Later Rationalization, Groupism, and the Chinese 6 on, when sugar planters or food-processing executives talked about "my group," I was immediately able to understand the nuances of the term in its idiosyncratic Filipino sense.

The Author s Reprints and permissions: Noor Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia Abstract This paper examines the degree to which work is becoming de-ethnicised in the Malaysian tourism industry sector. The degree of association of occupation with ethnicity was tested through a quantitative survey of respondents from a representative sample of the parent population in Keywords Workplace, ethnicity, occupation, hotels, Malaysia Corresponding author: These terms are rather loosely descriptive and do not inform the reader about the distribution of power among the main social groups in the country. Qualitative data shall be used in a complementary fashion to open up paths of interpretation related to the determinant factors of de ethnicisation of work. Tourism economics and political agenda The tourism industry has been endowed with a double role in Malaysia. Its second role lies on social-cum-political ground. Malaysian citizens categorised as Bumiputera sons of the soil by the Malaysian National Census. The aid fund for the Bumiputera partnership program shall be restructured and man- aged by a smaller group of agencies, thereby securing a correlation between actual funding and needs. Local investors are fully aware of this when they deal with global hospitality cor- porations, whether those are Western, Chinese or even Japanese. Population ethnic distribution in Kuala Lumpur. These figures do not incorporate the population living in the greater Kuala Lumpur area geographical area covering Wilayah Kuala Lumpur to Wilayah Putrajaya. As the Bumiputera category includes constitutionally non-Malay Citizen, we can assume that the Malaysian-Chinese population is com- paratively more numerous than the Malay population within the boundaries of Kuala Lumpur federal territory. Hotel industry guests for greater Kuala Lumpur area January—December Hotel guests by locality: A symmetrical reading of this consumption would classify intrinsic wealth production in the service industry sector. The Hotel is an urban object: The Hotel is thus a resolutely modern social construct. Being a place of modernity, as well as of ethnic and occupational plurality, The Hotel is also a place of globalisation. We may locate two main functions within: The availability on the market of a restaurant concept positions the latter in a tension between the global and the local. Historical account of occupational ethnicisation in Malaysia The social construction of diversity in Malaysia is above all a tale of colonisation and migration. This unique form of Creolity in Malaysia is due to pragmatic reasons. Secondly, the Chinese imper- ial court punished by death any of its subjects who were foolish enough to settle overseas. Social change was so drastic that Munshi Abdullah, the self- proclaimed Malay we know today that he was of Tamil descent scribe of Downloaded from etn. Dialectal divisions increased as they were roughly matching occupational distribu- tion: Cantonese were dominating mining industry and handicraft, Hakka were simply miners, while the Hokkien and Teochiew worked in agriculture, small shops or as boatmen. Chinese, Tamils, and Indians Barnard, In the Colonial Census, the former Sam-Sam category about 7. The Bengali merchant cast, once very prominent during the Melaka Sultanate era, was still part of the Malayan social scenery, as were the Gujarati traders. According to Tate, the degree of interaction between these social strata was extremely low Muzafar, On the estates, Malayalis or Downloaded from etn. Concurrently, the Chettiar sub-caste, as moneylenders, was a familiar feature of the Straits Settlements, while the Sikhs were recruited as police and guards. This Colonial Decree lays the foundation for the famous article from the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, formalised in and still applicable today. Considered as Malay is any person who: As an illustration, a person of Arab descent might be categorised as Malay in the state of Kedah, but not in the state of Johor. The paradigm shifted from occupational ethnicisation to wealth distribution. This statement became the foundation of the New Economic Policy in The Tenth Malaysia Plan â€" The Second Malaysia Plan advocated for a disappearance in the mid-term of the association of ethnicity with economic function, in the interests of national unity Malaysia Economic Planning Unit, If dissociation of ethnicity with economic function remained a priority of the Ninth Malaysia Plan Malaysia Economic Planning Unit, â€" The latest orientation of social engin- eering in Malaysia seems henceforth clear enough: Problem statement The political issue at stake can be seen through a

double lens: The question that arises, in a context of seemingly ethnic-cum-functional equity is the following: Locating ethnicisation of work The quantitative survey was conducted in a form of a plain and short questionnaire designed to test the reality of ethnicity association with economic function, then occupation within The Hotel. The selected ethnic categories match the ones used in the Malaysia National Census: Indians The ethnicity of the respondents is at their own ascription. Respondents have been allowed to tick only one casing. Re-construction of the parent population The survey was conducted between April and April Ten hotels matching these criteria were selected; the totality of full-time employees working in those estab-lishments represents the parent population Table 4. Sample design Among the collected questionnaires, have been considered as exploit- able. Delimitation of parent population. Northern America or Europe. Place of modernity All hotels in the parent population are located in urban area greater Kuala Lumpur. Chinese ethnicity displays two strong associations: Chinese ethnicity presents two strong associations: Indian ethnicity presents only one strong association: Main findings Looking at the survey results, it seems that ethnicisation of work is indeed a reality within our sample. We may now observe three main ethnicisation trends: As per Malay ethnicity, its homogenous distribution between culinary production and restaurant service may come as a surprise once we acknowledge two simple facts: Survey results tend to demonstrate that work ethnicisation is not related to economic unbalance, as correlation between ethnicity and social-cum-professional status is not established. Determinant factors of work ethnicisation in the Kuala Lumpur luxury hotel industry are yet to be stated. Twenty-one exploratory semi-structured interviews were conducted to com- plement the quantitative survey between April and Fragments of possible causations appear commonly during these interviews, such as ethnic co-optation: See the following verbatim as an illustration: One of them called me for the job at The Caravelle. Faisal, Malaysian-Indian, 47 years old, Supervisor, Italian restaurant11 In the quantitative survey, we added a question to test the ethnicity of the prescriber; this information would not necessarily shed enough light on this com- plex question. Some basic questions should be in order, before drawing hasty conclusions: Does the prescriber act on his own initiative, or along the lines of corporate culture? The ethnicisation of a particular job vacancy could as well be the outcome of a managerial strategy consisting of diluting ethnically driven power areas in the organ- isation. On the other hand, statistically speaking, strict correlation does not always signify causality. We could, for example, witness a strong ethnic correlation within a particular hot kitchen department where the Chef de Cuisine â€" who is of Indian ethnicity and whose vernacular language is Tamil â€" seems to recruit only fellow Indians and Tamil-speakers. Further investigations could teach us that these workers were recruited mainly because they were equipped with unique skills unrelated with cultural variables, such as mastering of Western cooking techniques applying to red meat. In certain cases, this logic may lead to transnational recruitment: The question thus remains: Professional identity, as a strategic power resource in The Hotel, is only legit- imate for a happy few located at the top of the company organisation chart; in other words: In the case of fragmented work where professional identity possesses little real- ity, ethnicity becomes an alternative source of power: By making ethnic groupism a social reality, local workers reproduce the pattern that has been historically embedded in the Malaysian collective psyche. Social embeddedness is so prevalent that it nurtures popular stereotypes of association of occupation with ethnicity, Downloaded from etn. Conclusion Findings from the quantitative survey conducted between April and April show a tangible association of occupation with ethnicity in our sample. Chinese ethnicity is clearly correlated with sales and marketing positions, with a propensity for white- collar occupations. Possible explanations include ethnic co-optation aimed at ontological security; or ethnic manipulation by Human Resource executives, seeking compliance with ethnic quotas or to counterbalance power areas by fragmenting ethnic concentra- tion; ethnicisation of work is evidently a multi-factored phenomenon. At this stage of our survey, we can advocate for plausibility as far as our qualitative data are concerned. This interpretative challenge is partly due to the complexity of the social object itself: We could, of course, design a causation chain that makes sense, enabling interlocking of macro and micro levels of social reality as per the following: When the pattern of ethnic distribu- tion is in place, new job incumbents have a propensity to practise ethnic groupism aiming at ontological security, as well as demographic weight for col- lective bargaining. In doing so, they reproduce a social cycle, nurturing, at the same time, ethnic stereotypes. Only a comprehensive and long

enough participant observation in this social milieu could provide the necessary inferences to untangle the web of meanings at work in our social object. The second category of causalities focuses on the social actor level and illustrates freedom of action, when workers choose con- sciously ethnic groupism as the last alternative path for access to power in a work organisation, where concepts of trade and craft represent only aesthetic ideologies. See Munshi Abdullah Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia. See Abdul and Farid Today believed to be the city of Palembang, Sumatra, Indonesia. Greater Kuala Lumpur area includes three federal territories: At the time of the survey, there was no hotel pertaining to a Western corporation in Cyberjaya. The occupational scale used in this article is the one that is provided by the Malaysian government, which is in turn inspired by the British occupational scale. Interview EKT, dated 25 August ; page 8 of transcription. Names have been modified. Interview EKT, dated 8 October ; page 13 of transcription.

Chapter 2 : Nihonjinron - Wikipedia

Groupism emphasizes group consistence. Collectivism advocates individuals to serve group interests as a priority, collectivism is very common in human society or even in other species classified as social animals, the difference of it in different cultures is about how much, not have or have not.

I find it interesting, and the longer I live in Japan, the more I find opinions vary on a Where you live in Japan and b Your ethnicity. One friend looks Japanese and feels there is very little racism here. There is more back in the USA he feels. I live in the sticks in Japan, and really enjoy going to Tokyo because it reminds me of home in that I am treated just like a regular guy. Where I live in the countryside, I am stared at, and objectified, and also admired. It goes hand in hand. Often women think I am tall and handsome. So that is one of the plusses. But yes I get stared at, at times. Treated like a movie star at times, and often the seat next to me is one of the last ones taken in my area. People there are much more used to non-Japanese. This seat thing in my town, has changed for the better over the years. I remember complaining about it ad nauseum 23 years ago. I never mention now except here LOL! I am caucasian, and my wife is Japanese. Our family will get stared at. But I take this to mean that our children are so beautiful and our family is very interesting. Overall, even in the countryside, Japanese are pretty accepting of my family. Mostly I like my life here. I am treated well most of the time. I am respected most of the time. If you want to date a Japanese lady or man, I say go for it! My advice on the staring: You will never stop it. It will take many more years for Japan to change. Japanese tend to stare without smiling. It can look threatening but rarely is. You just look different. Tokyo is a whole different ball game. I feel at home in Tokyo. You are not so much a gaijin in Tokyo. In the country though, it is quite different. Not bad, just different. When I go to a party here, people will make a big deal of me. It helps me to get students. But the negative is you get stared at sometimes, and very, very rarely, you encounter a racist who is rude to you. But I can count on one hand how many times that has happened. Being rare sets up opportunity. If I were single and young again sigh , I think living in the countryside might be cool. You would be very unique. I think Asian people and people of African decent have it worse unfortunately. I agree with the people who have said that the caucasians who have never experienced being treated differently based on race will notice it here. There is a lot of unintentional racism here. But there is also a lot of times when you get treated like a prince or a king. It swings both ways. And I think there are many, many Japanese women who are interested in dating non-Japanese. But you are talking about the women with a more international outlook. And frankly, the women here who have a more insular outlook are not as interesting anyway. You are going to be attracted to the Japanese who are special, because they are special. He is African American and has spent many years in Yokohama. Which I would argue is not as accepting of non-Japanese as Tokyo is.

Chapter 3 : CREATIVITY: BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

6 Rationalization, Groupism, and the Chinese (pp.) In this chapter I will employ a manifold, oblique approach to describing the cultures of Philippine sugar in order to "triangulate" on my subject.

As Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin have pointed out, social, group, or "collaborative creativity," are central factors in organizational innovation and change. Yet, there has been very little research in what seems to be a critical area. This absence constitutes a peculiarity in and of itself. In this paper, we argue that cultural and methodological factors, primarily due to a North-American bias, has contributed to this neglect. We also contend that our thinking about self-and-society has been marked by certain forms of knowing and thinking which have prevented us from tackling important subjects such as the collaborative and social dimensions of creativity. We also examine various related dualisms, such as self-society, creativity-conformity, and order-disorder, with reference to how they have blocked a conceptualization of, and inquiry into, social creativity. At the core of our argument lies the polarization between the individual and the group, and between creativity and conformity. This polarization literally has prevented us from thinking about "social" or "group" and creativity together. It is this type of polarized thinking that make us react to the notion of "social creativity" as if it were an oxymoron. Why has it taken so long for research to emerge on the social dimensions of creativity? By social creativity, we mean, broadly speaking, any and all creative processes leading to creative products that are the result of the interaction between two or more people. In other words, creativity that involves groups and collaborations. The production of movies, musical performances in fact, almost any performing art , the creative process in scientific laboratories, in organizations, are but a few examples of what we mean by social creativity. Such creative processes that are not confined to the workings of a lone geniusâ€"as in an isolated author, composer, or anyone else working alone, literally, in physical isolation. However, this broad definition of "social" creativity is somewhat problematic, as we shall see. There is a real philosophical question as to whether anyoneâ€"any individual human being--can really be considered isolated or "alone. For example, can there really be such a thing as a "lone" genius? Even if somebody works in physical isolation, is she or he not part of a larger discourse, and a social creature, working with a socio-historical context and tradition? Would the concept of a "genius," lone or otherwise, even exist without "others" Montuori and Purser, ? It is quite easy for us to accept the fact that a successful team exhibits a high degree of cooperative behavior among its members. Several typical retorts come to mind: Is it not ultimately the individuals themselves who are creative? These questions reflect our cultural understanding of the self. For example, the self can be viewed atomistically or holistically. If one holds an atomistic view of the self, then even creativity in groups or in collaborative settings will be located and attributed to an individual, rather than to a group process. Atomism leads to methodological individualism, and from this perspective, "social" creativity is therefore a very problematic and even contradictory concept. On the other hand, if one holds a holistic viewpoint, creativity is by definition social, and the individual is epiphenomenal--the vehicle for social forces which play themselves out with or without any particular individual. As we are beginning to see, inquiry into social creativity immediately raises larger philosophical and, indeed, political questions regarding the interplay between individualism and collectivism. This is an age-old and problematic debate, which, in creativity research, finds an analog in the "lone genius versus the Zeitgeist" argument Simonton, The debate is also found in the literature on social change, reflected as the "individual actor versus social movement" argument, which has been viewed in terms of an opposition between "individual and society" as the primary ontological units Wielemans, Fundamental polarities between individualism vs. Creativity is seen as either the product of the cogitations of a lone genius, struggling against an oppressive social environment, or alternatively, as the product of sociological and historical forces, with the individual as merely a "vessel" or even an expression for those forces. For individualists, social factors are epiphenomenal Sampson, , and for more collectivist positions, the individual is simply expressing the social, political, and economic forces of the times. This is can be traced back to the dualisms Ogilvy mentioned above. To actually become aware of the polarized bias of our thinking is difficult to do since thought is not merely personal, but also collective in

nature. The thinking behind these historically opposed positions is typically dichotomizing and polarizing: Through the lens of individualism, the notion of social creativity will appear as collectivistic and anti-individualistic. Greening and Hale , for instance, view social creativity through this lens. For them, any inclusion of social factors in the study of creativity diminishes the importance and primacy of the individual. This is a typical example of such dichotomizing thinking in operation: We propose that theorizing social creativity needs to break free of this oppositional thinking. As Ogilvy suggests, the very structure of our thinking about the relationship between individual and society is problematic inasmuch as it sets up an opposition between the two. Disjunctive Thinking and Cultural Flip-Flops One does not have to be a proponent of cyclical theories of American cultural history to acknowledge that in American management literature, and in broader sociological analyses of the culture, that there have been swings between the polarities of individualism and groupism. Historically, American culture bounced back-and-forth between phases of excessive individualism and excessive flights into collectivism or groupism, all under the larger banner of discussions of American individualism. If we look back to the s and early 60s, books such as W. After the 60s, we saw the emergence of what Tom Wolfe would later call the "Me-Generation," culminating in the rampant individualism and narcissism of the 70s and 80s. The spirit of individualism found it way back into corporations. Psychologist Michael Macoby presented a typology of managerial personalities, including the familiar, loyal, "Company Man," but now also presenting a new type, "The Gamesman. Movies such as Wall Street, and characters such as Michael Milken, represented the almost playful but razor-sharp determination of the 80s speculator, a shrewd player in what was fast becoming an information economy. The jungle fighter competed in a system based on what Hazel Henderson called "funny money," a system entrained to quarterly reports, investor psychology, and global information flows of capital. The job of management was no longer seen as building real productive capacity, or material empires of factories with tangible products, but rather as playing with information in a "symbolic economy" Ogilvy, Now, paradoxically, autonomy and self-reliance have become signature traits of the American Silicon Valley entrepreneur, whose driving passion is to Get. Comâ€"which requires promoting the very sort of commercialism that can make them millionaires overnight. Ironically, the flip to valuing "autonomy" has become coopted by the very culture it originally arose as a critique of. The 90s has been a strange mix of seemingly contradictory and mixed ideologies. Business students are given a strong message that "entreprenuerialism" is the royal road to career success, that this is a "winner take all society," and that one needs to become their own CEO when it comes to managing their career. Having "a job" and any notion of loyalty to a company are quaint, industrial-age notions that are long gone. On the other hand, corporations have jumped full force back into to teams, partnerships, and alliancesâ€"social forms that require high degrees of collaborative behavior. Even in the broader culture, there is a movement toward getting back to community, the new urbanism, communitarianism, and the social construction of the self. Employees are now pressured and told they have to work in teams, while they are also given the message that real success comes through individual initiative and entrepreneurship. There is a great tension between these two pressures, one that, arguably, the present way of conceptualizing these terms cannot address. As we shall see, it is precisely the polarizing and dichotomizing tendency of our present way of thinking that creates this tendency towards faddish flip-flops. The Creative Interplay of Individualism and Collectivism The polarization between individualism and collectivism creates some interesting examples of what Jung called enantiodromia, where one pole of an opposition tends to turn into its opposite. Ogilvy has argued that a polar opposition between individualism and collectivism leads to a dialectical process: He goes on to state that these polar oppositions are in fact socially constructed, falsely reified abstractions which lead to highly problematic conceptualizations in the human sciences. The titles of such classic works as Reisman et. Slater, for example, has discussed the paradox of "conforming individualism," the tendency for individualism to set up a certain model for everybody to follow so that one may become an individual like everybody else. Likewise, Ogilvy has referred to the 60s hippie movement as "non-conformist collectivism," whereby the youth movement represented a non-conformist reaction to traditional values and customs, but did so in a very collectivist way Woodstock, communes, the "uniforms" of long hair, jeans, etc. Bellah et al. The inner tensions of American individualism add up to a classic case of ambivalence. According to Sampson,

self-contained individualism posits "firm boundaries, personal control, and an exclusionary concept of the person" p. Persons are governed internally, value autonomy, and "tend to be characterized by a suspicion about and, at times, even antipathy toward social institutions, viewing these as potential infringements on personal autonomy" p. He goes on to state that the exclusionary nature of self-contained individualism is as "if one were to draw a circle marking off the region of self from the region of nonself," and "the circle would be drawn so as to exclude others from the region defined as belonging to self" p. The belief in self-contained individualism, where the self is a "hermetic and self-sufficient whole, one whose elements constitute a closed system presuming nothing beyond themselves, not other utterances" Bakhtin, in Sampson, , p. Individualism sets up an opposition between autonomy and dependence. Contrast this with Japanese culture, where the concept of "amae," the desire to be indulged, mothered, and totally dependent the way a newborn infant is with its mother, is valued as highly as individualism in the U. But contrary to expectations, Pye writes that to the western mind, individualism is essential for aggressive, creative behavior; dependency, which is seen as stifling and immature, is regarded as an obstacle to modernization. Yet the experiences of both private and public institutions not only in Japan but in most Asian countries indicate that people who are secure in their immediate settings, and who have supportive superiors, can be boldly aggressive and creative in their risk-taking. Moreover, such risk-taking is usually not a matter of gratifying personal pride but of accomplishing something exceptional for the collectivity. Hegel, in an early anti-Kantian, relational view of the person, argued that self-consciousness achieves itself only through the recognition of another self-consciousness. Likewise, the individualist can only achieve real recognition of individuality through others, creating a somewhat "hidden" dependency, because even if the self stands above others through superior achievements, it still "needs" the others in order to "be someone. If we are not to have a self that hangs in the void, slowly twisting in the wind, these are issues we cannot ignore. They are, from this perspective--epistemological focal settings--which bring forth certain ways of understanding the world rather than others. And, indeed, in opposition to the other term. It may be these interpretive and world-constructing tensions cause the cycles of individualism and conformity that we pointed out above. This paradoxical phenomenon, whereby excessive emphasis on one term of a perceived opposition, such as individualism versus collectivism, leads to a strange and seemingly unconscious "return of the repressed," is the result of fundamentally "disjunctive" thought Morin, Either individualism, as represented by the US with its focus on freedom of the individual and the individual as the fundamental ontological unit, or collectivism, as represented by the former USSR and China, with its focus on the primacy of the collectivity, and society as the fundamental ontological unit. We must remember that the management cycles of individualism and collectivism discussed here emerged, until the last ten years, in the shadow of the Cold War. As Ogilvy shows, individualism and collectivism are closely tied to the polarization between capitalist free-market economies and Marxist, centrally planned economies. For example, Mao Zedong argued that liberalism: It is a corrosive which disrupts unity, undermines solidarity, induces inactivity, and creates dissension. A communist should be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about the individual and more concerned about others than about himself. Only then can he be considered a communist. The political polarization is a good example of oppositional identity, where two terms such as individualism and collectivism define themselves to a large extent in opposition to the other "opposite" term, that is, in reaction to it. Particularly as they become more and more mutually exclusive, this tends to let the other term in through the back door, in a dynamic that is recognized in the saying, "We become what we hate. And what this appeal reveals is that bureaucratic authority is nothing other than successful power" p. As Sampson states, the autonomy of dominant groups "rests upon their power to construct nonautonomous others" p. The Dynamics of Creativity When it comes to creativity, Whyte illustrates the nature of disjunctive thinking in a very telling way. This echoes the disjunctive polarization also found in the creativity literature, which contrasts creativity with conformity.

Chapter 4 : Noahpinion: Japan is not a collectivist society

the groupism that underpins the assumption of ' the Chinese ' as an ' ethnic group '. Rather than reifying Chineseness as a prim ordial ethno-cultural substance, we should examine.

History[edit] This section possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. His nationalismâ€"and, problematic though it may be, that term will be usedâ€"was not of the bellicose sort, but rather seemed to reflect an accurate awareness of cultural and political differences combined with a sense of self-confidence. Early themes[edit] This section possibly contains original research. March Learn how and when to remove this template message The problem of Japanese identity in much of the early period is in terms of the local traditions and the powerful influence of Chinese culture, for example the revolt of the anti-Buddhist Mononobe and Nakatomi clans against the pro-Buddhist Soga clan, which had sponsored the introduction of not only Buddhist metaphysics but also Chinese statecraft into Japan in the 6th century. In turn this had some impact on Japanese self-images, when this material began to be read by many Japanese after the Meiji Restoration; and this tradition of cross-cultural discourse forms an important background component in the rise of the modern nihonjinron. These scholars worked independently, and reached different conclusions, but by the 19th century were grouped together by a neo-Kokugakuist named Konakamura to establish the earliness of Japanese self-awareness. The irony was that the intellectual techniques, textual methods and cultural strategies used by nativist scholars against Confucianism borrowed heavily from currents in both Chinese thought Taoist, Confucian and Buddhist and their Japanese offshoots. In similar wise, scholars detect in modern Japanese nationalism, of which the nihonjinron are the resonant if melodiously subdued, post-war echo, many features that derived from borrowings abroad, from the large resources of cultural nationalism mined in European countries during their own respective periods of nation-formation. The preponderant place of China as model and cultural adversary in the cognitive models developed hitherto was occupied by the West. Japanese contact with, and responses to these emerging Western stereotypes, which reflected the superiority complex, condescension and imperial hauteur of the times, fed into Japanese debates on national identity. As Leslie Pincus puts it, speaking of a later phase: Just as ukiyo-e were first reimported back into Japan from Paris museums and private European collections after World War 1, less tangible aspects of the cultural past were newly rediscovered by Japanese visitors in Europe. Postwar period[edit] Total economic, military and spiritual mobilization could not stave off defeat however, and slowly, under occupation, and then rapidly with its reasserted independence, Japan enjoyed a decades-long resurgence as global industrial and economic powerhouse until the crisis of the s. The cultural patterns over this century long trajectory is one of a continuous oscillation between models of pronounced Westernization and traditionalist autarky. A major controversy surrounds the question regarding the affiliation of the post-war nihonjinron theories with the prewar conceptualization of Japanese cultural uniqueness. To what degree, that is, are these meditations under democracy on Japanese uniqueness innocent reflections of a popular search for identity, and in what measure, if any, do they pick up from the instrumental ideology of Japaneseness developed by government and nationalists in the prewar period to harness the energies of the nation towards industrialization and global imperium? These debates ranged from liberal center-left critics to radical Marxist historians. In fact the genre is simply the Japanese reflex of cultural nationalism, which is a property of all modern nations. The trend of the tone of nihonjinron argument is often reflective of the Japanese society at the time. Peter Dale, covering the period analysed by the Nomura survey, distinguished three major phrases in the development of post-war nihonjinron discourse: Dominance of the Western model with a concomitant repudiation of Japanese specificity. Recognition of historical relativity, of certain defects in Western industrial society, and certain merits in Japanese traditions, as they are re-engineered in Japanese modernization. Recognition of Japanese specificity as a positive model for a uniquely Japanese road towards modernity and its global outreach. For Aoki, contrariwise, they are natural movements in a national temper which seeks, as has been the case with other nations, its own distinctive path of cultural autonomy and social organization as Japan adapts itself to the

global world order forged by the West. During the early post-war period, most of nihonjinron discourses discussed the uniqueness of the Japanese in a rather negative, critical light. Nihonjinron books written during the period of high economic growth up to the bubble burst in the early s, in contrast, argued various unique features of the Japanese as more positive features. Specific theses[edit] The Japanese race is a unique isolate, having no known affinities with any other race. In some extreme versions, the race is claimed to be directly descended from a distinct branch of primates. Thus, human nature in Japan is, peculiarly, an extension of nature itself. The Japanese language is also uniquely vague. This is the Japanese version of the Sapirâ€"Whorf hypothesis , according to which grammar determines world-view. Dale , Harumi Befu , and Kosaku Yoshino view nihonjinron more critically, identifying it as a tool for enforcing social and political conformity. Dale, for example, characterizes nihonjinron as follows: Secondly, they presuppose that the Japanese differ radically from all other known peoples. Thirdly, they are conspicuously nationalistic, displaying a conceptual and procedural hostility to any mode of analysis which might be seen to derive from external, non-Japanese sources. Karel van Wolferen echoes this assessment, noting that: Japanese are portrayed as if born with a special quality of brain that makes them want to suppress their individual selves.

Chapter 5 : Full text of "Reason and omission of Groupism in General Muslims"

This is a four minute video in Chinese by a graduate student at a Japanese university. The content is about Japanese style of groupism.

Here we reproduce editorials, commentaries and essays from The China Critic organized around twenty topics. As this material has been edited to read as one continues essay, the numbering of footnotes has been adjusted accordingly. Other minor changes have been made in accord with the in-house style of China Heritage Quarterly. One was the Confucian article of faith that man was perfectible through proper guidance and moral education. Indeed, faith in the redemptive qualities of education is one of the most enduring characteristic s of Chinese culture. In essence, many New Culture liberals assumed the role of Confucian chun-tzu gentlemen , paternalistically drawing the proper moral lessons from which others might benefit. Many concluded that they had lost touch with reality and that Confucianism had become too abstract. Scholarship emphasized critical, textual comparisons rather than moralistic commentaries, and the reverence traditionally directed at the classics was replaced by a critical objectivity. A new spirit of inquiry and new standards of evidence, which can arguably be called proto-scientific, emerged as a totally indigenous force. Certain ideas were shared by both revolutionaries and reformers. Both were highly critical of the Confucian tradition for its repressiveness, citing with approval the Western emphasis on freedom and equality. Moreover, conditions were so volatile that individuals frequently shifted positions, rarely maintaining a logically consistent revolutionary or reformist posture on all issues. The period takes its name from the May Fourth incident, which refers to student demonstrations of 4 May against the Versailles Conference. These protested news that the Shantung Peninsula Chinese territory which had become part of the German Concession in China would be transferred to Japan rather than restored to Chinese control. The broader May Fourth period was characterized by considerable intellectual and cultural ferment, and these developments are usually identified as the New Culture movement. Compared with the reformers of , the May Fourth generation seems more totalistic in its rejection of Chinese traditions. In a general way this dichotomy has some validity. But, most important, he stressed the need for new citizens, articulating a vision of comprehensive intellectual reform which played so large a part in the thinking of New Culture liberals. They would provide the foundation for representative government. Liang very strongly stood for liberating Chinese minds from the conventions of the past, opening them to ideas from everywhere. Like many of his contemporaries he felt Western strength was rooted in its assertive individuals, freedom of thought, and representative institutions. And he thought these were necessary for China to become strong. Like the New Culture liberals, he advocated a qualified form of individualism as a means toward the goal of national strength. Also, like them he placed high hopes on the value of education as a vehicle of social reform. New Culture values were most clearly articulated in the early years of the May Fourth period, from about to In essence China needed its own renaissance, in which a spirit of assertiveness, rationalism, and individualism would replace the stultifying imprint of Confucian passivity, superstition and groupism. The commitment to individualism was certainly a qualified one, and a big dose of Confucian paternalism lingered in the New Culture perspective as will be discussed in chapter two ,but still the orientation was toward radical cultural change. Moreover, New Culture advocates believed cultural reform so vital t hat they assigned it priority over political, social, and economic reform. A solid cultural foundation had to be laid before enduring political changes could occur. The failure of the revolution of had, it was argued, proved the futility of attempting political reform without the requisite cultural foundation. New Culture advocates, thus, vowed to refrain from politics and to devote themselves to education and cultural activities. Or to put it another way, as Jerome Grieder has suggested, they endeavored to introduce a new, more limited definition of politics to the Chinese scene. The cultural orthodoxy was defined by the state, and mastery of its fine points was the smoothest path to success for an aspiring official. Although the Confucian polity was not monolithic, since various schools of thought were tolerated, the boundaries of legitimate diversity were carefully drawn. Variations on the conventional theme were acceptable, but no questioning of fundamental principles was permitted. The Confucian polity was a pervasive

presence which shaped the thinking and behavior of all Chinese, from aspiring degree candidates to peasants, by providing a code of proper behavior. Those who deviated from accepted ways were considered rebels. There was no place within the unified Confucian polity for anyone who wished to carve out an independent role as detached critic. In Confucian China the concept of a loyal opposition involved a contradiction in terms. One was either part of the polity or a rebel. The New Culture ambition was to divide the Confucian polity into the two independent, though interrelated, components of politics and culture. Politics would encompass a narrowly defined range of purely governmental activities. Culture, then, would have an independent identity, with its sphere of activities unrestricted by any governmental orthodoxy. Individuals might safely remain outside government, acting as educators and independent critics to influence cultural values and ultimately influence politics. Thus it would be possible to work from the outside and still be a respectable citizen and not a rebel. The Dilemmas for New Culture Liberals The very fact that t hey felt their basic principles to be a product of rational analysis created some severe challenges to the integrity of New Culture liberals. Because their reform program seemed scientific, liberals were reluctant to abandon it merely because conditions made it temporarily inapplicable. Nor could they join the more activist political reform movements of the times without compromising their intellectual honesty. The combination of inapplicable circumstances and the desire for intellectual consistency created, during the s and s, some agonizing dilemmas for those who held liberal views. Ironically, New Culture liberals laid the groundwork for the own later difficulties. During the early years of the May Fourth movement ca. During this time of relative consensus much was accomplished in bringing Confucian values under scrutiny and in fostering some of the more modern, Westernized attitudes considered so essential. However, the new atmosphere, for which the liberals were largely responsible, sparked the May Fourth incident which proved to be an unhappy watershed. Subsequently, liberals found themselves defending their principles against increasingly strident attacks. The reason was that the apparent success of the incident seemed the product of what most participants, especially students, termed political activities. This conclusion posed a challenge to the liberal scheme of priorities, which subordinated political activism to cultural reform. Indeed, New Culture liberals especially hoped that students would eschew political activities in favor of more cultural and intellectual endeavors. Thenceforth, however, students were less receptive to the liberal vision of reform, preferring speedier, more activist, political alternatives. The liberal commitment to political detachment was also severely tested by the policies of warlord governments in the s. A program of education and intellectual regeneration required a favorable atmosphere for implementation. Yet the warlords curtailed intellectual freedom and crippled education by withholding funds. These circumstances prompted teacher strikes, to recover salaries several months in arrears, and political involvement to the extent o f circulating petitions and engaging in political advocacy. Drafted by Hu Shih and signed by sixteen intellectuals, the statement basically called for a more honest and efficient government. In September , three of the signatories became members of the cabinet, with the formation of what was optimistically termed the Good Men Government. For many this was conclusive proof of the bankruptcy of the liberal posture. Standing aloof from the practical tasks of political organization and relying on the persuasive power of rational argument seemed irrelevant and even irresponsible. Yet liberals viewed the situation in a different light. While others were calling for more political activism, liberals were concerned with having compromised their principles by the limited steps which they had taken. After all, if political activity was justified under certain conditions, what was left of the liberal conviction that intellectual changes must precede political reform? The s also witnessed the development of a labor movement and growing anti-foreign sentiment. Both required a response from the liberals. Students, the Communists, and Sun Yat-sen protested this action by the Peking government. Then and later the pressure was on the liberals to take a stand, as other groups had, with reference to the labor movement. This placed them in an uncomfortable position. The whole idea of class struggle offended the lingering Confucian sensibilities of many liberals. Moreover, the labor movement seemed to mean an inevitable resort to extreme measures and violence, and few liberals had the stomach for this kind of direct confrontation. Finally, while liberals certainly desired better conditions for workers, their attitude toward popular movements was always an ambivalent one. The heritage of Confucian paternalism, previously mentioned in relation to liberal advocacy of individualism, also was an important

force whenever reference was made to the people. As a result liberals were somewhat reluctant to associate with the people, much less empathize with them to the extent that Mao Tse-tung was to do. As with Chinese society in general, the condition of the people or the workers could only be improved by fundamental changed in outlooks and attitudes. Such attitudinal changes must precede economic improvements or the latter would only be ephemeral. Consequently, labor organizations and demonstrations seemed premature to most liberals. They preferred to stress worker education and moral uplift. Related to and reinforcing the labor movement was the growing anti-foreign sentiment. In these times of very heated emotions many liberals found themselves caught on the horns of a dilemma. Certainly their sense of nationalism was outraged by the privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China; and they too were enraged by the events of May Yet marching in demonstrations and using passionate rhetoric were generally not their style. Moreover, the expression of extreme anti-foreignism conflicted with liberal cosmopolitanism and openness to all ideas regardless of their place of origin. Finally, as always, questions of this sort were judged as premature and pointless according to liberal guidelines on reform. Labor organizations and the expulsion of foreigners might provide fleeting emotional gratifications, but they also diverted limited energies from the more important task of cultural reform. So liberals generally persisted in their belief that no political or social change could endure unless the cultural foundation was solidly grounded, and mostly they contented themselves with perfunctory statements of sympathy with prevailing anti-foreign emotions. In general, then, liberals tried to remain detached from the political and social battles of the s, preferring to work for more long-term reforms. This stance inevitably provoked criticism from many sides, and by there was no longer any way to avoid the necessity of choice. Liberals had to respond to his action, compelled to choose between the Communists and the Nationalists. The option of aloof neutrality was no longer available to them. Most liberals found Communism anathema because of its dogmatism, economic determinism, emphasis on class conflict, and sanctioning of violence. In the final analysis, all were fervent patriots and most sided with Chiang in hopes that he might bring strength and stability to China. From the beginning of the Nationalist period liberals found the principle of intellectual freedom even more threatened than it had been under the warlords. The Nationalists were more concerned with propaganda and indoctrination than with the objective consideration of ideas.

Chapter 6 : Monday Methods: What in the world is groupism? : AskHistorians

This innovative ethnography takes a new approach to the study of Philippine sugar. For much of the late colonial history of the Philippines, sugar was its most lucrative export, the biggest employer, and the greatest source of political influence.

The study of history at its core, is a study of actors, in the sense of the study of how things affect a single individual or a collection of individuals and how they affect the world around them and others. Yet history, as people who ask questions and also write answers on this sub are aware, is often framed in a way that confers that status of the actor to a group as a whole. What I mean is that history, in this sub as well as elsewhere, is often conceptualized with certain groups, such as ethnicities, nations etc. This is, of course, often done because it functions as a convenience but it also carries wide-reaching implications. In his essay Ethnicity without Groups Roger Brubaker writes "Group" functions as a seemingly unproblematic, taken-for-granted concept As a result, we tend to take for granted not only the concept "group", but also "groups" â€" the putative things-in-the-world to which the concept refers. This is what I will call groupism: In the domain of ethnicity, nationalism, and race, I mean by "groupism" the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interest and agency can be attributed. I mean the tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial or cultural blocs. What Brubaker refers to is to imagine such things as the Franco-German war of or the Middle Eastern conflict as result of an inherent group conciseness of Frenchmen and Germans and of Palestinians and Israelis that stems from these groups being collective historical actors with a will of their own rather than a collection of individuals who frame themselves and each other within such a matrix. What Brubaker means is the following We need to break, for example, with the seemingly obvious and uncontroversial point that ethnic conflict involves conflict between ethnic groups. I want to suggest that ethnic conflict â€" or what might be better called ethnicized or ethnically framed conflict â€" need not, and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic groups [emphasize original]. Rather, we need to understand such categories as ethnic or other groupist terms as something invoked and constructed by historical actors. It is these actors who cast ethnic, racial or national groups as the protagonists of conflict, of struggle. In fact, these categories, while essential to the actors casting them, referencing them, are in themselves a construct, a performance. Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or collective individuals â€" as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring "groups" encourages us to do â€" but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, and disaggregated terms. This means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, cultural idoms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organized routines, institutional forms, political projects and cognitive events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racilization and nationalization as political, social, cultural and psychological processes The gist of it is that in order to gain a greater understanding of history we must think of groups and their group identities not as something a priori, not as something that has an in-the-world-substance but rather as something that is the product of a process and has an ever shifting connotation, content, and consequence. What it means to be German, French, Palestinian or Israeli is not predetermined by characteristics inherent and unchanging to this group moniker but the product of a historical, political, and social process. It is, in fact contingent upon such processes. So rather than framing our historical narrative centered around groups such as the Germans, the French etc. Rather than essentializing what it means to be part of a group existing independently from its members, the historian should ask how these groups are constructed and performed as part of their historical context. In short, "the Germans" e.

Chapter 7 : Ethnic groupism: Understanding ethnicisation of work in Malaysia | Wendy A Smith - calendrier

This is what I will call groupism: the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.

Chapter 8 : Barons, brokers, and buyers (edition) | Open Library

rationalize meaning: 1. to try to find reasons to explain your behaviour, decisions, etc.: 2. to make a company, way of working, etc. more effective, usually by combining or stopping particular activities, or (of a company, way of working, etc.) to become more effective in this way: 3. to create a.

Chapter 9 : Liberalism in an Illiberal Age | China Heritage Quarterly

Chinese ethnicity displays two strong associations: one with back oï¬ce positions (+), and the other with activities linked to sales function (+). The weak- est statistical link is the one associated with the F&B function ().