

Chapter 1 : Russo German War Scenario list

*Russo-German War: Winter and Spring Battles for Central Europe/No 32 (Battle situation--east front) 1st Edition by W. Victor Madeja (Author).*

Author The Newest Valor Book It answers questions like: Who is the historic enemy of democracy? Who wants you to believe that the United States is still a republic rather than an oligarchy? Who wants you to waste time dredging Karl Marx rather than protecting patriotic values? Who controls the teaching of Civics? We adapt ideas of Thomas Paine to a modern context. The occupation government has largely removed him from our history, starting when President Teddy Roosevelt called him "a dirty. He was taller than average. Those who knew him, in a harsh age, attest to his cleanliness amid intellectual clutter. In the last years of his life, when he resided in New Yorky, a pro-British press already had an agenda to destroy him for stirring both French and Irish Independence. War is a Racket. It was written by a two-time medal of honor winning Quaker from PA. That page also includes a list of websites that reinforce our message. Painting of Paine c. We are able to accept payment through PayPal and in a few months we expect to have a "storefront" to ease shopping by accepting credit card payments. If you buy our books or CDs, we will also send a catalog that includes thousands of books from other publishers and a sample of writing by Thomas Paine. Dealers should contact us by E-Mail for a list of generous discounts. The following images may look familiar because they are typical of the symbols that represent the variety of the titles that we published, including a dozen case studies on fascism and Nazism. The center one illustrated the dozen books on the various Axis armies. The Valor imprint was added and sometimes we used the company logo shown here. Books on the Russo-German War often had color maps showing the eastern front.

**Chapter 2 : Guerra Ruso-Alemana () | World War II Social Place**

*Russo-German War: Winter and Spring Battles for Central Europe/No 32 (Battle situation--east front) by W. Victor Madeja. Game Book Marketing Co,*

By re-creating this forgotten offensive, Glantz commemorates a rich and important chapter in the history of a war that brought down the German Army and reshaped the map of Europe. Brandel on Jan 17, This corps was furthermore under the command of general-mayor M. V tanks were erroneously described as Tiger tanks when they were in fact Panthers page I was also worried, because I have all the books by Glantz and they can be divided into three categories: The Battle for Lvov , extremely interesting and well written because they offer new information and new insights; example: This latest book, I am afraid, falls into the last category. After reading it my first impulse was to rip out the first pages. Being a book lover I did not do this of course, but still In this first third of the book Glantz describes, no sorry, lists, units, commanders boring the reader to tears and actually describes what is on the maps!! Any editor worth his salt should have told Glantz to stop babbling and refer the material to an appendix or in case of the battle dispositions refer to the maps. On the plus side: If, like me, you want to know more about the fighting around Targul Frumos or the Dnjestr bridgeheads, I am afraid you will have to buy this book. Hence three stars just sufficient. As a writer about the war myself as well as a voracious reader I think I know what I am talking about. Glantz can give me a call any day of the week for some free advice. So Glantz does overstate that point. What Glantz does achieve is a unique synthesis of the diverse sources and he analyzes them skillfully. Unfortunately, the reviewer from Vienna is right about the small number of mistakes and, indeed, there are a few more than he cited. Editors let Glantz down there as well. They exist to pick up those little typos or tiny mis-statements. Not perfect but VERY needed. Another great book by David Glantz By 1. The Germans succeeded because they were able to concentrate their forces and attack at the right time and place. Glantz concludes his book by stating that the Soviet operations in the Balkans disprove the notion that Stalin and his generals attacked on a single front at at time since the Balkans operations only occurred weeks before the Soviet summer offensive in Otherwise this is an excellent book that specialists, who study the Eastern Front, would enjoy. Dreary, plodding reading By S. That said, this is operational military history at its worst. The whole thing reads like an over-long after action report prepared by a junior officer who never took a liking to writing coherent narrative essays. There is no political context discussed in this book, nor is there discussion about weapons, weaponry, personalities, etc. Sure, its authoritative, but does that mean it has to be such a drudge to get through? I put this book down half-way through and read other books before I worked up the patience to tackle this to its finish. Of the eight I have read, this was the worst. The writing is relatively poor, and features a lot of repetition, with little flow or tension. The book is crying out for a good editor to really clean it up. The history, of course, is excellent as always. But I would recommend his operational studies of Mars and Kursk before this one. They are both excellent. This book might be useful for serious scholars, comfortable with a 40,foot campaign overview, but it will be hopelessly dry for the armchair historian set. Red Storm Over the Balkans is useful because the subject matter is so obscure, but as a piece of writing it plods and peters out similar to the offensive it covers. At my age, i need a magnifying glass for the maps. This is another Glantz special: These books must be a godsend for the companies that make wargames. After reading Glantz books, i feel like becoming a wargame designer myself! The maps are great though i wish they were bigger! The story is about the failed Soviet invasion of Romania and of the Balkans on Spring The Soviets were coming after 9 months of continuous successful offensives after the battle of Kursk and they were thinking to be unstoppable, so the Stavka chose the 2nd and the 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to invade Romania and after, all the Balkans. Instead , they failed with huge losses. As usual , the history is written by the winners and this offensive has been cancelled in the "official history", and as usual, David Glantz, using a lot of unknown diaries and documents, reconstruct the real development of the actions of both sides, writing another page of true deep history. Excellent read to conclude the events of Operation Bagration and the nonstop advance of Soviet Red Army that sustained heavy casualties and yet still had the resources to advance along the entire Eastern Front during the period. I

expected a better book By F. Carol Sabin on Dec 29, Definetely this is not one of the best book of Glantz. There are several reasons for this failure. At first glance the title is somehow deceiving "Red storm over Balkans" , but we recovered when reading the subtitle "the failed soviet invasion of Romania". Since The Balkans countries are those territories south of Danube, the correct title, according to the content, should be the subtitle. Despite the claim of being a "forgotten battle", the truth is far from that, the battles discussed were well known, for example, in Romania. Too bad for Glantz who is well known for his scrupulous research and from different sources. Concerning the maps they are satisfactory and help orient the reader about different locations depicted in the book. If you jump to the conclusions - which are good - you can save some time. Otherwise your patience is tested, the text being at the upper part of not being readable. Glantz sheds valuable light on the heretofore virtually unknown Soviet offensives into northern Romania in April-June For decades now, Mr. Glantz has been unearthing important new historical details from Soviet-era archives and bringing new perspectives to our understanding of the Russo-German conflict; this book adds to that contribution. As with many of Mr. Readers expecting an American Sniper-style first person account should turn to Stephen Ambrose or others of his ilk I only include this remark because a fair number of readers seem to be shocked when military history does not read like a film script. Red Storm over the Balkans consists of nine chapters, arranged chronologically. The book includes ten tables, including orders of battle for the periods between 1 April and 1 June , as well as 32 maps. The first two chapters deal with the campaign in the Ukraine during December - April and Soviet planning in regard to the invasion of Romania. In essence, the Germans were defeated in the Ukraine and fell back across the Dniester River into Romania; the Soviets hoped to bounce the river and capture Romania before the Axis could establish a new frontline. However, the German-Romanian forces were able to mount a surprisingly strong defense around the obscure town of Tirgu Fromos in northern Romania. The author does a great job laying out the operations of both sides and there is great drama in watching the German defensive success against the odds. Eventually, the Soviets brought up more forces and overwhelmed the Axis defense by June , which ended up knocking Romania out of the Axis camp, but the initial setbacks were so humiliating that Soviet post-war historians obliterated this entire campaign from their version of the Great Patriotic War. Red Storm over the Balkans offers an insightful look at an important campaign that was deliberately concealed by decades of Soviet white-washing. Overall, Red Storm over the Balkans is a solid, insightful and rewarding piece of military historical writing. Not for the casual reader By Vanguard 18 on Jun 21, As are most of the books Glantz has authored this is for serious students of the Eastern Front. Very detailed, relatively dry, but full of detail, about this side show. People complain about the authors style, his maps, his detailed orders of battle, and numerous orders and plans, I am of the opinion that if you really want to know about an event, the more info the better. Detailed, informative and augmented with maps and photos. This little known operation gets the attention it finally deserves. This is one of my favorite books by this author By H. With all the detailed information I found the maps to be very helpful. This particular edition is in a Hardcover format. It was published by University Press of Kansas and has a total of pages in the book. To buy this book at the lowest price, [Click Here](#).

**Chapter 3 : W. Victor Madeja | Open Library**

*Russo-German War: Winter and Spring* by W. Victor Madeja 1 edition - first published in *The Russo-German War, Summer /Destruction of the Eastern Front (Battle Situation-East Front, No 33)*.

Although the great powers of Europe had declared war on one another, neither side had yet committed to launching a significant attack, and there was relatively little fighting on the ground. This was also the period in which the United Kingdom and France did not supply significant aid to Poland, despite their pledged alliance. While most of the German Army was fighting against Poland, a much smaller German force manned the Siegfried Line, their fortified defensive line along the French border. At the Maginot Line on the other side of the border, French troops stood facing them, whilst the British Expeditionary Force and other elements of the French Army created a defensive line along the Belgian border. There were only some local, minor skirmishes. The British Royal Air Force dropped propaganda leaflets on Germany and the first Canadian troops stepped ashore in Britain, while Western Europe was in a strange calm for seven months. In their hurry to re-arm, Britain and France had both begun to buy large numbers of weapons from manufacturers in the United States at the outbreak of hostilities, supplementing their own production. The non-belligerent United States contributed to the Western Allies by discounted sales of military equipment and supplies. In doing so, the Germans beat the Allies to the punch; the Allies had been planning an amphibious landing in which they could begin to surround Germany, cutting off her supply of raw materials from Sweden. However, when the Allies made a counter-landing in Norway following the German invasion, the Germans repulsed them and defeated the Norwegian armed forces, driving the latter into exile. The Kriegsmarine, nonetheless, suffered very heavy losses during the two-months of fighting required to seize all of mainland Norway. The Western Allies primarily the French, Belgian and British land forces soon collapsed under the onslaught of the so-called " blitzkrieg " strategy. The majority of the British and elements of the French forces escaped at Dunkirk. With the fighting ended, the Germans began to consider ways of resolving the question of how to deal with Britain. If the British refused to agree to a peace treaty, one option was to invade. While the majority of the German army was mustered for the invasion of the Soviet Union, construction began on the Atlantic Wall – a series of defensive fortifications along the French coast of the English Channel. These were built in anticipation of an Allied invasion of France. A scout car has been abandoned Because of the massive logistical obstacles a cross-channel invasion would face, Allied high command decided to conduct a practice attack against the French coast. Most of the troops were Canadian, with some British contingents and a small American and Free French presence along with British and Polish naval support. The raid was a disaster, almost two-thirds of the attacking force became casualties. However, much was learned as a result of the operation – these lessons would be put to good use in the subsequent invasion. The bulk of the Allied armies were occupied in the Mediterranean, seeking to clear the sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and capture the Foggia Airfield Complex. By the summer of 1944, when expectation of an Allied invasion was freely admitted by German commanders, the disposition of troops facing it came under the command of OB West HQ in Paris. In turn it commanded three groups: It was not possible to predict where the Allies might choose to launch their invasion. The chance of an amphibious landing necessitated the substantial dispersal of the German mobile reserves, which contained the majority of their panzer troops. Each army group was allocated its mobile reserves. The OKW retained a substantial reserve of such mobile divisions also, but these were dispersed over a large area: The Second Front[ edit ].

**Chapter 4 : Western Front (World War II) - Wikipedia**

*Russo-German War: Winter and Spring Battles for Central Europe/No 2 copies The Russo-German War: Summer-Autumn (Battle Situation-East Front, No 2 copies The Russo-German War, 25 January to 8 May, 2 copies.*

Soviet rifle corps in the Russo-German War, by Bill Wilson This text is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Fernand Radou Belgian soldier from to Introduction For many in the Wehrmacht, the Red Army was for the entire war a poorly-understood force. German intelligence had some idea of how large the Red Army was at various points during the war, but German misconceptions about the Soviet forces have endured in the popular imagination, lending vague notions of "red hordes" and overwhelming numerical superiority. Even though the structure of these forces has been made available by Russian sources, it remains a little known topic of the Second World War. Significant among the obscuring factors is the sheer number of formations fielded by the Soviets. Even their largest field force, the fronts, would be difficult to list from memory. Likewise, the situation for combined-arms armies and, further down, rifle corps is even more problematic because of their quantity. The rifle corps are not well known, and a misconception lingers that the Soviets abolished the echelon of rifle corps in late for the duration of the war. While it is true this command echelon almost disappeared from the Red Army during this period, it did not vanish completely, and was in fact rebuilt from late forward as the wartime structure of the Soviet forces matured. A complicating factor is the varying interest in different periods of the war. It is only recently that more interest has been shown by historians in the final struggle for Germany itself. A key part of this struggle was the military structure of the combatants, and the Soviet Army was by far the largest land force in the field by This document identifies the rifle corps of the Soviet Army during the period January to May "period of interest" , and brings out statistical data to dispel some of the anonymity which inhibits a better understanding of the Soviet forces. The source for this data is overwhelmingly the official order of battle of the Soviet Army Boevoi sostav Sovetskoi armii. General Comments The corps fielded by the Soviet Army were significantly smaller than their western counterparts in terms of personnel strength. This aspect was driven by two factors. The first was the relatively smaller size of component divisions. The second factor keeping the strength of the Soviet corps relatively low were the comparatively few attached supporting units. Depending on divisional strength, by mid, rifle corps ranged in strength from 12, to 24, men Glantz Another document depicts the strength of rifle corps attachments included in mid as between 20, and 30, men Connor B1. This may be compared to the roughly ,man strength of a U. In terms of personnel strength, a rifle corps was roughly equivalent to a U. Complicating the assessment of the Soviet rifle corps in was the differentiation between regular rifle corps, light rifle corps, and guards rifle corps. The light rifle corps th and th were made up of specialized brigades and employed in rough terrain. The guards rifle corps numbered forty in total and often had more attached supporting units than their regular counterparts. Notably, guards rifle divisions were not always subordinated to guards rifle corps and guards rifle corps often had regular divisions subordinated to them. This document takes note of unusual situations concerning such subordination issues. Finally, the Soviets employed other kinds of corps. Tank and mechanized corps were truly division-sized units made up of brigades. Artillery corps were specialized units. Cavalry corps, like rifle corps, had subordinated divisions, but were typically smaller in personnel strength. These distinctions are important because they reflect on the part of the Soviets a flexible understanding of the concept of a corps as an echelon of command. Numbers and Distribution For the period of interest, the Soviet Army fielded rifle corps. Of these, 40 were guards rifle corps, numbered one through forty. The remainder were regular rifle corps, numbered one through one hundred thirty five. Of the regular rifle corps, two th and th were light rifle corps of a different structure. All of the guards rifle corps were committed in action against the Germans, although the 37th, 38th, and 39th Guards Rifle Corps were held in VGK reserve until March Twenty of the regular rifle corps were subordinated to commands not engaged in operations against the Germans. These twenty were the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 26th, 31st, 34th, 39th, 56th, 58th, 59th, 66th, 82nd, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, and st. Thus, in action against the Germans were regular rifle corps, two light rifle corps, and 40 guards rifle corps. With a typical corps commanding three rifle divisions, the distribution of

the rifle corps among the fronts in action against the Germans was a function of how many rifle divisions were subordinated to any given front. Nevertheless, it is illuminating to view at a glance the distribution of rifle corps among the fronts. The fronts are listed north to south and the VGK Reserve. This distribution is shown in Table One. The 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts were deactivated and their forces transferred to other fronts. Span of Control Span of control is the number of subordinate elements controlled by higher management. As the Soviet Army, to the corps echelon at least, was dominantly a force of triangular organization, one may define a rifle corps as having a "normal" span of control of three rifle divisions. Again, the two light rifle corps do not conform to this standard because their subordinate units were brigades and not divisions. In examining the span of control, therefore, the sample includes regular rifle corps and 40 guards rifle corps that were committed in action against the German forces. The first examines how stable was the subordination of rifle divisions to rifle corps. The second examines how stable was the subordination of rifle corps to higher headquarters. The subordination of all rifle divisions as grouped under fronts was checked for the five months of the period of interest. Subordination of a division to the same rifle corps for a period of four months or more was deemed a significant relationship. By fronts as the order of battle existed on 1 January, the following number of rifle divisions were subordinated to the same corps for a period of four consecutive months or more. Its nine divisions remained subordinated to the same three corps until the end of the Russo-German War. The lower stability percentages for the Baltic Fronts were strongly influenced by their disbandment during the period of interest. These actions forced the reorganization of command relationships, and in many cases, divisions were transferred to other corps, sometimes more than once, during the period of interest. Of minor note is that the 1st and 2nd Rifle Divisions, ultimately subordinate to the 1st Baltic Front on 1 January, were both disbanded in March. An interesting aspect of the table is that it highlights the stability of divisional subordination to corps in the Belorussian Fronts, particularly when compared to the Ukrainian Fronts. Only subordination relationships for forces in contact with the Germans or in VGK Reserve were assessed. Transfer of corps between armies was an exceptional event. Guards Formations Discussion of the guards divisions and corps is necessary as there are aspects of their deployment and relationship that are not immediately obvious. Guards units were formed by re-titling an existing regular formation that had distinguished itself in battle. Certainly, the definition of good battlefield performance extended beyond physical courage, else it is unlikely that so many guards armies and corps would have been formed, as these were headquarters units only. An important realization is that regular units were routinely subordinated to guards headquarters units. Thus, regular rifle corps were found in guards armies, and regular rifle divisions were found in guards rifle corps. While there were guards armies with only guards rifle corps and guards rifle corps commanding only guards rifle divisions, this was hardly a standard arrangement. By way of example, in January, 14 of the 40 guards rifle corps commanded regular rifle divisions as a part or all of their subordinated rifle divisions. In the same month, 33 of the 40 guards rifle corps commanded two or more guards rifle divisions. In one exceptional case, 14th Guards Rifle Corps did not command any guards rifle divisions during the entire period of interest. In April, of regular rifle corps, 12 were subordinated to guards armies, while five regular rifle corps 21st, 60th, 76th, 100th, and 110th were subordinated to guards armies for the entire period of interest. Conversely, guards rifle divisions and corps were routinely subordinated to regular headquarters units. Of guards rifle divisions subordinated to rifle corps employed against German forces in January, 27 were subordinated to regular rifle corps while 94 were under the command of guards rifle corps. While a strong tendency existed for guards rifle divisions to be subordinated to guards rifle corps, this was often not the case. In another exceptional case, 20th Rifle Corps commanded two guards rifle divisions during the entire period of interest, while the 3rd, 25th, 27th, 30th, 32nd, 37th, 41st, 49th, 50th, 64th, 96th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, and 105th Rifle Corps all commanded at least one guards rifle division during the entire period of interest. Subordination of guards rifle corps shows a similar tendency, but not absolute rule, to subordination to guards armies. In April, 25 of the 40 guards rifle corps were subordinated to guards armies, while 18 guards rifle corps were subordinated to guards armies for the entire period of interest. Summary The official order of battle is an informative document that offers various insights into Soviet organization and that removes some of the anonymity caused by the large size of the Soviet forces. The document makes clear the scale of Soviet rifle

unit force generation, and the dominant commitment of this force to the struggle against Germany. Review of the data confirmed the strong tendency of rifle corps to exhibit triangular organization, as well as a strong cohesiveness in terms of the subordination of divisions to corps, and corps to armies. The data also demonstrated a strong tendency of regular rifle units to be subordinated to regular headquarters and, likewise, for guards rifle units to be subordinated to guards headquarters. Where mixing of guards and regular formations occurred, it raises a question as to how the presence of the different formations impacted the overall performance of corps and armies. A discussion of rifle corps organization as well as tables of corps subordination and division counts follow for those interested in a closer look at the raw data.

### Chapter 5 : Military History Online - Soviet rifle corps in the Russo-German War,

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### Chapter 6 : calendrierdelascience.com: W. Victor Madej: Books, Biography, Blogs, Audiobooks, Kindle

*The Russo-German War, Summer /Destruction of the Eastern Front (Battle Situation-east Front).*

### Chapter 7 : W. Victor Madej | Open Library

*Operation Spring Awakening (Unternehmen Frühlingserwachen) (6 - 16 March ) was the last major German offensive of World War calendrierdelascience.com took place in Hungary on the Eastern Front.*

### Chapter 8 : Operation Spring Awakening - Wikipedia

*The Eastern Front of World War II was a theatre of conflict between the European Axis powers and co-belligerent Finland against the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), Poland and other Allies, which encompassed Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Northeast Europe (), and Southeast Europe from 22 June to 9 May*

### Chapter 9 : Forgotten battles of the Russo-German War - Page 5 - Axis History Forum

*Russo-Finish War: Winter War () and Continuation War () Russo - German War () Norway and Denmark Campaign () In the early spring of.*