

Chapter 1 : Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise - PhilPapers

Loeb, Louis E., Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise, Oxford University Press, , pp, \$ (hbk), ISBN The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the project and sets out the key interpretive constraints. Loeb holds that there is a positive.

I pretend not to have here exhausted this subject. It is sufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy. Some of these mechanisms involve associations among passions that depend on their intrinsic experienced qualities, while some others involve the mixing of passions to generate new passions. The Primary Mechanism Hume introduces his account of the six direct passions of desire, aversion, joy, sorrow, hope and fear with three concise statements: When evil is in the same situation there arises grief or sorrow. What is common to all the mechanisms Hume describes, though, is the presence of some fluctuation in the consideration of various possible circumstances or prospects. Probability is here presented as a species of uncertainty. To be in a state of probabilistic uncertainty toward some circumstance, according to Hume, is to be in a fluctuating, unstable state of mind in which one successively considers various contrary possibilities, of which the first circumstance is only one. The successive considerations of these possibilities, Hume says, are accompanied by corresponding and successive elicitations of joy or grief, according to the goodness or badness of the respective objects under consideration. I adopt the interpretation that, in its primary sense, probability is for Hume a, possibly complex, doxastic disposition or attitude toward some conceived possibility, resulting from certain characteristic causes. Hume answers with an intriguing musical analogy: The imagination is extremely quick and agile; but the passions are slow and restive: According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of joy or sorrow predominates in the composition: That is, in other words, the grief and joy being intermingled with each other, by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by their union the passions of hope and fear. He says that when they result from ideas of objects that are entirely different, they occur separately and in an alternating fashion. The contrary passions instead destroy one another when they are elicited by ideas something of some adverse and something prosperous in the same situation. Probability and the Primary Mechanism Louis Loeb has argued⁶ that although Hume treats his discussion of probability in Treatise 2. I also think that the Book Two account has further problems of its own when it is deployed to explain how joy and grief mix to produce hope and fear. Consider a chance process of the kind Hume uses as his main example. A single die is to be tossed. Hume describes several phases in the evolution of our doxastic disposition with respect to the outcome of the toss: First, when we consider some idea representing the mere possibility of the die landing on one of its faces or another, that idea quickly becomes a belief in the manner Hume has previously described in Treatise 1. So, the idea of the die landing then occurs in our mind with the degree of force and vivacity that constitutes belief. We are then led to consider the six distinct ways in which the die might land with a single face upward. But we do not yet have an established degree of assurance for two other, more coarse-grained possibilities: The six ideas representing the six possibilities regarding the individual faces are then combined into two ideas representing the two possibilities regarding the number of dots, an effect triggered by the similarity of the ideas that are combined. The four ideas representing the faces that contain four dots combine to form a single idea representing the possibility that the die will land with 9 Hume defends an indifference principle in this section of the Treatise. He holds that the assurance attending one outcome regarded as a chance outcome can only be superior to some contrary outcome if the two outcomes are comprised respectively of different numbers of more specific outcomes, each of which is regarded as neither more nor less likely than any of the others. The assurance attending the former will be twice that of the latter. In such cases, events of the same kind are not constantly conjoined with only one kind of outcome, but sometimes yield one outcome, sometimes another. The subject is now assured of the possibility of four dots with a degree of assurance $X - Y$, and apparently has zero force attending the consideration of the possibility of two dots. For example, we might imagine a Humean inquirer who starts

with no stable and established degrees of assurance toward the two alternate possibilities of four dots versus two dots. The inquirer alternately considers the single possibility of four dots with vacillating degrees of assurance, sometimes weaker, sometimes stronger. Then, following the Phase 3 process, the inquirer ends up with a steady degree of assurance accompanying any subsequent consideration of the possibility of four dots, at least up to the time the die finally lands. But the existence of that kind of stability does not mean that, after the stability is achieved, the inquirer only thinks of the possibility of four dots going forward, and the possibility of two dots never again comes to mind. And it is only this latter kind of oscillation that really seems necessary to the primary mechanism for the generation of hope and fear. It is possible Hume thought that joy and hope, though not desires as such, are impressions whose degrees jointly depend on both the antecedent desirability of some possibility considered as such, without regard to its likelihood, and the probabilities attached to those possibilities by the person considering them. We can think of joy and grief as the weighted products of antecedent desirability and undesirability, as the first factor, and the degree of probability as the second factor. Imputing it to Hume will help us make clearer sense of his reasoning, and save his extended account from falling into unintelligibility. And sometimes, it turns out, fear is produced without any mixing of joy and grief at all. What seems to be implicit in this reasoning is that the consideration of a great evil with a low degree of probability elicits a quantity of grief roughly commensurable in magnitude to the joy felt by considering a small good with a high degree of probability. So, the fluctuation between these two 10 considerations produces a high degree of fear from the mixing of joy and grief. But how can the passions of hope and fear be the strongest when we have exactly equal probabilities? If you mingle equal amounts of joy and grief, do you get very strong hope or very strong fear or both, and an oscillation between the two? Nevertheless, the view gains plausibility when we consider situations just off the equiprobability center line, so to speak, where the chances are not exactly equal. Encrease the probability, and by that means the grief, the fear prevails still more and more, till at last it runs insensibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief. So, while the passion felt when the chances are exactly balanced is not explained, this much is clear: Hume thinks that fear and hope are strongest when there is the most uncertainty regarding outcomes of roughly equivalent goodness and badness, apart from the degenerate case of exact equality of probability. The passions generated from joy and grief seem to occur on a linear spectrum in accordance with the probability of the alternative good and bad outcomes we are considering, a spectrum something like as follows: But the bare view that hope and fear result somehow from mixtures of joy and grief still seems intact at this point. In such cases, we have only mixtures of grief with grief: Here there is an evil certain, but the kind of it uncertain: Consequently the fear we feel on this occasion is without the least mixture of joy, and arises merely from the fluctuation of the fancy betwixt its objects. Horror is presumably a species of fear. So, Hume seems to be offering a circular explanation of why we experience fear when we consider these awful evils by claiming that when we think of such an evil we fear it, and so recoil from thinking about it. It is the fluctuation itself between the two negative considerations that is responsible for the fear. In the remainder of the section, this is the view that emerges: Fluctuation in thought between contrary possibilities is an uneasy, unpleasant sensation, and so by principles governing the association of passions, the unpleasantness of the fluctuation gives rise to a similarly unpleasant passion: But it remains to be understood why it is fear that is aroused rather than some other, equally similar and unpleasant passion. Hume regards the mixed impression of fear as, generally, a component of more complex mental episodes of which fear is only an element. But when we are absent, the details of the suffering are not present to us. We know the friend is suffering, but our mind incessantly wanders over all the possible precise ways in which the friend might be suffering at that moment. Presumably this disposition includes the perplexed thinking of various ideas, the arousal of additional follow-on passions, and the primary impressions we experience of the bodily responses to fear. Either way, the sensation of fear is identified by Hume, in this context at least, with the feeling of the triggered mental events standardly accompanying fear, not just with the felt qualities of the impression of fear properly. This phenomenon creates a puzzle for Hume because pity and hatred are unpleasant, and malice and love are pleasant, and so it would seem that if the mixing is governed by the association of passions according to their hedonic qualities, pity should give rise to hatred and malice should give rise to love. So, pity gives rise to the

desire for the well-being of the pitied individual, love as an accompaniment to the pity.

Chapter 2 : Louis E. Loeb (Author of Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise)

David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism. Louis Loeb argues that Hume's destructive conclusions have in fact obscured a constructive stage that Hume abandons prematurely.

June 10, Loeb, Louis E. Loeb marshals substantial support for the view that Hume has a robust normative epistemology, an epistemology that can be understood in light of the sections of the Treatise traditionally taken as arguing for skepticism, and in light of the more genuinely skeptical themes of Part IV of Book I. If Loeb convinces the reader that for Hume, justified beliefs are those that have the characteristic of stability, he does so by taking the whole of Book I into account. Loeb is guided by interpretive coherence and the independent plausibility of the positions he discovers in Hume. The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the project and sets out the key interpretive constraints. While Hume endorses the view that justified beliefs are stable beliefs, he ultimately holds that stability in belief is not achievable for the reflective person. At the end of the first chapter Loeb provides an extremely helpful prospectus of the project, mapping out the book with an annotated list of no fewer than twenty-one theses. This is a great convenience, and readers will consult the prospectus often. While Loeb has a good deal to say about what he finds wrong with other interpretations of Hume, in this first chapter he refreshingly emphasizes the interpretations which anticipate or otherwise suggest the stability interpretation developed in the subsequent chapters. While Loeb is always focused on the Treatise, the notes are filled with careful and helpful discussions of matters of interpretation from the secondary literature. Justification is the default state for belief. One does not need to actively provide reasons in order to have justified belief. What has to be explained in a theory of justification is not how some beliefs get their justification but rather how others fail to have it. A stability account of justification fits nicely with this insight. The final three chapters explicate some of the most important topics in Part IV of the Treatise. In this final part of Book I, Hume launches his attacks on the systems of both the ancient and the modern philosophers. If Loeb shows that Hume provides an account of justified belief in Treatise Part III, his approach to Part IV is to show that for Hume certain beliefs, including belief in material substratum, in the continued and distinct existence of perceptions, and in the soul, are not justified. Thus belief is the unifying feature of Parts III and IV of the Treatise, though it turns out that, for a reflective person, there is no stable outcome. One observation, however, applies to the approach Loeb takes in the last three chapters. It concerns the pervasiveness of belief as the central subject of Book I. What could be made clearer is the fact that, for Hume, these items only take on the status of belief in philosophical systems. The same fiction-generating mechanisms function in the vulgar as well as in philosophers. But in the case of the vulgar such mechanisms do not generate unstable belief. Is this just because the vulgar are unreflective? It seems rather that for Hume, continued and distinct existence and the self function as stable conceptual underpinnings of ordinary belief and they do so without counting as beliefs. Even in this passage he is merely comparing memories with belief in terms of vivacity. There is still a distinction to be made between them. Clearly memories are analogous to beliefs. Like beliefs, they are high vivacity ideas. But Hume generally restricts belief to the results of causal inference, and in doing so emphasizes the mechanism which brings about the high-vivacity idea more than the occurrent properties of the perception. Loeb does not deny that there are belief-related lively ideas. On his view these lively ideas are manifestations of the steady dispositions. While interpreters may disagree about whether it is appropriate to refer to the lively-idea-forming mechanisms as beliefs or simply call them belief-forming mechanisms, Loeb is surely right that this is where the normative action is. If mere liveliness conferred justification, then Hume would not be in any position to criticize the effects of education, poetical enthusiasm or superstition, since those effects can also be high-vivacity ideas. In Chapter IV Loeb looks closely at a number of passages which have not received a great deal of attention by Hume scholars. In one such passage Hume describes a case of situated cognition, the case of someone hung out over a precipice in an iron cage. Loeb is certainly correct to see this example as a case of potentially destabilizing conflict. But Loeb sees the conflict as one between accidental generalizations the circumstance of being hung out over a precipice and genuine regularities well fastened chains keep iron cages from falling.

This passage, however, picks up on precipice examples discussed by Montaigne, Pascal, and Malebranche, and it is intended to show the destabilizing effect of the direct passion of fear on belief. In the normal run of life an epistemic agent, even a relatively unreflective one, will experience belief-destabilizing situations such as precipices. Unreflective persons, however, will not confront the destabilizing effects from conflicting evidence as often as the reflective person, and thus will have wider ranging dispositions to stable belief than reflective persons. Does this mean that the unreflective person has a belief system that is in some sense more justified than that of the reflective person? As Loeb notes, that depends on whether justification is understood as stability for any fully-reflective person or as stability relative to the belief-forming mechanism of the epistemic agent. Engagement with these chapters is equally rewarding. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,

Chapter 3 : Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise - Oxford Scholarship

*Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise [Louis E. Loeb] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism.*

She calls it, "Reflective Wisdom. Most generally, her account is marked by an explicit disavowal of a comprehensive account of the ends of life. The book is not an inquiry into the aim of life. Instead, Tiberius is concerned to say quite literally how we should live. Tiberius argues that persons should choose goods using appropriate reflection, where this amounts to broadly epistemically virtuous reflection. To motivate and defend the particular dictates of reflective virtue, Tiberius relies on a complicated coherence account of justification. That coherence theory is the second major feature of her argument. In her view, Reflective Wisdom is in one way or other, from top to bottom, in the Humean spirit. The book begins with, and really is driven by, a sustained analysis of how ordinary agents actually guide their lives. The first section of the book is devoted to careful inquiry into the first-personal nature of value commitments: From here, Tiberius proceeds in the second and longest section to defend four substantive virtues of Reflective Wisdom: The first explores the relationship between Reflective Wisdom and morality. The second is a defense of her effort to construct normative theory from a naturalistic account of good living. Ultimately, the three major sections of the book seem somewhat disjointed in the sense that each could very nearly be approached in its own right. That said, there is much of value in the individual parts, especially the more theoretical first and third sections. Tiberius offers keen insights on a wide scope of philosophical issues that promise to engage an equally wide audience. Still, there are some difficulties that should be addressed. Three particular Humean characteristics stand out. In the first place, Tiberius takes Hume to have advocated at the close of the Treatise the basic demand for good living she defends, namely that to live well is to live a life that "can bear your reflective survey" Thus she argues at several junctures that a plausible normative theory for how to live must fit with our best understanding of the natural world, which includes our best understanding of how minds like ours actually work. She intends, thirdly, a Humean account of normativity itself. Tiberius unfortunately never pauses to offer a dedicated discussion of coherence. There is no chapter, section heading, or even index reference to coherence. The reader is consequently burdened with puzzling out the details of coherence, which is a bit off-putting given that Tiberius claims that "all aspects" of Reflective Wisdom depend on those details. In any event, this much is clear: According to Tiberius, what makes for appropriate reflection is determined by those reflective considerations that successfully balance the values we actually have. That is, appropriate reflection is determined by those considerations, which from the reflective stance of ordinary individuals bring our values into coherence. Because, a coherent value system is one that we can reflectively endorse. And why accept this further claim? This, I think, is the bedrock theoretical question for Tiberius. As I read her, she has two related answers. And life-satisfaction and self-direction, she argues, in turn imply a demand for coherence. Second, the fundamental properties of value commitments themselves point to coherence. That is, the properties that characterize the nature of "value commitment" imply a coherence account of endorsement for those commitments. So let me put a little pressure on each. If we share with Hume a serious concern with living a life that can bear our reflective scrutiny, then we must, Tiberius argues, already be committed to the value of life-satisfaction. The idea is that as persons concerned with living well by reflection we are already committed to a certain kind of compatibility between our value commitments and what she calls our "affective orientation. Hence the claim that coherence serves as a normative constraint for reflective value: Tiberius explains, "[O]ne of the standards that our values can be held to is that we enjoy their pursuit, find them rewarding, and the like" I have no objection to the general "implicit value" strategy or the conclusion that the particular value of life-satisfaction points towards a normative coherence theory. Is it then, two attitudes? Or do these parts combine in the form of one new cognitive emotion? This is potentially a serious lacuna given how frequently Tiberius talks of emotion throughout the book. Moreover, she sometimes leans towards a cognitive conception of emotion and sometimes towards a non-cognitive one. For example, "satisfaction" is often talked about as if it were an affective primitive, that is, as a distinctive or peculiar sentiment. Telling

against this interpretation is the psychological research Tiberius appeals to in order to explain life-satisfaction. This research talks of "global" satisfaction measured by a five-point questionnaire -- E. But with one exception the SWLS looks wholly cognitive. The one exception is a question asking whether "I am satisfied with my life. At least, she never returns to say what the peculiar affect is. Now a comment on value commitments per se: Tiberius argues that stability, volitional efficacy, and justifiability are the three general properties of value commitments. Stability is especially important, for it stands in a "reciprocal" relationship with justification. By this Tiberius does not intend a bi-conditional. Instead, considerations of stability and justification bear on or "sustain" each other. Equally important, value commitments always potentially serve as reasons for other value commitments. Taken together, we very roughly get an account like this: But to ask this is to invite questions of stability, not only about the value in question, but also of other values. The demand for coherence is thus implied by the fundamental nature of value. First, Hume himself made much of stability and Tiberius seems unaware of this. Nothing by Loeb appears in the bibliography. One is the importance of the viewpoint of the "judicious spectator" or "common viewpoint," as Hume alternatively referred to it. Perhaps Tiberius considers this aspect of Hume as of a piece with the kind of reflective idealizations she rejects. Not if that means full information and perfect rationality. On the contrary, the central function of that viewpoint seems, for Hume, its facilitation of impartiality. In Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume stresses the value of belief or judgment to withstand inter-subjective sympathetic contradiction keep in mind that, for Hume, moral judgments are emotions. Now, Tiberius does attempt to include sympathy in her own theory. But there are some problems with her discussion. Like coherence, there is no dedicated discussion. She seems to use the term in connection with simulationist language, treating "sympathy" as what most moral psychologists and philosophers of mind now call "empathy" or a kind of empathy, namely, as the means by which we conceptualize the viewpoints of other persons, and, at least typically, come to share their mental states. However, even assuming that Tiberius is thinking of sympathy as a kind of empathy, she still treats sympathy as a limited epistemic tool subserving a particular virtue. Sympathy is discussed in terms of a merely informational capacity to identify what others value that helps us develop "perspective" on our own values. She does return to discuss sympathy in Chapter 7, but only briefly, and if anything moves away from the idea of empathy. Most important, Tiberius makes no effort to connect sympathy to stability at a fundamental level -- which brings me back to the irony at hand. But I do have specific reservations about two of her conclusions, one each for the virtues of "attentional flexibility" and "perspective. Attentional flexibility reflects the idea that the wise person must know when not to reflect -- i. However, the idea of being "in the moment" struck me as offering Tiberius grounds for a much more creative and far-reaching discussion than she provides. In particular, the idea is important to Asian virtue ethics, be it Buddhist, Confucian, or Taoist. Lao Tzu in particular makes much of it. Given the growing interest in finding common ground between Western and Eastern Philosophy, I think Tiberius missed an opportunity. Regarding the virtue of perspective, Tiberius argues that the wise person must keep in view what is "really" important by assessing the relative importance of various values considered from her own reflective stance and then correspondingly adjust her attitudes. These dictates seem rather obvious, and I think the argument for this particular virtue will struggle to impress readers. That risk is compounded by what I think is an error in one of the more interesting claims Tiberius does make about perspective: On the one hand Tiberius argues that sympathy is required for "remembering" the weights of our values: Now, sympathy certainly could do this by presenting within experience information about what other people value, and thereby giving us a comparative prompt for self-reflection. But it seems unlikely that only sympathy could do this. I think material gain, competition, and fame are all bunk values. Granted, this habit may not be perfectly reliable. But then again, neither is sympathy, as the collective history of humankind has proven many times over. It was unclear to me, from what she says about sympathy and perspective, how Reflective Wisdom as a subjectively focused theory of reflective endorsement motivates or grounds a requirement for the interpersonal expression of such endorsement. Tiberius closes the book with a different sort of problem entirely. She wonders why we should treat reflection as authoritative in the first place. In particular, she worries aloud about whether coherence underwrites the authority of reflective standards and virtues only insofar as we already want to live a life that can "bear our reflective scrutiny. The

point is that Reflective Wisdom looks dangerously contingent in virtue of making a desire its ultimate basis. Some of the moves Tiberius makes to answer this worry are familiar -- modifications of expressivist strategies tailored to her particular theory. The most important is her emphasis on a distinction between the arbitrary and the contingent. Tiberius argues that only the former presents a fundamental threat to a strategy that bases normative authority on desire. She then attempts to persuade us that the desire to live a reflective life, although contingent, is not arbitrary. The desire to live a reflective life is partly constitutive of being a reflective person.

Chapter 4 : Fear and the Sensation of Fear in Hume's Treatise | Dan Kervick - calendrierdelascience.com

David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism. Louis Loeb argues that Hume's destructive conclusions have in fact obscured a constructive stage that Hume abandons prematurely. Working within a philosophical tradition that values tranquillity, Hume favors an.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Hume Studies Volume 30, Number 2, November , pp. LOEB The symposiasts press from a number of directions. I will have to give ground: We share a number of fundamental theses: There is a corollary: Some of these shared claims go against the grain of major lines of interpretation. At the same time, there are deep disagreements: This response is divided as follows: Reply to Kelly 1. The Narrow Circle, Invisibles, and Partiality 3. Information, Sympathetic Templates, and Stigmatized Groups 4. Reply to Schmitt 1. Peak Stability versus Average or Temporal Stability 4. The Two-stage Model 2. Long-term Consensus Part 3 of my reply to Schmitt incorporates his fruitful options for a stability interpretation and thus repairs shortcomings in my reading. The resulting revisions are pivotal to parts 1 and 4 of my reply to Williams. Part 3 takes up broad matters of interpretation germane to both Schmitt and Williams. Stability, Reflective Endorsement, and the Motivation for the Steady Point of View Kelly reminds us that sentimentalist moral theories are at risk of licensing moral judgments that we would reject as resulting from "distortions, " failures to give all persons "full sympathetic attention" Kelly , First, there are "outsiders" Kelly , ; we care more for persons inside our group or groups Kelly , generating garden variety cases of partiality. Second, there are outsiders whom we regard with "a sense of their unfamiliarity" or "difference," lowering or You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 5 : Louis Loeb | U-M LSA Philosophy

Working within a philosophical tradition that values tranquillity, Hume favors an epistemology that links justification with settled belief. Hume appeals to psychological stability to support his own epistemological assessments, both favorable regarding causal inference and unfavorable regarding the imagination.

Chapter 6 : Top shelves for ECG Problems

Get this from a library! Stability and justification in Hume's Treatise. [Louis E Loeb] -- "David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism.