

Chapter 1 : The Road to a Free Europe Goes Through Moscow - POLITICO Magazine

The Soviet Union no longer exists, but Russia, the largest and most powerful of the former 15 Soviet republics, is still struggling on its road to democracy. The Kremlin has created a hostile environment for investigative reporters, foreign NGOs, and religious communities.

A powerful vector through which Russia blends its informational and kinetic warfare is migration, the consequences of which threaten the future of the European project perhaps more than any other crisis. As fears of demographic and societal change have taken hold in Europe, Russia has subtly insinuated itself into Western politics to an extent unprecedented since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its narrative of impending civilizational doom increasingly and often unwittingly adopted in the parts of Europe traditionally most resistant to Russian meddling and by conservative Central and Eastern Europeans with stalwart anti-Soviet pedigrees. A primary component of hybrid war is disinformation. Finely attuned to the particular grievances of a diverse array of Western audiences, Russian psychological operatives produce narratives that find fertile ground in Europe, where resentment over the Iraq War, fallout from the financial crisis and revelations of National Security Agency surveillance continue to breed anti-American sentiment and undermine societal resilience to Russian agitprop. Once Moscow had Pravda and espoused the virtues of the international proletariat. Take the case of the disturbed young man who shot up a Washington, D. The assailant came to this conclusion after marinating in a stew of conspiracy websites that developed the story based upon email correspondence stolen by Russian hackers from Democratic Party servers. Last year in the Netherlands, a motley collection of Russian expatriates, far-right nationalists and left-wingers banded together to defeat a referendum on an EU trade agreement with Ukraine. Arms procurement grew by 60 percent in alone. Kremlin rhetoric over the past several years has also shifted in a disturbingly confrontational direction. Other Russian officials, meanwhile, engage in shockingly loose talk about using nuclear weapons and Russian military exercises frequently end with simulated nuclear strikes on NATO capitals. The West has neither acknowledged the threat from Russia nor adequately prepared to defend itself against potential aggression. Only four European members of NATO commit the recommended 2 percent of their GDP to defense; so poorly equipped is the Bundeswehr that its soldiers infamously had to use broomstick handles instead of guns during a training exercise. The annexation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine is a warning shot across the bow of the West, a message, written in blood, that the old ways of doing business are over. To avert catastrophe, it is imperative that the United States pivot back to Europe. Abandoning Europe at this time would create a political and security vacuum on the Continent, one that would inevitably be filled by Russia. In response to Brexit, the U. While introspection is necessary, we do not need to rethink first principles. Protectionism remains wrong, both morally and economically. Increasingly, these calls for reassessing the liberal world order are finding an audience on this side of the ocean, where voices posit that it has outlived its usefulness. The fundamentals remain; the arrangements we have are working. They need strengthening, not a redesign. The West wants peace and Russia wants victory. These desires are incompatible. Those who cherish liberal democracy and wish to see it endure must accept the fact that a Russian regime is once against trying to debilitate and subvert the free world. While Russia today may not be as conventionally strong an adversary as it was during the Cold War, the threat it poses is more diffuse. Russia is as much an enemy as it was a generation ago, and we need to adopt a more hardheaded, adversarial footing and mentality to defeat it. We must steel ourselves once again for a generational, ideological struggle in defense of liberal values and open societies and avoid self-inflicted wounds. If the Putin regime cannot live alongside a democratic West, a democratic West cannot live with the Putin regime. A genuinely democratic Russia would feel no threat from Europe, and thus lack the impulse to debase and disrupt it. But only absent the revisionist and belligerent regime in Moscow is a Europe whole, free and at peace possible.

Chapter 2 : Russia's Road to Democracy

Russia has embarked on a slow but steady path of foreign policy alignment with the West. President Vladimir Putin's market-oriented economic policies and structural reforms have added momentum.

Andreas Umland 29 November Through the Orange Revolution in Ukraine turned its back on authoritarian politics and started on the bumpy road towards democracy, says Andreas Umland, reviewing the cream of recent scholarship in this second article marking the fifth anniversary of that event. Five years on from the Orange Revolution two books have appeared which cast light on what the Orange Revolution was really about, and review its significance against the background of developments in Russia. *Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*. At worst, it is regarded as a clash between two antagonistic civilizations, with heavy involvement by the amerikantsy. There is no doubt that two clearly distinguishable Ukrainian political groups were set against each other in these elections. Though both were officially in favour of EU membership, one was more pro-Western than the other. Admittedly, the Orange Revolution was not a proper revolution by comparison with the French, Russian or other social revolutions. Yet the actions that came to be known as the Orange Revolution were not merely about who would win the elections. What mobilized hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians as well as several prominent international organizations was the issue of how the elections were conducted. In other words, the primary question was whether this presidential poll constituted a democratic election, or not. What the Russian noise concerning the Orange Revolution has been trying to obfuscate ever since is that this upheaval was not so much about which politician would rule Ukraine, but about what kind of rule the country should have. At the heart of such systems lies a formal acceptance of multi-party and -candidate elections as a procedure for the legitimization of power. Its papers show that these phenomena are not as region-specific as we might have thought. He demonstrates in admirable detail how hidden control of information flows, party-building, and electoral processes by the powers-that-be have so subverted democracy in the post-Soviet world that a relatively novel system of relations between the state and society has been created. Under this system fundamental electoral procedures are formally observed, but rendered largely senseless by their more or less sophisticated manipulation. He has turned the term into one specifically designed to distinguish certain essentially anti-democratic political practices from those political PR campaigns that are also well known in the West. On the other hand, we might be dealing here with a situation where post-communist studies can make a contribution to general political science. They might not have had the benefit of serving in the Soviet security services, but may still be equally cynical and similarly original in their choice of instruments for stage-managing allegedly democratic processes. It was not only the more pro-Western approach of Yushchenko and supposedly pro-Russian sentiment of Yanukovich that was at stake for the Kremlin in Kyiv in It might have been the experience of the Orange Revolution that motivated the Kremlin three years later to abandon its earlier dramaturgy of staged political competition by controlled parties. In December it opted for an almost complete, largely undisguised restoration of an essentially single-party system. In fact, Ukraine is, as of today, still developing differently from virtually all other states that grew out of the Soviet Union founded in There are now also a number of scholarly monographs, collected volumes and research papers that deal specifically with the Ukrainian presidential elections of Sometimes, to be sure, certain small facts are wrong, a Russian or Ukrainian word is misspelled, or an interesting event is missing in the story. Rather, one is left overwhelmed by the amount of empirical data provided here. It appears, however, that Georgian democratization has more recently encountered difficulties. Moldova and the Baltic republics were annexed to the Soviet Union only later. About the author Dr.

Chapter 3 : Politics of Russia - Wikipedia

This is the first part of an interview with Russian oppositionist and fighter for democratic rights and freedoms, Igor Sharapov. He talks about the development of democracy in Russia, his life-long struggle with Russia's tyrannical regime, Russian foreign relations, and future perspectives for his country.

After resigning in , he became a newspaper publisher and wrote a doctoral thesis on religious intellectuals and the Islamic revolution. After his presidential candidacy was refused in , he initiated a campaign for a referendum on a new Iranian constitution. The first began with the revolution, lasted throughout the war with Iraq, and ended with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in . The second was the era of consolidation of state institutions under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani from . The third was ushered in by the election of President Mohammad Khatami on a reform platform in . The third republic will end with the election of a new president in June . What will replace it? Where is Iran going? Who is Mohsen Sazegara? He was part of the inner sanctum of power in the new Islamic Republic, helping found the notorious Revolutionary Guard Corps and authoring its constitution. Throughout the s Sazegara held a range of bureaucratic positions within the regime, including political deputy of Islamic Republic radio and television and vice-minister of planning and budget. He came to believe that the conceptual foundation the Islamic Republic was flawed and that Islamism must be eschewed in favour of a pluralist and tolerant democracy. He developed and published these views in a variety of journals later closed by the regime, including Golestan-e-Iran, Jamee, and Toos. In , the Council of Guardians refused to allow Sazegara to register as a candidate in the presidential election. He became one of the chief organisers of a campaign for a referendum on a new Iranian constitution. He has been arrested repeatedly and endured two hunger strikes. Three generations, five transformations

Iranians today belong to three generations. We belong ideologically to the mids and were heavily influenced by revolutionary discourses. Not only in the government, but in the opposition too! They came to maturity during the Iran-Iraq war , when , Iranians died, mostly young men around people were killed during the revolution. This generation, who got involved in social and political affairs after the war ended, believed in what we said even more than we did. They had ideals, and were prepared to sacrifice everything. I have to say that they were really pure. Now, they are disillusioned and have become passive. I like the second generation very much and have many friends amongst them. They are really good people. This generation, our children, knows little and cares less about the revolution or the Shah. You had your revolution, they say, but we have a different agenda. During this post-revolution historical cycle , Iran has undergone a profound social transformation. This has five key, and interrelated, dimensions: First, there has been a vast increase in population , from 35 million in to 69 million in . Moreover, Iranians are increasingly city-dwellers: This is a striking change in a country where the vast majority of people have historically worked on the land. During their school years, they must be at home, and they do not have opportunities to be involved in society as boys do. Third, Iranians are communicating with each other more than ever before. The young generation in particular is online and blogging; there are , weblogs , making Persian the fourth most-used weblog language. BBC radio has more than 7. The most popular newspaper in Iran has a circulation of around , All this is a window on the outside world for Iranians. The regime tried to interfere with satellite waves in Tehran two years ago, but the effort was difficult, expensive and controversial. The changes of the last twenty years have made that impossible. The fourth of these changes is that Iranians are travelling back and forth more than ever. Every summer about , Iranians travel abroad, and approximately , Iranians return for a visit. So there is an active conversation going on: This is bad news for the regime in another respect. After the revolution, foreign travel without permission was banned and the country closed. Now, many people face problems in acquiring foreign visas, which leads them to ask themselves: This interaction is only the latest phase in a long historical reality. Iranian people, throughout our history , have always been active in the international realm, encountering other societies and their ideas. Ordinary people as well as intellectuals follow what is happening in the outside world, in the west especially. Fifth, there has been an explosion of new ideas in Islamic intellectual life. This trend arrived in the context of an exhaustion of ideas among what I call the four political tribes in Iran: Marxists, monarchists,

nationalists, and Islamists. Now, at this juncture in Iranian history, all four approaches have reached a dead end. A new paradigm is emerging. A formative moment came in 1980. I was then deputy minister for heavy industry and president of the Industrial Development and Renovation Organisation. Something happened that made me say to myself: But we were in the middle of the war with Iraq, and I felt I had to stay in the government. It took about a year before I resigned. With the end of the war in 1988, and the death of Imam Khomeini in 1989, I decided I needed time to study. I refused offers of a variety of posts in the new government, saying that I would prefer to study history. I gradually realised that there were big mistakes in the underlying ideas of the revolution. I saw a kind of fascism at work in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result of this rethinking, I re-entered the arena of politics. In 1997, I forwarded my name to be a candidate in the presidential election; I knew that the unelected clerics in the Council of Guardians would refuse to register me, but my real purpose was to begin a conversation, especially with students. I went to many universities to campaign. My platform was the constitution. The constitutional issue has become paramount because the country is now at a crisis point. There is huge dissatisfaction with the way the country is governed; the overwhelming majority of young Iranians are against the regime. This situation is really dangerous. In such circumstances, with the current constitution in place, the presidency means nothing. President Khatami possesses no real power. So the goal must be to change the constitution and make the position of a democratically elected president meaningful. In March 1999, officers of the ministry of intelligence arrested me at home. I was charged with making propaganda against the regime. In response, my wife announced that I would go on a hunger strike, and some friends proposed that I become mayor of Tehran under the auspices of a National Coalition of Liberals in town council elections. The description of me as mayor was a pressure on the regime, because according to the law, a directly elected council chooses the mayor. My friends said that if the people elect us, we in turn will elect Mohsen Sazegara mayor of Tehran. The regime made its calculations, and after five days they released me. I was arrested again in June 1999, and again started a hunger strike. It lasted seventy-nine days, with a two-week break in the middle. I am writing a book about it, called *Prison in Prison*. My own son was one of those arrested. He was kept in an isolation cell for twenty-five days; some were held in such cells for eighty-five days. My blood pressure still went up and up, and eventually I collapsed. So after fifty-six days they rushed me to the hospital and put me on an intravenous drip. I tried to resist, and they fastened my hands to the bed. As a result I ended my hunger strike. When an officer of another branch of government came to arrest me on a new charge, it was clear that the attorney-general had lied; he had tricked me. And so I did. This time I quickly became weak, and they sent me back to the hospital. I was there for another twenty-three days until I was returned to jail. They said I would be kept there indefinitely. I was sure my death was imminent. I knew nothing about what was happening outside. My wife came once to visit with my mother, but the conversation was monitored. On my release, I found out that people at one university had held a candlelight vigil after a rumour that I had died. Several other universities announced they would hold their own vigils on behalf of all the political prisoners.

Chapter 4 : Ukraine: on the bumpy road to democracy | openDemocracy

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Cheney is not Churchill, and cannot change the course of history. Besides, power in Russia belongs to Putin, not Stalin. To the contrary, it is increasingly opening its doors to the West, both economically and politically. It is enough to recall its energy projects, and its readiness to discuss any subject despite many differences of opinion with the West. The latter cannot start fighting without an opponent - it takes two to tango. But there are more important points than that. I have repeatedly read Western comments about the importance of exerting pressure on Russia on the eve of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg on many issues, starting with the Iranian nuclear file and ending with its domestic problems. Such statements show that the U. Therefore, the West, and the U. The manner of talking should be changed, too. This became particularly obvious after the recent lectures of Rice and Cheney, who tried, for the umpteenth time now, to teach what they call true democracy to the Russians. Both looked somewhat comical, like a man yelling something to the train, which has long left the station. If Washington had analyzed the situation in time, it would have come to a natural conclusion. Russia was not going to be committed to bed forever. It has recovered from the upheaval of the Soviet collapse, and chosen its own road. Moscow is beset with problems but it is ready psychologically, above all to resolve its problems on its own. It is grateful for friendly advice and sincere help, but it is emphatically against the preachy tone and importunate advice, all the more so if it contradicts the very nature of Russia and its people. Russia will not change whether the West curses it, complains about it being slow on the uptake, or tries to analyze why the Russians have a peculiar view of the world. Russia did not adopt a Western pattern of democracy in the short period of bourgeois development after the democratic interlude in February of Today, its political system is not going to be a replica of Western democracy, either. It should not be forgotten that pre-revolutionary Russia was moving ahead by leaps and bounds, as many Western experts acknowledge. The German government commission led by Professor Auhagen, which visited Russia in , on the eve of World War I, made a worrisome conclusion for Wilhelm II - once Russia finished its land reform, there would be no country capable of fighting against it. It is a myth that the Russians are allergic to a market economy. The problem of Russian democracy is not simple, either. In order to succeed, a democracy has to absorb the national features and traditions of the Russians. Russian democracy will never be a perfect clone of the Western political system. Russia has another history, and its view of the good and evil, and human rights and freedoms largely differs from that of the West. The recent Council of the Russian People, held recently in Moscow at the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church, was strongly critical of the West for neglecting moral standards. Speakers emphasized that without respect for morality, freedoms of the individual and of speech lead to social degradation. The Catholic Church is of the same opinion. Why insist on the Russians following the Western road? Russia has opted for democracy. There are no serious indications that it will deviate from this strategic direction. But the purely Russian nuances, such as stronger statehood or tougher morality will manifest themselves with time. Finally, as any sovereign state, Russia will be defending its interests in the world arena - the stronger the country, the tougher its policy. There is nothing to be scared of. But it would be logical to expect Russia after some time to have strategic interests near U. Rice talk today about U.

News Russia's road to democracy. By Pyotr Romanov, RIA Novosti political commentator. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have recently been lecturing Russia on how to run its affairs.

United Russia 8 May The constitution created a dual executive consisting of a president and prime minister, but the president is the dominant figure. The constitution spells out many prerogatives specifically, but some powers enjoyed by Yeltsin were developed in an ad hoc manner. A special provision allowed Yeltsin to complete the term prescribed to end in June and to exercise the powers of the new constitution, although he had been elected under a different constitutional order. In the presidential election campaign, some candidates called for eliminating the presidency, criticizing its powers as dictatorial. Yeltsin defended his presidential powers, claiming that Russians desire "a vertical power structure and a strong hand" and that a parliamentary government would result in indecisive talk rather than action. The president has broad authority to issue decrees and directives that have the force of law without judicial review, although the constitution notes that they must not contravene that document or other laws. Under certain conditions, the president may dissolve the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, the Federal Assembly. The president has the prerogatives of scheduling referendums a power previously reserved to the parliament, submitting draft laws to the State Duma, and promulgating federal laws. The executive-legislative crisis of the fall of prompted Yeltsin to emplace constitutional obstacles to legislative removal of the president. The charges then must be adopted by a special commission of the State Duma and confirmed by at least two-thirds of State Duma deputies. A two-thirds vote of the Federation Council is required for removal of the president. If the Federation Council does not act within three months, the charges are dropped. The constitution does not provide for a vice president, and there is no specific procedure for determining whether the president is able to carry out his duties. The president is empowered to appoint the prime minister to chair the Government called the cabinet or the council of ministers in other countries, with the consent of the State Duma. The president chairs meetings of the Government, which he also may dismiss in its entirety. Upon the advice of the prime minister, the president can appoint or remove Government members, including the deputy prime ministers. The president also appoints justices of federal district courts. The presidential administration is composed of several competing, overlapping, and vaguely delineated hierarchies that historically have resisted efforts at consolidation. In early, Russian sources reported the size of the presidential apparatus in Moscow and the localities at more than 75, people, most of them employees of state-owned enterprises directly under presidential control. Former first deputy prime minister Anatoly Chubais was appointed chief of the presidential administration chief of staff in July Yegorov had been appointed in early, when Yeltsin reacted to the strong showing of antireform factions in the legislative election by purging reformers from his administration. Yeltsin now ordered Chubais, who had been included in that purge, to reduce the size of the administration and the number of departments overseeing the functions of the ministerial apparatus. Chubais also received control over a presidential advisory group with input on the economy, national security, and other matters. Another center of power in the presidential administration is the Security Council, which was created by statute in mid The constitution describes the council as formed and headed by the president and governed by statute. Since its formation, it apparently has gradually lost influence in competition with other power centers in the presidential administration. In July, a presidential decree assigned the Security Council a wide variety of new missions. As had been the case previously, the Security Council was required to hold meetings at least once a month. Other presidential support services include the Control Directorate in charge of investigating official corruption, the Administrative Affairs Directorate, the Presidential Press Service, and the Protocol Directorate. The Administrative Affairs Directorate controls state dachas, sanatoriums, automobiles, office buildings, and other perquisites of high office for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, a function that includes management of more than state industries with about 50, employees. The Committee on Operational Questions, until June chaired by antireformist Oleg Soskovets, has been described as a "government within a government". Also attached to the presidency are more than two

dozen consultative commissions and extrabudgetary "funds". The president also has extensive powers over military policy. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of the armed forces, the president approves defense doctrine, appoints and removes the high command of the armed forces, and confers higher military ranks and awards. The president is empowered to declare national or regional states of martial law, as well as state of emergency. In both cases, both houses of the parliament must be notified immediately. The Federation Council, the upper house, has the power to confirm or reject such a decree. The regime of martial law is defined by federal law "On Martial law", signed into law by president Vladimir Putin in . The circumstances and procedures for the president to declare a state of emergency are more specifically outlined in federal law than in the constitution. In Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Ingushetia and North Ossetia, two republics beset by intermittent ethnic conflict. Presidential elections[edit] The constitution sets few requirements for presidential elections, deferring in many matters to other provisions established by law. The presidential term is set at six years, and the president may only serve two consecutive terms. A candidate for president must be a citizen of Russia, at least 35 years of age, and a resident of the country for at least ten years. If a president becomes unable to continue in office because of health problems, resignation, impeachment, or death, a presidential election is to be held not more than three months later. In such a situation, the Federation Council is empowered to set the election date. The Law on Presidential Elections, ratified in May, establishes the legal basis for presidential elections. The law, which set rigorous standards for fair campaign and election procedures, was hailed by international analysts as a major step toward democratization. The purpose of the 7 percent requirement is to promote candidacies with broad territorial bases and eliminate those supported by only one city or ethnic enclave. The law required that at least 50 percent of eligible voters participate in order for a presidential election to be valid. In State Duma debate over the legislation, some deputies had advocated a minimum of 25 percent which was later incorporated into the electoral law covering the State Duma, warning that many Russians were disillusioned with voting and would not turn out. To make voter participation more appealing, the law required one voting precinct for approximately every 3, voters, with voting allowed until late at night. The conditions for absentee voting were eased, and portable ballot boxes were to be made available on demand. Strict requirements were established for the presence of election observers, including emissaries from all participating parties, blocs, and groups, at polling places and local electoral commissions to guard against tampering and to ensure proper tabulation. The Law on Presidential Elections requires that the winner receive more than 50 percent of the votes cast. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote a highly probable result because of multiple candidacies, the top two vote-getters must face each other in a runoff election. Once the results of the first round are known, the runoff election must be held within fifteen days. A traditional provision allows voters to check off "none of the above," meaning that a candidate in a two-person runoff might win without attaining a majority. Another provision of the election law empowers the CEC to request that the Supreme Court ban a candidate from the election if that candidate advocates a violent transformation of the constitutional order or the integrity of the Russian Federation. The presidential election of was a major episode in the struggle between Yeltsin and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation KPRF, which sought to oust Yeltsin from office and return to power. Yeltsin had banned the Communist Party of the Russian Republic for its central role in the August coup against the Gorbachev government. As a member of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the banned party, Gennady Zyuganov had worked hard to gain its relegalization. Although there was speculation that losing parties in the December election might choose not to nominate presidential candidates, in fact dozens of citizens both prominent and obscure announced their candidacies. After the gathering and review of signature lists, the CEC validated eleven candidates, one of whom later dropped out. In the opinion polls of early, Yeltsin trailed far behind most of the other candidates; his popularity rating was below 10 percent for a prolonged period. However, a last-minute, intense campaign featuring heavy television exposure, speeches throughout Russia promising increased state expenditures for a wide variety of interest groups, and campaign-sponsored concerts boosted Yeltsin to a 3 percent plurality over Zyuganov in the first round. The election campaign was largely sponsored by wealthy tycoons, for whom Yeltsin remaining at power was the key to protect their property acquired during the reforms of . After the first election round, Yeltsin took the

tactically significant step of appointing first-round presidential candidate Aleksandr Lebed, who had placed third behind Yeltsin and Zyuganov, as head of the Security Council. Despite his virtual disappearance from public view for health reasons shortly thereafter, Yeltsin was able to sustain his central message that Russia should move forward rather than return to its communist past. Zyuganov failed to mount an energetic or convincing second campaign, and three weeks after the first phase of the election, Yeltsin easily defeated his opponent, 54 percent to 40 percent. Turnout in the first round was high, with about 70 percent of Total turnout in the second round was nearly the same as in the first round. A contingent of almost 1, international observers judged the election to be largely fair and democratic, as did the CEC. See below for a summary of the results Most observers in Russia and elsewhere concurred that the election boosted democratization in Russia, and many asserted that reforms in Russia had become irreversible. Yeltsin had strengthened the institution of regularly contested elections when he rejected calls by business organizations and other groups and some of his own officials to cancel or postpone the balloting because of the threat of violence. The high turnout indicated that voters had confidence that their ballots would count, and the election went forward without incident. Government of the Russian Federation The constitution prescribes that the Government of Russia, which corresponds to the Western cabinet structure, consist of a prime minister chairman of the Government , deputy prime ministers, and federal ministers and their ministries and departments. Within one week of appointment by the president and approval by the State Duma, the prime minister must submit to the president nominations for all subordinate Government positions, including deputy prime ministers and federal ministers. The prime minister carries out administration in line with the constitution and laws and presidential decrees. The ministries of the Government, which numbered 24 in mid, execute credit and monetary policies and defense, foreign policy , and state security functions; ensure the rule of law and respect for human and civil rights; protect property; and take measures against crime. If the Government issues implementing decrees and directives that are at odds with legislation or presidential decrees, the president may rescind them. The Government formulates the federal budget , submits it to the State Duma, and issues a report on its implementation. If the State Duma rejects a draft budget from the Government, the budget is submitted to a conciliation commission including members from both branches. Besides the ministries, in the executive branch included eleven state committees and 46 state services and agencies, ranging from the State Space Agency Glavkosmos to the State Committee for Statistics Goskomstat. There were also myriad agencies, boards, centers, councils, commissions, and committees. Chernomyrdin, who had been appointed prime minister in late to appease antireform factions, established a generally smooth working relationship with Yeltsin. Chernomyrdin proved adept at conciliating hostile domestic factions and at presenting a positive image of Russia in negotiations with other nations. As part of his presidential campaign, Yeltsin threatened to replace the Chernomyrdin Government if it failed to address pressing social welfare problems in Russia. After the mid presidential election, however, Yeltsin announced that he would nominate Chernomyrdin to head the new Government.

Chapter 6 : Iran's road to democracy | openDemocracy

In Russia's Road to Democracy, Victor Sergeev and Nikolai Biryukov assess why the Congress of People's Deputies, and the other newly elected institutions founded under perestroika, not only failed to prevent, but also seemed to speed up and provoke, the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Chapter 7 : How Totalitarianism Took Over Russia | On Point

On the question of Russia's progress toward democracy, put Bjorkman on the side of those who see the glass as half empty. Put him also in the smaller group that views this midcourse stall as unstable and, more important, as unnecessary. He argues that neither a wealth of polling data nor the logic.

Chapter 8 : Russia's road to democracy

DOWNLOAD PDF RUSSIAS ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

This is the third part of the interview with Russian oppositionist and fighter for democratic rights and freedoms, Igor Sharapov. He talks about the development of Russian democracy, his life-long struggle with Russia's tyrannical regime and people's attitude towards Ukraine.