

## Chapter 1 : The Sources of Military Doctrine : Barry R. Posen :

*Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security.*

Print Print What is Army Doctrine? The first step in learning doctrine should be understanding what it is. The manual that replaced it includes only two paragraphs on the role of doctrine and the remainder of the material was moved to a new 64 page Doctrine Primer ADP that greatly expands the topic. The remainder of this article relies heavily on the short but detailed definition of the role and components of doctrine in the FM As a military term, Army doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. But doctrine is more than just principles. It is a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as part of a joint force and a statement of how the Army intends to fight. It establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that Army leaders use to solve military problems. It is supposed to focus on how to thinkâ€”not what to think. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well. A quote attributed to Marine General Jim Mattis is illustrative of this view: This again is a misunderstanding of what doctrine actually consist of. According to the old FM , doctrine consists of a fundamental principles, b tactics, techniques, and procedures, and c terms and symbols. First and foremost, doctrine provides fundamental principles. They are principles that have been learned through battles and wars that have been successful under many conditions such as the principles of fire and maneuver or the principles of joint operations. Importantly, doctrine is not always prescriptive, but it is authoritative and a starting point in addressing new problems. Principles are not supposed to be checklists or constraining sets of rules. They are meant to foster the initiative needed for soldiers to be adaptive, creative problem solvers. They provide a basis for incorporating new ideas, technologies, and organizational designs. Secondly, doctrine consists of tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs. They support and implement fundamental principles, linking them with associated applications. Tactics are the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Techniques are non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. They are the primary means of conveying the lessons learned that units gain in operations. Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. They normally consist of a series of steps in a set order. Procedures are prescriptive; regardless of circumstances, they are executed in the same manner. They are often based on equipment and are specific to particular types of units. Finally, doctrine provides a common language for military professionals to communicate with one another. This is particularly important under fire when information must be quickly and accurately transferredâ€”and universally understood. When a mission is given to destroy, clear, or secure an objective there will should be shared understanding by all on the task to be completed. And yes, doctrine includes our love of acronyms so that we can transfer a lot of information quickly. Military symbols are our way of providing common graphical understanding of a myriad of information and provide another way to quickly transfer information. Establishing and using words and symbols with common military meanings enhances communication. It makes a common understanding of doctrine possible. Doctrine provides the ability to take a sketch like the figure below to transfer a massive amount of information. It enables soldiers to quickly identify the units involved, the main effort, all the missions, the exact tasks to be completed and much more. Sample course of action sketch, FM The importance of this common language cannot be overstated. It allows people from completely different backgrounds social, regional, commissioning sources, etc. It enables the Army to communicate quickly even when there is a language barrier such as military international, multinational, non-government partnerships. It provides the lessons from generations of soldiers learned during hard fought battles, campaigns, and wars. Challenge the naysayers who might think they are smart enough to win the next war on the basis of their experience alone. Encourage all to take advantage of the tools doctrine provides our force. An infantryman for the past 23 years, he has held the ranks of private to sergeant first class, and lieutenant to major while serving in ranger, airborne, light, and mechanized infantry units. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.

### Chapter 2 : Military doctrine of Russia - Wikipedia

*The Sources of Military Doctrine Book Description: Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security.*

Posen draws heavily on "Balance of Power" and organizational theories on how military doctrine is created and implemented. Using these theories, Mr. Although I am not fond of balance of power theories, it is hard to deny Mr. This book could also stand a little update since it was first written in the mids. Though I doubt Mr. Although this book has a lot of political scientist jargon, it is still a fine book that I highly recommend to anyone interested in the theories behind military doctrines and strategies. His goal is very ambitious. He aims to analyze the relative explanatory value of organizational theory as compared to balance of power theory by analyzing the development of military doctrine in interwar France, Britain, and Germany. Insofar as each theory has its own predictions to make regarding each of these three areas, he intends to compare the actual state of affairs in each to the theorized state of affairs and, to the extent that one or the other balance of power of organizational is a more accurate predictor, make a judgement regarding its relative value as a predictive theory. If this were merely ambitious, it would simply be a very long book. Unfortunately, the undertaking is not so straightforward as it might seem. First of all, in some cases the theories predict similar if not completely overlapping policies. For instance, while organizational theory ostensibly predicts a military to prefer an offensive doctrine, certain circumstances in balance of power theory do as well, leaving the author and the reader to make extremely subjective judgement regarding which is "more" correct. Even a single theory can have more than one predicted result "Organization theory offers contradictory predictions for the attitudes of the French Army toward offense and defense. Additionally, and similarly, many of the observations regarding causal relationships are extremely subjective and, as admitted by the author, easily traced to more than one source. While this is an obvious truth in both cases, its connection to and impact on either organization theory or balance of power theory or both is lacking. Perhaps neither theory is responsible for the policies - perhaps a blind adherence to specific experiences is. The author admits as much in the final paragraph of the France chapter, but insists that though readers may "suggest that the two theories capture causal forces of equal power," the following chapters on Britain and Germany would be much more definitive. The final sentence in the chapter on France reads, "In comparative perspective, balance of power theory [in the Britain and Germany chapters] appears more decisive than it does in the admittedly complicated and murky case of French interwar doctrine. To the extent that Posen suggests that the forces of balance of power theory are more powerful or explanatory than those of organizational theory, it comes as kind of a "duh" realization. One might expect the prospect of World War and the desire to balance power in order to counter threats to rather easily break through whatever institutional or organizational mores might otherwise guide doctrine. Though he sets out to compare the relative explanatory power of each theory, he ends up using each where it appears to fit best. While they are interesting insights, they feel too subjective and qualified to say much concretely about the relative value of one theory over the other. I was left with the distinct impression and Posen appears to agree that both theories are necessary to satisfactorily explain any of the doctrines. I may have been more satisfied had he just come right out and said it. A must-read book for any studies on military doctrines.

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*The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars / Edition 1 Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security.*

You can help by adding to it. Ferdinand Foch , as an instructor, argued against the concept of a commander moving units without informing subordinates of his intentions. In doing so, a common doctrine served as a point of training. We have then, a doctrine. All the brains have been limbered up and regard all questions from an identical point of view. The fundamental idea of the problem being known, each one will solve the problem in his own fashion, and these thousand fashions, we may very well be sure, will act to direct all their efforts to a common objective. Mission-type tactics German military doctrine incorporates the concept of Auftragstaktik Mission-type tactics , which can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In the case of an attack, the holding formations would contain the enemy and strike formations would counter-attack to neutralize enemy forces. In the case of an Indian attack, the holding formations would pin enemy forces down whilst the strike formations attack at a point of Indian choosing. A leaked US diplomatic cable disclosed that it was intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a hour period during a crisis. To compensate, it relies on deterrence , including through a presumed nuclear weapons arsenal. It tries to overcome its quantitative disadvantage by staying qualitatively superior. If [the Arabs] attack us as they did this time, we shall transfer the war to the gates of their country. We do not intend to conduct The basic philosophy of Israel was not to initiate war, unless an act of war was carried out against us. Military doctrine of Russia The Soviet meaning of military doctrine was very different from U. Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Grechko defined it in as "a system of views on the nature of war and methods of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and army for war, officially adopted in a given state and its armed forces. However, the political side of Soviet military doctrine, Western commentators Harriet F Scott and William Scott said, "best explained Soviet moves in the international arena". It emphasizes the initiation of military hostilities at a time, date, and location of its choosing on terms of its choosing and the extensive preparation of the battlespace for operations. The Soviet response to problems of nuclear strategy began with classified publications. NATO underpins the defence of the UK and its Allies, while also providing deployable expeditionary capabilities to support and defend UK interests further afield. They required each arm and service to produce their own specific publications to give effect to FSR. After the Second World War FSR were replaced by various series of manuals, again with specific training pamphlets for each arm and service. These deal with operational and tactical matters. The current capstone publication for the army is Army Doctrine Publication Operations alongside maritime and air-power equivalents and joint warfare publications all under the umbrella of BDD. The four layers constituting "land doctrine" are summarised as: BDD is divided into two parts: Defence Context deals with two matters. First, the relationship between Defence policy and military strategy, and "while highlighting the utility of force " emphasizes the importance of addressing security issues through a comprehensive, rather than an exclusively military, approach. Second it expounds the Nature of and the Principles of War , the three Levels of Warfare Strategic, Operational and Tactical and its evolving character. The part deals with three matters. First it describes the likely employment of the British Armed Forces in pursuit of Defence policy aims and objectives. Next it explains the three components of fighting power conceptual, physical and moral components and the criticality of the operating context to its effective application. Finally it describes the British approach to the conduct of military operations "the British way of war". This includes mission command, the manoeuvrist approach and a warfighting ethos that requires accepting risks. Title 10 of the United States Code states what Congress expects the Army, in conjunction with the other Services, to

accomplish. Preserve the peace and security and provide for the defense of the United States, its territories and possessions, and any areas it occupies; Support national policies; Implement national objectives; Overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. Key concepts[ edit ] Most modern US doctrine is based around the concept of full spectrum operations, which combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint or combined force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They employ synchronized actionâ€”lethal and nonlethalâ€”proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment. Offensive operations defeat and destroy enemy forces, and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted abroad to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Civil support operations are support tasks and missions to homeland civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. This includes operations dealing with the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the homeland. Under President Lyndon Johnson it was stated that the US armed forces should be able to fight two â€”at one point, two-and-a-halfâ€”wars at the same time. This was defined to mean a war in Europe against the Soviet Union, a war in Asia against China or North Korea, and a "half-war" as wellâ€”in other words, a "small" war in the Third World. When Richard Nixon took office in , he altered the formula to state that the United States should be able to fight one-and-a-half wars simultaneously. This doctrine remained in place until â€”90, when President George H. In , President Bill Clinton ordered a "Bottom-Up Review," based on which a strategy called "win-hold-win" was declaredâ€”enough forces to win one war while holding off the enemy in another conflict, then moving on to win it after the first war is over. The final draft was changed to read that the United States must be able to win two "major regional conflicts" simultaneously. The first 1 refers to defending the US homeland. The 4 refers to deterring hostilities in four key regions of the world. The 2 means the US armed forces must have the strength to win swiftly in two near-simultaneous conflicts in those regions. The final 1 means that the US forces must win one of those conflicts "decisively". The general policy objectives are to 1 assure allies and friends; 2 dissuade future military competition, 3 deter threats and coercion against U. Currently the basic Air Force doctrinal documents are the series of Air Force publications. Currently the basic unclassified naval doctrinal documents are Naval Doctrine Publications 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. According to it, any citizen who resists an aggressor is a member of the armed forces, thus the whole population could be turned into a monolithic resistance army. Starting from the elementary school education, over high schools , universities , organizations and companies, the authorities prepared the entire population to contest an eventual occupation of the country and finally to liberate it. For this purpose, the Territorial Defense Forces TO would be formed to mobilize the population in case of an aggression. The combat readiness of the TO meant that the steps of organization and training could be bypassed after the start of hostilities. Large numbers of armed civilians would increase the cost of an invasion to a potential aggressor. In such a situation, Yugoslavia would remain non-aligned, and it would not accept foreign troops of either alliance on its territory. The doctrine recognized the likelihood that one side or the other might try to seize Yugoslav territory as a forward staging area , to ensure lines of communication or simply to deny the territory to enemy forces. Such action would be considered aggression and would be resisted. They had able-bodied civilian males and females. Between 1 and 3 million Yugoslavs between the ages of 15 and 65 would fight under TO command as irregular or guerrilla forces in wartime. In peacetime, however, about , TO troops were involved in military training and other activities. The TO concept focused on small, lightly armed infantry units fighting defensive actions on a familiar local terrain. A typical unit was a company -sized detachment. More than communes, factories, and other enterprises organized such units, which would fight in their home areas, maintaining local defense production essential to the overall war effort. The TO also included some larger, more heavily equipped units with wider operational responsibilities. The TO battalions and regiments operated in regional areas with artillery and antiaircraft guns and some armoured vehicles. Using their mobility and tactical initiative, these

units would attempt to alleviate the pressure of enemy armored columns and air strikes on smaller TO units. In the coastal regions, TO units had naval missions. They operated some gunboats in support of navy operations. They were organized to defend strategic coastal areas and naval facilities against enemy amphibious landings and raids. They also trained some divers for use in sabotage and other special operations. The TO was helped by the fact that most of its citizen- soldiers were one-time JNA conscripts who had completed their term of compulsory military service. Other sources of TO manpower lacked prior military service and required extensive basic training. The TO organisation was highly decentralized and independent. TO units were organized and funded by the governments in each of the Yugoslav constituent republics:

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*Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine / military doctrine decides what means to employ and how to employ them - prioritization and structure 13 / mil ops are offensive to disarm, defensive to deny, or deterrent to punish 14 / realist 16 / "true deterrent doctrines, when backed up by an appropriate force posture, should limit the.*

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Snyder ignores the overwhelming context of culture in shaping national behavior. National behavior, or ethos, creates its own imperatives, its own reality, as well as the limits and the possibilities of individual and institutional action. This is true as much for military institutions and their strategic plans as it is for political groups, economic concerns, and social constituencies. Variation between national cultures leads to variations in the style and substance of strategic plans. The incremental spirit of the age, a *Zeitgeist* unconsciously informed by a changing collective vision of national-tribal history, leads to an evolution of national ethos. Military institutions will of course reflect corporate bias, but group bias in national society is subsumed by an overriding cultural milieu. Variations in national ethos created distinct and variant war plans among the European powers of the 19th century. There was no robotic institutional mechanism directing these plans toward "offensive" war. War was an extension of national mission, and war plans reflected not only national goals, but national values. Strategies, like industry or art, expressed different cultural identities. The manner in which nations prosecuted war in should be examined in the context, time, place, and thought of its own world. Snyder is seeking lessons for our own time, however, and the actions of another age must be made to fit his commentary. This personal imperative can be detected in his use of the slogan "offensive doctrine" or "offensive war. How satisfying to imbue the general staffs of the great powers of the 19th century with an irrational obsession with "the offensive," an ingrained "motivated bias" that triggered a horrible, debilitating war which might have been avoided had certain rational hedges against such bias been implanted in time. How similar will be our fate unless we soon awake. *The Sources of Military Doctrine*. Cornell University Press, Barry Posen is also a political scientist, writing a study on military doctrine published in the same year as Mr. Snyder's. A similar cautionary tale unfolds. Snyder, is concerned neither for what happened in history nor why, in either a temporal or cultural context. In fact, he all but states that theories not merely explain national behavior, they are in themselves the basis for behavior. People do not make decisions; theories do. The planners of military institutions, whether the RAF Bomber Command or the German General Staff, act according to the iron rules of "Organization Theory. The only tension for Mr. Posen in the source and resolution of historical action is in the relative weight of influence assigned to each model. Worse than his manipulation of human decision making is his reduction of human behavior to a litany of sterile absolutes. Military institutions "prefer offense," "oppose innovation," and "attempt to go their own way. Snyder, fortunately has a higher calling. His metamorphosis of another world, a part of our world, is not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

## Chapter 5 : The Sources of Military Doctrine | | Publications | MIT Security Studies Program (SSP)

*Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy—that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive.*

Edit The United States Constitution invests Congress with the powers to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States and to raise and support armies. Title 10 of the United States Code states what Congress expects the Army, in conjunction with the other Services, to accomplish. Preserve the peace and security and provide for the defense of the United States, its territories and possessions, and any areas it occupies; Support national policies; Implement national objective; Overcome any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. Key concepts Edit Most modern US doctrine is based around the concept of full spectrum operations, which combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint or combined force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment. Offensive operations defeat and destroy enemy forces, and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted abroad to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Civil support operations are support tasks and missions to homeland civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. This includes operations dealing with the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the homeland. Under President Lyndon Johnson it was stated that the US armed forces should be able to fight two—at one point, two-and-a-half—wars at the same time. This was defined to mean a war in Europe against the Soviet Union, a war in Asia against China or North Korea, and a "half-war" as well—in other words, a "small" war in the Third World. When Richard Nixon took office in , he altered the formula to state that the United States should be able to fight one-and-a-half wars simultaneously. This doctrine remained in place until , when President George H. In , President Bill Clinton ordered a "Bottom-Up Review," based on which a strategy called "win-hold-win" was declared —enough forces to win one war while holding off the enemy in another conflict, then moving on to win it after the first war is over. The final draft was changed to read that the United States must be able to win two "major regional conflicts" simultaneously. The first 1 refers to defending the US homeland. The 4 refers to deterring hostilities in four key regions of the world. The 2 means the US armed forces must have the strength to win swiftly in two near-simultaneous conflicts in those regions. The final 1 means that the US forces must win one of those conflicts "decisively". The general policy objectives are to 1 assure allies and friends; 2 dissuade future military competition, 3 deter threats and coercion against U. Currently the basic Air Force doctrinal documents are the series of Air Force publications. Currently the basic unclassified naval doctrinal documents are Naval Doctrine Publications 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. According to it, any citizen who resists an aggressor is a member of the armed forces, thus the whole population could be turned into a monolithic resistance army. Starting from the elementary school education, over high schools , universities , organizations and companies, the authorities prepared the entire population to contest an eventual occupation of the country and finally to liberate it. For this purpose, the Territorial Defense Forces TO would be formed to mobilize the population in case of an aggression. The combat readiness of the TO meant that the steps of organization and training could be bypassed after the start of hostilities. The TO would supplement the regular JNA , giving it greater defensive depth and an armed local population ready to support combat actions. Large numbers of armed civilians would increase the cost of an invasion to a potential aggressor. In such a situation, Yugoslavia would remain non-aligned, and it would not accept foreign troops of either alliance on its territory. The doctrine did recognize the likelihood that one side or the other might try to seize

Yugoslav territory as a forward staging area, to ensure lines of communication, or simply to deny the territory to enemy forces. Such action would be considered aggression and would be resisted. The TO forces consisted of able-bodied civilian males and females. Between 1 and 3 million Yugoslavs between the ages of 15 and 65 would fight under TO command as irregular or guerrilla forces in wartime. In peacetime, however, about , TO troops were involved in military training and other activities. The TO concept focused on small, lightly armed infantry units fighting defensive actions on a familiar local terrain. A typical unit was a company -sized detachment. More than communes, factories, and other enterprises organized such units, which would fight in their home areas, maintaining local defense production essential to the overall war effort. The TO also included some larger, more heavily equipped units with wider operational responsibilities. The TO battalions and regiments operated in regional areas with artillery and anti-aircraft guns and some armoured vehicles. Using their mobility and tactical initiative, these units would attempt to alleviate the pressure of enemy armored columns and air strikes on smaller TO units. In the coastal regions, TO units had naval missions. They operated some gunboats in support of navy operations. They were organized to defend strategic coastal areas and naval facilities against enemy amphibious landings and raids. They also trained some divers for use in sabotage and other special operations. The TO was helped by the fact that most of its citizen- soldiers were one-time JNA conscripts who had completed their term of compulsory military service. But TO recruitment was somewhat limited by the JNA desire to include as many recently released conscripts as possible in its own military reserve. Other sources of TO manpower lacked prior military service and required extensive basic training. The TO organisation was highly decentralized and independent. TO units were organized and funded by the governments in each of the Yugoslav constituent republics:

*Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.. It is a guide to action, rather than hard and fast rules.*

Central Proposition “ civilian intervention in military affairs is a key determinant of integration and innovation. Balance of power theory can help explain the causes of such intervention. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies. In times of threat we should see greater accommodation of doctrine to the international system” integration should be more pronounced, innovation more likely. Preface 7 “ Within grand strategy, military doctrine sets priorities among various military forces and prescribes how those forces should be structured and employed to achieve the ends in view. That did not result in less spending 21 “ When states hold offensive doctrines, and know that their adversaries do as well, there is good reason for them to fear that a decision will be reached early in a war. Ideally, the military means chosen by states seeking to change that status quo will appear so effective that those states threatened would rather accommodate than fight. Close inspection may show that no innovation is required, but this should never be assumed. A war during such a period of transition can be very dangerous. Decisions made long before the war will determine some operational possibilities during the war. Military doctrine is a key component of grand strategy. Chapter 2 “ Explaining Military Doctrine 36 “ In spite of real differences of substance, the behaviors of a great diversity of states in a wide range of historical circumstances seem to exhibit important underlying similarities. Melian dialogue 38 “ In explaining international outcomes, balance of power theorists have stressed the influence of the system; organization theorists the state and its constituents parts. In violent disputes two factors determine outcomes: Organization theory also predicts that these organizations will deliberately try to escape civilian control in the pursuit of their own interests. This should be true because organizations abhor uncertainty “ it should also be true because military organizations are very hierarchical, restricting the flow of ideas from the lower levels to the higher levels. The civilians were prime movers in the development of a defensive military innovation in the face of an offensively inclined and inertial service. Balance of power theory, on the other hand, goes a long way to explain the peculiarities of British military doctrine and the air defense innovation. These purposes were best served by leaving the border unfortified, thus inducing the Germans to invade through Belgium. At the same time, however, they are often willing to understate or overstate its impact to suit organizational interests, policy preferences, or constraints and incentives presented by the distribution of power in the international system. Such states are thrown back upon their own military resources, with unpredictable consequences. Military doctrines are important because they affect the quality of life in the international political system and the security of the states that hold them. Military doctrines may stress different military operations “ offensive, defensive, or deterrent. Military doctrines may or may not be integrated with the political objectives of a grand strategy. They may be innovative or stagnant. Balance of power theory predicts greater heterogeneity in military doctrine, dependent on reasonable appraisals by each state of its political, technological, economic, and geographical problems and possibilities in the international political system. In the broadest sense military doctrine should, according to organization theory, show a tendency to be offensive, disintegrated, and stagnant. This is suggested both by the character of military organizations and by their functional separation from the political decision-makers of the state. In general, anything that makes the civilian leaders of a state more fearful should encourage political-military integration and operational innovation. Civilian preferences for offense, defense, or deterrence will be influenced by the international environment. Finally, if the two theories “ have any validity at all, we should find that technology and geography are rarely determinative in their own right, although they should often have an important effect on doctrine “. In times of relative international calm we should expect a high degree of organizational determinism. In times of threat we should see greater accommodation of doctrine to the international system “ integration should be more pronounced, innovation more likely. Among states, doctrines should show more heterogeneity. However, even under such circumstances all will not necessarily be well. Multipolar structures, although they exert an important

influence on doctrine, may so confuse decision-makers as to allow organizational determinants to come to the fore once again. She won the battle for which she had prepared and lost the one for which she had not. Her military doctrine had long envisioned major land campaigns on the European continent. Operations beyond its shores had been given little thought. Had that doctrine been held by a state with more limited aims, the Battle of Britain might never have been fought. However, German grand strategy contained the seeds of its own disintegration because its ends were infinitely expansive and they expanded at a rapid rate. No military doctrine, much less a force posture, could keep up with such a policy. In a way, Germany was a victim of its own too rapid successes. These made new enemies for Germany more quickly than her military organization could adapt to them. In a world of limited means and widely distributed power, it may be that such a hidden brake would operate on any open-endedly imperial policy. No doctrine can keep up. Both operationally and politically, it looked backward to World War I. Stationary, defensive, attrition warfare, waged in the company of a powerful coalition, was both the French fear and the French aim. The main goal was to get others to share the costs of French defense. Until such cooperation could be assured, French military doctrine would aim to limit possible damage to France and to the French Army. None would risk German animosity for the sake of French goals. For this reason, interwar military cooperation was weak. Belgium, Holland, Britain, and France, the coalition, had few military discussions in the late s. Yet, French doctrine called for limiting the damage to France, keeping the war away from her frontiers. This demanded a move into Belgium, a move that could only be a nightmare for the uncoordinated, defensively oriented, mutually suspicious Allied armies. British doctrine was somewhat similar. It was defensive, yet it was more innovative. It was well integrated with the political aspects of British grand strategy. Like France, Britain sought to transfer the costs of her defense to her allies. Geographically, she was better set up for this. Britain was hard to conquer, except by sea, and the Royal Navy had that bet covered. What they temporarily forgot, because it was convenient to do so, was that a successful German occupation of the channel coast, even if only of the mouth of the Scheldt, would provide an amphibious and aerial springboard against Britain. Defending the channel coast would demand a major ground force commitment and potentially high casualties such as those Britain had suffered in World War I. Until , the British hoped that the French would pay these costs. She hoped to commit just enough ground forces to the continent to get the French to fight. Who could imagine a change in land warfare so decisive as to allow the conquest of France? Hence, in May , Britain fought a land battle that her grand strategy had for years sought to avoid. The peculiar British euphoria after Dunkirk may be explained by the fact that the British Expeditionary Force had both preserved British honor and avoided the disaster of the trenches at the same time. Besides these gains, a military defeat was a smallish matter. In the summer of , on the other hand, the British found themselves fighting the battle that they had both feared and planned for during the preceding six years. The casualties of that summer were puny compared to the astounding losses of World War I. British fighters successfully bought the time for the next phase of the long-planned British war effort. For just as the French had counted on transferring a portion of their defense costs to the British, the British had counted on transferring some of their defense costs to anybody and everybody. With the time bought by Fighter Command, a new ally or two might be found. In this sense, British grand strategy was perhaps the most successful of the s. From on, however, it became more integrated and innovative. Throughout the period the doctrine had a very strong dissuasive component, stronger than that of French military doctrine. Yet, even without civilian guidance, balance of power considerations can overcome organizational biases when threats are sufficiently great.

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*Military Doctrine. SOURCES OF DOCTRINE Last Updated: 27 Feb Doctrine should be based on critical analysis and the lessons of operations rather than.*

Chapter 8 : Military doctrine - Wikipedia

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### Chapter 9 : What is Army Doctrine? - Modern War Institute

*Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (New York: Cornell University press, ) Review by Solomon Major, Friday, March 10, Quick Summary: Posen seeks to define the primary determinants of states' military doctrinesâ€”which he.*