Chapter 1 : Social emotions - Wikipedia

Abstract Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior. This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions. As in previous decades, much research remains focused on shame and guilt. We review current thinking on the distinction between shame and guilt, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two moral emotions. Several new areas of research are highlighted: In recent years, the concept of moral emotions has been expanded to include several positive emotionsâ€"elevation, gratitude, and the sometimes morally relevant experience of pride. Finally, we discuss briefly a morally relevant emotional processâ€"other-oriented empathy. This review summarizes current theory and research on moral emotions, offering a framework for thinking about the ways in which morally relevant emotions may moderate the link between moral standards and moral decisions, and ultimately moral behavior. Living a moral, constructive life is defined by a weighted sum of countless individual, morally relevant behaviors enacted day in and day out plus an occasional particularly self-defining moment. As imperfect human beings, however, our behavior does not always bear a one-to-one correspondence to our moral standards. Many potential explanations exist for the discrepancy between behavioral decisions intentions and actual behavior in both moral and nonmoral domains. Historically, much social psychological theory and research was devoted to understanding the imperfect link between intentions e. As with the link between intentions and behaviors in general, the link between moral intentions and moral behaviors is likewise an important issue. However, owing to space limitations, this chapter focuses on the processes further upstream from intentions: The current review emphasizes cognitive and emotional processes relevant to the more cross-culturally invariant moral standards. Naturally, people do, on occasion, lie, cheat, and steal, even though they know such behavior is deemed wrong by moral and societal norms. Moral emotions represent an important but often overlooked element of our human moral apparatus. We also consider several positively valenced moral emotionsâ€"elevation, gratitude, and the sometimes morally relevant experience of pride. In addition, we discuss briefly a morally relevant emotional processâ€" empathy. This self-evaluation may be implicit or explicit, consciously experienced or transpiring beneath the radar of our awareness. But importantly, the self is the object of these self-conscious emotions. As the self reflects upon the self, moral self-conscious emotions provide immediate punishment or reinforcement of behavior. In effect, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride function as an emotional moral barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability. When we sin, transgress, or err, aversive feelings of shame, guilt, or embarrassment are likely to ensue. Moreover, actual behavior is not necessary for the press of moral emotions to have effect. People can anticipate their likely emotional reactions e. Thus, the self-conscious moral emotions can exert a strong influence on moral choice and behavior by providing critical feedback regarding both anticipated behavior feedback in the form of anticipatory shame, guilt, or pride and actual behavior feedback in the form of consequential shame, guilt, or pride. Thus far, we have been discussing situation-specific experiences of consequential and anticipatory feelings of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride. In the realm of moral emotions, researchers are also interested in dispositional tendencies to experience these self-conscious emotions e. An emotion disposition is defined as the propensity to experience that emotion across a range of situations Tangney From this perspective, shame-prone individuals would be more susceptible to both anticipatory and consequential experiences of shame, relative to their less shame-prone peers. That is, a shame-prone person would be inclined to anticipate shame in response to a range of potential behaviors and outcomes. In turn, such an individual also would be inclined to experience shame as a consequence of actual failures and transgressions. Shame and Guilt The vast majority of research on moral emotions has focused on two negatively valanced, self-conscious emotionsâ€"shame and guilt. Nonetheless, a number of attempts have been made to differentiate between shame and guilt over the years. Attempts to differentiate between shame and guilt fall into three categories: Research indicates that type of event has surprisingly little to do with the distinction between shame and guilt. Most types of events e.

Some researchers claim that shame is evoked by a broader range of situations including both moral and nonmoral failures and transgressions, whereas guilt is more specifically linked to transgressions in the moral realm Ferguson et al. In our view Tangney et al. As demonstrated by Shweder et al. In short, from this broader cultural perspective, shame and guilt are emotions each primarily evoked by moral lapses. Another frequently cited distinction between shame and guilt focuses on the public versus private nature of transgressions e. For example, a systematic analysis of the social context of personal shame- and guilt-eliciting events described by several hundred children and adults Tangney et al. Solitary shame experiences were about as common as solitary guilt experiences. Where does the notion that shame is a more public emotion come from? Although shame- and guilt-inducing situations are equally public in terms of the likelihood that others are present and aware of the failure or transgression and equally likely to involve interpersonal concerns, there appear to be systematic differences in the nature of those interpersonal concerns. In contrast, when describing guilt experiences, respondents were more concerned with their effect on others. Several subsequent studies Smith et al. For example, participants primed to focus on public exposure of a moral transgression attributed equivalent levels of shame and guilt to story protagonists, but when the public versus private dimension was not highlighted, participants attributed less shame guilt was uniformly high across conditions. However, taken together, Smith et al. More often than not, our failures and transgressions do not escape the notice of others. According to Lewis , shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self; guilt involves a negative evaluation of a specific behavior. Both shame and guilt are negative emotions and as such, both can cause intrapsychic pain. Shamed people also feel exposed. Lewis described a split in self-functioning in which the self is both agent and object of observation and disapproval. Guilt, on the other hand, is typically a less devastating, less painful experience because the object of condemnation is a specific behavior, not the entire self. On balance, guilt appears to be the more adaptive emotion, benefiting individuals and their relationships in a variety of ways Baumeister et al. In this section, we summarize research in five areas that illustrates the adaptive functions of guilt, in contrast to the hidden costs of shame. Specifically, we focus on the differential relationship of shame and guilt to motivation hiding versus amending , other-oriented empathy, anger and aggression, psychological symptoms, and deterrence of transgression and other risky, socially undesirable behavior. On the one hand, shame corresponds with attempts to deny, hide, or escape the shame-inducing situation. Physiological research has linked the shame experience with elevated levels of proinflammatory cytokine and cortisol Dickerson et al. Physiological Correlates of Shame. Guilt, on the other hand, corresponds with reparative actions including confessions, apologies, and undoing the consequences of the behavior. On the whole, empirical evidence evaluating the action tendencies of people experiencing shame and guilt suggests that guilt promotes constructive, proactive pursuits, whereas shame promotes defensiveness, interpersonal separation, and distance. Other-oriented empathy versus self-oriented distress Second, shame and guilt are differentially related to empathy. Specifically, guilt goes hand in hand with other-oriented empathy. This differential relationship of shame and guilt to empathy is apparent both at the level of emotion disposition and at the level of emotional state. Marschall found that people induced to feel shame subsequently reported less empathy for a disabled student, especially among low-shame-prone individuals. Why might shame, but not guilt, interfere with other-oriented empathy? Individuals in the throes of shame turn tightly inward, and are thus less able to focus cognitive and emotional resources on the harmed other Tangney et al. More recent empirical research has supported her claim. In fact, compared with those who are not shame-prone, shame-prone individuals are more likely to engage in externalization of blame, experience intense anger, and express that anger in destructive ways, including direct physical, verbal, and symbolic aggression, indirect aggression e. Finally, shame-prone individuals report awareness that their anger typically results in negative long-term consequences for both themselves and for their relationships with others. Guilt-proneness, in contrast, is consistently associated with a more constructive constellation of emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. Compared with their nonguilt-prone peers, guilt-prone individuals are less likely to engage in direct, indirect, and displaced aggression when angered. And they report positive long-term consequences to their anger Tangney et al. Consistent with these findings, Harper et al. Shame and anger have been similarly linked at the situational level, too Tangney et al. For example, in a study of anger episodes

among romantically involved couples, shamed partners were significantly more angry, more likely to engage in aggressive behavior, and less likely to elicit conciliatory behavior from their perpetrating significant other Tangney b. Taken together, the results provide a powerful empirical example of the shame-rage spiral described by Lewis and Scheff , with a partner shame leading to feelings of rage, b and destructive retaliation, c which then sets into motion anger and resentment in the perpetrator, d as well as expressions of blame and retaliation in kind, e which is then likely to further shame the initially shamed partner, and so forthâ€"without any constructive resolution in sight. Recently, Stuewig et al. We theorized that negative feelings associated with shame lead to externalization of blame, which in turn leads shame-prone people to react aggressively. Guilt, on the other hand, should facilitate empathic processes, thus reducing outward directed aggression. As anticipated, we found that across all samples, externalization of blame mediated the relationship between shame-proneness and both verbal and physical aggression. Guilt-proneness, on the other hand, continued to show a direct inverse relationship to aggression in three of the four samples. In addition, the link between guilt and low aggression was partially mediated through other-oriented empathy and a propensity to take responsibility. In short, shame and anger go hand in hand. Desperate to escape painful feelings of shame, shamed individuals are apt to turn the tables defensively, externalizing blame and anger outward onto a convenient scapegoat. Blaming others may help individuals regain some sense of control and superiority in their life, but the long-term costs are often steep. Friends, coworkers, and loved ones are apt to become alienated by an interpersonal style characterized by irrational bursts of anger. Psychological symptoms When considering the domain of social behavior and interpersonal adjustment, empirical research suggests that guilt, on balance, is the more moral or adaptive emotion. Guilt appears to motivate reparative action, foster other-oriented empathy, and promote constructive strategies for coping with anger. But are there intrapersonal or intrapsychic costs for those individuals who are prone to experience guilt? Conversely, is shame perhaps less problematic for intrapersonal as opposed to interpersonal adjustment? Although the traditional view is that guilt plays a significant role in psychological symptoms, the empirical findings have been more equivocal. Recently, however, theorists and researchers have emphasized the adaptive functions of guilt, particularly for interpersonal behavior Baumeister et al. In an effort to reconcile these perspectives, Tangney argued that earlier work failed to take into account the distinction between guilt and shame. Instead, guilt is most likely to be maladaptive when it becomes fused with shame.

*Some Emotions and a Moral [Anonymous] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This is a reproduction of a book published before This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages.*

Morality and the Superego: The founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud , proposed the existence of a tension between the needs of society and the individual. A proponent of behaviorism, B. Skinner similarly focused on socialization as the primary force behind moral development [2]. Interviewing children using the Clinical Interview Method, Piaget found that young children were focused on authority mandates, and that with age children become autonomous, evaluating actions from a set of independent principles of morality. Piaget characterizes the development of morality of children through observing children while playing games to see if rules are followed. Eliot Turiel argued for a social domain approach to social cognition, delineating how individuals differentiate moral fairness, equality, justice , societal conventions, group functioning, traditions , and psychological personal, individual prerogative concepts from early in development throughout the lifespan [4]. Over the past 40 years, research findings have supported this model, demonstrating how children, adolescents, and adults differentiate moral rules from conventional rules, identify the personal domain as a nonregulated domain, and evaluate multifaceted or complex situations that involve more than one domain. The Handbook of Moral Development , edited by Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana, provides a wide range of information about these topics covered in moral development today. Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello , for instance, present evidence that three-year-olds are more willing to help a neutral or helpful person than a harmful person. While obvious distress cues e. That is, they judge that victims who resist illegitimate requests will feel better than victims who comply. Emotions[edit] Moral questions tend to be emotionally charged issues which evoke strong affective responses. Consequently, emotions likely play an important role in moral development. However, there is currently little consensus among theorists on how emotions influence moral development. Psychoanalytic theory , founded by Freud, emphasizes the role of guilt in repressing primal drives. Research on prosocial behavior has focused on how emotions motivate individuals to engage in moral or altruistic acts. Social-cognitive development theories have recently begun to examine how emotions influence moral judgments. Intuitionist theorists assert that moral judgments can be reduced to immediate, instinctive emotional responses elicited by moral dilemmas. Research on socioemotional development and prosocial development has identified several "moral emotions" which are believed to motivate moral behavior and influence moral development Eisenberg, for a review. Moreover, there exists a bigger difference between guilt and shame that goes beyond the type of feelings that they may provoke within an individual. This difference lies in the fact that these two moral emotions do not weigh the same in terms of their impact on moral behaviors. Studies on the effects of guilt and shame on moral behaviors has shown that guilt has a larger ability to dissuade an individual from making immoral choices whereas shame did not seem to have any deterring effect on immoral behaviors. In contrast to guilt and shame, empathy and sympathy are considered other-oriented moral emotions. The relation between moral action and moral emotions has been extensively researched. Some approaches to studying emotions in moral judgments come from the perspective that emotions are automatic intuitions that define morality Greene, ; [21] Haidt, [22]. For instance, Kochanska showed that gentle parental discipline best promotes conscience development in temperamentally fearful children but that parental responsiveness and a mutually responsive parent-child orientation best promote conscience development in temperamentally fearless children. Development can be divided up to multiple stages however the first few years of development is usually seen to be formed by 5 years of age. Some, however not limited to are of these theoretical frameworks: While most of this research has investigated two-dimensional relationships between each of the three components: These judgments are more complex than regular judgments as they require one to recognize and understand eg. Such actions can negatively impact a child in the long term in the sense of weakening ones confidence, self esteem as well personal identity. One explicit manner in which societies can socialize individuals is through moral education.

Solomon and colleagues present evidence from a study that integrated both direct instruction and guided reflection approaches to moral development, with evidence for resultant increases in spontaneous prosocial behavior. For example, children being raised in China eventually adopt the collective communist ideals of their society. In fact, children learn to lie and deny responsibility for accomplishing something good instead of seeking recognition for their actions. Starting in preschool, sharing, helping, and other prosocial behaviors become more common, particularly in females, although the gender differences in prosocial behavior are not evident in all social contexts. Shweder , Mahapatra, and Miller argued for the notion that different cultures defined the boundaries of morality differently. Moral relativism can be identified as a form of moral skepticism and is often misidentified as moral pluralism. It opposes to the attitude of moral superiority and ethnocentrism found in moral absolutism and the views of moral universalism. Turiel and Perkins argued for the universality of morality, focusing largely on evidence throughout history of resistance movements that fight for justice through the affirmation of individual self-determination rights. Wainryb , in contrast, demonstrates that children in diverse cultures such as the U. Wainryb ; shows that many apparent cultural differences in moral judgments are actually due to different informational assumptions, or beliefs about the way the world works. Values are transmitted through religion , which is for many inextricably linked to a cultural identity. Intrinsic aspects of religion may have a positive impact on the internalization and the symbolism of moral identity. Religious development mirrors the cognitive and moral developmental stages of the children. In indigenous American communities[edit] In Indigenous American communities , morality is taught to children through storytelling. It provides children guidelines for understanding the core values of their community, the significance of life and ideologies of moral character from past generations. Storytelling in everyday life is used as an indirect form of teaching. Stories embedded with lessons of morals, ideals, and ethics are told alongside daily household chores. Most children in Indigenous American communities develop a sense of keen attention to the details of a story with the goal of learning from them, and to understand why people do the things they do. Specific animals are used as characters to symbolize specific values and views of the culture in the storytelling where listeners are taught through the actions of these characters. In the Lakota tribe , coyotes are often viewed as a trickster character, demonstrating negative behaviors like greed, recklessness, and arrogance [64] while bears and foxes are usually viewed as wise, noble, and morally upright characters from which children learn to model. The reuse of characters calls for a more predictable outcome that children can more easily understand. Social exclusion[edit] Intergroup exclusion context provides an appropriate platform to investigate the interplay of these three dimensions of intergroup attitudes and behaviors, prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. This approach has been helpful in distinguishing which concerns children attend to when presented with a situation in which exclusion occurs. Exclusion from a peer group could raise concerns about moral issues e. In intergroup as well as intragroup contexts, children need to draw on knowledge and attitudes related to their own social identities, other social categories, the social norms associated with these categories as well as moral principals about the welfare of the excluded, and fair treatment, to make judgments about social exclusion. In the absence of information, stereotypes can be used to justify exclusion of a member of an out-group Horn , [68] Killen and Stangor, [69]. Also, research has documented the presence of a transition occurring at the reasoning level behind the criteria of inclusion and exclusion from childhood to adolescence Horn, Calman stated in regards to the reallocation of resources in a medical setting, resources must be thought of not only as money, but also in the form of skills, time, and faculties. Concerns of morality arise when the initiation, continuation, and withdrawal of intensive care affects a patients well being due to medical decision making. How do I select the appropriate diagnostic test? How do I choose among several risky treatments? Freud, Women, and Morality: The Psychology of Good and Evil. Psychology of Learning for Instruction. Varma, and Phillip Williams. Piaget, Psychology and Education: Papers in Honour of Jean Piaget. Hodder and Stoughton, The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context, and Conflict. Cambridge University Press, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice. Handbook of moral development. Scaling of theory-of-mind tasks. Child Development, 75, British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2, Testing theory of mind and morality knowledge in young children. Young children selectively avoid helping people with harmful intentions. Child

Development, 81, Intention, act, and outcome in behavioral prediction and moral judgment. Child Development, 67, Child Development, 77, Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development. Annual Review of Psychology, 51,â€" Annual Review of Psychology. Measuring guilt in children: In Guilt and Children, ed. Empathy-related responding in children. Altruism and prosocial behavior. In The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Science, , The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, , The role of emotions in moral development.

Chapter 3 : Some Emotions and a Moral by John Oliver Hobbes

Some Emotions and a Moral [John Oliver Hobbes] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Leopold is delighted to publish this classic book as part of our extensive Classic Library collection.

He can build an entire house with his own hands, as he is skilled in carpentry, plumbing, masonry, roof work, and so on. He demonstrates this every day at his own home, and so people naturally ask him for help. Being extremely nice, J. One neighbor, whom he barely knew, kept asking about how to put a skylight in his roof. By the end of the day, he had successfully put the skylight in, having provided expert labor that normally would have cost more than six hundred euros. By now you can guess: The man went alone. Roughly speaking, sentimentalists think that these two responses are intimately related, with the feeling in the driving seat. There are many questions we could ask about this. One kind of question is explanatory: Why do we think that the neighbour did something wrong? Explanatory sentimentalists believe that moral thoughts are fundamentally explained by sentiments or emotions. The second kind of question is constitutive: What does our thought that the neighbour did something wrong consist in? That is, what kind of thought is it? Is it more like believing that Pluto is a planet or like wanting to hit an uncooperative computer? Judgment sentimentalists believe that moral judgments are constituted by emotional or non-cognitive responses, at least in part, or alternatively are judgments about emotional responses or the tendency of something to give rise to them. Some judgment sentimentalists are also expressivists, who believe that the meanings of moral terms must be accounted for in terms of associated non-cognitive states. Is the wrongness of the action a projection of our sentiments? If it is a fact, is it like the fact that the square of the hypotenuse is the sum of the squares of the other two sides of a right triangle, or like the fact that water is H2O, or perhaps more like the fact that rotten food is disgusting? For metaphysical sentimentalists, moral facts make reference to our sentimental responses. But even if we assume we know all the pertinent empirical facts, how do we know that what the neighbour did is wrong? What if someone disagrees? How can we justify our verdict? Epistemological sentimentalists believe that moral justification bottoms out in sentimental responses of a certain kind. These sentimentalist views are logically independent of each other. One indication of this is that they contrast with different views. Epistemological and possibly explanatory sentimentalist views contrast with rationalist and intuitionist views, according which we can acquire moral knowledge by reasoning or intuition, respectively. Judgment sentimentalist views, in turn, contrast with some forms of cognitivism. Metaphysical sentimentalist views contrast with error theory and mind-independent moral realism in naturalist and non-naturalist variants. Explanation It is not uncommon for contemporary philosophers to see sentimentalism as a theory of moral judgment or facts. But classical sentimentalists clearly considered the primary question to be a moral psychological one: What feature of human natureâ€"reason, sentiment, or intuitionâ€"explains why we approve of something or blame someone? Since it is in this context of fundamentally explaining our moral judgments that they introduced some of their main arguments, it is good to start with these issues, even though they lie on the borderline of philosophy and what is now the empirical science of psychology. Anthony Ashley Cooper, better known by his title as the Earl of Shaftesbury, introduced the notion of a moral sense in his Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit. Such affections can, by reflection, become the object of a second-order affection: In a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection; but the very Actions themselves, and the Affections of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike. There is also a place for subordinate self-interested motives, since society suffers if individuals fail to preserve or defend themselves. To be virtuous, a creature must not only do the right things, but exercise its moral sense and act for the very reason that something is worthy and honest â€" His argument for the existence of a moral sense draws on his rejection of rationalism and intuitionism see Supplement on Anti-Rationalist Arguments. There are many more such senses than traditionally acknowledged. Since moral

ideas arise spontaneously, Hutcheson concludes we have a moral sense, a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of Actions, when they occur to observation, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them. On this picture, in contrast to Shaftesbury, the motive of morally praiseworthy actions is benevolence and not the thought that the action is obligatory or that it would be approve of by the moral sense itself. What is known as System 1 or the Intuitive System comprises of automatic, effortless, fast, often associative, parallel, affective, and modular processes. We are only conscious of their outputs, not the processes themselves. System 2 or the Reasoning System comprises of conscious, effortful, slow, memory-taxing, sometimes inferential, rational, and linear processes. Further, in some studies, people are easily dumbfounded when challenged on their moral views: He believes we are pre-programmed to respond to suffering with compassion, arrogance by subordinates with contempt, cheating with anger, and impurity with disgust, for example. But how can it be adaptive to risk the wrath of an aggressor in order to defend a victim that one sympathizes with, for example? Further, as discussed below, contemporary sentimentalists who follow Hume rather than Hutcheson argue that there is no need to assume that moral reactions are innate, and some reason to assume they are not even if our innate dispositions do play a role in explaining them. The story is at least incomplete. For more discussion, see the entry on Morality and Evolutionary Biology. Further, as a psychologist, Haidt offers no a priori arguments against the possibility of reason yielding moral verdicts. Indeed, Daniel Jacobson points out that the evidence that people lack reasons for their judgments is in fact very thin. This is relevant to the epistemic status of judgments based on emotion see Section 5. In contemporary use, the term is often used for a kind of concern for another. But Hume and Smith, in different ways, used it for sharing what another feels. The contemporary term for this kind of mechanism is empathy for the distinction between sympathy and empathy, see Darwall ; Sober and Wilson Following Hutcheson, Hume rejects reason or reasoning as the source of moral distinctions understood either as judgments or facts. Content sceptical arguments, in turn, aim to demonstrate that recognizably moral conclusions cannot be reached by reason alone, without sentiment-supported premises. These arguments are crucial for the case for sentimentalism. Contemporary sentimentalists have developed new versions of both arguments against Kantian counters. For a more thorough discussion, see Supplement on Anti-Rationalist Arguments. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of particular kind from the contemplation of a character. T Sometimes he says that approval consists of a form of love towards an agent on account of such pleasure. What kind of pleasure? T But why does contemplation of a character without reference to our own interest give us pleasure in the first place? How does sympathy work? For Hume, the mechanism is a kind of analogical association: When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. T Similar association operates on the causes of a passion. It is by this mechanism that the pleasures and pains of others are communicated for us, so that we are ourselves pleased in a special way when contemplating those durable character traits that reliably benefit and hence please others. Here is how Hume summarizes the view: When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleased with it, and approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and is itself a kind of pleasure. T This simple account needs refinement, however. Hume observes two ways in which our moral approval diverges from what causes sympathetic pleasure. First, what comes naturally to us is taking on the feelings of the near and the dear, those who are close to or similar to us and those we care about. Yet we regard a historical character renowned for being just with equal moral approval as someone with the same trait living today in our own town, for example. Hume remarks that this sort of correction for variability and distance is common to all the senses. As Geoffrey Sayre-McCord has argued, such a perspective is not one of an omniscient ideal observer, but rather a point of view we all could realistically occupy. Adam Smith presents a different theory about the nature and mechanisms of sympathy and consequently moral and evaluative approval. Approbation is the pleasant feeling that results from perceiving this coincidence TMS 56 note a. But [resentment and gratitude], as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with

them. Smith argues that reflection on our own motives requires that we distance ourselves from our agential standpoint and endeavour to view them â€¦ with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. TMS Our original motive for doing so is our desire for the approval of those we care about. TMS n We then judge ourselves and potentially guide our action by the imagined responses of an impartial and well-informed spectator. This empathy is a warm feeling. When we empathize with the agent, we come to share this warm feeling. And this empathetic warm feeling constitutes moral approval. In contrast, unempathetic actions manifest a coldness towards others. More precisely, differences in the strength of our empathic reactions or tendencies to react to various situations correspond pretty well to differences in the normative moral evaluations we tend to make about those situations. This, for Slote, basically accounts for the commonsense deontological distinction between the seriousness of the wrong of doing harm rather than allowing it to happen. Jesse Prinz notes that the view has difficulty with disapproval: Julia Driver points out that people such as autists, who are according to some views incapable of empathy can nevertheless morally approve or disapprove of things. Nor do all agents we disapprove of lack empathy. Even if these criticisms of Slote are justified, empathetic feelings may enter into the explanation of moral judgment more indirectly. Shaun Nichols shares the Humean ambition of explaining moral thought without assuming an innate moral capacity or sense. Instead, Nichols assumes that normal people have a generic capacity to be guided by norms or rules of various kinds, and certain non-moral emotional dispositions, such as the disposition to have an aversive response to suffering in others.

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Behavioral neuroscience[edit] After functional imaging â€" functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI in particularâ€"became popular roughly a decade ago, researchers have begun to study economic decision-making with this new technology. This allows researchers to investigate, on a neurological level, the role emotions play in decision-making. Developmental picture[edit] The ability to describe situations in which a social emotion will be experienced emerges at around age 7, [8] and, by adolescence, the experience of social emotion permeates everyday social exchange. While brain areas such as medial prefrontal cortex MPFC , superior temporal sulcus STS , temporal poles TP and precuneus bordering with posterior cingulate cortex are activated in both adults and adolescents when they reason about intentionality of others, the medial PFC is more activated in adolescents and the right STS more in adults. Comparing with adolescents, the left temporal pole has a stronger activity in adults when they read stories that elicit social emotions. Neuroeconomics To investigate the function of social emotions in economic behaviors, researchers are interested in the differences in brain regions involved when participants are playing with, or think that they are playing with, another person as opposed to a computer. This is an example of the way social decision making differs from other forms of decision making. In behavioral economics , a heavy criticism is that people do not always act in a fully rational way, as many economic models assume. One player, called the proposer, decides ratio by which the money gets divided. The other player, called the responder, decides whether or not to accept this offer. If the responder accepts the offer, say, y amount of money, then the proposer gets x-y amount and the responder gets y. But if the responder refuses to accept the offer, both players get nothing. This game is widely studied in behavioral economics. According to the rational agent model, the most rational way for the proposer to act is to make y as small as possible, and the most rational way for the responder to act is to accept the offer, since little amount of money is better than no money. When offers are unfair as opposed to fair, three regions of the brain are active: The insula is an area active in registering body discomfort. It is activated when people feel, among other things, social exclusion. Whether or not the offer gets rejected can be predicted with a correlation of 0. Research using PET scan has found that, when players punish other players, activity in the nucleus accumbens part of the striatum , a region known for processing rewards derived from actions [25] gets activated. Social or moral aspect[edit] Some social emotions are also referred to as moral emotions because of the fundamental role they play in morality. Pride, for instance, is a social emotion which involves the perceived admiration of other people, but research on the role it plays in moral behaviors yields problematic results.

Chapter 5 : Virtue Ethics: Morality and emotions

Some Emotions and a Moral has 1 rating and 1 review. Sem said: This is one of those stories in which a group of unlikeable people do nothing much at all.

She moved her delicate fingers across his medals clad chest as she bade him goodbye. Unsure if he would see her again, he planted a kiss on her forehead and turned abruptly towards the door. No bullets had him hit so hard as much as his daughters tears. Jitendra Patil Pic Source: As he drove away, she came running down the stairs two at a time. Her mouth crumpled like used wrapping paper. She gulped down her breakfast morosely, wore her shoes, picked up her school bag and started to walk out of the door, her shoulders slumped. As she climbed down the steps, the car glided to a stop outside the house. He got out of the car. She ran to him, her whole face lit up like a Christmas tree. Her jaw ached from smiling. Fifteen years later, no one would remember he was late for a meeting, but a little girl would never ever forget that her father drove all the way back home just to kiss her goodbye! Lesson For Everyone A son took his old father to a restaurant for an evening dinner. Others diners watched him in disgust while his son was calm. The son settled the bill and started walking out with his father. The Sweeter Apple A lovely little girl was holding two apples in her hands. The mom felt the smile on her face freeze. She tried hard not to reveal her disappointment. This is the sweeter one. The boy sensed there was something wrong because of the painful silence they shared between them that night. The girl then asked the boy to pull over because she wanted to talk. She told him that her feelings had changed and that it was time to move on. A silent tear slid down his cheek as he slowly reached out to his pocket and passed her a folded note. At that moment, a drunk driver was speeding down that very same street. He severed right into the car killing the boy. Miraculously, the girl survived. Remembering the note later, she unfolded it and read, Source: Let me know in the comments. If you enjoyed reading this post, you will love the ebook that comes for free when you subscribe to the blog. Go to the side bar, enter your details and get the two ebooks for free!

Chapter 6 : Some Emotions and a Moral and the Sinners Comedy

You have been overworking, said Golightly, and this morbidity is the result. All your life you have been zealously bottling your spirits, and now you complain because they are stale. You have always avoided sympathy, and yet you grumble because you are out of touch with the world.

Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response Jesse Prinz argues that the source of our moral inclinations is merely cultural. Suppose you have a moral disagreement with someone, for example, a disagreement about whether it is okay to live in a society where the amount of money you are born with is the primary determinant of how wealthy you will end up. In pursuing this debate, you assume that you are correct about the issue and that your conversation partner is mistaken. You conversation partner assumes that you are making the blunder. In other words, you both assume that only one of you can be correct. Relativists reject this assumption. They believe that conflicting moral beliefs can both be true. The stanch socialist and righteous royalist are equally right; they just occupy different moral worldviews. Relativism has been widely criticized. It is attacked as being sophomoric, pernicious, and even incoherent. Moral philosophers, theologians, and social scientists try to identify objective values so as to forestall the relativist menace. I think these efforts have failed. Moral relativism is a plausible doctrine, and it has important implications for how we conduct our lives, organize our societies, and deal with others. Cannibals and Child Brides Morals vary dramatically across time and place. Consider cannibalism, which has been practiced by groups in every part of the world. Or consider blood sports, such as those practiced in Roman amphitheaters, in which thousands of excited fans watched as human beings engaged in mortal combat. Killing for pleasure has also been documented among headhunting cultures, in which decapitation was sometimes pursued as a recreational activity. Many societies have also practiced extreme forms of public torture and execution, as was the case in Europe before the 18th century. And there are cultures that engage in painful forms of body modification, such as scarification, genital infibulation, or footbinding â€" a practice that lasted in China for 1, years and involved the deliberate and excruciating crippling of young girls. Variation in attitudes towards violence is paralleled by variation in attitudes towards sex and marriage. Arranged marriage is also common, and some cultures marry off girls while they are still pubescent or even younger. In parts of Ethiopia, half the girls are married before their 15th birthday. Of course, there are also cross-cultural similarities in morals. No group would last very long if it promoted gratuitous attacks on neighbors or discouraged childrearing. But within these broad constraints, almost anything is possible. Some groups prohibit attacks on the hut next door, but encourage attacks on the village next door. Some groups encourage parents to commit selective infanticide, to use corporal punishment on children, or force them into physical labor or sexual slavery. Such variation cries out for explanation. Objectivists reply in two different ways: Some objectivists say moral variation is greatly exaggerated â€" people really agree about values but have different factual beliefs or life circumstances that lead them to behave differently. For example, slave owners may have believed that their slaves were intellectually inferior, and Inuits who practiced infanticide may have been forced to do so because of resource scarcity in the tundra. But it is spectacularly implausible that all moral differences can be explained this way. For one thing, the alleged differences in factual beliefs and life circumstances rarely justify the behaviors in question. Would the inferiority of one group really justify enslaving them? Would life in the tundra justify infanticide? Differences in circumstances do not show that people share values; rather they help to explain why values end up being so different. Deny that variation matters. Scientific theory variation can be explained by inadequate observations or poor instruments; improvements in each lead towards convergence. When scientific errors are identified, corrections are made. By contrast, morals do not track differences in observation, and there also is no evidence for rational convergence as a result of moral conflicts. Indeed, slavery became more prevalent after the Enlightenment, when science improved. Even with our modern understanding of racial equality, Benjamin Skinner has shown that there are more people living in de facto slavery worldwide today than during the height of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. With morals, unlike science, there is no well-recognized standard that can be used to test, confirm, or correct when disagreements arise. Objectivists might reply that progress has

clearly been made. Here we are in danger of smugly supposing superiority. Each culture assumes it is in possession of the moral truth. From an outside perspective, our progress might be seen as a regress. Consider factory farming, environmental devastation, weapons of mass destruction, capitalistic exploitation, coercive globalization, urban ghettoization, and the practice of sending elderly relatives to nursing homes. Our way of life might look grotesque to many who have come before and many who will come after. Emotions and Inculcation Moral variation is best explained by assuming that morality, unlike science, is not based on reason or observation. What, then, is morality based on? To answer this, we need to consider how morals are learned. Children begin to learn values when they are very young, before they can reason effectively. Young children behave in ways that we would never accept in adults: Each of these methods causes the misbehaved child to experience a negative emotion and associate it with the punished behavior. Children also learn by emotional osmosis. They hear hours of judgmental gossip about inconsiderate neighbors, unethical coworkers, disloyal friends, and the black sheep in the family. Consummate imitators, children internalize the feelings expressed by their parents, and, when they are a bit older, their peers. Emotional conditioning and osmosis are not merely convenient tools for acquiring values: Parents sometimes try to reason with their children, but moral reasoning only works by drawing attention to values that the child has already internalized through emotional conditioning. No amount of reasoning can engender a moral value, because all values are, at bottom, emotional attitudes. Recent research in psychology supports this conjecture. It seems that we decide whether something is wrong by introspecting our feelings: For example, psychologist Simone Schnall and her colleagues found that exposure to fart spray, filth, and disgusting movies can cause people to make more severe moral judgments about unrelated phenomena. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt and colleagues have shown that people make moral judgments even when they cannot provide any justification for them. Our emotions confirm that such acts are wrong even if our usual justification for that conclusion harm to the victim is inapplicable. If morals are emotionally based, then people who lack strong emotions should be blind to the moral domain. This prediction is borne out by psychopaths, who, it turns out, suffer from profound emotional deficits. Psychologist James Blair has shown that psychopaths treat moral rules as mere conventions. This suggests that emotions are necessary for making moral judgments. The judgment that something is morally wrong is an emotional response. Morality involves specific emotions. In some cases, the moral emotions that get conditioned in childhood can be re-conditioned later in life. Someone who feels ashamed of a homosexual desire may subsequently feel ashamed about feeling ashamed. This person can be said to have an inculcated tendency to view homosexuality as immoral, but also a conviction that homosexuality is permissible, and the latter serves to curb the former over time. This is not to say that reasoning is irrelevant to morality. One can convince a person that homophobia is wrong by using the light of reason to draw analogies with other forms of discrimination, but this strategy can only work if the person has a negative sentiment towards bigotry. Likewise, through extensive reasoning, one might persuade someone that eating meat is wrong; but the only arguments that will work are ones that appeal to prior sentiments. It would be hopeless to argue vegetarianism with someone who does not shudder at the thought of killing an innocent, sentient being. As David Hume said, reason is always slave to the passions. If this picture is right, we have a set of emotionally conditioned basic values, and a capacity for reasoning, which allows us to extend these values to new cases. There are two important implications. One is that some moral debates have no resolution because the two sides have different basic values. This is often the case with liberals and conservatives. Research suggests that conservatives value some things that are less important to liberals, including hierarchical authority structures, self-reliance, in-group solidarity, and sexual purity. Debates about welfare, foreign policy, and sexual values get stymied because of these fundamental differences. The second implication is that we cannot change basic values by reason alone. Various events in adulthood might be capable of reshaping our inculcated sentiments, including trauma, brainwashing, and immersion in a new community we have an unconscious tendency towards social conformity. Reason can however be used to convince people that their basic values are in need of revision, because reason can reveal when values are inconsistent and self-destructive. An essay on moral relativism might even convince someone to give up some basic values, on the ground that they are socially inculcated. But reason alone cannot instill new values or settle which values we should have. Reason tells us

what is the case, not what ought to be. In summary, moral judgments are based on emotions, and reasoning normally contributes only by helping us extrapolate from our basic values to novel cases. Reasoning can also lead us to discover that our basic values are culturally inculcated, and that might impel us to search for alternative values, but reason alone cannot tell us which values to adopt, nor can it instill new values. God, Evolution, and Reason: Is There an Objective Moral Code? The hypothesis that moral judgments are emotionally based can explain why they vary across cultures and resist transformation through reasoning, but this is not enough to prove that moral relativism is true. An argument for relativism must also show that there is no basis for morality beyond the emotions with which we have been conditioned. The relativists must provide reasons for thinking objectivist theories of morality fail.

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What are the Desiderata? Two broad desiderata have governed the project of defining emotions in both philosophy and affective science: A definition that aims exclusively at a is a descriptive definition. A definition that aims at b at the cost of possibly violating some ordinary intuitions is prescriptive. Scientists have also been interested in the study of folk emotion concepts, and they have applied to them experimental techniques common in the psychology of concepts. There are better and worse examples of emotions as ordinarily understood e. What philosophers and affective scientists aim to offer are prescriptive definitions of emotions that preserve as much ordinary language compatibility as it is compatible with serving interest-dependent theoretical objectives. One reason why theoreticians are not merely interested in outlining the contours of folk emotion concepts through descriptive definitions is that they suspect that such concepts may include widely diverse items that are not amenable to any robust theoretical generalizations. At first blush, the things we ordinarily call emotions differ from one another along several dimensions. For example, some emotions are occurrences e. Some involve strong motivations to act e. Some are present across species e. This multi-dimensional heterogeneity has led some to conclude that folk emotion categories do not designate natural kinds, either with respect to the generic category of emotion Rorty b, ; Griffiths ; Russell ; Zachar ; Kagan , or with respect to specific emotion categories such as anger, fear, happiness, disgust, and so on Scarantino ; Barrett , Others have argued that there is, nevertheless, enough homogeneity among instances of folk emotion categories to allow them to qualify as natural kinds e. The concept of a natural kind is itself contentious and probably more suitable for discussing the categories affective scientists are interested in, so we will speak of theoretical kinds instead, understood as groupings of entities that participate in a body of philosophically or scientifically interesting generalizations due to some set of properties they have in common. Whether folk emotion categories are homogeneous enough to qualify as theoretical kinds has important methodological implications. To the extent that they are, the prescriptive definitions of emotions the theorist offers can achieve both theoretical fruitfulness and maximal compatibility with ordinary linguistic usage in such case, prescriptive definitions will also be descriptively adequate. To the extent that they are not homogeneous enough, prescriptive definitions will have to explicate folk emotion categories, transforming them so as to increase theoretical fruitfulness while giving up on some degree of ordinary language compatibility Carnap Theoretical fruitfulness, however, is conceived differently by philosophers and affective scientists. The former often have as their primary target making sense of the human experience of emotions and sometimes to contribute to other projects in philosophy, such as explaining the origins of rational action or moral judgment, or shedding light on what makes life worth living, or investigating the nature of self-knowledge. Affective scientists, by contrast, are more likely to favor a third-person approach that may be highly revisionary with respect to our first-person self-understanding. And their prescriptive definitions are often designed to promote measurement and experimentation for the purposes of prediction and explanation in a specific scientific discipline. In this entry, we will assess philosophical and scientific definitions of emotions in terms of both ordinary language compatibility and theoretical fruitfulness, but acknowledge that the field currently lacks clear guidelines for how to strike a proper balance between these two desiderata. Three Traditions in the Study of Emotions: At the same time, many of the things we call emotions today have been the object of theoretical analysis since Ancient Greece, under a variety of language-specific labels such as passion, sentiment, affection, affect, disturbance, movement, perturbation, upheaval, or appetite. This makes for a long and complicated history, which has progressively led to the development of a variety of shared insights about the nature and function of emotions, but no consensual definition of what emotions are, either in philosophy or in affective science. A widely shared insight is that emotions have components, and that such components are jointly instantiated in prototypical episodes of emotions. Consider an episode of intense fear

due to the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear on your path while hiking. At first blush, we can distinguish in the complex event that is fear an evaluative component e. One question that has divided emotion theorists is: Which subset of the evaluative, physiological, phenomenological, expressive, behavioral, and mental components is essential to emotion? Although such theories differ on multiple dimensions, they can be usefully sorted into three broad traditions, which we call the Feeling Tradition, the Evaluative Tradition and the Motivational Tradition Scarantino The Feeling Tradition takes the way emotions feel to be their most essential characteristic, and defines emotions as distinctive conscious experiences. The Evaluative Tradition regards the way emotions construe the world as primary, and defines emotions as being or involving distinctive evaluations of the eliciting circumstances. The Motivational Tradition defines emotions as distinctive motivational states. Each tradition faces the task of articulating a prescriptive definition of emotions that is theoretically fruitful and compatible at least to some degree with ordinary linguistic usage. And although there are discipline-specific theoretical objectives, there also is a core set of explanatory challenges that tends to be shared across disciplines: How are emotions different from one another, and from things that are not emotions? Do emotions motivate behavior, and if so how? Do emotions have object-directedness, and if so can they be appropriate or inappropriate to their objects? Do emotions always involve subjective experiences, and if so of what kind? For example, a viable account of anger should tell us how anger differs from fear and from non-emotional states differentiation , whether and how anger motivates aggressive behaviors motivation , whether and how anger can be about a given state of affairs and be considered appropriate with respect to such state of affairs intentionality , and whether and how anger involves a distinctive subjective experience phenomenology. We now consider some of the most prominent theories within each tradition, and assess how they fare with respect to these four theoretical challenges and others. As we shall see, each tradition seems to capture something important about what the emotions are, but none is immune from counterexamples and problem cases. As a result, the most recent trend in emotion theory is represented by theories that straddle traditions, in an attempt to combine their distinctive insights. Although we begin our investigation with William James and will occasionally mention earlier accounts, our primary focus will be on theories developed in the last 50 years. The Early Feeling Tradition: The idea that emotions are a specific kind of subjective experiences has dominated emotion theory roughly from Ancient Greece to the beginning of the twentieth century. This idea can be interpreted in either of two ways. The great classical philosophersâ€"Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Lockeâ€"all understood emotions to involve feelings understood as primitives without component parts. When we perceive that we are in danger, for example, this perception directly sets off a collection of bodily responses, and our awareness of these responses is what constitutes fear. This approach has acquired new prominence in recent times with the affirmation of the psychological constructionist movement in affective science section 8. But the James-Lange theory seemed less successful with respect to the challenges of motivation, differentiation and intentionality. First, James stated that common sense is wrong about the direction of causation concerning emotions and bodily changes: How could they be so important, critics like Dewey , asked, if they have no causal import with respect to actions? Furthermore, the theory lacked an adequate account of the differences between emotions. This objection was influentially voiced by Walter Cannon According to a common interpretation of the James-Lange theory, what distinguishes emotions from one another is the fact that each involves the perception of a distinctive set of bodily changes. Cannon countered that the visceral reactions characteristic of distinct emotions such as fear and anger are indistinguishable, and so these reactions cannot be what allows us to tell emotions apart. Subsequent research has not fully settled whether emotions do, in fact, have significantly different bodily profiles, either at the autonomic, expressive or neural level for the latest on bodily signatures, see Clark-Polner et al. Independently of how the empirical debate on bodily signatures is settled, brain or bodily changes and the feelings accompanying these changes can get us only part way towards an adequate taxonomy. Emotions, however, are capable of being not only explained, but also justified. The first distinction we need to draw is the one between particular objects and formal objects of emotions. As Kenny first emphasized, any X that I can have emotion E about is a particular object of E, whereas the formal object of E is the property which I implicitly ascribe to X by virtue of having E about X. Particular and formal

objects constitute the two principal aspects of emotional intentionality: The second distinction we wish to draw is that between two types of particular objects of emotions: The target object of an emotion is the specific entity the emotion is about. For example, love can be about Mary, or about Bangkok, or about Homer Simpson and so on. These are all possible targets of love, and they may be real or imaginary. Not every emotion has a target. I may be angry that my life has turned out a certain way, without there being any particular entityâ€"myself or anyone elseâ€"at which my anger is directed. Propositional objects capture facts or states of affairs, real or imagined, towards which my emotion is directed. Conversely, not all emotions have a propositional object. For example, if Mary is the target of my love, there may be no proposition, however complex, that captures what it is that I love about Mary Kraut ; Rorty []. Finally, there also appear to be affective states that lack both types of particular objects: For example, I can be depressed or elated but not depressed or elated about any specific target or fact. These seemingly objectless affective states share many properties with object-directed emotions, especially with respect to their physiological and motivational aspects, so we may consider them to be emotions without objects. On the other hand, some have suggested that such objectless states are better regarded as moods Frijda ; Stephan a. Whether we think of seemingly objectless affective states as emotions or moods, we must decide what kinds of objects they lack. Here two main options are available. The first is to assert that some affective states have neither particular objects nor formal objects. If we think of moods and objectless emotions that way, it becomes hard to explain how such affective states may have conditions of correctnessâ€"formal objects being among other things descriptions of what the world must be like for the affective state to be fitting Teroni If instead we think of such affective states as having formal objects and conditions of correctness, then their objectlessness is only apparent, because they need to have targets or propositional objects of some kind to which they implicitly ascribe the property defined by the formal object. What are the formal objects of specific emotions? This is a controversial topic, because the ascription of formal objects commits one to the claim that each emotion, on conceptual grounds, ascribes a specific property to its particular object. Once the formal object of an emotion has been clarified, we can use it to justify emotions by citing their conditions of elicitation. The Early Evaluative Tradition in Philosophy: Emotions as Judgments Evaluative theories of emotions, a. A key distinction is that between constitutive and causal evaluative theories. Constitutive theories state that emotions are cognitions or evaluations of particular kinds, whereas causal theories state that emotions are caused by cognitions or evaluations of particular kinds. The constitutive approach tends to be dominant in philosophy, while the causal approach enjoys significant support in psychology. Let us consider these two strands of cognitivism in turn. The emergence of the constitutive approach in philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century can be traced to a pair of articles by C. These authors were not the first to emphasize that emotions are object-directed or endowed with intentionalityâ€"Brentano [] had already done so with inspiration from various medieval authors King But these mid-twentieth century philosophers were the first to articulate an influential argument to the effect that, in order to account for their intentionality, emotions must be cognitive evaluations of some kind rather than feelings see also Meinong The argument goes roughly like this. If emotions have intentionality, it follows that there are internal standards of appropriateness according to which an emotion is appropriate just in case its formal object is instantiated Kenny But feelings are not the kinds of things that can enter into conceptual relations with formal objects. What kinds of cognitive evaluations?

Chapter 8 : 5 Emotional Short Stories That Will Make You Cry Insantly

Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior. This chapter reviews current theory and research on moral emotions.

The truth of the matter is that there is really nothing trustworthy about me. The one thing certain seems to be this—in some way or other I must find amusement. When I reached home I thought better of it, and I wrote as I did. In the circumstances I think that was rather decent—for me. I was afraid you might take me too seriously—again. An unnecessary fear, no doubt; but give me the credit of trying to put things right. It is not often that I want to do even that. Cynthia was sitting in an armchair; Provence was standing by the fireplace. He looked pale and careworn—Cynthia smiling and ironical. If you did not speak the truth at the Museum, the whole world is a lie. But there is a difference between liking and loving. I have no love to give, and I am not worth loving. Believe me; do believe me. That is why I think it will be so much happier, for both of us, never to see each other again. Your life is full of many things—first of all, your work. Love that, it will repay you better than loving me. As for my life, that will pass pleasantly enough. I have got what I always wanted—money. I would have loved you, only I loved money more. It was my first love, and I have been faithful to it. You can say I have been faithful to one love. She held it up to the light and it curled round her finger. I call that a rather pretty omen. Agatha was quite right. I shall find it gayer abroad. When Lady Theodosia came in a few moments later, she found Cynthia standing cold and passive where Provence had left her—by the fireplace. As her aunt entered she looked at the clock. This note had evidently been written under considerable agitation, and entreated him to call that day. The tippling friend, whose name was Collingwood, received him. I want to talk to you about Golightly. You must see that yourself. I go by symptoms. If he comes to grief, I shall lose my faith in human nature. He told me I should probably know quite soon enough. He said this much, that her husband was a brick. I consider that a bad sign—his calling the husband a brick. It proves conclusively the Potiphar theory. My wife has a great deal of tact, and he is very fond of her. I wonder if she could help us. But I always forget that fellows have got wives. And let me tell you this—Golightly thinks a lot of you. When he reached home it was past eleven, but Grace was reading in the drawing-room. She was dressed in a lace tea-gown, and he thought she was looking even pretty: He was filled with remorse to think that the shadow of his lonely, monotonous life had fallen on so light and airy a being. I have had one or two things to bother me to-day. From all I hear from Collingwood, he has got into some entanglement with a married woman. Of course, I can be sure of one thing. Even if it comes to the worst, George would have to persuade himself that he was doing the right thing. I would stake my life on that. I wish I could find out who the woman is. Things may not be so bad as they seem. Can you think of any one? I ought not to have told you when you were so tired. He used to be very frank and boyish in his manner; now he seems cold and reserved. Sometimes I have fancied he wanted to avoid me What a dull, sad business life is," he added, wearily; "it is not until everything has gone wrong that we see how easily it might all have been right. And always ourselves to blame, never any one else—only ourselves. At half-past one he was roused by a furious knocking at the hall-door. When he opened it Collingwood rushed in, pale, stricken, and breathless. He has shot himself. Grace had seen Collingwood drive up, and had crept to the top of the stairs to hear what was said. When the first shock of his news had passed she came slowly down the staircase, with one trembling hand on the railings, with the other clutching vainly at the wall. She burst into hysterical tears. For the first time she turned towards Godfrey. I—" never had strong nerves.

Chapter 9 : Moral Sentimentalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Some Emotions and a Moral and the Sinners Comedy from the manufacturer. Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos.

Contributor How We Make Moral Decisions The concept of humans as rational beings whose actions are driven primarily by logic and reason needs to go -- our cognitive resources are more limited than we think, and we take shortcuts through reasoning more often than we know. In your arms is your infant child, who is about to cry. Do you hold your hand over his mouth, smothering him but saving everyone you are with, or do you let him cry, knowing that doing so will result in the death of not only the baby, but everyone in the basement? Dilemmas like this, beloved of philosophers and psychologists who work on moral decision-making, may be far-fetched, but they illustrate important discrepancies between our immediate reactions and logical reasoning that we often find difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. While ethics has a long history in philosophy, recent research in psychology has brought a new perspective to issues of moral behaviour and decision-making. Hume observed that moral judgments were not derived from reason, but from moral sentiments. In a similar line, SIM proposes that emotional intuitions drive the moral judgments we make, while rationales and justifications are generated post hoc. One interesting consequence of this is that unrelated emotions can influence our moral judgments, often without our conscious awareness. For example, feelings of disgust induced by unpleasant smells have been shown to lead to more severe moral judgments. A slightly different theory suggests that reason plays a bigger role in our moral decisions -- but still not as big as proponents of human rationality would like to believe. These systems are linked to consequentialist and deontological ethics, respectively -- take the infamous trolley problem, where we face the choice of whether or not to push one man off a bridge to stop a trolley which otherwise would kill five people in its path. Our immediate, emotional reaction against pushing the man to his death is deontological; it follows the rule that killing, no matter the circumstances, is wrong. The rational, consequentialist choice is to push the one man to save the five. But not all moral stimuli produce instinctive emotional responses -- Greene distinguishes between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. The classic trolley problem is personal, but with a slight variation, sometimes called the "switch dilemma," it can become impersonal: Imagine you are deciding whether or not to flip a switch to divert the trolley from a track on which it will kill five men to a track where it will kill one. For many people, flipping a switch seems more acceptable than pushing a man, even if both actions have the same outcome. Splitting ideas on morality into dualities is not an invention of modern psychology, but a tradition that extends far into the history of philosophy. The dividing lines between deontologists, who focus on the rightness or wrongness of actions themselves, and consequentialists, who focus on the consequences of those actions, go beyond ethics to yet older divides between reason and emotion. Psychologists are now testing the ideas of philosophers, and are beginning to uncover the role of emotions in moral decision making and the form of their interaction with reason. Rather than consistently taking one moral stance, most of us are greatly influenced by contextual factors like how personal a moral dilemma is, how difficult it is, and even by unrelated emotions. We have an intuitive response that killing is wrong because, at least in most cases, it is. Antonio Damasio illustrates this when he draws upon evidence from patients with frontal lobe damage to support his somatic marker hypothesis , the idea that physiological sensations like our "gut feelings" and the emotions they evoke can influence our decision-making behaviours. Our intuitions and heuristics are not random; they exist because they are generally useful -- that is, precisely because they direct us towards behaviours that are typically reasonable. The concept of humans as rational beings whose actions are driven primarily by logic and reason needs to go -- our cognitive resources are more limited than we think, and we take shortcuts through reasoning more often than we know. As research makes us more aware of the processes underlying our moral decision-making, the question we should ask ourselves is not whether we should be deontologists or consequentialists, but how we can be more cognizant of the factors that are influencing our decision making process. Despite hearing the trolley problem countless times, choosing an answer is still

difficult -- and justifying the inconsistent decisions many of us make in personal versus impersonal dilemmas is even more difficult. We may be closer to getting answers on how moral judgments are made, but whether there are right or wrong answers, and what those answers are, remains a question outside the realm of science.