

**Chapter 1 : Index : Russia's Western Borderlands,**

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There ought to be some to govern, and others to obey. Order Catherine the Great ruled over an expanding Russian Empire as Empress from until her death in 1796. During her reign, Catherine attempted to transform the nature of the autocratic regime in Russia by strengthening her own position through westward expansion and administrative reform. Foremost, uniformity and order were the desired goal for Catherine the Great. Catherine believed that a properly ordered empire would strengthen her position as Empress, and would ultimately benefit all Russians who would be subject to a standardized code of conduct. During her time as Empress, she embarked on a series of provincial reforms that fundamentally altered the character of Russian occupation in the peripheral regions. Catherine aimed to eliminate the arbitrary nature of local governance by creating a uniform imperial administration that would provide order even in the furthest outposts and borderlands. The common narrative espoused by scholars focuses on the importance of the Black Sea to Russian imperial ambitions. The strategic importance of a warm-water port, for reasons both economic as well as political, was certainly a guiding influence for Russian expansion into the West. She was motivated not only by access to the sea, but also by the opportunity to move Russia into the realm of European affairs. Catherine sought to achieve modernization by reorienting her empire towards the West and modeling her administration on the principles outlined by the thinkers of the Enlightenment. Moreover, Catherine received her education in the imperial courts of Germany so she understood the European model for economic policy and local governance. Catherine wanted the great minds of Europe to support her as she reoriented Russia towards the West, so it should come as no surprise that she wanted to portray herself as an enlightened ruler. She actively cultivated relationships with figures of the Enlightenment, particularly the French philosopher Voltaire, as she crafted administrative policy. Catherine sought to create an orderly system in the borderlands by consolidating ethnicities into particular administrative regions. The Russian empire contained a variety of distinct ethnic groups, and Catherine believed that in order to bring order to a multi-ethnic state she had to form districts containing cohesive ethnic groups. In accordance with the popular opinion of the philosophes, Catherine did promise some religious freedoms in the Nakaz to non-Orthodox Russians in order to maintain stability. However, in practice the forced relocation of ethnic groups into defined territories and administrative districts did result in the de facto persecution of certain groups. Catherine desired uniformity, even if it meant that some groups would suffer as a result of relocation to the new administrative zones. Once these new administrative subdivisions formed in the borderlands, the local officials were expected to dress alike and act according to a uniform code. Uniformity was the true basis of her enlightened thinking and policies in the borderlands; thus, she did not necessarily uphold the natural rights of man that we now tend to associate with the Enlightenment. The Koszciuszko Uprising signaled that local Poles in the newly acquired borderland territories resisted the expansion of Russian influence into the region. The Soviet administration of the twentieth century used similar techniques when they formed states around the idea of titular nationality. While she was enlightened in the sense that she took inspiration from the philosophers of Europe, Catherine the Great did not hesitate to use traditional means of force and coercion to move her policies forward. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had dominated affairs in Eastern Europe for centuries, and it stood as a symbol of opposition for many Russians. There was also resentment between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia over the persecution of Orthodox believers in the primarily Catholic country. Catherine also supported the partitions of Poland because they allowed Russia to expand into the West and situate itself among the powers of Europe. However, the process of annexing the borderland alone was not enough to reorient the Russian empire. Catherine recognized that shifting focus towards Europe involved something greater, a cultural transformation within the circles of the Russian elite. She was also a patron of the arts, and invited

figures like Diderot to her court after he was banned from publishing his Encyclopedia in France. Catherine also published a number of plays and poems that she shared with Voltaire. Catherine invited a vast array of European literary figures to her court, and she even published several works in response to foreign critics of Russian culture who claimed that she was little more than a despotic ruler. In addition to refuting her French critics, Catherine also patronized Russian writers like Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov and Ivan Nikitich Boltin who adopted European literary styles and shifted away from the medieval literary tradition in Russia. Western culture was embraced in all aspects of court life, and Russian writers were rewarded with praise if they emulated their European counterparts. Finally, Catherine reached out to Russian nobles and the elite administrators by sponsoring the translation of prominent European works into the Russian text. The old norms of Russian culture were pushed aside by Catherine. Instead, she focused on how encouraging European culture at court could serve as a tool to refute the allegations made against her by critics abroad and to convert skeptics within the elite. Catherine the Great frequently used her relationship with Voltaire to improve her public image in France, for instance. She wanted Russia to be accepted as an equal among the nations of Europe, and she recognized that such a transformation required a drastic change in not only foreign policy but also in domestic policy. Finally, Catherine reoriented her empire towards Europe by instituting a series of reforms to benefit the nobles. Through the Charter of the Nobility in Catherine afforded a number of advantages to the nobles, including exemptions from conscripted service, freedom from the poll tax, and increased access to exotic goods imported from abroad. Grey, The personal rivalries and political intrigues of these families prevented Russia from effectively administering territories beyond the central territories of the Russian empire. Catherine modeled her reforms after the nobility in Europe, where the nobles could actually bolster the prestige of the Monarch and effectively govern local territories. The exemptions and advantages afforded to the nobility also applied to the new nobles occupying the Western borderlands. Catherine was able to integrate non-Russian economic elites in the Western borderlands into the imperial administrative framework. Raeff, Her success in co-opting the local elite into serving within the reformed administrative system made it possible for Catherine the Great to incorporate these regions into the multi-ethnic empire. Harvard University Press, Yale University Press, University of California Press, Order, in Documents of Catherine the Great:

**Chapter 2 : Catherinian Policy in the West - Russia's Periphery**

*This book examines Russian policies in the western borderlands during the main period of expansion of the imperial system. Originally published in The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the.*

The Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation By Andrzej Nowak A study of the patterns of Russian imperialism, and an articulation of structures of Russian and Soviet domination of Eastern and Central Europe, continue to be paramount for the understanding of the present situation not only in that region but outside it as well. This I say with great regret, because recently hopes have been raised that Russia has abandoned its imperialistic habits and policies. A recent twist in Polish-Russian relations can serve as an example of the relevance of historical patterns in that regard. The Oleksy affair suggests that regardless of its color: In the background of these statements and threats are five hundred years of Polish-Russian relations. But are they only five centuries of Polish-Russian relations? This question leads into the heart of the matter: It is easy to say when the Polish history began - in the second half of the tenth century, with the baptism of the Polish state founder Mieszko I. But when and where did Russian history begin? Almost every Russian historian would respond that the history of Russia goes back to the end of the ninth and beginning of the tenth century, i. Kiev was the capital and the main cultural, political, and economic center of this state. The ruling families of Kievan Rus and Poland often intermarried; at times they formed profitable alliances, at other times they fought with each other; but a truly antagonistic atmosphere, one that often prevails between two incompatible political orientations, was missing. Here it should be noted that the Ukrainians see the beginning of the Russian state differently. Several centuries of the existence of Kievan Rus are considered by Ukrainians as the glorious beginnings of their national history, and not that of the Russians. Kievan Rus was however undermined by the Mongol invasion in the middle of the thirteenth century, and that brutal war had momentous consequences for both facts and perceptions concerning Ukrainian ethnicity and nationhood. When the Mongol empire fell apart, Ukraine became a bone of contention between Poland and the newly established Muscovite state. Indisputably, Kiev is now the center of a nation and the capital of the Ukrainian state. But up to the twentieth century Russians and Poles denied the Ukrainians a separate national identity. As a matter of fact, even nowadays most of the Russian political and cultural elite can hardly conceive of their country as separated from Ukraine, and can hardly grant Kiev psychological independence from Moscow. So-called liberals and Westernizers, such as the mayor of St. Zbigniew Brzezinski observed that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire. If it is no longer an empire, it poses much less threat to Central Europe. But the Russian political and cultural elite, from Anatoly Sobchak to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, can hardly conceive of their country as separated from Ukraine. Actually, the beginnings of the Russian statehood as it exists now are connected not so much with Kiev but rather with Moscow which is almost miles to the north of the Ukrainian capital. A mix of Slavic and Ugro-Finnic population of those northern European territories, and an addition of the Mongol invaders that occupied Moscow for two and a half centuries, constitute the ethnic and cultural origins of the Russian nation. During their expansion in the fourteenth century, Lithuanian grand dukes separated Poland and Russia by conquering most of the western and southern parts of the former Kievan Rus. It was the Lithuanians and not the Russians who deserve major credit for the disintegration of the Mongol empire. It was the ambition of Lithuania's grand dukes to unite all land that historically belonged to the first state of Eastern Slavs, and to liberate it from Mongol domination. They were prevented from achieving this aim by the grand dukes of Moscow who controlled most of the eastern part of the former Kievan Rus and who also wanted to reunite all of it under their rule. At the time when Moscow began to "gather the Russian lands" as the self-proclaimed successor of Kiev, the pagan rulers of Lithuania chose Poland as their principal ally and conveyor of Christianity and Western culture. The Polish-Lithuanian union began in with the marriage of the Lithuanian grand duke with a Polish princess. The union lasted for four hundred years, and it ended with the last partition of Poland in Ivan III, who started a series of successful campaigns against the Lithuanians in , clearly defined his goal: This marked the real beginning of the Polish-Russian relations, the beginning of the great contest for

Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, and the contest for the political, strategic and civilizational preponderance in Central and Eastern Europe. In , the power over the ancient Kievan Rus passed to the tsar, and the most important objective of Muscovite foreign policy, relentlessly pursued for two centuries, seemed to have been achieved. Shortly afterwards, Ukrainian leaders were either jailed or deported to Siberia. In , the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was abolished. British historian Hugh Seton-Watson compared the struggle between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian state with the historical contest between France and Germany for the control of Burgundy, Lorraine, Holland and Belgium. He is right, but at the same time he underrates the strategic and cultural importance of the Polish-Russian contest for the lands between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Germany without Holland, Lorraine, or Burgundy is still an important European power. France without Lorraine and Burgundy would be an important European power as well. Without Ukraine and Belarus Moscow would not be able to maintain an aggressive posture toward Central and Eastern Europe. For Poland, ceding these vast territories to Moscow meant mortal danger to her own independence. If Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania proved capable of overcoming the poisonous legacy of the past, they would be more than able to balance off the power of the Russian state. Huntington, would have been pushed westward, taking Belarus, Ukraine, all Baltic nations, and probably the whole Central Europe with Poland, Slovakia and Bohemia, away from Europe. Francis Dvornik, who was a great expert on the medieval history of Eastern Slavs, stated that the Polish-Lithuanian union drew Poland quite unnecessarily into the duel between Lithuania and Muscovy, and that Lithuanian-Russian symbiosis would perhaps have been possible, had pagan Lithuania become Orthodox. He believed that if this had happened, the union of the former Kievan Rus lands would have been accelerated, thus giving the Poles an opportunity to act as a friendly transmitter of Western culture to the Orthodox Russians. However, another eminent historian, Piotr Wandycz, reminded us that there was no guarantee that such a huge Russo-Lithuanian state would not engulf the small Polish kingdom. Nor was there much reason to suppose that an Orthodox Russo-Lithuanian empire would have been more friendly to the West than Muscovy. There is little doubt that without the Polish-Lithuanian Catholic union the "fault line" between civilizations in Europe, the line that was recently redrawn by Samuel P. Huntington, would have been pushed westward, taking the entire Belarus, Ukraine, all Baltic nations, and probably the whole Central Europe with Poland, Slovakia and Bohemia, into the Eastern zone, and cutting all these countries off from the common experiences of European history: Launching his successive attacks on Lithuania, Ivan III exploited exactly this deeper meaning for his own, strictly political aims. It suited him and his successors well if stresses and strains arose between the Orthodox and Catholics in Ukraine and Belarus. Ivan posed as the protector of the Orthodox and intervened under this pretext. To pose as the protector of every conceivable minority - of course in neighbouring countries only, and not within the Russian state itself - has been a constant feature of Russian foreign policy since those days the pressure put on the Baltic states concerning their Russian minorities is the most recent example. Ivan calculated that the Lithuanian -Ukrainian Orthodox nobility would desert to him with their vast resources and territories. What King Sigismund proposed to the Muscovites in was a union that bears striking similarities to the European Union of today. Thus there was no question of deserting to Moscow as long as Warsaw could ensure fairly equitable treatment of the nobility in all its lands: During the three centuries of confrontation with the Polish-Lithuanian state, the Polish pattern of political liberties and gentry privileges proved to be tempting for the Muscovite state-made and state-controlled nobility the boyars. Andrei Kurbski, a leading representative of this group and a top advisor to Ivan IV the Terrible , fled to Poland, becoming the first Russian political emigre. His flight stimulated an unprecedented reign of terror in Muscovy, so called opritchnina, organized by Ivan IV to prevent further defections. Russian historian Evgenii Belov was the first to argue that the cruel measures taken by Ivan the Terrible diverted Russia decisively from the Polish model of government Andrei Kurbski was the first Russian political emigre. As Alexander Yanov pointed out in his book, it was the Russian historian, Evgenii Belov, who first argued persuasively that the cruel measures taken by Ivan the Terrible diverted Russia decisively from the Polish model of government. Had it not been for the opritchnina, wrote Belov, Russia would have been transformed into a second Poland. But to him, the acceptance of the Polish political and cultural model symbolized political disintegration and, in the final analysis, the loss of national distinctiveness for Russia. Belov

assumed, of course, that the Polish national identity was about to expire. But in the first decade of the seventeenth century, after the victorious Polish-Lithuanian offensive launched by King Stefan Batory, and after the end of the Rurik dynasty in Muscovy, it was the Russian autocratic tradition that was put in real danger. So far, the kings of Poland, who were dependent on the nobility, could not pursue a resolute foreign policy and were forced to leave the initiative to the neighboring kingdoms. But after eight wars fought between Muscovy-Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for Ukrainian lands and access to the Baltic sea, the Polish side launched a diplomatic offensive that was aimed at ending the entire contest. Envoys of Polish King Sigismund III Vasa came to Moscow in and proposed a close union between the two countries, a perpetual and firm defensive alliance. Finally, provision was to be made for a future personal union. In other words, what was proposed bears striking similarities to the European Union today. In response, he conceived one of the first plans of a partition of Poland-Lithuania, attempting to win over the Austrian emperor to this aim. But before the emperor had an opportunity to express his opinion of this proposal, the Muscovite state was engulfed in a civil war. The Poles and Lithuanians tried to intervene: This was the time of humiliation for the Russians: Poles had an opportunity to enforce with sword in hand the peaceful overture that had been rejected by Boris Godunov ten years earlier. As the father of Russian historiography Nikolai Karamzin pointed out, although Wladyslaw had been elected by the city of Moscow alone, he stood a good chance of becoming tsar of all Muscovy. He was to rule with the assistance of the boyar council called the Duma, and the council of all estates called the Zemsky Sobor, thus introducing "democracy for the nobility" into Russia, three hundred years before the first Russian State Duma gathered. Had this happened, the autocratic regime in Russia would have changed and with it the fate of Russia. Karamzin added that perhaps "the fate of Europe would also have changed for many centuries. Russian rancor toward the West as represented by Catholic Poland received a powerful impetus owing to this victory. Sigismund, however, changed his mind and instead of sending his son to Moscow, offered himself for the Russian throne. This altered the whole picture. It amounted to a foreign ruler wishing to incorporate Muscovy into his kingdom. The result was a powerful Russian reaction, a surrender of the Polish garrison in the Kremlin on November 7, , and a protracted war with Poland. How important this date still is to the Russians is demonstrated by the fact that November 7 was declared by Soviet leaders to be the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, and the post-Soviet Russian leaders declared in that November 7 would be a national holiday commemorating the chasing away of the Polish invaders from Moscow. Russian rancor toward the West as represented by Catholic Poland received a powerful impetus due to these events. Catherine recommended that her ambassadors form a "Russian party" in Poland, with a view to subverting Polish politics. Two subsequent wars did not change a stalemate in the Polish-Russian contest. It was radically changed at last by the "great mute" of East European history: The Cossacks, led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, rebelled in against Polish landowners, many of whom insisted, contrary to the law, that Cossacks were no more than serfs whereas in fact, they were free people, and their leaders were entitled to all the rights and privileges of the nobility in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. By , the Cossacks were in a desperate situation and were ready to recognize the supremacy of the tsar. Khmelnytsky treated a forthcoming union with Moscow as a temporary measure and not as a permanent merger of Ukraine with Muscovy. But Russian historiography tends to represent it as such, and since Western historians have taken most of their cues from Russians rather than from other East European peoples, such a view is now firmly enshrined in American textbooks of European history. Poles, Russians and Cossacks divided into hostile factions fought over Ukraine until the Polish-Russian armistice concluded in Andrusovo in partitioned Ukraine along the Dnieper River. Russia received eastern Ukraine, or the territories on the left bank including the city Kiev. Poland retained western Ukraine.

### Chapter 3 : Sarmatian Review XVII Andrzej Nowak

*Between and , the Russian Empire annexed western borderlands that, in , accounted for about one-fifth of the land area and nearly 30 percent of the population of European Russia exclusive of the Caucasus. From the very beginning, Russian rulers and their officials wanted to bring this.*

What is an Empire? Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. People and Empire, Cambridge, The Imperial Dimension In: New York, London, , pp. Gemeinschaft Societies and Sacred Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spreas of Nationalism. London, New York, , pp. The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe. No 1 Winter , pp. Integration, Voice and Exit: Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews. The Origin of the "Jewish Question" in Russia, Dekalb, Illinois, , pp. Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy. Imperial Abosrption of the Hetmanate. Basil Dmytryshyn, Imperial Russia Nation and State in Late Emperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, Dekalb, New York, , Empire Fires Back Part 1. Who Administred the Borderlands? Pittsburgh, Chapter 7. A Century of Ambivalence. New York, , pp. Dissertation, University of Michigan, A Comparative Profile of Belorussia to No 1 January Dissertation, Harvard University, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Jews during the W. Geoff Eley, Remapping the Nation: National Revolutions and Civil War in Russia. N 2 Summer Between Hitler and Stalin Jan T. Revolution from the Abroad. Essays in Modern Ukrainian History, , No 2 April East European Politics and Societies, 5, 3 Fall

### Chapter 4 : Russia's Western Borderlands, : Thaden, Edward C. :

*In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content. CHAPTER 4 THE POLISH PROVINCES.A.T THE BEGINNING of the nineteenth century Russians were still inclined to view the "territories annexed from Poland" (oblasti ot Potshi prisoediennye), as they were officially designated, as Polish provinces.*

### Chapter 5 : Russia's Western Borderlands,

*Russia's Western Borderlands, (Princeton Legacy Library) [Edward C. Thaden] on calendrierdelascience.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. This book examines Russian policies in the western borderlands during the main period of expansion of the imperial system.*