

Chapter 1 : Philosophical Investigations - Wikipedia

In Zhongying Cheng & On Cho Ng (eds.), The Imperative of Understanding: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and Onto-Hermeneutics: A Tribute Volume Dedicated to Professor Chung-Ying Cheng. Global Scholarly Publications (

The text[edit] Editions and referencing[edit] Philosophical Investigations was not ready for publication when Wittgenstein died in 1951. There are multiple editions of Philosophical Investigations with the popular third edition and 50th anniversary edition having been edited by Anscombe: Macmillan Publishing Company, This edition includes the original German text in addition to the English translation. The text is divided into two parts, consisting of what Wittgenstein calls, in the preface, Bemerkungen, translated by Anscombe as "remarks". In the second part, the remarks are longer and numbered using Roman numerals. In the index, remarks from the first part are referenced by their number rather than page; however, references from the second part are cited by page number. The comparatively unusual nature of the second part is due to the fact that it comprises notes that Wittgenstein may have intended to re-incorporate into the first part. Subsequent to his death it was published as a "Part II" in the first, second and third editions. Rather than presenting a philosophical problem and its solution, Wittgenstein engages in a dialogue, where he provides a language-game a more or less ordinary use of the words in question, that describes how one might be inclined to think about it, and then shows why that inclination suffers from conceptual confusion. The following is an excerpt from the first entry in the book that exemplifies this method: I send someone shopping. Explanations come to an end somewhere. The reader is presented with a use of language: Wittgenstein supplies the response of one or more imagined interlocutors. He may put these statements in quotes to distinguish them from his own: Wittgenstein shows why the reaction was misguided, but not unnatural: Through such language-games, Wittgenstein attempts to get the reader to come to certain difficult philosophical conclusions independently; he does not merely argue in favor of theories. Wittgenstein viewed the tools of language as being fundamentally simple, [7] [non-primary source needed] and he believed that philosophers had obscured this simplicity by misusing language and by asking meaningless questions. He attempted in the Investigations to make things clear: Picture theory of language A common summary of his argument is that meaning is use. According to the use theory of meaning, the words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate, nor by the mental representations one might associate with them, but by how they are used. For example, this means there is no need to postulate that there is something called good that exists independently of any good deed. Meaning and definition[edit] Wittgenstein rejects a variety of ways of thinking about what the meaning of a word is, or how meanings can be identified. He shows how, in each case, the meaning of the word presupposes our ability to use it. He first asks the reader to perform a thought experiment: Any definition that focuses on amusement leaves us unsatisfied since the feelings experienced by a world class chess player are very different from those of a circle of children playing Duck Duck Goose. Any definition that focuses on competition will fail to explain the game of catch, or the game of solitaire. And a definition of the word "game" that focuses on rules will fall on similar difficulties. The essential point of this exercise is often missed. Wittgenstein argues that definitions emerge from what he termed " forms of life ", roughly the culture and society in which they are used. Wittgenstein stresses the social aspects of cognition; to see how language works for most cases, we have to see how it functions in a specific social situation. In short, it is essential that a language is shareable, but this does not imply that for a language to function that it is in fact already shared. For Wittgenstein, the thing that the word stands for does not give the meaning of the word. Wittgenstein argues for this making a series of moves to show that to understand an ostensive definition presupposes an understanding of the way the word being defined is used. Family resemblances[edit] Why is it that we are sure a particular activityâ€™e. Olympic target shootingâ€™is a game while a similar activityâ€™e. How do we recognize that two people we know are related to one another? We may see similar height, weight, eye color, hair, nose, mouth, patterns of speech, social or political views, mannerisms, body structure, last names, etc. Wittgenstein suggests that the same is true of language. We are all familiar i. He suggests that an attempt to untangle these knots requires

more than simple deductive arguments pointing out the problems with some particular position. Language-games[edit] Wittgenstein develops this discussion of games into the key notion of a language-game. Wittgenstein introduces the term using simple examples, [17] but intends it to be used for the many ways in which we use language. For example, in one language-game, a word might be used to stand for or refer to an object, but in another the same word might be used for giving orders, or for asking questions, and so on. The famous example is the meaning of the word "game". We speak of various kinds of games: These are all different uses of the word "games". Wittgenstein also gives the example of "Water! The meaning of the word depends on the language-game within which it is being used. Another way Wittgenstein puts the point is that the word "water" has no meaning apart from its use within a language-game. One might use the word as an order to have someone else bring you a glass of water. But it can also be used to warn someone that the water has been poisoned. One might even use the word as code by members of a secret society. Wittgenstein does not limit the application of his concept of language games to word-meaning. He also applies it to sentence-meaning. It only acquires significance if we fix it within some context of use. Thus, it fails to say anything because the sentence as such does not yet determine some particular use. The sentence is only meaningful when it is used to say something. For instance, it can be used so as to say that no person or historical figure fits the set of descriptions attributed to the person that goes by the name of "Moses". But it can also mean that the leader of the Israelites was not called Moses. Or that there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses, etc. What the sentence means thus depends on its context of use. Rules[edit] One general characteristic of games that Wittgenstein considers in detail is the way in which they consist in following rules. Rules constitute a family, rather than a class that can be explicitly defined. Indeed, he argues that any course of action can be made out to accord with some particular rule, and that therefore a rule cannot be used to explain an action. Following a rule is a social activity. Private language argument Wittgenstein also ponders the possibility of a language that talks about those things that are known only to the user, whose content is inherently private. Wittgenstein presents several perspectives on the topic. One point he makes is that it is incoherent to talk of knowing that one is in some particular mental state. For Wittgenstein, this is a grammatical point, part of the way in which the language-game involving the word "pain" is played. First, he argues that a private language is not really a language at all. This point is intimately connected with a variety of other themes in his later works, especially his investigations of "meaning". For Wittgenstein, there is no single, coherent "sample" or "object" that we can call "meaning". Rather, the supposition that there are such things is the source of many philosophical confusions. Meaning is a complicated phenomenon that is woven into the fabric of our lives. As a consequence, it makes no sense to talk about a private language, with words that mean something in the absence of other users of the language. Again, several examples are considered. One is that perhaps using S involves mentally consulting a table of sensations, to check that one has associated S correctly; but in this case, how could the mental table be checked for its correctness? It is "[a]s if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true", as Wittgenstein puts it. That is, the only way to check to see if one has applied the symbol S correctly to a certain mental state is to introspect and determine whether the current sensation is identical to the sensation previously associated with S. Thus, for a language to be used at all it must have some public criterion of identity. Often, what is widely regarded as a deep philosophical problem will vanish, argues Wittgenstein, and eventually be seen as a confusion about the significance of the words that philosophers use to frame such problems and questions. It is only in this way that it is interesting to talk about something like a "private language" â€” i. Wittgenstein asserts that, if something is a language, it cannot be logically private; and if something is private, it is not and cannot be a language. Wittgenstein suggests that, in such a situation, the word "beetle" could not be the name of a thing, because supposing that each person has something completely different in their boxes or nothing at all does not change the meaning of the word; the beetle as a private object "drops out of consideration as irrelevant". And, contrapositively, if we consider something to be indeed private, it follows that we cannot talk about it. According to Wittgenstein, those who insist that consciousness or any other apparently subjective mental state is conceptually unconnected to the external world are mistaken. Wittgenstein explicitly criticizes so-called conceivability arguments: And if

anyone can do soâ€”why should that not merely prove that such image-mongery is of no interest to us? It is as if I were to say: Arguments that claim otherwise are misguided. Wittgenstein has also said that "language is inherent and transcendental", which is also not difficult to understand, since we can only comprehend and explain transcendental affairs through language. Wittgenstein and behaviorism[edit] From his remarks on the importance of public, observable behavior as opposed to private experiences , it may seem that Wittgenstein is simply a behaviorist â€”one who thinks that mental states are nothing over and above certain behavior. However, Wittgenstein resists such a characterization; he writes considering what an objector might say: He is, of course, primarily concerned with facts of linguistic usage. However, some argue that Wittgenstein is basically a behaviorist because he considers facts about language use as all there is. Such a claim is controversial, since it is not explicitly endorsed in the Investigations. Often one can see something in a straightforward way â€” seeing that it is a rabbit, perhaps.

Situating Xunzi. Nicholas Bunnin - - In Zhongying Cheng & On Cho Ng (eds.), The Imperative of Understanding: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and Onto-Hermeneutics: A Tribute Volume Dedicated to Professor Chung-Ying Cheng. Global Scholarly Publications.

Chinese Ethics Michael Hemmingsen Email: HSS Phone Number: Monday-Friday pm Outline This course provides a historical overview of ethical thought in China, from the Zhou dynasty to the modern day. We consider the major indigenous schools of thought, including Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, and the thought of Mozi and Yang Zhu, as well as the contemporary role ethics of Roger T. Learning Outcomes By the end of the course students will be able to: Graham A Radical Reaction: Cua Xin and Moral Failure: A Critical Survey Roger T. Ames Confucian Role Ethics, p. This is designed to be a flexible assignment that you can tailor to your schedule and interest and therefore students will have a choice as to which weeks and readings they sign up to for their reflections. Sign-ups will be in the first class, and it will be first in first-served. For instance, a reflection on Philip J. Instructions Each critical reflection will critically assess the reading. The best critical reflections will not just repeat the material, but will engage with it in a manner that demonstrates thoughtfulness, creativity, care and insight. They will select the week they prefer in the first class. It is strongly recommended that students create materials such as handouts to assist with the discussion. PowerPoint presentations are permitted, but students should keep in mind that their role is not to provide a lecture, but to stimulate debate and discussion, so PowerPoint should be used with this aim in mind. Students will be graded on: In other words, so long as the essay relates to one of the Chinese philosophers we have discussed in the course in some way, the topic is acceptable. It is recommended though by no means required that the essay focus on ethics. Students who are unsure whether a topic is acceptable can discuss it with me before writing, though I encourage students to be creative in their topic, and to follow their own interests. Students will be assessed on the following: Supplementary Readings Kongzi Bryan W. New Essays, edited by Brian W. Open Court, Laozi Philip J. Berger Routledge, Jung H. Palgrave Macmillan, Robert E. Greenwood Press, A. Investigations in Chinese Philosophy Chicago: S , Li Zhi Pauline C. S Pauline C. Peter Lang, Mou Zhongsang N. A Vocabulary Hong Kong:

Chapter 3 : Journal of Chinese Philosophy TOC | Warp, Weft, and Way

'Situating Xunzi' in On-cho Ng, ed., The Imperative of Reading: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and Onto-Hermeneutics 'God's Knowledge and Ours: Kant and Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition' Journal of Chinese Philosophy, December

Mou Zongsan Mou Zongsan is considered to be one of the more influential second generation philosophers. Mou claims universality exists in all philosophical truth. Which suggests that political and social theories of the world can be connected in essence. Mou argues in his lectures that particularity exists because of the different systems that are established in different cultures. However, these different systems, after a series of philosophical reasoning and interpretation, arrive at a same philosophical truth. He believes that our physical limitations, i. However, being that our mind, i. Mou asserts that historical necessity exists neither because of logical necessity or metaphysical necessity but because of what he calls a development of the spirit, what he also labels as dialectical necessity. He claims that history however should be perceived and interpreted as something that has both historical necessity i. For there are two types of judgment: Mou states, that Greek or Chinese, these basic necessities behind history and fundamental human character are the same, and therefore universality in philosophical truth exists even behind politics and history. New Confucian Manifesto[edit] Main article: However, it did not come into common use until the late s. This work is often referred to as the "New Confucian Manifesto," although that phrase never occurs in it. The Manifesto presents a vision of Chinese culture as having a fundamental unity throughout history, of which Confucianism is the highest expression. The particular interpretation of Confucianism given by the Manifesto is deeply influenced by Neo-Confucianism, and in particular the version of Neo-Confucianism most associated with Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming as opposed to that associated with Zhu Xi. In addition, the Manifesto argues that while China must learn from the West modern science and democracy, the West must learn from China and the Confucian tradition in particular "a more all-encompassing wisdom. Harmonious Society The concept of a harmonious society simplified Chinese: As a result, the philosophy has also been characterized as deriving from New Confucianism. The philosophy is recognized as a response to the increasing social injustice and inequality emerging in mainland Chinese society as a result of unchecked economic growth, which has led to social conflict. The governing philosophy was therefore shifted around economic growth to overall societal balance and harmony. Some scholars, notably Yan Xuetong and Daniel A. Bell , advocate the restoration of meritocratic Confucian institutions such as the censorate in China and elsewhere as part of a New Confucian political program. Considering the historical development of the concept of harmony we need to ask ourselves to what extent are the philosophical traditions based on historic assumptions, and to what extent are they merely a product of the ideological and political demands of the current period.

Chapter 4 : Bloomsbury - Nicholas Bunnin - Nicholas Bunnin

Kurtis Hagen's book The Philosophy of Xunzi is a contribution to a growing area of Chinese philosophy, one that addresses the question of how to make sense of the classic text of Xunzi.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: John Berthrong bio Umberto Bresciani. The New Confucian Movement. Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies, University of California Press, Intrinsic classical learning, the exercise of divining from canonical historical records how men in general should make history for all time, lapsed" p. In his sincere mourning for the passing of the Confucian Way Levenson was premature in judging that Confucianism had passed forever into the museum of cultural history because Dr. Umberto Bresciani, writing about the reinvention of Confucianism, reports that something quite different was happening to Confucianism during the twentieth century. Although some critical scholars doubt that we can use the publication of the manifesto to mark so precisely the beginning of the revival of Confucianism, it has become a commonplace to mention this important document as denoting an important founding moment in the life of the New Confucian movement. What Bresciani has done, and done superbly, for the first time in English, is to provide a comprehensive historical narrative of what he calls the reinvention of Confucianism in the twentieth century via the founding of the New Confucian movement. As I will discuss below, his scholarship is as impressive as it is judicious. Previously, the scholarly community lacked a coherent historical and philosophic account in any Western language of the rise of the revived Confucian discourse now known as Contemporary New Confucianism although there are two other parallel studies in English that also contain a great deal of information about New Confucianism: Cheng Chung-ying and Nicholas Bunnin, eds. Blackwell Publishers,], and John Makeham, ed. A Critical Study [New York: As Bresciani notes, there is a growing controversy about what to call the new movement. The debates over naming it are reminiscent of the great arguments that characterized the discussion of the philosophic typologies in Chinese intellectual history beginning with the works of Zhuangzi, Xunzi, and Sima Qian. While it might seem a harmless discussion of how to describe a movement by showing what is new in it and what links it to previous manifestations of Confucian history, any rhetorician knows that setting the range of permissible description or the giving of names and titles is important to any debate. We all remember that when Master Kong was asked what he would do if he were given political power, he responded that he would first rectify names. We should pause for a moment and consider why it has taken so long for an informed and critical scholar like Bresciani to write a narrative account of the rise of the New Confucian movement and the fact that Confucianism is showing signs of a significant revival in the new millennium. The logic concerning the "necessary" decline of Confucianism from the nineteenth century is this: The shop of Confucianism needed to be [End Page 94] closed and boarded over before Chinese intellectuals could set about the business of restoring China to its place of dignity, wealth, and power among the nations of the world. I remember a prescient discussion of the fate of Confucianism

Chapter 5 : Nicholas Bunnin (Oxford University) - PhilPeople

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Chapter 6 : New Confucianism - Wikipedia

NICHOLAS BUNNIN. CONTEMPORARY CHINESE PHILOSOPHY. Dedicated to my mother Mrs Cheng Hsu Wen-shu and the memory of Edited by CHUNG-YING CHENG AND NICHOLAS BUNNIN.

Chapter 7 : Nicholas Bunnin, Situating Xunzi - PhilPapers

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

Chapter 8 : Nicholas Bunnin | The Forum for Philosophy

The author concludes that official political interpretations from the P.R. China mainly follow Xunzi's classical elaboration of this concept, which is in the legalist tradition and implies autocratic elements, whereas the philosophic interpretations written by the Taiwanese Modern Confucians generally elaborate the Mencian, i.e. the more egalitarian and democratic stream of classical Confucian thought.

Chapter 9 : Project MUSE - Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement (review)

Warp, Weft, and Way is a group blog of Chinese and Comparative philosophy. Its primary purpose is to promote and stimulate discussion of Chinese philosophy and cross-tradition inquiry among scholars and students of philosophy, whatever their level of training. Contributors include active scholars.