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Chapter 1 : Happiness Quotes (quotes)

*Real Happiness of a People Under a Philosophical King [Christian Wolff] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks.*

GNH Defined[edit] GNH is distinguishable from Gross Domestic Product by valuing collective happiness as the goal of governance, by emphasizing harmony with nature and traditional values as expressed in the 9 domains of happiness and 4 pillars of GNH. The domains weigh equally but the indicators within each domain differ by weight. The first GNH surveys consisted of long questionnaires that polled the citizens about living conditions and religious behavior, including questions about the times a person prayed in a day and other Karma indicators. It took several hours to complete one questionnaire. Later rounds of the GNH Index were shortened, but the survey retained the religious behavioral indicators. One distinguishing feature of Bhutan GNH Index from the other models is that the other models are designed for secular governments and do not include religious behavior measurement components. The data is used to compare the happiness between different groups of citizens , [30] and changes over time. Headquartered in Vermont, GNHUSA is a c 3 tax-exempt non-profit organization with a mission to increase personal happiness and the collective wellbeing by changing how the United States measure their progress and success. Wheatley returned to Vermont determined to introduce the little-known GNH concepts to the general public in the U. After establishing the nonprofit in the spring of , representatives of the group attended the fifth international GNH research conference in Brazil in November and, in June , hosted the first US-based conference on Gross National Happiness and other alternative indicators, at Champlain College in Burlington, Vermont. GNHUSA collaborates with the Vermont Data Center to perform a periodic study of well-being in the state , as a pilot for other states and municipalities. The organization also collaborates closely with the Happiness Alliance in collecting online GNH data, based on the domain of happiness developed by Bhutan. In , GNHUSA initiated the process of establishing chapters in all 50 states to work with local governments and institutions on well-being initiatives, beginning with Wisconsin and North Carolina. The organization also promotes the U. Along the way, Walkers perform audio and video interviews and collect survey responses, introducing the concept of GNH and amassing data that will assist them in tailoring the GNH domains and indicators to American culture. Criticism[edit] GNH has been described by critics as a propaganda tool used by the Bhutanese government to distract from ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses it has committed. Before that time the ethnic cleansing in Bhutan of non-Buddhist population of ethnic Nepalese of Hindu faith as a result of the GNH cultural preservation. Therefore, probably, the more accurate historical reference is to mention the coining of the GNH phrase as a key event, but not the Bhutan GNH philosophy, because the philosophy as understood by western scholars is different from the philosophy used by the King at the time. Bhutan aspires to enhance the happiness of its people and GNH serves as a measurement tool for realizing that aspiration. It is home to perhaps , people most of whom live in grinding poverty.

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Chapter 2 : Ethics - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

The real happiness of a people under a philosophical King demonstrated ; Not only from the Nature of Things, but from the undoubted Experience of the Chinese under their first Founder Fohi, and his Illustrious Successors, Hoam Ti, and Xin Num.

Indian philosophy Indian philosophy Sanskrit: Some of the earliest surviving philosophical texts are the Upanishads of the later Vedic period ~ BCE. Important Indian philosophical concepts include dharma , karma , samsara , moksha and ahimsa. Indian philosophers developed a system of epistemological reasoning pramana and logic and investigated topics such as metaphysics, ethics, hermeneutics and soteriology. Indian philosophy also covered topics such as political philosophy as seen in the Arthashastra c. The commonly named six orthodox schools arose sometime between the start of the Common Era and the Gupta Empire. Later developments include the development of Tantra and Iranian-Islamic influences. Buddhism mostly disappeared from India after the Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent , surviving in the Himalayan regions and south India. Due to the influence of British colonialism, much modern Indian philosophical work was in English and includes thinkers such as Radhakrishnan , Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya , Bimal Krishna Matilal and M. Jain philosophy Jain philosophy separates body matter from the soul consciousness completely. Jain philosophy attempts to explain the rationale of being and existence, the nature of the Universe and its constituents, the nature of bondage and the means to achieve liberation. Jain texts expound that in every half-cycle of time, twenty-four tirthankaras grace this part of the Universe to teach the unchanging doctrine of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Buddhist philosophy begins with the thought of Gautama Buddha fl. Buddhist thought is trans-regional and trans-cultural. It originated in India and later spread to East Asia , Tibet , Central Asia , and Southeast Asia , developing new and syncretic traditions in these different regions. The various Buddhist schools of thought are the dominant philosophical tradition in Tibet and Southeast Asian countries like Sri Lanka and Burma. Because ignorance to the true nature of things is considered one of the roots of suffering dukkha , Buddhist philosophy is concerned with epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and psychology. The ending of dukkha also encompasses meditative practices. Key innovative concepts include the Four Noble Truths , Anatta not-self a critique of a fixed personal identity , the transience of all things Anicca , and a certain skepticism about metaphysical questions. Mahayana philosophers such as Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu developed the theories of Shunyata emptiness of all phenomena and Vijnapti-matra appearance only , a form of phenomenology or transcendental idealism. After the disappearance of Buddhism from India, these philosophical traditions continued to develop in the Tibetan Buddhist , East Asian Buddhist and Theravada Buddhist traditions. The modern period saw the rise of Buddhist modernism and Humanistic Buddhism under Western influences and the development of a Western Buddhism with influences from modern psychology and Western philosophy. East Asian philosophy The Analects of Confucius fl. East Asian philosophical thought began in Ancient China , and Chinese philosophy begins during the Western Zhou Dynasty and the following periods after its fall when the " Hundred Schools of Thought " flourished 6th century to BCE. These philosophical traditions developed metaphysical, political and ethical theories such Tao , Yin and yang , Ren and Li which, along with Chinese Buddhism , directly influenced Korean philosophy , Vietnamese philosophy and Japanese philosophy which also includes the native Shinto tradition. During later Chinese dynasties like the Ming Dynasty ~ as well as in the Korean Joseon dynasty ~ a resurgent Neo-Confucianism led by thinkers such as Wang Yangming ~ became the dominant school of thought, and was promoted by the imperial state. In the Modern era, Chinese thinkers incorporated ideas from Western philosophy. Modern Japanese thought meanwhile developed under strong Western influences such as the study of Western Sciences Rangaku and the modernist Meirokusha intellectual society which drew from European enlightenment thought. The 20th century saw the rise of State Shinto and also Japanese nationalism. The Kyoto School , an influential and unique Japanese philosophical school

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developed from Western phenomenology and Medieval Japanese Buddhist philosophy such as that of Dogen. African philosophy Main article: African philosophy African philosophy is philosophy produced by African people , philosophy that presents African worldviews, ideas and themes, or philosophy that uses distinct African philosophical methods. Modern African thought has been occupied with Ethnophilosophy , with defining the very meaning of African philosophy and its unique characteristics and what it means to be African. Another early African philosopher was Anton Wilhelm Amo c. Contemporary African thought has also seen the development of Professional philosophy and of Africana philosophy , the philosophical literature of the African diaspora which includes currents such as black existentialism by African-Americans. Modern African thinkers have been influenced by Marxism , African-American literature , Critical theory , Critical race theory , Postcolonialism and Feminism. Indigenous American philosophy is the philosophy of the Indigenous people of the Americas. There is a wide variety of beliefs and traditions among these different American cultures. Among some of the Native Americans in the United States there is a belief in a metaphysical principle called the "Great Mystery" Siouan: Wakan Tanka , Algonquian: Another widely shared concept was that of Orenda or "spiritual power". According to Peter M. Whiteley, for the Native Americans, "Mind is critically informed by transcendental experience dreams, visions and so on as well as by reason. Another feature of the indigenous American worldviews was their extension of ethics to non-human animals and plants. The Aztec worldview posited the concept of an ultimate universal energy or force called Ometeotl which can be translated as "Dual Cosmic Energy" and sought a way to live in balance with a constantly changing, "slippery" world. The theory of Teotl can be seen as a form of Pantheism. Aztec ethics was focused on seeking tlamatiliztli knowledge, wisdom which was based on moderation and balance in all actions as in the Nahua proverb "the middle good is necessary". These groupings allow philosophers to focus on a set of similar topics and interact with other thinkers who are interested in the same questions. The groupings also make philosophy easier for students to approach. Students can learn the basic principles involved in one aspect of the field without being overwhelmed with the entire set of philosophical theories. Various sources present different categorical schemes. The categories adopted in this article aim for breadth and simplicity. These five major branches can be separated into sub-branches and each sub-branch contains many specific fields of study.

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Chapter 3 : Philosophy - Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Back to Top Ethics or Moral Philosophy is concerned with questions of how people ought to act, and the search for a definition of right conduct identified as the one causing the greatest good and the good life in the sense of a life worth living or a life that is satisfying or happy. The word "ethics" is derived from the Greek "ethos" meaning "custom" or "habit". Ethics differs from morals and morality in that ethics denotes the theory of right action and the greater good, while morals indicate their practice. It asks questions like "How should people act? See below for more discussion of these categories. He asserted that people will naturally do what is good provided that they know what is right, and that evil or bad actions are purely the result of ignorance: So, in essence, he considered self-knowledge and self-awareness to be the essential good, because the truly wise i. According to Aristotle , "Nature does nothing in vain", so it is only when a person acts in accordance with their nature and thereby realizes their full potential, that they will do good and therefore be content in life. He encouraged moderation in all things, the extremes being degraded and immoral, e. Virtue, for Aristotle , denotes doing the right thing to the right person at the right time to the proper extent in the correct fashion and for the right reason - something of a tall order. Cynicism is an ancient doctrine best exemplified by the Greek philosopher Diogenes of Sinope , who lived in a tub on the streets of Athens. He taught that a life lived according to Nature was better than one that conformed to convention, and that a simple life is essential to virtue and happiness. As a moral teacher, Diogenes emphasized detachment from many of those things conventionally considered "good". Hedonism posits that the principal ethic is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. This may range from those advocating self-gratification regardless of the pain and expense to others and with no thought for the future Cyrenaic Hedonism , to those who believe that the most ethical pursuit maximizes pleasure and happiness for the most people. Somewhere in the middle of this continuum, Epicureanism observed that indiscriminate indulgence sometimes results in negative consequences, such as pain and fear, which are to be avoided. According to Epictetus , difficult problems in life should not be avoided, but rather embraced as spiritual exercises needed for the health of the spirit. Pyrrho , the founding figure of Pyrrhonian Skepticism , taught that one cannot rationally decide between what is good and what is bad although, generally speaking, self-interest is the primary motive of human behavior, and he was disinclined to rely upon sincerity, virtue or Altruism as motivations. Humanism , with its emphasis on the dignity and worth of all people and their ability to determine right and wrong purely by appeal to universal human qualities especially rationality , can be traced back to Thales , Xenophanes of Colophon - B. These early Greek thinkers were all instrumental in the move away from a spiritual morality based on the supernatural, and the development of a more humanistic freethought the view that beliefs should be formed on the basis of science and logic, and not be influenced by emotion, authority, tradition or dogma. Normative Ethics Back to Top Normative Ethics or Prescriptive Ethics is the branch of ethics concerned with establishing how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong. It attempts to develop a set of rules governing human conduct, or a set of norms for action. Normative ethical theories are usually split into three main categories: Consequentialism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics: Thus, a morally right action is one that produces a good outcome or consequence. Consequentialist theories must consider questions like "What sort of consequences count as good consequences? Utilitarianism , which holds that an action is right if it leads to the most happiness for the greatest number of people "happiness" here is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain. The origins of Utilitarianism can be traced back as far as the Greek philosopher Epicurus , but its full formulation is usually credited to Jeremy Bentham , with John Stuart Mill as its foremost proponent. Hedonism , which is the philosophy that pleasure is the most important pursuit of mankind, and that

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individuals should strive to maximize their own total pleasure net of any pain or suffering. Epicureanism is a more moderate approach which still seeks to maximize happiness, but which defines happiness more as a state of tranquillity than pleasure. Egoism, which holds that an action is right if it maximizes good for the self. Thus, Egoism may license actions which are good for the individual, but detrimental to the general welfare. Individual Egoism holds that all people should do whatever benefits him or her self. Personal Egoism holds that each person should act in his own self-interest, but makes no claims about what anyone else ought to do. Universal Egoism holds that everyone should act in ways that are in their own interest. Asceticism, which is, in some ways, the opposite of Egoism in that it describes a life characterized by abstinence from egoistic pleasures especially to achieve a spiritual goal. Thus, individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self-interest. Rule Consequentialism, which is a theory sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile Consequentialism and Deontology, that moral behavior involves following certain rules, but that those rules should be chosen based on the consequences that the selection of those rules have. Negative Consequentialism, which focuses on minimizing bad consequences rather than promoting good consequences. This may actually require active intervention to prevent harm from being done, or may only require passive avoidance of bad outcomes. Deontology is an approach to ethics that focuses on the rightness or wrongness of actions themselves, as opposed to the rightness or wrongness of the consequences of those actions. Some deontological theories include: Natural Rights Theory such as that espoused by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, which holds that humans have absolute, natural rights in the sense of universal rights that are inherent in the nature of ethics, and not contingent on human actions or beliefs. This eventually developed into what we today call human rights. Pluralistic Deontology is a description of the deontological ethics propounded by W. Ross - He argues that there are seven prima facie duties which need to be taken into consideration when deciding which duty should be acted upon: In some circumstances, there may be clashes or conflicts between these duties and a decision must be made whereby one duty may "trump" another, although there are no hard and fast rules and no fixed order of significance. Contractarian Ethics or the Moral Theory of Contractarianism claims that moral norms derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement. It holds that moral acts are those that we would all agree to if we were unbiased, and that moral rules themselves are a sort of a contract, and therefore only people who understand and agree to the terms of the contract are bound by it. Contractualism is a variation on Contractarianism, although based more on the Kantian ideas that ethics is an essentially interpersonal matter, and that right and wrong are a matter of whether we can justify the action to other people. Virtue Ethics, focuses on the inherent character of a person rather than on the nature or consequences of specific actions performed. The system identifies virtues those habits and behaviors that will allow a person to achieve "eudaimonia", or well being or a good life, counsels practical wisdom to resolve any conflicts between virtues, and claims that a lifetime of practicing these virtues leads to, or in effect constitutes, happiness and the good life. It was first advocated by Plato and is particularly associated with Aristotle, and became the prevailing approach to ethical thinking in the Ancient and Medieval periods. It fell out of favor in the Early Modern period, but has recently undergone a modern resurgence. Agent-Based Theories give an account of virtue based on our common-sense intuitions about which character traits are admirable e. Ethics of Care was developed mainly by Feminist writers, and calls for a change in how we view morality and the virtues, shifting towards the more marginalized virtues exemplified by women, such as taking care of others, patience, the ability to nurture, self-sacrifice, etc. Meta-Ethics Back to Top Meta-Ethics is concerned primarily with the meaning of ethical judgments, and seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments and how they may be supported or defended. A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory see below, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad or evil; rather it tries to define the essential meaning and nature of the problem being discussed. It concerns itself with second order questions, specifically the semantics, epistemology and ontology of ethics. The major meta-ethical views are commonly divided into two camps: Moral Realism and Moral Anti-Realism: Moral

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Realism or Moral Objectivism holds that there are objective moral values, so that evaluative statements are essentially factual claims, which are either true or false, and that their truth or falsity are independent of our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes towards the things being evaluated. It is a cognitivist view in that it holds that ethical sentences express valid propositions and are therefore truth-apt. There are two main variants: Ethical Naturalism This doctrine holds that there are objective moral properties of which we have empirical knowledge, but that these properties are reducible to entirely non-ethical properties. It assumes cognitivism the view that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false , and that the meanings of these ethical sentences can be expressed as natural properties without the use of ethical terms. Ethical Non-Naturalism This doctrine whose major apologist is G. Moore holds that ethical statements express propositions in that sense it is also cognitivist that cannot be reduced to non-ethical statements e. Moore claimed that a naturalistic fallacy is committed by any attempt to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition in terms of one or more natural properties e. Ethical Intuitionism is a variant of Ethical Non-Naturalism which claims that we sometimes have intuitive awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moral Anti-Realism holds that there are no objective moral values, and comes in one of three forms, depending on whether ethical statements are believed to be subjective claims Ethical Subjectivism , not genuine claims at all Non-Cognitivism or mistaken objective claims Moral Nihilism or Moral Skepticism: There are several different variants: Moral Relativism or Ethical Relativism: Non-Cognitivism , which holds that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine propositions, thus implying that moral knowledge is impossible. Again there are different versions: Prescriptivism or Universal Prescriptivism: Hare - , that moral statements function as imperatives which are universalizable i. Therefore, because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Blackburn argues that ethics cannot be entirely realist, for this would not allow for phenomena such as the gradual development of ethical positions over time or in differing cultural traditions. Projectivism in Ethics originally proposed by David Hume and more recently championed by Simon Blackburn is associated by many with Moral Relativism , and is considered controversial, even though it was philosophical orthodoxy throughout much of the 20th Century. This has led to charges of individuals claiming to hold attitudes that they do not really have, and therefore are in some way insincere. Moral Nihilism , which holds that ethical claims are generally false. It holds that there are no objective values that nothing is morally good, bad, wrong, right, etc. Error Theory is a form of Moral Nihilism which combines Cognitivism the belief that moral language consists of truth-apt statements with Moral Nihilism the belief that there are no moral facts. Moral Skepticism , which holds that no one has any moral knowledge or the stronger claim that no one can have any moral knowledge. It is particularly opposed to Moral Realism see above and perhaps its most famous proponent is Friedrich Nietzsche. An alternative division of meta-ethical views is between:

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Chapter 4 : Philosopher king | philosophy | calendrierdelascience.com

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Abelard was born into the lesser nobility around in Le Pallet, a small town in Brittany near Nantes. He received early training in letters, and took to his studies with enthusiasm; his later writings show familiarity with Cicero, Horace, Juvenal, Ovid, Lucan, Seneca, and Vergil. Abelard eventually renounced his inheritance, including its attendant knighthood, to pursue philosophy. He did so by travelling to study with well-known philosophers, most notably Roscelin and William of Champeaux. During the first years of the twelfth century, Abelard felt confident enough to set himself up as a lecturer, first at Melun and then at Corbeil, competing mainly with William of Champeaux Paris for students and reputation. Abelard returned to Paris sometime between and with his health restored and his ambition intact. Around Abelard decided to study theology; he sought out the most eminent teacher of theology of his day, Anselm of Laon not to be confused with Anselm of Canterbury, and became his student. It was not a good choice: It would be the last time he studied with anyone. After his recovery, Abelard resumed teaching at a nearby priory, primarily on theology and in particular on the Trinity. It was not to be. Abelard says that poverty forced him to resume teaching. He and the students who flocked to him in droves constructed an oratory named the Paraclete, where he continued to write, teach, and research. Abelard found the monks of Saint Gildas difficult and obstructive—“even dangerous”—and he claims that there were several attempts on his life while in residence. By the mid Abelard was given permission to return to Paris retaining his rank as abbot and to teach in the schools on the Mont Ste. After some inconclusive attempts to resolve their differences, Abelard asked the archbishop of Sens to arrange a public dispute between himself and Bernard on 3 June, to settle their disagreements. When Abelard discovered that there was no debate but instead a kangaroo court, he refused to take part, announcing his intention to appeal to the Pope directly. He walked out of the proceedings and began travelling to Rome. The Council condemned nineteen propositions it claimed to find in his works and adjourned. Bernard launched a successful campaign petitioning the Papal Court before Abelard was out of France; a letter from the Pope upholding the decision of the Council of Soissons reached Abelard while he was at Cluny; Abelard was ordered to silence. By all accounts Abelard complied immediately, even meeting peacefully with Bernard in reconciliation. Abelard remained under the protection of Peter the Venerable first at Cluny, then at St. Marcel, as his health gradually deteriorated. Abelard died on 21 April His two masterworks are: In addition, there are four lesser works on dialectic: The Ethics offers an analysis of moral worth and the degree of praise or blame that should attach to agents and their actions; it breaks off at the beginning of the second book. The Conversations is a pair of debates among characters who appear to Abelard in a dream over the nature of happiness and the supreme good: Abelard also wrote a slight work of practical advice for his son: His three main works are devoted to a philosophical analysis of the Trinity, the several versions representing successive stages of his thought and his attempts at orthodoxy each rewritten several times: The first version of the Theology seems to have been the work condemned at the Council of Soissons, the last the work condemned at the Council of Sens. In addition to these three works, in which problems in philosophical theology are treated thematically, Abelard also wrote several commentaries: Abelard also took up questions about faith and reason in a short work: Finally, Abelard composed an extremely influential theological work that contains no theoretical speculation at all: Abelard does not attempt to harmonize these apparently inconsistent remarks, but in his preface he lays down rules for proper hermeneutic investigation: It is possible some of these works may yet be found. He is an irrealist not only about universals, but also about propositions, events, times other than the present, natural kinds, relations, wholes, absolute space, hylomorphic composites, and the like. Instead, Abelard holds that the concrete individual, in all its richness and variety, is more than enough to populate the world. Abelard preferred reductive, atomist, and material explanations whenever possible; he

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devoted a great deal of effort to pouring cold water on the metaphysical excesses of his predecessors and contemporaries. Abelard defends his thesis that universals are nothing but words by arguing that ontological realism about universals is incoherent. Hence, Abelard concludes, universality is not an ontological feature of the world but a semantic feature of language. Suppose universals were things in the world, so that one and the same item is completely present in both Socrates and an ass at the same time, making each to be wholly an animal. Abelard points out that then the same thing, animal, will be simultaneously rational due to its role in constituting the species human being and irrational due to its role in constituting the species ass. But then contraries are simultaneously present in the same thing as a whole, which is impossible. To the rejoinder that rationality and irrationality are not actually present in the same thing, Abelard offers a twofold reply. First, he rejects the claim that they are present only potentially. Each species is actually informed by a contrary, and the genus is actually present in each as a whole; hence it is actually informed by one contrary in one species and by the other in the other; since it is wholly one and the same in each, it is therefore actually informed by contraries, and the contradiction results. Second, Abelard undertakes to establish that contraries will be present not merely in the genus but even in the selfsame individual. For Socrates is an animal, and so is Brunellus the Ass; but by transitivity—“since each is wholly and completely animal”—Socrates is Brunellus, and hence both rational and irrational. Put a different way, each is essentially an animal, and furthermore essentially rational and essentially irrational. Prospects are no better for realism if the universal is identified not with a single thing but with a collection of things. Abelard points out that collections are posterior to their parts, and, furthermore, the collection is not shared among its parts in the way a universal is said to be common to many. Nor does it help to try to identify the universal with the individual in some fashion, for example in claiming that Socrates qua human is taken as the universal human being; Abelard argues that if the universal really is the individual, then we are stuck with the consequence that either individuals such as Socrates are common to many, or there are as many universals as there are individuals, each of which is absurd. Abelard concludes that universality is merely linguistic, not a feature of the world. These terms are semantically general, in that their sense applies to more than one thing, but they do not thereby name some general thing; instead, they distributively refer to each of the individuals to which the term applies. Abelard maintains that everything in the world apart from God and angels is either form, matter, or a composite of form and matter. The matter of something is that out of which it is made, whether it persists in the finished product as bricks in a house or is absorbed into it as flour in bread. Ultimately, all material objects are composed of the four elements earth, air, fire, and water, but they do not retain their elemental forms in most combinations. In general, the form of a material object just is the configuration of its material parts: Forms are therefore supervenient on matter, and have no ontological standing independent of it. This is not to deny that forms exist, but to provide a particular explanation of what it is for a form to inhere in a given subject, namely for that subject to have its matter configured in a certain way. For example, the inherence of shape in the statue just is the way in which its bronze is arranged. Hence material things are identical with what they are made of—with one exception: Strictly speaking, since human souls are capable of existence in separation from the body, they are not forms after all, though they act as substantial forms as long as they are joined to the body. Material composites of form and matter, humans excepted, are integral wholes made up of their discrete material parts as configured in a given way. Abelard countenances many types of integral wholes: Most of these wholes are ontologically nothing beyond their material parts. Whether structured composites have any independent ontological standing depends on the status of their organizing forms. Intuitively, some wholes have a natural division that takes precedence over others; a sentence, for example, is divided into words, syllables, and letters, in precisely that order. According to Abelard, the principal parts of a whole are those whose conjunction immediately results in the complete whole. His intent seems to be that the nature of the composition if any that defines the integral whole also spells out its principal parts. A house consists of floor, walls, and roof put together in the right way. It is an open question whether each principal part such as the wall requires the existence of all of its subparts every brick. Individuals have natures, and in virtue of their natures they belong to determinate natural kinds.

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Instead, Abelard takes a natural kind to be a well-defined collection of things that have the same features, broadly speaking, that make them what they are. Why a given thing has some features rather than others is explained by how it got that way—the natural processes that created it result in its having the features it does, namely being the kind of thing it is; similar processes lead to similar results. On this reading, it is clear that natural kinds have no special status; they are no more than discrete integral wholes whose principle of membership is similarity, merely reflecting the fact that the world is divided into discrete similarity-classes of objects. Furthermore, such real relations of similarity are nothing themselves above and beyond the things that are similar. If these causal powers were different, then natural kinds might be different as well, or might not have been as sharply differentiated as they are now. Given how matters stand, natural kinds carve the world at its joints, but they are the joints chosen by God. Logic Abelard was the greatest logician since Antiquity: Abelard observes that the same propositional content can be expressed with different force in different contexts: Likewise, the distinction allows Abelard to define negation, and other propositional connectives, purely truth-functionally in terms of content, so that negation, for instance, is treated as follows: That is, the conclusion—more exactly, the sense of the final statement—is required by the sense of the preceding statement s , so that it cannot be otherwise. An entailment is complete perfecta when it holds in virtue of the logical form complexio of the propositions involved. By this, Abelard tells us, he means that the entailment holds under any uniform substitution in its terms, the criterion now associated with Bolzano. The traditional four figures and moods of the categorical syllogism derived from Aristotle, and the doctrine of the hypothetical syllogism derived from Boethius, are all instances of complete entailments, or as we should say, valid inference. There is another way in which conclusions can be necessary and relevant to their premisses, yet not be formally valid not be a complete entailment. The necessary connection among the propositions, and the link among their senses, might be a function of non-formal metaphysical truths holding in all possible worlds. Abelard takes such incomplete entailments to hold according to the theory of the topics to be forms of so-called topical inference. Against Boethius, Abelard maintained that topical rules were only needed for incomplete entailment, and in particular are not required to validate the classical moods of the categorical and hypothetical syllogism mentioned in the preceding paragraph. One of the surprising results of his investigation is that he denies that a correlate of the Deduction Theorem holds, maintaining that a valid argument need not correspond to an acceptable conditional sentence, nor conversely, since the requirements on arguments and conditionals differ. This led to a crisis in the theory of inference in the twelfth century, since Abelard unsuccessfully tried to evade the difficulty. These debates seem to have taken place in the later part of the 1100s, as Abelard was about to become embroiled with Bernard of Clairvaux, and his attention was elsewhere. To do so, he relies on the traditional division, derived from Aristotle, that sees the main linguistic categories as name, verb, and their combination into the sentence. Abelard takes names to be conventionally significant simple words, usually without tense. So understood there are a wide variety of names: Even so his list is not general enough to catalogue all referring expressions. These are at the heart of the problem of universals, and they pose particular difficulties for semantics.

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Chapter 5 : Plato and Aristotle

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At a certain point, Wylie was genuinely freaked out: The company has created psychological profiles of million Americans. And now they want to work with the Pentagon? Alt-right presents itself as a movement that addresses the concerns of ordinary white hard-working deeply religious people who stand for simple traditional values and abhor corrupted eccentrics like homosexuals and vegans, but also digital nerds. And now we learned that their electoral triumphs were masterminded and orchestrated precisely by such a nerd who stands for all they oppose! There is more than an anecdotal value in this fact: At a more basic level, a closer look at the context of Cambridge Analytica makes it clear how cold manipulation and the love and care for human welfare are two sides of the same coin. The researcher who personifies this intersection is Martin Seligman: At the same time, his work attracted interest and funding from the military as a central part of its soldier-resilience initiative. A science that is oriented toward the development of behavioral technologies is bound to view us narrowly as manipulable subjects rather than rational agents. To grasp the whole scope of this control, one should move beyond the link between private corporations and political parties as is the case with Cambridge Analytica, to the interpenetration of data processing companies like Google or Facebook and state security agencies. Assange was right in his strangely ignored key book on Google [iii]: The biggest achievement of the new cognitive-military complex is that direct and obvious oppression is no longer necessary: The predominant critique proceeds in the way of demystification: But what is urgently needed is also the opposite move: Is the topic of scientific research on human welfare and happiness at least the way it is practiced today really so innocent, or is it already in itself permeated by the stance of control and manipulation? What if the sciences are here not just misused? What if they find here precisely their proper use? As is often the case, Bhutan, a developing Third World country, naively spelled out the absurd socio-political consequences of this notion of happiness: Officials said they have already conducted a survey of around people and drawn up a list of parameters for being happy, similar to the development index which is tracked by the United Nations. The main concerns have been identified as psychological well-being, health, education, good governance, living standards, community vitality and ecological diversity! this is cultural imperialism, if there ever was one. When, exactly, can a people be said to be happy? In a country like Czechoslovakia in the late s and s, people in a way effectively were happy. Three fundamental conditions of happiness were fulfilled there. It is good to experience a brief shortage of some goods on the market from time to time no coffee for a couple of days, then no beef, then no TV sets. These brief periods of shortage functioned as exceptions which reminded people that they should be glad that the goods were generally available; if everything is available all the time, people take this availability as an evident fact of life and no longer appreciate their luck. This place was just at the right distance, not too far, not too close. That fragile balance was disturbed " by what? Desire was the force which compelled the people to move on " and end up in a system in which a large majority is definitely less happy! Happiness is thus in itself in its very concept, as Hegel would have put it confused, indeterminate, inconsistent. It is a pagan category: Happiness is thus inherently hypocritical: Do we not encounter a similar gesture in much of Leftist politics? When a radical Leftist party just misses winning elections and taking power, one can often detect a hidden sigh of relief: The mother of all such gestures is the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia which crushed the Prague Spring and its hope of democratic Socialism. So, it would have had to choose between reasserting party control " i. In a way, the Soviet intervention saved the Prague Spring: Many internal sources confirm that the government was secretly hoping to lose the referendum, in which case it would have had to step down and leave it to others to perform the dirty job of austerity. Since they won, this task fell to themselves, and the result was the

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self-destruction of the radical Left in Greeceâ€ Without any doubt, Syriza would have been much happier if it were to lose the referendum. Truth hurts; it brings instability; it ruins the smooth flow of our daily lives. The choice is ours: You Might Also Like.

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Chapter 6 : Philosophy Debate Topics | calendrierdelascience.com

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See Article History Philosopher king, idea according to which the best form of government is that in which philosophers rule. It was influential in the Roman Empire and was revived in European political thought in the age of absolutist monarchs. It has also been more loosely influential in modern political movements claiming an infallible ruling elite. At the outset of Book V, Socrates is challenged by his interlocutors to explain this last proposal. In response, Socrates expounds three controversial claims, which he acknowledges will expose him to ridicule. Those children, together with those of the artisan class, will be tested, and only the most virtuous and capable will become rulers. Finally, Socrates declares that these rulers must in fact be philosophers: Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide—cities will have no rest from evils—there can be no happiness, either public or private, in any other city. Socrates predicts that this claim will elicit even more ridicule and contempt from his Athenian contemporaries than will equality for women rulers or communality of sex and children. Many Athenians saw philosophers as perpetual adolescents, skulking in corners and muttering about the meaning of life, rather than taking an adult part in the battle for power and success in the city. On this view, philosophers are the last people who should or would want to rule. The Republic turns this claim upside down, arguing that it is precisely the fact that philosophers are the last people who would want to rule that qualifies them to do so. Only those who do not wish for political power can be trusted with it. Philosophers are both morally and intellectually suited to rule: The city can foster such knowledge by putting aspiring philosophers through a demanding education, and the philosophers will use their knowledge of goodness and virtue to help other citizens achieve these so far as possible. Thus, the emphasis in the Platonic notion of the philosopher king lies more on the first word than the second. While relying on conventional Greek contrasts between king and tyrant and between the king as individual ruler and the multitudinous rule of aristocracy and democracy, Plato makes little use of the notion of kingship per se. That he had used the word, however, was key to the later career of the notion in imperial Rome and monarchical Europe. To the Stoic Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius reigned “, what mattered was that even kings should be philosophers, rather than that only philosophers should rule. The enlightened despots of the 18th century, such as Frederick II the Great of Prussia and Catherine II the Great of Russia, would pride themselves on being philosopher kings and queens. More than 1, years later the notion of such a figure acting as the interpreter of law inspired the Ayatollah Khomeini and the revolutionary state that he shaped in Iran. Finally, and more broadly, the notion of the philosopher ruler has come to signify a general claim to domination by an unaccountable, if putatively beneficent, elite, as in certain forms of Marxism and other revolutionary political movements.

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Chapter 7 : Happiness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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Is time really money? Does love, beauty, or justice hold any value? Other divisions include eschatology, teleology and theology. In past centuries natural science was included in philosophy, and called "natural philosophy". Is philosophy good or bad? Very few people would dispute this. It is easy to argue that philosophy is a good thing, because it helps people to think more clearly. Philosophy helps people to understand the world and the way people act and think. Philosophers believe that asking philosophical questions is useful because it brings wisdom and helps people to learn about the world and each other. Some philosophers might even argue that the question "Is philosophy good or bad? However, some people think that philosophy is harmful, as philosophy encourages free-thinking and often questions the beliefs that others hold. For example, philosophies such as some existentialist views say that there is no meaning to life or human existence, except the meaning that we make up or invent. People from some religions do not agree with the beliefs of existentialism. It should be noted that every major science, including physics, biology, and chemistry are all disciplines that originally were considered philosophy. As speculation and analysis about nature became more developed, these subjects branched away. This is a process that continues even today; psychology only split in the past century. In our own time, subjects such as consciousness studies, decision theory, and applied ethics have increasingly found independence from philosophy as a whole. Because of this, philosophy seems useful because it makes new kinds of science. What philosophers do[change change source] Philosophers ask questions about ideas concepts. They try to find answers to those questions. Some thinkers find it very hard to find those words that best describe the ideas they have. When they find answers to some of these questions philosophers often have the same problem, that is how to best tell the answers they found to other people. Depending on the meaning of the words they use, the answers change. Some philosophers are full-time thinkers called academics, who work for universities or colleges. These philosophers write books and articles about philosophy and teach classes about philosophy to university or college students. Other philosophers are just "hobby" thinkers who think about philosophy during their free time. A small number of hobby thinkers have thought so much about philosophy that they are able to write articles for philosophy magazines. Other people approach philosophy from another job. For example, monks, artists, and scientists may think about philosophical ideas and questions. Most philosophers work by asking questions and looking for good definitions meanings of words to help them understand what a question means. Some philosophers say the only thing needed to answer a question is to find out what it means. The only thing that makes philosophical questions such as those above difficult is that people do not really know what they mean Ludwig Wittgenstein held this view. Philosophers often use both real and imaginary examples to make a point. For example, they may write about a real or fictional person in order to show what they think a good person or a bad person is like. Some philosophers look for the simplest way to answer a question and say that is probably the right answer. Others believe that complicated answers to questions can also be right. For an example of a philosophical problem, see the God paradox. Philosophers use logic to solve problems and answer questions. Logical consistency is a cornerstone of any acceptable theory. Philosophers who disagree with a theory will often try to find a logical contradiction in a theory. If they find a contradiction, this gives them a reason to reject that theory. If they do not find an inconsistency, the philosopher might show that the theory leads to a conclusion which is either unacceptable or ridiculous. This second approach is usually called *reductio ad absurdum*.

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Chapter 8 : SparkNotes: The Declaration of Independence (): Preamble

As is often the case, Bhutan, a developing Third World country, naively spelled out the absurd socio-political consequences of this notion of happiness: two decades ago, the kingdom of Bhutan decided to focus on Gross National Happiness (GNH) rather than Gross National Product (GNP); the idea was the brainchild of ex-king Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who sought to steer Bhutan into the modern world, while preserving its unique identity.

December January ; First published: It was proofed and corrected by Andy Blunden, February , and corrected by Matthew Carmody in For Germany, the criticism of religion has been essentially completed, and the criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism. Man, who has found only the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where he sought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mere appearance of himself, the non-man [Unmensch], where he seeks and must seek his true reality. The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man – state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo. Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusiones man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself. It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus, the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of Earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics. The only reason for this is that it is concerned with Germany. If we were to begin with the German status quo itself, the result – even if we were to do it in the only appropriate way, i. Even the negation of our present political situation is a dusty fact in the historical junk room of modern nations. If I negate powdered pigtailed, I am still left with unpowdered pigtailed. If I negate the situation in Germany in , then according to the French calendar I have barely reached , much less the vital centre of our present age. Indeed, German history prides itself on having travelled a road which no other nation in the whole of history has ever travelled before, or ever will again. We have shared the restorations of modern nations without ever having shared their revolutions. We have been restored, firstly, because other nations dared to make revolutions, and, secondly, because other nations suffered counter-revolutions; on the one hand, because our masters were afraid, and, on the other, because they were not afraid. With our shepherds to the fore, we only once kept company with freedom, on the day of its internment. One school of thought that legitimizes the infamy of today with the infamy of yesterday, a school that stigmatizes every cry of the serf against the knout as mere rebelliousness once the knout has aged a little and acquired a hereditary significance and a history, a school to which history shows nothing but its a posteriori, as did the God of Israel to his servant Moses, the historical

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school of law " this school would have invented German history were it not itself an invention of that history. A Shylock, but a cringing Shylock, that swears by its bond, its historical bond, its Christian-Germanic bond, for every pound of flesh cut from the heart of the people. Good-natured enthusiasts, Germanomaniacs by extraction and free-thinkers by reflexion, on the contrary, seek our history of freedom beyond our history in the ancient Teutonic forests. Besides, it is common knowledge that the forest echoes back what you shout into it. So peace to the ancient Teutonic forests! War on the German state of affairs! They are below the level of history, they are beneath any criticism, but they are still an object of criticism like the criminal who is below the level of humanity but still an object for the executioner. In the struggle against that state of affairs, criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its enemy, which it wants not to refute but to exterminate. For the spirit of that state of affairs is refuted. In itself, it is no object worthy of thought, it is an existence which is as despicable as it is despised. Criticism does not need to make things clear to itself as regards this object, for it has already settled accounts with it. It no longer assumes the quality of an end-in-itself, but only of a means. Its essential pathos is indignation, its essential work is denunciation. It is a case of describing the dull reciprocal pressure of all social spheres one on another, a general inactive ill-humor, a limitedness which recognizes itself as much as it mistakes itself, within the frame of government system which, living on the preservation of all wretchedness, is itself nothing but wretchedness in office. This infinitely proceeding division of society into the most manifold races opposed to one another by petty antipathies, uneasy consciences, and brutal mediocrity, and which, precisely because of their reciprocal ambiguous and distrustful attitude, are all, without exception although with various formalities, treated by their rulers as conceded existences. And they must recognize and acknowledge as a concession of heaven the very fact that they are mastered, ruled, possessed! And, on the other side, are the rulers themselves, whose greatness is in inverse proportion to their number! Criticism dealing with this content is criticism in a hand-to-hand fight, and in such a fight the point is not whether the opponent is a noble, equal, interesting opponent, the point is to strike him. The point is not to let the Germans have a minute for self-deception and resignation. The actual pressure must be made more pressing by adding to it consciousness of pressure, the shame must be made more shameful by publicizing it. Every sphere of German society must be shown as the *partie honteuse* of German society: The people must be taught to be terrified at itself in order to give it courage. This will be fulfilling an imperative need of the German nation, and the needs of the nations are in themselves the ultimate reason for their satisfaction. The struggle against the German political present is the struggle against the past of the modern nations, and they are still burdened with reminders of that past. Tragic indeed was the pre-existing power of the world, and freedom, on the other hand, was a personal notion; in short, as long as it believed and had to believe in its own justification. That is why its downfall was tragic. If it believed in its own essence, would it try to hide that essence under the semblance of an alien essence and seek refuge in hypocrisy and sophism? History is thorough and goes through many phases when carrying an old form to the grave. The last phases of a world-historical form is its comedy. Why this course of history? So that humanity should part with its past cheerfully. This cheerful historical destiny is what we vindicate for the political authorities of Germany. Meanwhile, once modern politico-social reality itself is subjected to criticism, once criticism rises to truly human problems, it finds itself outside the German status quo, or else it would reach out for its object below its object. The relation of industry, of the world of wealth generally, to the political world is one of the major problems of modern times. In what form is this problem beginning to engage the attention of the Germans? In the form of protective duties, of the prohibitive system, of national economy. Germanomania has passed out of man into matter, and thus one morning our cotton barons and iron heroes saw themselves turned into patriots. People are, therefore, beginning in Germany to acknowledge the sovereignty of monopoly on the inside through lending it sovereignty on the outside. People are, therefore, now about to begin, in Germany, what people in France and England are about to end. The old corrupt condition against which these countries are revolting in theory, and which they only bear as one bears chains, is greeted in Germany as the dawn of a beautiful future which still hardly dares to pass from crafty theory to

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the most ruthless practice. Whereas the problem in France and England is: Political economy, or the rule of society over wealth; in Germany, it is: National economy, or the mastery of private property over nationality. In France and England, then, it is a case of abolishing monopoly that has proceeded to its last consequences; in Germany, it is a case of proceeding to the last consequences of monopoly. There it is a case of solution, here as yet a case of collision. This is an adequate example of the German form of modern problems, an example of how our history, like a clumsy recruit, still has to do extra drill on things that are old and hackneyed in history. If, therefore, the whole German development did not exceed the German political development, a German could at the most have the share in the problems-of-the-present that a Russian has. But, when the separate individual is not bound by the limitations of the nation, the nation as a whole is still less liberated by the liberation of one individual. The fact that Greece had a Scythian among its philosophers did not help the Scythians to make a single step towards Greek culture. As the ancient peoples went through their pre-history in imagination, in mythology, so we Germans have gone through our post-history in thought, in philosophy. We are philosophical contemporaries of the present without being its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the ideal prolongation of German history. If therefore, instead of the oeuvres incompletes of our real history, we criticize the oeuvres posthumes of our ideal history, philosophy, our criticism is in the midst of the questions of which the present says: What, in progressive nations, is a practical break with modern state conditions, is, in Germany, where even those conditions do not yet exist, at first a critical break with the philosophical reflexion of those conditions. The German nation must therefore join this, its dream-history, to its present conditions and subject to criticism not only these existing conditions, but at the same time their abstract continuation. Its future cannot be limited either to the immediate negation of its real conditions of state and right, or to the immediate implementation of its ideal state and right conditions, for it has the immediate negation of its real conditions in its ideal conditions, and it has almost outlived the immediate implementation of its ideal conditions in the contemplation of neighboring nations. Hence, it is with good reason that the practical political party in Germany demands the negation of philosophy. It is wrong, not in its demand but in stopping at the demand, which it neither seriously implements nor can implement. It believes that it implements that negation by turning its back to philosophy and its head away from it and muttering a few trite and angry phrases about it. Owing to the limitation of its outlook, it does not include philosophy in the circle of German reality or it even fancies it is beneath German practice and the theories that serve it. You demand that real life embryos be made the starting-point, but you forget that the real life embryo of the German nation has grown so far only inside its cranium. In a word "You cannot abolish [aufheben] philosophy without making it a reality. The same mistake, but with the factors reversed, was made by the theoretical party originating from philosophy. In the present struggle it saw only the critical struggle of philosophy against the German world; it did not give a thought to the fact that philosophy up to the present itself belongs to this world and is its completion, although an ideal one.

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Chapter 9 : Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right

There are roughly two philosophical literatures on "happiness," each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses 'happiness' as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing.

This question has no straightforward answer, because the meaning of the question itself is unclear. What exactly is being asked? In that case your inquiry is linguistic. Chances are you had something more interesting in mind: Is it pleasure, a life of prosperity, something else? A state of mind A life that goes well for the person leading it In the first case our concern is simply a psychological matter. What is this state of mind we call happiness? Typical answers to this question include life satisfaction, pleasure, or a positive emotional condition. Having answered that question, a further question arises: Perhaps you are a high-achieving intellectual who thinks that only ignoramuses can be happy. On this sort of view, happy people are to be pitied, not envied. The present article will center on happiness in the psychological sense. In the second case, our subject matter is a kind of value, namely what philosophers nowadays tend to call prudential value—or, more commonly, well-being, welfare, utility or flourishing. For further discussion, see the entry on well-being. Whether these terms are really equivalent remains a matter of dispute, but this article will usually treat them as interchangeable. To be high in well-being is to be faring well, doing well, fortunate, or in an enviable condition. Ill-being, or doing badly, may call for sympathy or pity, whereas we envy or rejoice in the good fortune of others, and feel gratitude for our own. Being good for someone differs from simply being good, period: Importantly, to ascribe happiness in the well-being sense is to make a value judgment: Objective list theorists, by contrast, think some things benefit us independently of our attitudes or feelings: Aristotelians are the best-known example: A passive but contented couch potato may be getting what he wants, and he may enjoy it. But he would not, on Aristotelian and other objective list theories, count as doing well, or leading a happy life. If so, then your question concerns matters of value, namely what is good for people—the sort of thing that ethical theorists are trained to address. Alternatively, perhaps you simply want to know about the nature of a certain state of mind—happiness in the psychological sense. In this case, some sort of psychological inquiry will be needed, either philosophical or scientific. Laypersons often have neither sort of question in mind, but are really asking about the sources of happiness. It leaves unanswered, or takes for granted, the question of just what happiness is, such that friends are a good source of it. Such failures have generated much confusion, sometimes yielding bogus disagreements that prove to be merely verbal. Such researchers employ the term in the psychological sense. The objectors are confused: Even later writers such as Mill may have used the term in its well-being sense, though it is often difficult to tell since well-being itself is often taken to consist in mental states like pleasure. To be happy, it seems, is just to be in a certain sort of psychological state or condition. This psychological usage, arguably, predominates in the current vernacular. Nor, when asserting that a life satisfaction study shows Utahans to be happier than New Yorkers, are they committing themselves to the tendentious claim that Utahans are better off. If they are, then the psychology journals that are publishing this research may need to revise their peer-review protocols to include ethicists among their referees. And the many recent popular books on happiness, as well as innumerable media accounts of research on happiness, nearly all appear to take it for granted that they are talking about nothing more than a psychological condition. Books of this sort appear to include Almeder , Annas , , McMahon , Noddings , White , though again it is not always clear how a given author uses the term. For discussion of the well-being notion, see the entry on well-being. Such arguments tend to grant the identification of happiness with pleasure, but challenge the idea that this should be our primary or sole concern, and often as well the idea that happiness is all that matters for well-being. This basic schema can be filled out in a variety of ways, but typically involves some sort of global judgment: This judgment may be more or less explicit, and may involve or accompany some form of affect. Happiness on such a view is more nearly the opposite of depression or anxiety—a broad psychological condition—whereas hedonistic happiness is simply opposed to

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unpleasantness. For example, a deeply distressed individual might distract herself enough with constant activity to maintain a mostly pleasant existence—broken only by tearful breakdowns during the odd quiet moment—thus perhaps counting as happy on a hedonistic but not emotional state view. The states involved in happiness, on an emotional state view, can range widely, far more so than the ordinary notion of mood or emotion. A fourth family of views, hybrid theories, attempts an irenic solution to our diverse intuitions about happiness: The most obvious candidate here is subjective well-being, which is typically defined as a compound of life satisfaction, domain satisfactions, and positive and negative affect. Researchers often seem to identify happiness with subjective well-being, sometimes with life satisfaction, and perhaps most commonly with emotional or hedonic state. The chief appeal of hybrid theories is their inclusiveness: Traditional philosophical methods of conceptual or linguistic analysis can give us some guidance, indicating that some accounts offer a better fit with the ordinary concept of happiness. Thus it has been argued that hedonism is false to the concept of happiness as we know it; the intuitions taken to support hedonism point instead to an emotional state view Haybron, , c. And some have argued that life satisfaction is compatible with profoundly negative emotional states like depression—a suffering artist might not value emotional matters much, and wholeheartedly affirm her life Carson, Davis b, Haybron, c, Feldman Yet it might seem counterintuitive to deem such a person happy. We use the term to denote different things in different contexts, and often have no clear notion of what we are referring to. One candidate is practical utility: We talk about happiness because we care about it. The question is why we care about it, and which psychological states within the extension of the ordinary term make the most sense of this concern. Even if there is no simple answer to the question what happiness is, it may well turn out that our interests in happiness cluster so strongly around a particular psychological kind that happiness can best, or most profitably, be understood in terms of that type of state Haybron, c. Alternatively, we may choose to distinguish different varieties of happiness. It will be less important how we use the word, however, than that we be clear about the nature and significance of the states that interest us. The most interesting questions concern the choice between life satisfaction and affect-based views like hedonism and the emotional state theory. And we seem to care not just about the total quantity of good in our lives, but about its distribution—a happy ending, say, counts for more than a happy middle Slote, Velleman Second, life satisfaction seems more closely linked to our priorities than affect is, as the suffering artist case illustrates. While a focus on affect makes sense insofar as we care about such matters, most people care about other things as well, and how their lives are going relative to their priorities may not be fully mirrored in their affective states. Life satisfaction theories thus seem to fit more closely with liberal ideals of individual sovereignty, on which how well my life is going for me is for me to decide. My satisfaction with my life seems to embody that judgment. Of course a theory of happiness need not capture everything that matters for well-being; the point is that a life satisfaction view might explain why we should care so much about happiness, and so enjoy substantive as well as intuitive support. The most common complaint has already been noted, namely that a person could apparently be satisfied with her life even while leading a highly unpleasant or emotionally distressed existence, and it can seem counterintuitive to regard such a person as happy see section 2. Two other objections are more substantive, raising questions about whether life satisfaction has the right sort of importance. One concern is whether people often enough have well-grounded attitudes of life satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Some research, for instance, suggests that life satisfaction reports tend to reflect judgments made on the spot, drawing on whatever information comes readily to mind, with substantial influences by transient contextual factors like the weather, finding a dime, etc. Schwarz and Strack Debate persists over whether this work undermines the significance of life satisfaction judgments, but it does raise a question whether life satisfaction attitudes tend to be well-enough grounded to have the kind of importance that people normally ascribe to happiness. The third objection is somewhat intricate, so it will require some explaining. You might reasonably be satisfied when getting very little of what you want, or dissatisfied when getting most of what you want. One reason for this is that people tend to have many incommensurable values, leaving it open how to add them up. Looking at the various ups

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and downs of your life, it may be arbitrary whether to rate your life a four out of ten, or a seven. A second reason is that life satisfaction attitudes are not merely assessments of subjective success or personal welfare: Given your values, you might reasonably be satisfied with a two, or require a nine to be satisfied. While it may seem important how well people see their lives going relative to what they care about, it is not obviously so important whether people see their lives going well enough that they are willing to judge them satisfactory. If life satisfaction attitudes are substantially arbitrary relative to subjective success, then people might reasonably base those attitudes on other factors, such as ethical ideals e. Shifts in perspective might also reasonably alter life satisfaction attitudes. After the funeral, you might be highly satisfied with your life, whereas the high school reunion leaves you dissatisfied; yet neither judgment need be mistaken, or less authoritative. That people in a given country register high levels of life satisfaction may reflect nothing more than that they set the bar extremely low; they might be satisfied with anything short of pure agony. Relative to what they care about, people in the dissatisfied nation could be better off than those in the satisfied nation. To take another example, a cancer patient might be more satisfied with his life than he was before the diagnosis, for he now looks at his life from a different perspective and emphasizes different virtues like fortitude and gratitude as opposed to say humility and non-complacency. Yet he need not think himself better off at all: Neither judgment need seem to him or us to be mistaken: For present purposes, the worry is that life satisfaction may not have the kind of significance happiness is normally thought to have. This may pose a difficulty for the identification of life satisfaction with happiness: Given the discovery that someone is happy, we might infer that he is doing well; if we learn that someone is unhappy, we may conclude that she is doing poorly. Such inferences are defeasible: So long as happiness tracks well-being well enough in most cases, this sort of practice is perfectly respectable. But if we identify happiness with life satisfaction, then we may have a problem: This sort of case may not be merely a theoretical possibility: It is not implausible that most people, even those enduring great hardship, can readily find grounds for satisfaction with their lives. Life may have to be pretty hard for a person to be incapable of affirming it. These criticisms of life satisfaction theories are for the most part fairly recent, so it remains to be seen how the debate will play out. Perhaps a different way of conceiving life satisfaction, for instance dispensing with the global judgment and aggregating particular satisfactions and dissatisfactions, would lessen the force of these objections.