

Chapter 1 : Social Institutions, Social Institution Definition, Social Institutions In Sociology

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Economy The economy is the social institution responsible for the production and distribution of goods. The two dominant economic systems in the world are capitalism, under which resources and means of production are privately owned, and socialism, a system under which those resources are owned by the society as a whole. Welfare capitalism and state capitalism are hybrids of capitalism and socialism. Welfare capitalism features a market-based economy coupled with an extensive social welfare system. Under state capitalism, the government closely monitors and regulates the resources and means of production, which are privately owned. According to Karl Marx, capitalism brings workers and employers into conflict. The economy is a quickly changing social institution. Economic trends include globalization, demand for educated professionals, self-employment, and diversity in the workplace.

Government The government is the institution entrusted with making and enforcing the rules of the society, as well as with regulating relations with other societies. A monarchy is a political system in which a representative from one family controls the government and power is passed on through that family from generation to generation. A democracy is a political system in which the citizens periodically choose officials to run their government. Authoritarianism is a political system that does not allow citizens to participate in government. Conflicts in governments generally take three forms: Family

The institution of family has three important functions: There are two types of families. A nuclear family comprises a mother, father, and their children living under one roof. An extended family includes several generations and branches living nearby. Marriage is a foundation of family life. It exists in every society, with some variations. Alternative families such as single-parent households, unmarried couples, and gay and lesbian couples are on the rise in the United States.

Religion Religion is a social institution that answers our larger questions and explains the seemingly inexplicable. Religious groups include churches, sects, and cults. In the United States, social class, race, and ethnicity are factors in how religious a person is.

Education Education is the preparation of children for adulthood. It is an important agent of socialization and encourages social integration. The quality of education at public and private schools varies greatly in the United States.

Medicine The institution of medicine is responsible for defining and treating physical and mental illnesses among members of a society. The definitions of physical and mental illnesses are different in different cultures. Scientific medicine is an approach to healing that focuses on illness. This method is common in the United States.

Chapter 2 : SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGION: THINKING BEYOND SECULARIZATION PERSPECTIVE

The third meeting of the Reentry Roundtable was held on March , , in Washington, DC. The title and theme of the meeting was "Prisoner Reentry and the Institutions of Civil Society: Bridges and Barriers to Successful Reintegration."

Art and culture See also: However, these institutions may be considered private or autonomous, whilst organised religion and family life certainly pre-date the advent of the nation state. The Neo-Marxist thought of Antonio Gramsci , for instance, distinguishes between institutions of political society police, the army, legal system, etc. For example, in *Schenck v. United States* , the circumstance of which made that speech case special Informal institutions[edit] Informal institutions have been largely overlooked in comparative politics, but in many countries it is the informal institutions and rules that govern the political landscape. To understand the political behaviour in a country it is important to look at how that behaviour is enabled or constrained by informal institutions, and how this affects how formal institutions are run. For example, if there are high levels of extrajudicial killings in a country, it might be that while it is prohibited by the state the police are actually enabled to carry out such killings and informally encouraged to prop up an inefficient formal state police institution. An informal institution tends to have socially shared rules, which are unwritten and yet are often known by all inhabitants of a certain country, as such they are often referred to as being an inherent part of the culture of a given country. Informal practices are often referred to as "cultural", for example clientelism or corruption is sometimes stated as a part of the political culture in a certain place, but an informal institution itself is not cultural, it may be shaped by culture or behaviour of a given political landscape, but they should be looked at in the same way as formal institutions to understand their role in a given country. Informal institutions might be particularly used to pursue a political agenda, or a course of action that might not be publicly popular, or even legal, and can be seen as an effective way of making up for lack of efficiency in a formal institution. For example, in countries where formal institutions are particularly inefficient, an informal institution may be the most cost effective way or actually carrying out a given task, and this ensures that there is little pressure on the formal institutions to become more efficient. The relationship between formal and informal institutions is often closely aligned and informal institutions step in to prop up inefficient institutions. However, because they do not have a centre, which directs and coordinates their actions, changing informal institutions is a slow and lengthy process. Social science perspectives[edit] While institutions tend to appear to people in society as part of the natural, unchanging landscape of their lives, study of institutions by the social sciences tends to reveal the nature of institutions as social constructions , artifacts of a particular time, culture and society, produced by collective human choice, though not directly by individual intention. Sociology traditionally analyzed social institutions in terms of interlocking social roles and expectations. Social institutions created and were composed of groups of roles, or expected behaviors. The social function of the institution was executed by the fulfillment of roles. Institutions can be seen as "naturally" arising from, and conforming to, human natureâ€”a fundamentally conservative viewâ€”or institutions can be seen as artificial, almost accidental, and in need of architectural redesign, informed by expert social analysis, to better serve human needsâ€”a fundamentally progressive view. Adam Smith anchored his economics in the supposed human "propensity to truck, barter and exchange". Modern feminists have criticized traditional marriage and other institutions as element of an oppressive and obsolete patriarchy. Economics, in recent years, has used game theory to study institutions from two perspectives. Firstly, how do institutions survive and evolve? In this perspective, institutions arise from Nash equilibria of games. For example, whenever people pass each other in a corridor or thoroughfare, there is a need for customs, which avoid collisions. Such a custom might call for each party to keep to their own right or leftâ€”such a choice is arbitrary, it is only necessary that the choice be uniform and consistent. Such customs may be supposed to be the origin of rules, such as the rule, adopted in many countries, which requires driving automobiles on the right side of the road. Secondly, how do institutions affect behaviour? In this perspective, the focus is on behaviour arising from a given set of institutional rules. In these models, institutions determine the rules i. Douglass North argues, the very emergence of an institution reflects behavioral adaptations through his application of increasing returns.

For example, the Cournot duopoly model is based on an institution involving an auctioneer who sells all goods at the market-clearing price. While it is always possible to analyze behaviour with the institutions-as-equilibria approach instead, it is much more complicated. A " memetic institutionalism " has been proposed, suggesting that institutions provide selection environments for political action, whereby differentiated retention arises and thereby a Darwinian evolution of institutions over time. Public choice theory , another branch of economics with a close relationship to political science, considers how government policy choices are made, and seeks to determine what the policy outputs are likely to be, given a particular political decision-making process and context. Credibility thesis purports that institutions emerge from intentional institution-building but never in the originally intended form. In history, a distinction between eras or periods, implies a major and fundamental change in the system of institutions governing a society. Political and military events are judged to be of historical significance to the extent that they are associated with changes in institutions. In European history, particular significance is attached to the long transition from the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages to the modern institutions, which govern contemporary life. Theories of institutional change[edit] In order to understand why some institutions persist and other institutions only appear in certain contexts, it is important to understand what drives institutional change. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson assert that institutional change is endogenous. They posit a framework for institutional change that is rooted in the distribution of resources across society and preexisting political institutions. These entrepreneurs weigh the expected costs of altering the institutional framework against the benefits they can derive from the change. Lipsky argues that patterns of institutional change vary according to underlying characteristics of issue areas, such as network effects. This produces a phenomenon called path dependence, which states that institutional patterns are persistent and endure over time. Once a choice is made during a critical juncture, it becomes progressively difficult to return to the initial point where the choice was made. James Mahoney studies path dependence in the context of national regime change in Central America and finds that liberal policy choices of Central American leaders in the 19th century was the critical juncture that led to the divergent levels of development that we see in these countries today. Though institutions are persistent, North states that paths can change course when external forces weaken the power of an existing organization. This allows other entrepreneurs to affect change in the institutional framework. This change can also occur as a result of gridlock between political actors produced by a lack of mediating institutions and an inability to reach a bargain. North, Wallis, and Weingast divide societies into different social orders: Open access orders and limited access orders differ fundamentally in the way power and influence is distributed. As a result, open access institutions placed in limited access orders face limited success and are often coopted by the powerful elite for self-enrichment. Transition to more democratic institutions is not created simply by transplanting these institutions into new contexts, but happens when it is in the interest of the dominant coalition to widen access. This can eventually lead to institutions becoming stuck on local maxima , such that for the institution to improve any further, it would first need to decrease its overall fitness score e. The tendency to get stuck on local maxima can explain why certain types of institutions may continue to have policies that are harmful to its members or to the institution itself, even when members and leadership are all aware of the faults of these policies. Under this analysis, says Ian Lustick, Japan was stuck on a "local maxima", which it arrived at through gradual increases in its fitness level, set by the economic landscape of the s and 80s. Without an accompanying change in institutional flexibility, Japan was unable to adapt to changing conditions, and even though experts may have known which changes the country needed, they would have been virtually powerless to enact those changes without instituting unpopular policies that would have been harmful in the short-term. For example, Lustick observes that any politician who hopes to run for elected office stands very little to no chance if they enact policies that show no short-term results. Unfortunately, there is a mismatch between policies that bring about short-term benefits with minimal sacrifice, and those that bring about long-lasting change by encouraging institution-level adaptations. Lustick himself notes that identifying the inability of institutions to adapt as a symptom of being stuck on a local maxima within a fitness landscape does nothing to solve the problem. At the very least, however, it might add credibility to the idea that truly beneficial change might require short-term harm to institutions and their members. David Sloan Wilson notes that Lustick needs to more

carefully distinguish between two concepts: This may be relatively simple in evaluating the economic prosperity of a society, for example, but it is difficult to see how objectively a measure can be applied to the amount of freedom of a society, or the quality of life of the individuals within. Institutionalisation The term "institutionalization" is widely used in social theory to refer to the process of embedding something for example a concept, a social role, a particular value or mode of behavior within an organization, social system, or society as a whole. The term may also be used to refer to committing a particular individual to an institution, such as a mental institution. To this extent, "institutionalization" may carry negative connotations regarding the treatment of, and damage caused to, vulnerable human beings by the oppressive or corrupt application of inflexible systems of social, medical, or legal controls by publicly owned, private or not-for-profit organizations. The term "institutionalization" may also be used in a political sense to apply to the creation or organization of governmental institutions or particular bodies responsible for overseeing or implementing policy, for example in welfare or development.

Chapter 3 : Reducing Mass Incarceration Requires Far-Reaching Reforms

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Obviously, the sociologist does not define institutions in the same way, as does the person on the street. Laypersons are likely to use the term "institution" very loosely, for churches, hospitals, jails, and many other things as institutions. According to Sumner and Keller institution is a vital interest or activity that is surrounded by a cluster of mores and folkways. Sumner conceived of the institution not only of the concept, idea or interest but of a institution as well. By structure he meant an apparatus or a group of functionaries. Lester F Ward regarded an institution as the means for the control and utilization of the social energy. T Hobhouse describe institution as the whole or any part of the established and recognized apparatus of social life. Robert Maclver regarded institution as established forms or conditions of procedure characteristic of group activity. Sociologists agree that institutions arise and persist because of a definite felt need of the members of the society. While there is essential agreement on the general origin of institutions, sociologists have differed about the specific motivating factors. Sumner and Keller maintained that institutions come into existence to satisfy vital interests of man. Ward believed that they arise because of social demand or social necessity. Lewis H Morgan ascribed the basis of every institution to what he called a perpetual want. Primary Institutions Sociologists often reserve the term "institution" to describe normative systems that operate in five basic areas of life, which may be designated as the primary institutions. In shorthand form, or as concepts, these five basic institutions are called the family, government, economy, education and religion. The five primary institutions are found among all human groups. They are not always as highly elaborated or as distinct from one another but in rudimentary form at last, they exist everywhere. Their universality indicates that they are deeply rooted in human nature and that they are essential in the development and maintenance of orders. The secondary institutions derived from Family would be The secondary institutions of economics would be The secondary institutions of Religion would be The secondary institutions of education would be The secondary institutions of State would be Sociologists operating in terms of the functionalist model society have provided the clearest explanation of the functions served by social institutions. Apparently there are certain minimum tasks that must be performed in all human groups. Unless these tasks are performed adequately, the group will cease to exist. An analogy may help to make the point. We might hypothesize that cost accounting department is essential to the operation of a large corporation. A company might procure a superior product and distribute it then at the price that is assigned to it; the company will soon go out of business. Perhaps the only way to avoid this is to have a careful accounting of the cost of each step in the production and distribution process. An important feature that we find in the growth of institutions is the extension of the power of the state over the other four primary institutions. The state now exercises more authority by laws and regulations. The state has taken over the traditional functions of the family like making laws regulating marriage, divorce, adoption and inheritance. The authority of state has similarly been extended to economics, to education and to religion. New institutional norms may replace the old norms but the institution goes on. The modern family has replaced the norms of patriarchal family yet the family as an institution continues. Sumner and Keller has classified institutions in nine major categories. He referred to them as pivotal institutional fields and classified them as follows:

Chapter 4 : Institution - Wikipedia

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The evidence is pervasive and clear, however, that religion has disappeared nowhere but changed everywhere. For those expecting its attenuation to accompany modernization, religion remains surprisingly vibrant and socially salient. This is particularly true in America, but in much of the rest of the world as well, where religion continues to be a potent factor in the emerging global order and its conflicts. It is in parts of Western Europe where individual religiosity has been radically transformed that the secularization thesis seems to work the best. Religion is a significant factor in voting patterns, ideology about public policy, and political careers. But pervasive evidence also exists for changes that many observers see as religious decline: Tolerance of "other religions" grows along with declines in specific confessional and denominational loyalties. Responding to religious persistence as well as perceived declines, social scientists have created neosecularization perspectives, ostensibly faithful to contemporary facts as well as classical theory. They understand modernization not to involve the actual disappearance of religion, but perhaps as attenuation and certainly as changing religious forms in relation to other institutions. From the assumed benchmark of unitary religion in medieval Europe, scholars have argued variously that secularization involved the differentiation of religion from other institutional realms, the privatization of religious belief and experience, desacralization and the declining scope of religious authority, and the "liberalization" of religious doctrine. See Dobbelaire, ; Chaves, ; Hadden, ; Hammond, ; Wald, ; and Wilson, Secularization theory, including its amended forms, has yielded many fruitful observations, and the secularization debate continues with great vigor about both the reality and the usefulness of its perspectives. See, for instance, Lechner, ; Stark and Iaconne, ; Yamane, While we do not disparage its usefulness, we think that contested issues have narrowed so that, increasingly, facts are less in question as much as are definitional, methodological, and epistemological issues or perhaps attachment to received social science traditions. In this paper we consider the relationship between social change and religion using perspectives other than secularization. Specifically, we utilize perspectives from 1 broad currents of world-historical change, 2 communication and media studies, and 3 postmodernism. We assume that like other institutional realms, religion is embedded in a broad process of sociocultural change, and that in this process religion is not passive, as so often depicted in secularization or modernization theory. Like other spheres, it is a partly autonomous force, reflexively shaping and being shaped by that large-scale transformation. This paper does not offer either new empirical observations or different causal explanations of large-scale change patterns. Rather it uses contemporary analytic frameworks to develop a broad overview of religious change, while suggesting parallel changes in other social spheres that are all embedded in the large-scale sociocultural transformation now occurring. We are more interested in the last part of this trichotomy, even though its contours, salient features, and the very terms to describe it are less clear. e. Pre-modern Traditional societies Spanning most of human history from roughly 8, B. Such local communities tightly bound space and time to particular places. In relatively self-contained communities, knowledge and beliefs were transmitted by oral traditions and strongly rooted in personal and local experience. Innis, ; Ong, Such communities were highly aware of being surrounded by very different "others" in different villages and other places. People understood that human life and nature were ruled by powerful natural and supernatural external forces, but spheres of social life like religion were still relatively fused and unitary, as were other institutional spheres like the family, work, medicine, or politics. The masses of ordinary villagers only dimly recognized religion or much else as distinct from a seamless web of personal and social life. Religio-magical ceremonies, ritual, and practice were personally conducted between, and strongly identified with, known and intimate others. Indeed, there is little evidence that abstract somethings called religion, religious faith, or different religions existed as words or ideas before the s. Historical research suggests that people in traditional societies rarely understood themselves as participating in something that scholars of later centuries would label as religion, and particularly not as Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism. Smith, To ask pre-moderns about most of the sociocultural forms we associate with religion today would simply be an unintelligible

question. Much of the usual history of traditional societies is written about their integrative systems of empire, where legitimacy was conferred by oral vows of loyalty, and about their differentiated panoply of dynastic rulers, soldiers, scribes, priests, merchants, and sorcerers. This controlling layer maintained itself by coercively expropriating the wealth of rural village communities, but otherwise left the inhabitants of these villages free to control their daily lives and to participate directly in their more immediate political, sociocultural, and religious spheres. Early modernity Modern sociocultural systems originated in post Feudal Europe in the commercial and industrial revolutions, when centers of economic production gradually shifted from the countryside to burgeoning cities. Separate pre-modern communities began to form broader integrated market systems, as competitive production for commodity exchange gradually replaced production for consumption. Industrial capitalism, driven by trade and colonialism, began its slow world-wide diffusion. Midth century social theory described emergent modernity in terms of the progressive growth in scale and differentiation of social institutions and the compartmentalization and specialization of the social roles of persons Parsons, ; Smelser, --also the touchstones of neosecularization theory. More recent analyses of modernity emphasize: Two pervasive mechanisms drove these processes: Expert systems reflected the central ethos of the European Enlightenment, that scientific knowledge and rationality would tame the natural world and overcome the dogmas of tradition Giddens, Organizations became the emblematic social forms of modernizing systems, particularly the nation state, as face-to-face feudal relations gave way to nationalism, changing the boundaries of "us" and "others. Over several hundred years, organizations proliferated and became more distinct, and, as Foucault observed, the boundaries or "membranes" around prisons, hospitals, military barracks, factories, and schools thickened People were increasingly separated from households into groups with homogenous purposes and identities. Print communication, later augmented by electronic media like radio and television, fostered far broader solidarity than could the oral media of traditional societies. Printed texts increasingly shaped intellectual worldviews and national myths, as printed constitutions and laws literally helped constitute nations, laws, and national myths Meyrowitz, Like learning and work, worship and religious devotion became increasingly separate and distinct. Religion in larger organizations was distinguished from the shared worship with those one could see, hear, and touch, as in more traditional orders. People increasingly understood religion as activities, organizations, and beliefs as distinct from other institutional spheres, and by the 14th or 15th century it was possible for many Europeans to speak of my religion, religion in general, and other religions Smith, ; Meyrowitz, As with other institutions in modern systems, organizations or organized religion, as constituted by churches, denominations, and sects, provided the context in which to understand religious belief and practice. Modern religious organizations could unify people across broader spans of time and space utilizing printed holy texts of religious literature and doctrine, or expert systems of special religious knowledge created by theologians, clergy, and bishops. Religious belonging increasingly became a matter of accepting formalized religious doctrines, creeds, and confessional statements e. Our point is that much of the current controversy concerning religion is about changes in the on-going fates of the predominant social forms of religion, that emerged in modern societies as late in human history as the s. Late or High Modernity Early modernity carried the seeds of its own transformation. In our view such large-scale transformations are typically gradual and continuous with the past, rather than discontinuous, sudden, apocalyptic, or revolutionary. Electronic communication media continues to augment print, thereby facilitating globalization by making all nations and regions informationally permeable e. TVs, satellite communication, personal computers, and web pages Meyrowitz, Giddens contends that globalization is inherent in the fundamental social processes of modernism. The emergence of global-scale economies and institutional connections, however rational to those enterprises themselves, vastly increase the separation of time and space and the disembedding of social relations, often rendering social life incomprehensible to ordinary persons Even though a variety of expert systems dominate the production of knowledge and policy in modern societies, the dream of the Enlightenment, to replace irrational dogmas and superstitions of traditional societies with rational certainty, has failed abysmally. Because expert knowledge, including that of theologians, becomes more specified but about less and less, comprehending and living life becomes more and more difficult. Both larger systems and personal life become infused with uncertainty. Traditional life was

more objectively hazardous and risky than life in the modern world but, ironically, expert knowledge and abstract systems have increased the awareness of uncertainties and risks. Matters are continually open to change and doubt, and have probabilistic outcomes. Ulrich Beck therefore characterized modern societies as "risk societies," in which individual action and organizational policy are driven not by a sense of certainty or fate but by calculating the odds. What are some basic social change processes of the transformation to late modernity? Thus dual processes, both integrating and fractionating, shape the current sociocultural transformation. These are analytic categories that express and summarize the cumulative effects of other diverse factors and processes. Integrating processes have their sources in the rise of new information technologies and in sociotechnical forces that facilitate the spatial spread of ideas, money, products, and human problems of many kinds. For particular organizations, integration is often accelerated by threats from a broader competitive climate and the necessity of organizations to protect their viability or profitability by growth, mergers, or alliances. These processes are associated with the emergence of broad but abstract cultural themes that may threaten particular other ones. In the transition to late-modernism, these forces effect organizations of all kinds: Everyday life becomes more ambiguous or hollowed out, and growing contingencies lead people to withdraw commitments and legitimacy from large systems. Integrating processes may also threaten the everyday life of persons as organizations seek to survive by the efficiency of removing the costs of labor. Thus, there is often a congruence among consciousness, ambiguity, and practical necessity that amplifies attempts to preserve, revive, or reconstitute relatively micro, private, local, or subnational spheres of both personal and social life. Featherstone, and Lasch, Next, we illustrate these processes with particular emphasis on religious change. We rely heavily on American evidence and case materials, but we think that the substance of our argument has wider implications. Growing large-scale relations in many spheres of social life began by the s, perhaps earlier. They accelerated and became more visible after World War II, understood as globalization by the s Robertson, Illustrations include the emergence of a world market system, multinational corporations, a world network of national governments and treaty organizations like N. Most of these are not religiously connected, but some are Boli and Thomas, Illustrating similar processes that elaborate broad religious structures across previously existing boundaries is not hard. Ecumenical ventures, like the National Council of Churches, represent a unifying effort, even it at times resorted to out of weakness. Such ventures, however, result in limited cross-boundary ties--given the extraordinary diversity of religious culture and doctrine in the United States. Organic mergers, such as that which gave rise to the United Church of Christ, have occurred, but are rare and usually viable only among organizations having common or compatible religious histories or cultures. Consultations, cooperation, and communion on practical, humanitarian, and even political matters--like the Christian Coalition--are more common, to which we would add new religious or quasi-religious enterprises like Promise Keepers and the Marriage Encounter Movement, which also transcend denominational boundaries. Wuthnow has documented the increasing organization and mobilization of religious resources across denominational lines, along with declining denominational conflicts and prejudices. Catholicism comes most easily to mind, and observers have noted both the strengthening of Papal supremacy, and the internationalization of Catholicism, so that it has not only "a structure centered on Rome, but also a remarkable increase in transnational Catholic networks and exchanges of all kinds that criss-cross nations and world regions, often bypassing Rome" Cassanova, ; see also Della Cava, In the shadow niches of Catholicism, both liberation theology base communities as well as Pentecostalism have become truly international, the one associated with radical politics and the other more apolitical Thomas, Even though formally apolitical, Pentecostalism, like other transnational Christian conservative movements, is neither escapist nor passive. Pentecostals use their religion to actively organize modern life and push for cultural transformations. In Latin America, for instance, while typically patriarchal, Pentecostalism stands staunchly against machismo culture. Turning to the non-Christian world, it is difficult to understand Islam as anything other than transnational. It dominates much of the world between Morocco and Mindanao, and it is the fastest growing religious affiliation in North America, perhaps in the world. We also note the enormous popularity of Buddhism in the West, particularly among American intellectuals, among whom it resonates culturally with the renaissance of mystical religiosity and spirituality. Of the world religions, Hinduism and

perhaps Judaism, are the remaining ones with distinct, though greatly contested, national bases. Truly cross boundary ecumenical relations also exist among formations within historic world religions, if not between them. There are, for instance, the loosely connected World Council of Protestant Churches, and other Christian ecumenical efforts: Lutheran-Catholic conversations, Catholic Anglican conversations, and ecumenical conversations between the Orthodox and Western Catholic Church. But there are still deep divisions between, for instance, evangelical and liberal Protestants, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhists. We argue in this article that as religions become truly transnational, there is, with notable exceptions, a process of disestablishment, whereby religions relinquish the most particularistic claims to legitimacy and privilege, and mobilize to protect universal human rights and democratic civil society. Witness, for example, the warm reception of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause by both secular and religious leaders around the world, or the expansion of humanitarian or environmental INGOs that are not explicitly religious.

Chapter 5 : Religion & Community - Creating Community

The institution building of Chicago's religious groups was accomplished in a relatively short span of time. In the first few decades after Chicago's incorporation as a city in , religious leaders had all they could do to establish modest houses of worship.

This is the baseline projection. If the states do nothing, the prison population will be , in December Reducing Mass Incarceration Requires Far-Reaching Reforms Ryan King, Bryce Peterson, Brian Elderbroom, and Elizabeth Pelletier Research has shown that policy changes over the past four decades have put more people in prison and kept them there longer , leading to exponential growth in the prison population even while crime has dropped to historic lows. But despite widespread agreement that mass incarceration is a serious problem , the national conversation is light on details about what it will take to achieve meaningful and sustainable reductions. What do states actually need to do roll back their prison populations by 10 percent? To advance the policy conversation, decisionmakers and the public need to know the impact of potential policy changes. Our Prison Population Forecaster can estimate the effect, by state, of policies that aim to reduce prison admissions and length of stay for the most common types of offenses. The tool currently uses data from 15 states, representing nearly 40 percent of the national prison population, to forecast population trends and project the impact of changes on rates of admission or lengths of stay in prison. Using the tool, we can see that in some states, limiting prison admissions to only new crimes and diverting parole and probation revocations will substantially reduce the number of people behind bars. Other states can stem prison growth by tackling how they address drug and property offenses. Still others may discover that modest reductions in time served for violent offenses are necessary. This forecasting tool paves the way for a more productive conversation about the need for tailored reforms that address the unique drivers of mass incarceration in each jurisdiction. Rethinking who goes to prison and how long they stay After nearly 40 years of unabated growth, the state prison population has begun to level off in some states and decline in many others. Many states have reduced prison admissions for drug possession and other less serious offenses, taking a critical first step in alleviating the harms caused by incarceration. The positive effect of these reforms on individuals, families, and communities should not be understated. These reforms have helped stem the tide of prison growth but they will not be sufficient to further cut the prison population dramatically. If the 15 states in our forecaster make no policy changes and current trends hold constant, the prison population in those states is forecasted to decline only 2 percent by the end of Accelerating this decline to make a real dent in mass incarceration will require us to fundamentally rethink whom we send to prison and how long they stay. For example, cutting total admissions in half for the 15 states in the forecaster click to see this scenario “a lofty goal” would reduce their collective prison population by 37 percent through Halving lengths of stay would cut the population by 39 percent. These scenarios include all offense types and are far beyond the scope of reforms being discussed at the state level. Drug offenses Over the past few years, many states have begun to reform their laws and reduce the number of people admitted to prison for drug offenses. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, prison admissions for drug-related crimes declined 22 percent between and Looking at all 15 states in the forecaster, another 15 percent reduction in drug admissions would result in a prison population that is 2 percent smaller by the end of than the projected baseline population “in other words, it would be 2 percent smaller than if we did nothing. Cutting drug admissions in half would shrink the prison population by 7 percent, or almost 33, inmates, by the end of Reducing lengths of stay for drug offenses by 15 percent or 50 percent would yield similar results. These numbers underscore the message that tackling mass incarceration will require reforms that reduce admissions or lengths of stay for other offenses. About 1 in 6 people in state prison is incarcerated for a drug conviction , and far fewer are incarcerated for low-level drug offenses, such as possession. Even if every person in state prison for a drug offense were released today, mass incarceration would persist. Other nonviolent offenses States have begun reforming sentencing policies for property offenses, a category that includes burglary, theft, and fraud. But these reforms, such as raising the felony-theft threshold, affect a small number of those convicted of the least serious property offenses. Policy changes that

cut admissions and lengths of stay for a wider range of property offenses therefore hold great potential for reducing mass incarceration. For example, for the states in the forecaster, sending 50 percent fewer people to prison for property offenses would have 1. Looking at all nonviolent offenses drug, property, and other, the forecaster projects that halving admissions would cut the prison population by 23 percent by This is a significant change, resulting in , fewer people in prison in these 15 states. Reducing lengths of stay for all nonviolent offenses would result in similar changes. Parole and probation violations Many states are also reconsidering how they address technical violations of probation and parole, such as failing a drug test. These changes may include restricting how long people stay in prison when they return for a technical violation, or diverting them from prison entirely. Building on these reforms holds the promise of significantly shrinking the prison population. For example, cutting in half the number of people sent to prison for a revocation would result in a 14 percent reduction in the prison population of the forecaster states by the end of Violent offenses The estimates for all 15 states obscure important variation between states. Each state has a wide range of policies that affect length of prison sentences and eligibility for release. And the effects of reforms will vary widely. This is particularly true when exploring the effects of reducing admissions or lengths of stay for nonviolent versus violent offenses. More than half of people in state prisons are incarcerated for a violent offense, so significantly reducing mass incarceration will require addressing lengths of stay for crimes that are unlikely to be eligible for prison diversion programs. In four of the states in our forecasterâ€”Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Islandâ€”reducing lengths of stay for violent offenses by a modest 15 percent would result in a much larger drop in the prison population than reducing drug admissions by 50 percent. In New York, one of the first states to revisit its mandatory minimum penalties and create alternatives to incarceration, sending 50 percent fewer people to prison for drug crimes would result in only a 1 percent decline in the projected prison population through Reducing lengths of stay for violent offenses by just 15 percent, however, would reduce the population by 6 percent. Is there any low-hanging fruit left? While dramatically reducing the national prison population requires addressing the hard stuffâ€”like long prison sentences and time served for violent offensesâ€”reforms to drug laws and revocation policies will still go a long way in many states. For example, nonviolent offenses are a major driver of the prison population in Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, so sending fewer people to prison for drug and property crimes would have a big impact on incarceration rates. Halving drug admissions would cut the prison population by nearly 10 percent in each of those states by the end of And a 50 percent reduction in admissions for all nonviolent crimes would cut at least a quarter off their populations nearly a third in Kentucky. In Missouri and Texas, reducing admissions for revocations of probation and parole supervision by 50 percent is projected to cut the prison population by nearly a quarter by the end of Given that many of these revocations are likely due to technical violations and not new crimes, there is plenty of low-hanging fruit to be picked for reform. A combination of reforms will be necessary The mass incarceration debate too often gets mired in false choices between addressing the problem on the front or back end admissions versus length of stay and questions about the relative impact of focusing on nonviolent or violent offenses, without a detailed understanding of how policy changes would affect the size of the prison population. Our forecasting tool sheds some light on the effects of potential reforms. However, no single policy change is sufficient to make meaningful reductions in the prison population, so policymakers will need to explore a combination of reforms. For now, our forecaster cannot model multiple scenarios simultaneouslyâ€”such as what would happen if states cut admissions for drug offenses by 25 percent and for property offenses by 15 percentâ€”but we plan to include this capability, more states, and demographic data in the next version. Pairing further reductions in admissions for drug and property offenses with reductions in lengths of stay for violent offenses is the surest way to meaningfully and sustainably reduce the prison population. The forecaster shines a bright light on that reality and drives home the point that significant across-the-board policy changes are necessary to reduce mass incarceration.

Chapter 6 : Religion and the US South | Southern Spaces

Urban Exploring or Urbex photography. Location reports from abandoned and forgotten buildings in the UK and Europe.

Tuesday, February 22, What is a city? Definitions of the urban What is a city? How do we distinguish urban from non-urban settlements in ways that make sense? Does it matter how we define cities, or is definition just a sterile typological exercise? Definition is crucial for comparison. If we are going to compare cities, or parts of cities, then it helps to have a clear and explicit notion of what we are talking about. In my field, archaeology, there are two main kinds of definitions of the city, based on two of the important characteristics of cities. The demographic definition is based on the idea that cities are big places with lots of people, while the functional definition flows from the notion that cities have an impact on their surroundings. Cities, according to Wirth, are defined by four characteristics: High population density 4. Social heterogeneity This sounds pretty good to most modern ears. It certainly fits contemporary cities, although there is always room for quibbling with quantitative definitions How many people? To use the demographic definition, one looks at a settlement, makes some measurements, and decides whether or not it is a city. The Functional Definition of Urban Although there may be precursors, most modern functional definitions of cities derive from mid-century economic geography, where central place theory focused on the regional distribution of retail market centers. Market centers provisioned a hinterland, and the larger the hinterland and the more goods and services provided, the more important the center. In these models retail marketing is an urban function—“an activity or institution located within a settlement that affects people and places beyond the settlement. Later developments in anthropology and geography expanded the notion of urban function beyond economics to include politics and religion Fox From this perspective, the Classic Maya jungle cities can be considered urban because their kings ruled city-states larger than the individual settlement, and their temples were the focus of worship for peasants as well as urban dwellers. From the demographic perspective, on the other hand, the Maya centers were not big enough to be called cities. To use the functional definition, one cannot simply look at a settlement and decide whether it is urban; one has to look at the entire regional context, including the hinterland and other nearby settlements. If the settlement in question was the setting for people and institutions that impacted a larger realm, it can be considered an urban settlement. A good example is the Classic Maya, the urban status of whose capitals was the subject of a lengthy debate. In his perspective, Teotihuacan over , population; density ca. If the goal is to analyze how large dense cities differ from smaller more dispersed settlements, then the demographic definition makes sense. The urban experience must have been radically different for the residents of Teotihuacan compared to the residents of Tikal or Copan. On the other hand, if one is interested in how the Maya centers affected their hinterlands, or the nature of their political, religious or economic influence, or how the inhabitants of the Maya landscape were linked together by polities or market systems or religious communities, then the demographic definition is of little help. The functional definition of urbanism acknowledges Tikal and Copan as urban centers, and this helps us understand how Maya society worked on a regional scale. One of the things I like about the functional definition of urbanism is that it allows us to talk about different kinds of cities: Sometimes the type of city differs among urban traditions. Swahili cities were trade centers, whereas most Maya cities were political-religious centers. And sometimes a single society has different functional types of cities. Just as the United States today has such diverse cities as Washington, DC, New York City, and Miami, so too did Aztec central Mexico have an imperial capital Tenochtitlan, ritual centers Malinalco, and city-state capitals many examples. Definitions help orient us in a field, they aid comparison, and they help us understand urban societies and their transformations. There is more to say about the topic, which I will return to in a future post. Cities in their Cultural Settings. Comment on Sanders and Webster. University Press of Florida, Gainesville. American Journal of Sociology

Chapter 7 : Religious Institutions

Increasingly, urban nature is viewed not only as a scientific, technological or design issue, but a moral one. The recent TNOG roundtable "Ecosystems for everyone" rested on the assumption that provision of and access to ecosystem services and urban nature is a "moral imperative".

Published March 16, Overview This guide investigates how "the South" has been an ideological and experiential focus for the development of distinctive religious forms and how some of the forms of religion identified with the South—evangelicalism, fundamentalism, pentecostalism—have dispersed throughout the nation. Photograph by Flickr user Gerry Dincher. Religion has been a formative experience for those living in the US South. It was not a matter of whether Faulkner or other southerners were necessarily believers themselves, but it was a tangible part of the landscape of places where many people were passionate and open about their faith. Eighmy, Often theologically and socially conservative, religion in the South also provided the rationale and organization for progressive reform. Religion advanced the cause of slavery, yet it also inspired slave rebellion. Religion comforts and sustains suffering people, and a South of slavery, Civil War, poverty, racial discrimination, economic exploitation, ill health, and illiteracy surely needed that crucial support. As the South went through the slow and sometimes agonizing process of modernizing, religion provided justification for the wealthy to profit from economic development, but it also gave meaning to those bearing the burdens of economic change without proper recompense. Throughout such changes, religious organizations remained central institutions of southern life. Bishops of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, ca. Lithograph of Richard Allen and other A. E. bishops by J. A. A consideration of the regional contexts of religion in the South directs attention to the geographic, environmental, demographic, economic, social, and cultural factors of religious development. Spatial and social places mattered. Commonalities existed across social barriers but experiences varied depending on whether you were a Mississippi Delta man or an Upcountry woman, black or white, rich or poor, Southern Baptist or African Methodist Episcopal, Episcopalian or Pentecostal. From early settlement, religious forms adapted to a stratifying social reality but also enabled southerners to give voice to yearnings that transcended hierarchies. Time, as well as place, mattered in understanding southern religion. Religion in the colonial period was considerably different from that in , and subsequent generations experienced dramatic social changes that would affect religion. Evangelicalism came to dominate the religious life of southerners, in ways distinctive to the nation. Although embodied in a myriad of denominational forms, evangelical Protestantism has served as an unofficially established religious tradition, powerful in worldly resources, institutional reach, moral authority, and cultural hegemony. Demographics was as fundamental as place and time in creating a regional religion in the US South. Indigenous peoples had their own religious systems that the coming of European Christianity disrupted, but the Native American presence left a spiritual legacy. More tangible influences of spirit-related health practices and site-related sacred spaces linger from this earliest time of Native American habitation. As the South became a predominantly biracial society in the nineteenth century, the coming together of the religions of western Europe and western Africa provided the essential background for the later development of religion in the South. European theology, liturgy, and morality would come to predominate, but not without considerable imprint from African spirituality. Slaves transmitted to their descendents particular styles of worship, mourning rites, and herbal practice rooted in religious systems of Africa. The Cotton Kingdom and its dependencies in America, Photograph of original courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. Although its boundaries have sometimes been hard to pin down and have varied from era to era, "the South" has been an ideological and experiential focus with significance for development of distinctive religious forms. Evangelical dominance developed at the same time as sectional political consciousness crystallized in the early nineteenth century, and religious groups, both culturally dominant ones and dissenters, lived within a society constrained by the orthodoxies of a sectional society often at odds with national expectations. Religious groups in the South sometimes used sectional identification to define themselves against outsiders—especially northerners—who used their own religious language and ideas to condemn the

immorality of the South. Indeed, religion in the South typically carried a heavy responsibility of defending "the South" itself because attacks against it were as often based on morality as on economics, politics, or other rationales. Ministers were peculiarly positioned to interpret sectional experience as divinely sanctioned when under attack, and they repeatedly did so. Region also matters in understanding religion in the South because of the variety of regional contexts that have existed within the geographical South. The Upper South of hill country and mountains nurtured different experiences and cultural forms from those in the Lower South. The long predominance of evangelical Protestantism in the South has been a crucial backdrop for religious development, but that religious tradition includes many specific groups, often with regional meanings within the broader South. Photographs by Flickr user J. The mountains of east Tennessee were an important hearth for white Pentecostalism, giving birth to the Church of God, while the Deep South of Mississippi and nearby Memphis nurtured black Pentecostalism through the Church of God in Christ. The Churches of Christ, a theologically conservative and morally strict group that grew out of the Presbyterians, are often one of the numerically largest and culturally powerful religious groups from middle Tennessee, down through north Mississippi, Arkansas, and into central and west Texas, but the group is hardly known in other parts of the South. Religious traditions that are outside the predominant evangelical Protestantism have special significance within particular places in the South. Ethnic groups planted and sustained religious traditions in regional enclaves outside the evangelical Protestant hegemony. Roman Catholics have dominated in south Louisiana, dating from sixteenth and seventeenth century French settlement, creating a unique landscape in the South, but Catholics also heavily influenced life in Hispanic south Texas, Cuban areas of Florida, and along the Gulf Coast with its early French and Spanish settlement. Catholics were also a historic presence in Maryland and Kentucky, even nurturing there a prominent twentieth-century spiritual presence in Thomas Merton. Jews have been small in numbers in the South, which has helped shape their peculiar patterns of accommodation and resistance to the overall culture. The geography of Jews in the South is usually depicted as a predominantly an urban one, to some degree, with notable communities in such cities as Atlanta, Memphis, Charleston, and Miami, but Jews have been a perhaps even more significant presence in small towns throughout the South. Central Texas has had a sizeable Lutheran presence, dating from German settlement in the s, while the Carolina Piedmont had been historic home to Quakers, Moravians, and other Protestant dissenters. Beginnings to South side of St. Photograph in public domain. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. Creative Commons license CCO 1. Established in, St. Attention to the historical development of religion in the South underscores dramatic changes and ways in which religion has entered into the ideology and experience of southerners. Anglicanism, an American version of the English national religion, was the first dominant religious tradition in the South, but dissenting Protestant sects, Catholics, and Jews were also present in the southern colonies. Virginia was especially significant as the home to Anglicanism, becoming the established church early on. Maryland, in its origins, represented an early version of southern religious pluralism, established as a potential refuge for Roman Catholics but also attracting Puritans, Quakers, and Anglicans. After the Glorious Revolution in England in the s, Maryland adopted Anglicanism as the state church of the colony, as did the Carolina colonies and eventually the rest of the southern colonies. Lay influence made for a distinctive Anglicanism, compared to the Church of England. Without a bishop in the colonies and with the predominant secular, materialistic values of a plantation society, the Anglican church was institutionally and culturally weak, but its presence did provide some degree of unity across the colonies, with ministers holding the main religious worship services in the South through the early s, teaching a common theology and moral values, and operating schools. A distinctive group of French Protestants in South Carolina, the Huguenots, mostly joined the Anglican church there. Anglicanism left its stamp on the later culture of the South through its embodiment of an influential social model. Anglican ministers had respected social and political authority and allied themselves with the gentry, and upper-class southerners would long admire the Anglican embrace of social class differences, along with paternalistic responsibilities and benevolence. When the Anglican church was disestablished after the American Revolution, its descendant, the new Episcopal church, would continue to attract members associated with the southern social elite. Evangelicalism began its rise to influence in the South during the mid-eighteenth century. Evangelical

Protestantism is a religious tradition that prizes religious experience over liturgy, theology, and other forms of religious life. Calvinist pessimism about human nature was a crucial progenitor of evangelicalism, giving it a characteristic concern for the inevitability of sinfulness and the need for a strong religious community and discipline to contain human frailty. As evangelical Protestantism developed, however, it came to be equally characterized by the hope of redemption. This recognition encouraged preaching that sought converts, giving birth to the camp meetings and revivalism that would become such a central part of southern life. A cartoon engraving depicting Reverend George Whitefield preaching. Evangelicalism in the South appeared with the rise of dissent within Anglican society. English preacher George Whitefield came to the southern colonies as well as others along the Atlantic Coast, and his preaching helped to fire the enthusiasm of the Great Awakening. While the impact of the Great Awakening in the South was limited, it did lead northern Presbyterians, such as the Rev. Samuel Davies, to settle in Virginia and establish an evangelical presence. More important than the Great Awakening in changing the Anglican dominance of religion in the South was the movement of increasing numbers of settlers into backcountry areas of Virginia and the Carolinas after. Attracted by inexpensive land, Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, Separate Baptists from the northern colonies, and German Protestants moved into the Piedmont, resulting in a surge of new Presbyterian and Baptist congregations, as well as a new presence of Quakers, Lutherans, German Reformed Methodists, and pietistic Protestant sects. All of these new religious influences appealed to the plain folk of the rural and backcountry areas and resulted in the growing marginalization of Anglicans, which was made complete with the overthrow of English authority during the American Revolution. By the 1780s, religious freedom and denominational competition for members represented a new religious sensibility in the South, as across the new nation. Pioneers in the great religious reformation of the nineteenth century, ca. Stone, Walter Scott, and A. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, www. The Cane Ridge Revival was the largest associated with this awakening, attracting 25,000 worshippers in the summer of 1800, to hear extended preaching. Plain folk in the Upcountry found a passionate new religion and Cane Ridge became a hearth for grassroots evangelical growth. The Second Great Awakening was national in scope, as Baptists and Methodists, especially effective at recruiting plain folk, rose to new prominence. They became the center of a more democratic religion complementary to the politics of the early nineteenth century that empowered plain folks in the South and elsewhere. Evangelicals, as historian Rhys Isaac notes, initiated a countercultural movement to gentry planter culture. They saw religious conversion as a transforming experience that led them to embrace an egalitarian fellowship with the redeemed, whether lowly in societal terms or not. Slaves, women, Indians, and the socially marginalized were welcomed as enthusiastic believers, who embraced individualistic conversion and proclaimed a rigorous moral austerity. The planter way of life with its indulgence and worldliness, became a target for criticism by young evangelical preachers, who were often itinerants and especially suspicious of the powers that be in a hierarchical society. Women prayed, prophesied, exhorted and in other ways exercised their spiritual gifts in unprecedented ways. Evangelicals insisted that converts take up the cross of Jesus, sometimes alienating not only planters but plain folk men with their radical vision that empowered all who put spiritual equality ahead of earthly values. This empowerment was perhaps especially significant in terms of African Americans in the South. Anglicans had been ineffective in efforts to convert slaves, but early evangelicals criticized slavery, sought black converts, and licensed black exhorters. The first black congregation in the southern colonies, founded in Silver Bluff, Georgia, in 1706, was Baptist, and Mechal Sobel has documented dozens of black Baptist churches by 1800. Most slaves worshipped, though, as part of biracial churches that would become even more numerous after 1800. The Sunny South, a negro revival meeting, a seeker "getting religion. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Collection, hdl. In time, evangelicals compromised their early social radicalism as part of their accommodation to existing hierarchies of southern life and their attempt to gain greater influence. In the first four decades of the nineteenth century, settlers from southern states moved into the Old Southwest, creating a new Cotton Kingdom and extending familial and ideological relationships across what we would now call the Deep South. Evangelicals were expansive and increasingly successful in this area, as they abandoned their original hostility to slavery and restricted black preachers. Evangelical doctrine increasingly restricted women as well, taking away their right to vote in

congregations, limiting their public role and emphasizing family life as a new evangelical ideal.

Chapter 8 : SparkNotes: Social Institutions: Quick Review

The Project on Religion and Urban Culture is discovering how and where religion rubs shoulders to create community in Indianapolis. We are working with neighborhoods to learn how religious institutions and people of faith function in these communities.

Religious Institutions North-Western Hymn Book, All large American cities can claim marks of a robust religious life, but several factors have made Chicago a particularly lively religious breeding ground. First, the city has benefited from a habit of religious charity dating back to the cholera epidemics of the 1830s, when temporary hospitals were set up by religious groups. The city contains the largest and the most activist Roman Catholic archdiocese in the United States, particularly notable for its nearly unbroken series of prelates who were either institution builders or whose social philosophies put them in the forefront of American reformist bishops. And it was in Chicago that the alliance between community organizer Saul Alinsky and the Catholic Church came to its fullest flowering. Urban sociology as an academic discipline began in the teens and twenties at the University of Chicago; though the department of sociology ultimately became self-consciously secular, its early ties were religious and reformist. The first head of the department was Albion Small, a former minister, and one of the department members, Charles Henderson, doubled as university chaplain. It is very likely, too, that sociological and reform activity at the University of Chicago helped stimulate the early establishment by Frederick Siedenburg of a department of sociology at Catholic Loyola University. In the 1930s, Saul Alinsky, a former sociology graduate student at the University of Chicago, would attract an unusually large number of Chicago ministers and lay Protestant leaders to his organizing efforts. He often managed to build coalitions that included Catholics and Protestants, most notably in organizations like Organization for the Southwest Community and the Woodlawn Organization. Although UTC dissolved, its model for training urban religious workers has persisted in Chicago. Recent immigrant groups e. Religious discourse was likely to be a staple of these institutions as well. Most of the institutions mentioned in this article fit this description. The first sign that a congregation was well established and acquiring wealth was its decision to employ an architect and invest in more expensive construction materials than wood or plain brick—thus, structures such as St. The next sign, in the case of a Protestant congregation particularly, might be a move to create a mission chapel elsewhere in the city, or a city mission to provide social and religious services in a poverty- or vicestricken district. Until the late decades of the nineteenth century, churches and synagogues tended to dispense charity in an ad hoc, informal manner, usually directed to needy members of the congregation rather than to city residents in general. But the pattern in many congregations was toward wider outreach. Grinding poverty too could separate people from their religious moorings. Salvation Army Meeting, Chicago religious leaders sprang into action, both denominationally and ecumenically. Brought to Chicago in 1879, the YMCA and the YWCA after established Bible study groups, dormitories, employment bureaus, and recreational especially athletic facilities designed to encourage young men and women, fresh from rural America, to shun the attractions of the city. The Salvation Army arrived in Chicago in 1879, and by it was providing social as well as evangelical services at its headquarters at Halsted and 12th Streets. The interdenominational Church Federation of Greater Chicago, founded in 1888, was strongly reformist in outlook and would become especially activist in the 1930s and 1940s. Fourth Presbyterian Church, Individual churches followed suit, establishing extensive Sunday schools, clubs, gymnasiums, dispensaries, vocational classrooms, facilities for the destitute, and missionary and devotional associations of various age groups, often separated by gender. Normally the physical plant of the church or synagogue had to be enlarged to accommodate all these functions. Jews expanded their scope of activities as well; when the Sinai Congregation built a new synagogue on the South Side in 1888, the building included a gymnasium, a pool, classrooms, and a social center. On the other end of the Protestant theological spectrum, Paul Rader held forth at the nondenominational Gospel Tabernacle—and, like Bradley, conducted a successful radio ministry. In addition to the churches and synagogues that offered multiple services and ministries under one or two roofs, there were institutions and agencies that were usually extracongregational and sometimes interdenominational

creations. They fell into several categories, depending on what service they offered and their clientele. As in other cities, women Protestant deaconesses, Catholic religious, and lay workers of all denominations played a dominant role in founding, leading, and staffing these institutions. Pacific Garden Mission, One group of institutions served a fairly wide range of the needs of the poor, especially immigrant and migrant: Christian- or Jewish-sponsored or -supported settlement, neighborhood, or community houses; and rescue homes. The most prestigious settlement houses Hull House [] and Chicago Commons [] were officially unreligious, especially after when the National Federation of Settlements promulgated a policy against religious affiliation. But this left a number of lesser-known institutions: Rescue homes tended to be more evangelical and more conservative, with individual conversion their most important goal. But to effect a sound conversion, evangelicals also felt compelled to provide food and shelter, instruction, work placement, and sometimes jobs. Pentecostals too established a series of missions, the most famous on North Avenue dating from the earliest years of the twentieth century. A group called the Bible Work of Chicago, which arose in in the aftermath of the Great Fire of , was eventually to be incorporated as the interdenominational Moody Bible Institute The institute itself, a headquarters of conservative American evangelicalism from its founding, has been a lively player on the Chicago religious scene, operating radio WMBI and dispatching its students and staff to a variety of Sunday schools, Bible classes, rescue missions , street meetings, and other works of evangelization and mercy. Young women alone in the city, in search of work or excitement, became an early and constant preoccupation of religious workers. Even more than young men, young women were perceived to be at risk in the city. Working in factories or domestic settings, they were often so ill paid as to be vulnerable to the temptations held out by prostitution or by more informal sexual arrangements. Catholics especially were worried about losing their children to Protestant orphanages and foster homes and established numerous institutions of their own, such as the Angel Guardian and St. The very old received attention from religious leaders; one of the best-known institutions of this type was the Drexel Home for Aged Jews Training School for Missions, Because the activity of healing the sick and assisting the dying has so often been construed as inherently religious, Chicago religious institutions established a long tradition of hospital founding and operation. Most of these hospitals ministered to the indigent, often the indigent of all faiths or of no faith, and frequently there were waiting lists of people needing beds. The groups with traditions of sisters Roman Catholic and Episcopalian and deaconesses especially Lutherans and Methodist found themselves particularly able to staff these hospitals. In the archdiocese contained 25 Catholic hospitals. Mount Sinai opened in , specifically for Eastern European Jews who had special dietary requirements. The Episcopalians had St. The heyday of such multipurpose churches and church-sponsored social service agencies was the s and s; the Great Depression effectively halted many of these efforts, and a number of them were never revived in the same form when prosperity returned. Not that religious concern for the poor ceased, nor the desire to instruct, convert, or provide wholesome entertainment. Also, as roles such as social worker, nurse, and counselor psychologist or psychiatrist became professionalized, competitive salaries and advanced equipment raised the cost of operating these institutions. These new-style professionals frequently operated out of private and secular agencies and institutions, preferring a social scientific discourse over a religious one. Emmanuel Church Bread Line, Yet certain religious institutional functions remained: There remained the need for a ministry for persons unable to find their way through the labyrinth of public and private services or who belonged to portions of the population almost universally despised or feared—drug addicts, prisoners, youth gangs. In the closing decades of the twentieth century, coalitions of churches, synagogues, and mosques, recognizing the failures of public housing and the diminished role of the federal government in affordable housing initiatives, have stepped into the housing breach. Reflecting an even more direct Alinsky heritage, in the Industrial Areas Foundation founded the congregation-based United Power for Action. Saint Aloysius Parish, Map In the area of education, Protestant and Jewish efforts have focused mostly on part-time Sunday or religious schools and on forms of higher education: At the elementary school level most Protestants and Jews sent their children to the public schools , whereas Catholics established parochial schools, ideally, one school per parish. In recent decades the contrast between Jewish and Catholic education has become less stark: Suburban developments have given rise to houses of worship, to charitable and welfare agencies especially in

the older, declining suburbs, and to religious schools. Suburbanization has presented its own problems for the establishment of religious institutions, however: Chicago-area Jews, for instance, have found it difficult to replicate the intimacy of the early communities of Maxwell Street and North Lawndale. On the other hand, recently arrived Hindu and Muslim immigrants have dealt with the dispersion of their populations over the greater Chicago area by establishing many of their temples and mosques at prime locations along the main expressways, thereby making them relatively accessible by car to both suburbanites and city dwellers. Wheaton Protestant churches, bolstered by the influence of the prominent evangelical college and its affiliated Billy Graham Center, have sponsored youth and other ministries in the city of Chicago. Religious Diversity, Map Those religious groups that have arrived in substantial numbers only since the immigration legislation—Muslims the largest, Hindus, Buddhists, and others—have created a host of their own institutions. Some have taken a pan-Islamic or pan-Hindu stance; others have been more attuned to the particularities of ethnicity and place of origin. These groups, aided by a relatively high level of education and economic means, have rapidly replicated the behavior of their predecessors in Chicago, refurbishing old churches or schools or building new houses of worship. Hindus especially have lavished money and crafts skill on temples modeled after those in India and other homelands, caring for the indigent among their membership and sometimes joining in interfaith efforts such as soup kitchens and shelters, and performing multiple social and cultural functions. Most temples and mosques include community halls, kitchens, and auditoriums. The second generation has received particular attention: They have also founded the American Islamic College. Yet the needs of so many Chicagoans—for ideals, ethical guidance, physical and mental healing, racial and economic justice, and simple food, shelter, and clothing—continue to elicit inherently religious responses. Government, businesses, philanthropic foundations, and practical individuals are not always ready or able to go the extra mile. Let Them Call Me Rebel: Saul Alinsky—His Life and Legacy. Cardinal Mundelein and Chicago Catholicism. Toward a Tenderer Humanity and a Nobler Womanhood: Portions are copyrighted by other institutions and individuals. Additional information on copyright and permissions.

Chapter 9 : Wide Urban World: What is a city? Definitions of the urban

Collaborative members include the Urban Institute's National Center for Charitable Statistics with GuideStar, Indiana University's Center on Philanthropy, the Association of Fundraising Professionals, the Foundation Center, and Blackbaud.