cognition by the time that it is fully sensed, there is no reason to assume that its quality is altered by perceptual and conceptual processes Panksepp a , b. Actually, the particular quality of each discrete emotion feeling evolved because its effects on other senses, cognition, and action are generally adaptive cf. For all basic emotions, motivational and action processes occur in similar fashion across situations. Among emotion schemas, however, there are wide differences in motivational, cognitive, and action processes across individuals. The determinants of which particular emotion feeling and what cognitive content occurs in a specific emotion schema include individual differences, learning, culture, and the conceptual processes influenced by them Izard a ; cf. Although they do not agree in all details, they agree that emotions have an infrastructure that includes neural systems dedicated, at least in part, to emotion processes and that emotions motivate cognition and action and recruit response systems. We may also be reaching a consensus that there are different forms of emotions, e. Emotions as Causal Processes Although experts agree that emotions motivate or influence cognition and action, not all agree on precisely what mediates the effects of emotions. The answer may depend on whether it is a basic emotion or an emotion schema. It may also depend on whether and how a distinction is made in the roles of emotion neurophysiology and emotion feelings cf. Panksepp a , b. Arguably, no one thing even emotion is ever the sole mediator of personally or socially significant behavior. Other person and contextual variables typically contribute to the causal processes. Yet, I propose that emotion feeling is virtually always one of the mediators of action in response to basic emotion and a mediator of thought and action in response to emotion schemas. Thus, the specific impact of emotion feeling in generating and altering behavior depends on the type of emotion involved in the causal process. Feeling in basic emotion affects action but not higher-order cognition, which has little or no presence in basic emotion processes. Feeling in emotion schemas may frequently affect action and will surely affect cognition. Thinking is a key agent in regulating sometimes suppressing; Gross and guiding behavior that stems from emotion schemas. Failure to make and keep the distinction between these two kinds of emotion experiences may be the biggest source of misunderstandings and misconceptions in current emotion science Izard a , Gray et al. I included an update on the distinction between types of emotions here for two reasons.

Chapter 8 : Discussion Questions

The question stirs great passion, as anyone who has followed the story about Intelligent Design knows. Is it really a theory or an idea? Ask a scientist, and he or she will share why it is so important to apply rigor to answering this question.

They are not the obvious questions, like, "What is the value of this constant, and why? Is spacetime four dimensional? It sure looks that way. Also, 4 is the "critical" dimension of quantum field theory. If not, does compactification work? What forces the extra dimensions to hide, and prevents them from reappearing? Does compactification destroy predictability? Does string theory work? Perturbative finiteness seems to be the only reason for it, but even in quantum field theory problems fixed at the perturbative level are known to return nonperturbatively. Is this what happens with the nonperturbative eleventh dimension, which is described by nonrenormalizable membrane theory? If so, is a dimensional perturbation expansion reasonable for an dimensional theory? Dual theories only count once. Is fine tuning really that much worse than any other kind of tuning? Where are those Higgs anyway? Is the graviton fundamental? But if not there, maybe elsewhere Do black holes exist? We have evidence of gravitational fields strong enough to be associated with black holes theoretically, but not of the event horizons that define black holes. If so, what do you do with the singularities? This is really a string theory question, since strings were originally proposed to describe hadrons. By "work", I mean I want to actually calculate the observed linear Regge trajectories that define the string, not just some constants characterizing low-energy behavior chiral symmetry breaking, etc.

Chapter 9 : Personal Identity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

My top 10 string theory questions Here are what I consider the top 10 questions in string theory (not necessarily in order of importance). They are not the obvious questions, like, "What is the value of this constant, and why?".*