

DOWNLOAD PDF SUMMA ON ECCLESIASTICAL POWER (SELECTIONS AUGUSTINE OF ANCONA

Chapter 1 : The Abuse of Ecclesiastical Power

Augustine of Ancona () Summa on ecclesiastical power (selections), ed. and trans. McGrade A. In: McGrade A, Kilcullen J, Kempshall M (eds) The Cambridge translations of medieval philosophical texts 2: ethics and political philosophy.

Life[edit] William of Ockham was born in Ockham, Surrey in and joined the Franciscan order at an early age. In , his commentary was condemned as unorthodox by a synod of bishops,[citation needed] and he was ordered to Avignon , France, to defend himself before a papal court. A theological commission had been asked to review his Commentary on the Sentences, and it was during this that William of Ockham found himself involved in a different debate. Michael of Cesena had asked William to review arguments surrounding Apostolic poverty. The Franciscans believed that Jesus and his apostles owned no property either individually or in common, and the Rule of Saint Francis commanded members of the order to follow this practice. In return for protection and patronage William wrote treatises that argued for emperor Louis to have supreme control over church and state in the Holy Roman Empire. William of Ockham died prior to the outbreak of the plague on 9 April Faith and reason[edit] William of Ockham espoused fideism , stating that "only faith gives us access to theological truths. The ways of God are not open to reason, for God has freely chosen to create a world and establish a way of salvation within it apart from any necessary laws that human logic or rationality can uncover. William incorporated much of the work of some previous theologians, especially Duns Scotus. From Duns Scotus, William of Ockham derived his view of divine omnipotence, his view of grace and justification, much of his epistemology[citation needed] and ethical convictions [22]. Nominalism[edit] William of Ockham was a pioneer of nominalism , and some consider him the father of modern epistemology , because of his strongly argued position that only individuals exist, rather than supra-individual universals , essences, or forms, and that universals are the products of abstraction from individuals by the human mind and have no extra-mental existence. William of Ockham is sometimes considered an advocate of conceptualism rather than nominalism, for whereas nominalists held that universals were merely names, i. Therefore, the universal concept has for its object, not a reality existing in the world outside us, but an internal representation which is a product of the understanding itself and which "supposes" in the mind the things to which the mind attributes it; that is, it holds, for the time being, the place of the things which it represents. It is the term of the reflective act of the mind. Hence the universal is not a mere word, as Roscelin taught, nor a sermo, as Peter Abelard held, namely the word as used in the sentence, but the mental substitute for real things, and the term of the reflective process. For this reason William has sometimes also been called a "terminist", to distinguish him from a nominalist or a conceptualist. He was criticized for this belief by his fellow theologians and philosophers. This maxim, as interpreted by Bertrand Russell , [26] states that if one can explain a phenomenon without assuming this or that hypothetical entity, there is no ground for assuming it, i. He thus does not accept the principle of sufficient reason , rejects the distinction between essence and existence, and opposes the Thomistic doctrine of active and passive intellect. His scepticism to which his ontological parsimony request leads appears in his doctrine that human reason can prove neither the immortality of the soul; nor the existence, unity, and infinity of God. These truths, he teaches, are known to us by revelation alone. Mathematics must be applied to other categories, such as the categories of substance or qualities, thus anticipating modern scientific renaissance while violating Aristotelian prohibition of metabasis. Theory of knowledge[edit] In the theory of knowledge, William rejected the scholastic theory of species, as unnecessary and not supported by experience, in favour of a theory of abstraction. This was an important development in late medieval epistemology. He also distinguished between intuitive and abstract cognition; intuitive cognition depends on the existence or non-existence of the object, whereas abstractive cognition "abstracts" the object from the existence predicate. Interpreters are, as yet, undecided about the roles of these two types of cognitive activities. His political ideas are regarded as "natural" or "secular", holding for a secular absolutism. He thought that the pope and churchmen have no right or grounds at all for secular rule like

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having property, citing 2 Tim. That belongs solely to earthly rulers, who may also accuse the pope of crimes, if need be. Thus he preceded Thomas Hobbes in formulating social contract theory along with earlier scholars. His contributions to semantics, especially to the maturing theory of supposition, are still studied by logicians. Only in very few of these cases is it possible to demonstrate direct links to William of Ockham or his texts. Works [edit] The standard edition of the philosophical and theological works is: The Franciscan Institute, "The seventh volume of the Opera Philosophica contains the doubtful and spurious works. The political works, all but the Dialogus, have been edited in H. Guilelmi de Ockham Opera Politica, 4 vols. Manchester University Press [vols. Oxford University Press [vol. Summa logicae Sum of Logic c. Expositionis in Libros artis logicae prooemium, "24, OP 2. Expositio in librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus, "24, OP 2. Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, "24, OP 2. Expositio in librum in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis, "24, OP 2. Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Quaestiones variae OT 8. Quodlibeta septem before, OT 9. Tractatus de quantitate " Tractatus de corpore Christi "24, OT

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Chapter 2 : Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas (selections)

Augustine of Ancona (Augustinus [Triumphus] de Ancona) (/), an Augustinian friar, wrote at least 32 theological and philosophical works but is chiefly known for his Summa de ecclesiastica potestate, a systematic argument for the supreme power of the pope in both temporal and spiritual affairs.

The sspcx have another article about canonizations, which was good. One thing that stood out was that Cajetan did not consider canonizations infallible, and Cajetan is quite an authority. Indeed, Cajetan was a member of the Dominicans, and his scholarship was quite excellent. One of the points raised by some people is that poorer religious orders did not in the past and do not currently have enough money to allow the necessary investigations so that their founders and other members could be canonized. Similarly many married couples have not been canonized because they lived humble lives that did not draw attention to their saintliness, and also because there was no one to fund their canonizations. Other saintly persons did not have a biographer to gather information about them. About 45 years ago in , a deceased cloistered Dominican nun from the Eastern seaboard New York or New Jersey was found to be incorrupt while the nuns were transferring coffins from one side of the underground burial chambers to the other when massive flooding had occurred. She had been dead for more than 50 years probably closer to years at the time of transfer. Her coffin was the only one which was found to be very heavy as the others bore decomposed remains. Thus, the nuns petitioned the bishop for permission to open her coffin and they discovered that her fingernails had grown after death, likewise her hair. Thus, they carefully trimmed her fingernails and hair and saved these relics, and clothed her in a new Dominican habit. When they tried to get more information on her, they discovered that she was a humble nun with little information about her. She simply did her duties quietly and obediently and did not hold any important offices such as being prior or novice mistress, so she did not stand out. Although it is obvious that she died in the odor of sanctity, she will never be canonized as so little is known about her. I remember reading several biographies of Ignatius of Loyola, who died in , and who was the founder of the Jesuits. I was deeply troubled by his life. The Jesuits had lots of financial support, so they were able to finance his canonization process. However, some people today question his sanctity and his order, which has been suppressed several times. Now that Francis is pope, more people are questioning the Jesuits. Perhaps Bishop Williamson is also questioning the sanctity of Ignatius of Loyola as he died less than years ago.

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Chapter 3 : Summa Theologica and Just War

ary ideas on property and political power of John Wyclif, the seventeen 14 augustine of ancona Summa on Ecclesiastical Power (selections) The Cambridge.

Social justice[edit] Aquinas defines distributive justice as follows: Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: Aquinas asserts that Christians have a duty to distribute with provision to the poorest of society. Thomas was a vocal supporter of the death penalty. This was based on the theory found in natural moral law , that the state has not only the right, but the duty to protect its citizens from enemies, both from within, and without. For those who have been appropriately appointed, there is no sin in administering punishment. No one sins working for justice and within the law. Actions that are necessary to preserve the good of society are not inherently evil. The common good of the whole society is greater and better than the good of any particular person. Therefore, certain men must be removed by death from the society of men. He based this on I Corinthians 5, 6: Also, it is argued that Matthew 13, This is explained by Matthew 13, Aquinas acknowledged these passages could also be interpreted as meaning there should be no use of the death penalty if there was a chance of injuring the innocent. The prohibition "Thou shall not kill", was superseded by Exodus 22, If they would not repent in the face of death, it was unreasonable to assume they would ever repent. Using the death penalty for revenge, or retribution is a violation of natural moral law. Many believe the correct interpretation of the commandment to be "Thou shalt not murder. Under Pope John Paul II , the Catholic Church came, according to one of two interpretations of Evangelium Vitae , [1] to advocate incarceration in lieu of the death penalty. Heretics[edit] Aquinas advocated the death penalty for obstinate heretics, writing With regard to heretics two points must be observed: On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death. On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but "after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: For Jerome commenting on Galatians 5: Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame. The penalty of death for obdurate heretics had been the standard for generations prior to the time of Aquinas. It had been formalized in Canon Law during the Lateran Councils of and It was also the standard part of most criminal and civil laws prior to the time of Aquinas. Cathars were executed in Oxford in Another was burned at the stake in London in Of course, these, and many others pre-dated Aquinas. Heretics were given two chances to recant their views. This is a position which, by modern standards would be considered exceptionally harsh, and has changed and softened since the 13th century. The Church was inexorably intermixed with the secular political structure. This was before the modern concept of separation of church and state had developed. It was also a product of Scholasticism which did not seek to find an equivocal position, but rather to reach a decisive univocal conclusion on matters of religion and philosophy. This view must be taken in context with the attitude shown by Aquinas in eschewing the forced baptism of the children of heretics, which was recommended by, among others, John Duns Scotus. The heretics Aquinas was referring to were those baptized Catholics who held positions of authority within the Church, and nonetheless persisted in teaching heretical views. It remains one of those passages which must be

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taken in context of the total message of Thomism. The growth of various heretical positions, leading to the Reformation, made execution of heretics impractical and counterproductive. Excommunication remained the penalty for such Church leaders who taught heresy. A review of the legal history prior to the time of Aquinas reveals the nature of recommending execution of heretics. The issue came to a head with the Manichean Cathari heresy. It was concluded that other heretics were to be deemed no better. The opinion prevailed in legal circles that human law and divine command demanded the death of the obdurate heretic. It was routinely enforced by both Church and State. In severe cases of religious pestilence, there was a need for a holy war. These prevailing feelings were legislated by the Church in the Lateran Councils of and The impenitent heretic when convicted by the ecclesiastical court for execution. Frederick II, incorporated the execution of heretics into his civil and criminal code of the Holy Roman Empire. The Fifth Lateran Council defined usury as "from its use, a thing which produces nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and profit without any work, any expense or any risk", [2] and that the modern idea of what the usury is cannot be applied to Thomasian thought. Thomas asserted that usury was a violation of natural moral law. All things are created for their natural end Aristotle. Money is not an end but a means of buying goods and services. Putting money out for the generation of more money is an evil unto itself. The formal value of money is the face value. Yet usury allows this face value to fluctuate, and hence the value of money can be diminished, thereby robbing the person who has purchased the money for use. Money stands alone as a non-vendible substance which is degraded from its natural end by selling. Another argument used by Aquinas was that of the Roman distinction between consumable goods and non-consumable goods. Food and clothes are consumable in that once they are used, they are gone. A piece of land is non-consumable since it can produce crops for years, yet never lose its value. Money as defined by Aquinas is a consumable. To put it out for profit betrays its purpose in natural law. This is the view that prevailed for the next three centuries following St. Yet it was the one Realistic Scholastic interpretation of natural law that was completely disconnected from the economic reality of the day. The time of Aquinas was one where land feudalism was ceding prominence to money capitalism. Over the next several centuries it became clear that capitalism would provide a greater amount of goods and services than any other system. Even in the time of Aquinas and before, kings and popes engaged in usury. Some of the effects of Protestantism were a clarification of the views and acceptance of the practice of usury. Profit from lending became an acceptable goal. This included putting money out for any return, no matter how minimal. It can be argued that this rigid stance may have encouraged the Protestant movement in larger money and trading centers. The issue was never as clear as the stance Aquinas took would indicate. He also who gives ten solidi a monetary unit, so that at another time just as many measures of grain, wine and oil may be paid back to him, and although these are worth more at the present time, it is probably doubtful whether at the time of payment, they will be worth more or less, for this reason, should not be considered a usurer. By reason of this doubt he is also excused, who sells clothing, grain, wine, oil, or other wares so that as a set time he receives for them more than they are worth at that time, if however, he had not intended so to sell them at the time of the contract. In other words, if the lender of the money "assumed the risk" "assumpsit" in Latin, along with the borrower, it was not usury. A century earlier, in the Second Lateran Council, Second Council of the Lateran, under the aegis of Pope Innocent II called the practice of loaning money "detestable and shameful The distinction between usury and putting money out while "assuming the risk" was not mentioned. However, it could be argued that any time one assumed the risk, it was not considered usury. There was always some confusion, and variance, in this teaching during the Middle Ages. The Fifth Lateran Council, decreed that a "reasonable degree of return" was allowable. The social evil that was associated with usury was the fact that poor tenant farmers and city dwellers were often thrown into prison, or even killed if they could not repay the money they borrowed, and the interest charged. In these cases, the lenders of the money had assumed no risk. Anthony of Padua AD preached against this evil. These events were occurring at a time when the Ecclesiastical Courts had great judicial power. There were several philosophical cross currents at play. On the one hand, the Canon Lawyers looked favorably on the products of labor, wages and profit, while

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holding suspect speculation, banking and finance. The Church discountenanced the fluctuations of wages and prices caused by the law of supply and demand. There was an attempt to maintain fixed standards of value. At the same time, there was a liberal and equitable view toward the old Roman idea of " contract ". This was something that was lacking in Roman contract. Insurance , assignability and negotiability were developments in the Church Courts. These areas were largely ignored by the Common Law , or secular law of the day, especially in England Plucknett p. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into modern teaching. A summary can be found in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church, sections " Forced baptism of children of Jews and heretics[edit] The question frequently arose whether the children of Jews and other heretics and non-believers should be baptized against the will of their parents.

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Chapter 4 : William of Ockham - Wikipedia

Augustine Triumphus of Ancona. Augustinus Triumphus was an Augustinian Hermit, theologian and writer. He was born in in Ancona (Italy). He belonged to an old patrician family; he died April 2, in Naples.

It seems that a man can merit eternal life without grace. Our Lord says Matt. Now we can do by ourselves what depends on our own will. It seems, therefore, that a man can merit eternal life by himself. Again, God gives eternal life to men as a meed or reward, according to Matt. Again, eternal life is the ultimate end of human life. Now every natural thing can attain its end by its natural power. Much more then can man, who is of a higher nature, attain eternal life by his natural power, without any grace. On the other hand: But no action transcends the limits of the principle by which a thing acts. Thus we see that no natural thing can produce, by its own action, an effect which is greater than its own active power, but only an effect commensurate with this power. Now eternal life is an end which exceeds what is commensurate with human nature, as is clear from what we said in Q. It follows that a man cannot, by his natural powers, produce meritorious works commensurate with eternal life. A higher power is needed for this, namely, the power of grace. Hence a man cannot merit eternal life without grace, although he can perform works which lead to such good as is connatural to him, such as labour in the field, eat, drink, have friends, and so on, as is said by Augustine or by another, in *Contra Pelagianos* 3; *Hypognosticon* 3, cap. On the first point: But as Augustine says in the same passage, his will must be prepared by God through grace. On the second point: It also agrees with what we said in the preceding article. On the third point: But the very fact that human nature is nobler than natural things means that it can be raised, at least through the help of grace, to an end higher than this, to which inferior natures can nowise attain. A man who can recover his health through the help of medicine is, similarly, nearer to health than another who can in nowise do so, as the philosopher remarks in *2 De Coelo*, texts 64,

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Chapter 5 : Thomas Aquinas - Wikipedia

Augustine: Earlier Writings. Professor of Ecclesiastical History, University of Edinburgh, Selections from the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas.

Now this is wealth: Further, according to Boethius De Consol. Therefore happiness consists in wealth. Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" Eccles. But as Boethius says De Consol. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says Polit. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth. Reply to Objection 1. All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: Reply to Objection 2. All things salable can be had for money: Hence it is written Prov. The desire for natural riches is not infinite: But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear Polit. Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: Hence it is written Sirach For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says Ethic. But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says Ethic. Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says Ethic. Moreover, the Apostle says 1 Tim. Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: Therefore happiness consists in honor. On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says Ethic. Therefore happiness does not consist in honor. I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein. As the Philosopher says Ethic. Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: Reply to Objection 3. That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius Div. Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says De Consol. But it happens that fame or glory is false: Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [Augustine, Contra Maxim. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written 2 Cor. The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written Mk. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy. Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever. It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first

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beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power. Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says *De Consol.* First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in *Metaph.* Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself. Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in *Ethic.* But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing. But it is not so with men. Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: For it is written *Sirach* Therefore it consists in the health of the body. Further, *Dionysius* says *Div.* Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness.

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Chapter 6 : CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Fathers of the Church

Augustinus of Ancona's Summa de potestate ecclesiastica (Summary of the Church's Power,) awarded the pope infinite power, placing him above all law and human judgment. William of Cremona's Reprobatio errorum () defended the Church's hierarchy against the more egalitarian theory of Marsiglio of Padua.

A Catholic has the right to refuse obedience in the first case and a duty to oppose the prelate in the second. Their consensus regarding law in general is that the legislator should not simply refrain from demanding something that his subjects would find impossible to carry out, but that laws should not be too difficult or distressing for those subjected to them. Thomas explains that, for a law to be just, it must conform to the demands of reason and have an effect which is both good and for the benefit of those for whom it is intended. A law can cease to bind without revocation on the part of the legislator when it is clearly harmful, impossible, or irrational. *Praelato non est obediendum contra praeceptum divinum.* In support of this teaching St. Thomas cites Acts 5: Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things. On Christmas Day, , Nestorius Patriarch of Constantinople , profiting from the immense crowd assembled to celebrate the birth of the Divine Child to Our Lady uttered this blasphemy from his episcopal throne: The general indignation was voiced by Eusebius, a layman, who stood up in the crowd and protested. Soon a more detailed protest was drafted in the name of the members of the abandoned Church, and numerous copies spread far and wide, declaring anathema on whoever should dare to say that He Who was born of the Virgin Mary was other than the only begotten Son of God. This attitude not only safeguarded the Faith of the Eastern Church, but was praised alike by Popes and Councils. When the shepherd turns into a wolf the first duty of the flock is to defend itself. As a general rule, doctrine comes from the bishops to the faithful, and it is not for the faithful, who are subjects in the order of Faith, to pass judgment on their superiors. But every Christian, by virtue of his title to the name Christian, has not only the necessary knowledge of the essentials of the treasure of Revelation, but also the duty of safeguarding them. The principle is the same, whether it is a matter of belief or conduct, that is of dogma or morals. Treachery such as that of Nestorius is rare in the Church; but it can happen that, for one reason or another, pastors remain silent on essential matters of faith. To sum up what has been demonstrated so far, normally subjects must be obedient to lawful authority in Church and State but they have the right to resist harsh and harmful laws which do not contribute to the common good. They must never compromise the Faith under the pretext of obedience. Catholics in English-speaking countries do not normally have to contend with shepherds who have actually become wolves but with shepherds who permit wolves to ravage their flocks, shepherds who condemn any of the sheep who have the temerity to complain. Such bishops are not the exception, they have become the norm. Dietrich von Hildebrand denounces them with the burning indignation of an Old Testament prophet: They either close their eyes and try, ostrich-style, to ignore the grievous abuses as well as appeals to their duty to intervene, or they fear to be attacked by the press or the mass-media and defamed as reactionary, narrow-minded, or medieval. They fear men more than God. The words of St. John Bosco apply to them: One is forced to think of the hireling who abandons his flocks to the wolves when one reflects on the lethargy of so many bishops and superiors who, though still orthodox themselves, do not have the courage to intervene against the most flagrant heresies and abuses of all kinds in their dioceses or in their orders. He shows with admirable clarity that the mark of a truly faithful Catholic can be a refusal to submit to heretical or compromising bishops. Should the faithful at the time of the Arian heresy, for instance, in which the majority of the bishops were Arians, have limited themselves to being nice and obedient to the ordinances of these bishops, instead of battling heresy? Is not fidelity to the true teaching of the Church to be given priority over submission to the bishop? Is it not precisely by virtue of their obedience to the revealed truths which they received from the Magisterium of the Church, that the faithful offer resistance? The drivel of the heretics, both priests and laymen, is tolerated; the bishops tacitly acquiesce to the poisoning of the faithful. Instead, these people are regarded as disturbers of the peace. Thomas Aquinas together with every reputable

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theologian who has examined the subject. There can be very few faithful Catholics who would refuse to align themselves with St. Thomas and Dietrich von Hildebrand on this point - with one reservation. Many, if not most, would add the proviso: However sincere such people may be, they display a lamentable ignorance of Church history and Catholic theology. He has noted that the attitude of these Catholics towards the Pope is tantamount to the claim that he is inerrant, that his every decision, his every word, is divinely inspired, that he is, in fact, a divine oracle. Writing in the March issue of the *Courier de Rome* he remarked: For them it is as if the person of the Pope were, as such, infallible, and as if all his words, all his directives, all his judgments in all matters, even those foreign to religion, could never be subject to error, though the whole history of the Church protests against that conviction which is close to idolatry. There have been Popes whose doctrine was near-heresy, Honorius and Liberius for example. There were others whose faith, hope and charity could hardly be perceived behind the disorders of their conduct. And there were some whose faults, stupidity, blunders, extravagances, and weaknesses in the government and administration of the Church were such that the divine organism entrusted to their care was more than once shaken. Few readers will possess this huge work but some will own the very scholarly one-volume work on the same subject, *The Popes*, edited by Eric John and published by Burns and Oates. It is only necessary to glance through the brief lives of the Popes in this book to find literally hundreds of examples of "faults, stupidity, blunders, extravagances, and weaknesses" among the Popes. A few of these examples will suffice to make the point: His knowledge and prudence were insufficient for his task of governing the Church, and he was a weak man who blustered and yielded. Within a few days of consecration he conferred on Patroclus, Bishop of Aries, a usurper of the see, unscrupulous in his methods, what amounted to legatine authority over all the bishops of southern Gaul, and reprimanded them harshly when they defended their rights. Zosimus ordered the rehabilitation of an African priest, Apiarius, degraded by his bishop for his immoral life. Pope Boniface II attempted to nominate his successor, "an ambitious and unscrupulous deacon named Vigilus. His action, however, met with such general disapprobation that he rescinded the decree. Pope Zosimus had refused to budge when opposed on equally just grounds. This did not prevent Vigilus from eventually obtaining the papacy. Silverius was unjustly deposed in and Vigilus elected in his place. Silverius was handed over "to Vigilus and his slaves. He was taken to the island of Palmaria where on 11 November his resignation was extorted. On 2 December he died, a victim of ill use and starvation. The guilt of his death rests primarily on Vigilus. The Church honors him as a martyr. In view of his shifty and unscrupulous character a Council of Oriental bishops falsely claimed that the letter of Bishop Ibas was not the document read at Chalcedon. The Council excommunicated Pope Vigilus, who then surrendered. It was perhaps the greatest humiliation in the history of the papacy. This condemnation was sustained by Pope Leo II and repeated by subsequent popes. If Honorius did not really favor heresy then Leo II erred in condemning him, but if Leo II did not err in his condemnation then Honorius was guilty of favoring heresy. Pope Sergius II Legitimate he may have been but suitable he certainly was not. This unscrupulous man who ruled the Church so arrogantly held a Roman Council which overturned the acts of the Council of Many of the better men of the day resisted and a bitter conflict arose. Here is another example of good Catholics justly resisting a bad pope. John conducted himself in the manner of a layman, preferring hunting to church ceremonies, and largely indifferent to Church matters. It was said that he was struck with a paralysis while visiting his mistress. He died on 14 May, without confession or receiving the Sacraments. Charles was made a senator of Rome for life. Seven new cardinals were created, four of them Frenchmen. Those appointed to offices in the Papal States by the previous pope were now displaced in favor of Frenchmen. Indulgences were multiplied, to be gained by an offering of money with little regard paid to the essential spiritual conditions. In the year the Pope proclaimed a Holy Year and allowed would-be pilgrims to the shrines of Rome to forego the arduous journey for a sum roughly equivalent to what they would otherwise have spent. The bankers of Europe were called in to collect the offerings which they divided equally with the Pope. There can be little doubt that Boniface IX, who treated the whole business simply as a political problem, was guilty of simony on a massive scale. Pope Sixtus IV had one dominating idea, "the desire to advance his family and obtain for it a

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leading position in Italy. Other popes had engaged in nepotism, some out of family loyalty and others from political considerations: His morals were equally unsuitable, and he openly avowed his illegitimate children. Administrative incompetence and the expenses of foreign policy in the early years of his pontificate led both to an increase in the sale of offices and to the creation of new posts in order that they might be sold. The number of papal secretaries was increased to twenty-six and the new posts sold for 62, ducats, while fifty-two Plumbatores were appointed to seal bulls, each of whom paid 2, ducats for his appointment. Despite the fact that all these citations appear in an approved and highly praised work of Catholic scholarship, many Catholics will be shocked to read them. They reveal that men totally unsuited for the highest office to which a human being can rise have been elected to the office of Sovereign Pontiff. They reveal that popes have appointed unworthy officials; that popes have been deceived by unscrupulous men; that policies they initiated have done harm to the Church; that they have subordinated the good of the Church to political policies, to the interests of a particular country or their family. If true, these statements reveal that to be elected pope guarantees neither impeccability nor inerrancy. But as the Church has never taught that the pope is impeccable or inerrant, no Catholic should shirk facing up to the truth. A most interesting article on this work appeared in the 19 July issue of *The Commonweal*, at that time one of the most reputable and orthodox publications in the English-speaking Catholic world. The article in *The Commonweal* comments: The circumstances of the time were favorable to Pastor. The nineteenth century had seen an unprecedented development of the historical sciences, and nowhere was this development more remarkable than in Germany, where Pastor was trained. Immense stores of authentic materials were made available to historians, and the publication of manuscripts and documents, of the fruits of individual and collective research, of historical monographs of every kind and of reviews which gave concession to the findings and opinions of every school of thought increased on all sides. Leo XIII gave further impetus to this movement when in he opened to historians the incomparable riches of the Vatican archives. Pope Leo performed an even greater service by his letter on the study of history, in which he declared that the Church has nothing to fear from the truth and desires only that the truth be known. He reaffirmed the norms by which all sound historical scholarship must be guided; the first law of history is, "Never tell a lie," and the second, "Do not fear to tell the truth."

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Chapter 7 : The Augustinian Order and Papal Power | Sacra Pagina

Augustine School was founded in and added the high school in The class of was our Ecclesiastical History Summa Theologica(selections) Dante.

Last updated on January 4, Aquinas asks when it is just to wage war. Clearly, war is a sin. Quotes in italics are from the Summa Theologica. For a war to be just, three conditions must be met: It is the just duty of our government to be a nonpartisan body which citizens may seek redress for wrongs committed against them. When this is the case, citizens do not have to resort to war or agitation. A root of violence is implicit in the duty of government. As government becomes more corrupt, justice declines, partisanship flourishes, and agitation emerges. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle Rom. Hence it is said to those who are in authority Ps. None of these wars can be considered defensive. Iraq never attacked the United States. Politicians most frequently go to war to enrich political associates, create a legacy for themselves, and create work for defense contractors. This is self aggrandizement of the most undiluted variety. Torture scandals, attacks on civilians, and the terror tactics used in modern war by US troops are unquestionably cruel. Is it sinful to go to war? Virtus added additional thoughts or echoed important points. It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mat. Killing another unjustly is an act that condemns the killer. Our Father turns unjust weapons on their owners either on earth or at judgment. The question of defensive war emerges and is aptly handled by Aquinas. Was Vietnam a defensive war? If one buys the domino theory of geopolitics a person can make that argument. Socialism, though, can only sustain itself if the proletariat eliminates all other classes and commits itself not to the grand vision of the French socialists but to abject poverty. Since this is not in the nature of human beings, the domino theory is not likely. Vietnam was a tragic farce. Was the first and second Gulf war a defensive war? The second Gulf war is an outgrowth of the first Gulf war. Terrorist attacks in New York had nothing to do with Iraq. The first Gulf war was a war waged on humanitarian grounds. No shots were fired at the United States, and no plans were afoot to invade US territory. Worse yet the grounds for the war were subsequently found to be a hoax. Aquinas - Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says Contra Faust. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword. Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written Mat. Aquinas - Such like precepts, as Augustine observes De Serm. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says Ep. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy. Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin. The outcome of these conflicts would not be peace, but the sort of violence we see in the nation building efforts in Iraq. Civilians are blown to pieces by military rounds, and the assets of warring nations are depleted. The solution to these political wars is peaceful commerce and an attitude of live and let live. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace. Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by

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the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself. On the contrary, they were told: If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering. The war on terror is not a manly exercise, and those police, TSA officials, and military that engage in this unjust war are in a state of perpetual sin. This applies to all unjust war. Invasions of privacy, the person, and property are violence. This is a violation of the Golden Rule. Incidentally, the modern libertarian incarnation of the golden rule is the Axiom of Non-Aggression. Aquinas - Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering.

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Chapter 8 : Canonizations not always infallible. - page 1 - Crisis in the Church - Catholic Info

Der Metaphysikkommentar des Augustinus Triumphus von Ancona [Augustini de Ancona sive Triumphi Summa de ecclesiastica potestate] Augustine of Ancona

Beatification and canonization since Vatican II: The traditional principles In order to proceed with order, we shall begin this part by defining beatification and canonization before demonstrating that canonization is infallible as such, leaving aside the circumstances that have arisen with the aggiornamento of Vatican II. Some Definitions a Beatification Beatification is an act by which the Sovereign Pontiff grants permission to render public honor to the beatified in certain parts of the Church until canonization. This act is therefore not a precept; it is a temporary, not definitive, act; it is reformable. Beatification amounts to authorization of public veneration. The act of beatification does not directly assert either the glorification or the heroic virtues of the servant of God. The object of canonization is threefold, for this act does not involve the cultus only. Firstly, the pope declares that the faithful departed is in the glory of heaven; secondly, he declares that the faithful departed merited to reach this glory by the exercise of heroic virtues which serve as an example for the whole Church; thirdly, in order to better set these virtues as an example and to thank God for having made them possible, he prescribes that public veneration be rendered to the faithful departed. Regarding these three points: The act of canonization declares definitively the sanctity of the canonized person as well as his glorification, and consequently it prescribes the cultus for the whole Church. It is another thing to prescribe the celebration of a Mass and recitation of an office in honor of the saint: The enrollment of a person in the Martyrology does not signify the infallible canonization of the individual. The Martyrology is the list that includes not only all the canonized saints, but also the servants of God that could have been beatified, either by the Sovereign Pontiff or by the bishops before the 12th century, the date at which the pope reserved to himself the privilege of conducting beatifications and canonizations. The difference is that beatification only makes the cultus possible it is a permission , while canonization renders the cultus obligatory it is a precept and imposes on the faithful the duty to believe explicitly in the reality of the glory and the heroic virtues of the saint. In all of that, the essential is the exemplary or heroic virtue of the faithful departed, and this is what one seeks to verify in the two inquiries, that of the beatification and that of the canonization. In effect, the cultus presupposes this virtue as the effect presupposes its cause. The miracles of themselves are only taken into account as signs that attest the heroic virtue. Without heroic virtue, there can be no sanctity and no veneration. This explains why neither all nor many people are canonized. Good example, to make an impression, must be unique or rare. Inflating the number of saints reduces their value as models. Then again, the Church has always given the examples of which the faithful are in need in their particular era. In this sense, canonization is a political act in the best sense of the term: Joan of Arc was canonized in , more than years after her death; St. Therese of the Child Jesus was canonized in , less than 30 years after her death. These two examples were beneficial to the Church, but the first would have been hard to comprehend had it occurred earlier, or too soon, before the passage of time had blurred the context and the aftermath of a century-long conflict. There is another difference to be noted, the one between salvation and sanctity. A person who dies in the odor of sanctity is saved, but one can be saved without having lived like a saint. In the eyes of the faithful, the chief purpose and immediate effect of canonization is to point out to set as an example holiness of life. Even if they have been saved and gone to heaven, one is not going to canonize people who have not given the example of holiness during their lifetime. Infallibility The question of infallibility is twofold. First, is the sovereign pontiff's judgment infallible when he canonizes a saint 2. Then, is it of faith that this judgment is infallible, such that denying it would be heretical 2. Each of these questions could be answered preliminarily following the indications given by Pope Sixtus V during the final consistory that preceded the canonization of St. Basing his arguments upon Holy Scripture, theological reasoning, and all manner of proofs, the pope demonstrated that the Roman Pontiff, the true successor of St. Peter and prince of the Apostles for whom Christ prayed,

asking that his faith fail not, who is the veritable head of the Church, foundation and column of truth directed and led by the Holy Ghost, cannot be mistaken nor induce into error when he canonizes saints. And he affirmed that this truth must be believed not only as a pious belief, but as the object of a very certain and necessary act of faith; and to establish this point he adduced all the weighty arguments of reason and divine authority. To which he added also, something quite obvious, that the laws of the Church and of the pope are certain and guaranteed whenever they concern the discipline of faith and morals and rest upon sure principles and solid foundations. That is why this twofold question must be examined in greater detail and take into consideration the hypotheses of different theologians. Canonization is infallible The infallibility of canonizations is today held to be a common and certain doctrine by the majority of theologians. According to him, the infallibility of a canonization is neither necessary nor possible. His fundamental reasoning is identical to that of Cajetan. Since Vatican II, some conciliar theologians have adopted this anti-infallibilist position. Some of them have alleged difficulties of an historical nature to call in question the infallibility of canonizations. Brunero Gherardini in an article published in *Divinitas* drew up an assessment of the controversy over this subject. Thomas,[14] the great majority of canonists[15] and theologians[16] defend the thesis of the infallibility of canonizations. Let us remark that the proposed question is very precise: Thomas does not ask if the pope is infallible when he canonizes a saint. The focus of his questioning is to know whether all the saints who have been canonized by the Church are in glory or if some of them may be in hell. This way of asking the question already affects the answer. This does not exclude the other two aspects: But there is an order among the three judgments the pope makes when he canonizes a saint. The first judgment bears upon a theoretical fact and states that a deceased person persevered to the end in the heroic exercise of supernatural virtue and is at present glorified in eternal beatitude. The third judgment is a precept that imposes public veneration of the saint on the whole Church. Canonization gives the heroic virtues of the saint as a model and makes his cultus obligatory. Benedict XIV, who quotes and adopts these reflections of St. Thomas, considers that, in the last analysis, the judgment of canonization rests upon a statement of a speculative truth deduced from revelation. To do so, we do not have at our disposition any argument of the supreme teaching authority, for the infallibility of canonizations has not been defined as a dogma. Thomas limits himself to giving what would be the equivalent of an argument from authority: There are two reductions: The first *reductio ad absurdum* on the practical level: The second *reductio ad absurdum* is on the theoretical level: Augustine says that if there were an error in the teaching of divine revelation consigned to the Scriptures, faith would be deprived of its foundation; but just as our faith is based on the teachings of Sacred Scripture, it is also based on the teaching of the universal Church; hence, if an error were found in the teachings of the universal Church, our faith would likewise be deprived of its foundation; now God cannot deprive the faith of its foundation; hence, like the teaching of Sacred Scripture, the teachings of the universal Church, including canonization, must be infallible. Dominic Banez completes this argument by specifying that if one affirms the possibility of error in the canonization of saints, the Church Militant would be scandalized in its morals, its profession of faith would be made suspect, and the Church Militant in heaven would be insulted. To corroborate these defensive arguments, St. Thomas then uses an argument of theological reason. The judgment of canonization is a judgment of the pope in a matter that implies a certain profession of faith, since to venerate a saint and imitate his virtues is to say implicitly that one believes he has attained the glory of heaven. The judgment of canonization is hence infallible. It is at this point useful to turn to clarifications given by John of St. Thomas in order to understand why the divine assistance is here required in particular. The judgment of canonization can be understood as a conclusion resulting from two premises. The first is a formally revealed conditional: The second is a probable fact attested by human testimony: The conclusion that flows from these two premises is thus obtained by means of testimony, and that is why it does not flow from a real, absolutely compelling, scientific demonstration. The judgment of canonization involves a line of argument which the classical logicians would have considered as probable. We find there what must normally be proved in every theological reasoning, since the proposition stated in the conclusion in this case is linked,

albeit indirectly, to a truth of faith. Though only indirect, the link exists, and the conclusion is rooted despite everything in a formal and explicit profession of faith. The difference that leads one to say that this argument is only probable is that, to establish a theological conclusion, one reasons from an evident and certain proposition of reason, whereas to establish the judgment of a canonization one reasons from testimonies. That is why divine assistance is necessary, precisely at the level of the discernment of the testimonies: One could object that if canonization is considered as infallible, it is placed on the same level as solemn, *ex cathedra* definitions, which seems inconceivable. Benedict XIV answers, with all of the most assured theological tradition,[19] that such assimilation is, on the contrary, in the order of things. Certainly, one cannot univocally reduce canonization to an infallible dogmatic definition; but one may nonetheless consider that the act of the infallible solemn magisterium happens in analogically various ways. An act of the pope having as its end the conservation of the common good of the entire Church is an act of infallible definition. Now, the pope conserves the common good of the whole Church not only when he acts strictly as supreme Doctor in teaching, but also when he acts more broadly as supreme Pastor in governing. The teaching of the doctor does not exhaust all the activity of the pastor. And it is incumbent on the pastor to make the laws that provide for the common good of the whole Church; as such these laws do not express formally revealed truth; but insofar as they are given for the good of the unity of faith, these are analogues of an infallible definition. Thomas and his commentators, that if canonization is in consequence a model and a law, it is also formally and foremost a mediate profession of faith. One could already rightly assimilate it to a definition. Canonization could be reduced to the exercise of the infallible and personal solemn magisterium of the sovereign pontiff as its secondary object. Among other authors, Fr. Salaverri cites several examples in which one sees that the terms employed by Popes Pius XI and Pius XII express without the least doubt their explicit intention to exercise a solemn, infallible act. Some think this infallibility is not a defined dogma of faith: Others think this conclusion is equivalent to a dogma of faith. Let us remark that the question is twofold: There is also the value of the infallibility of the act of canonization: Thomas, and Bannez are interested in both aspects, but give priority to the first. Is it of defined faith that a canonized saint is indubitably in the glory of heaven? The most common thesis in theology is that in which one demonstrates that the glorification of a canonized saint can be infallibly defined not as of faith, that is to say as formally revealed, but as virtually revealed. Denial of this truth does not entail the note of heresy because it is not a formally revealed truth and because its negation would only indirectly be detrimental to faith. If this virtually revealed truth is the object of an infallible definition in the context of an act of canonization, it will be defined, not as of divine and catholic faith, but as certain or of catholic faith; its denial would thus be erroneous or false; and according to John of St.

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Chapter 9 : Thought of Thomas Aquinas - Wikipedia

A higher power is needed for this, namely, the power of grace. Hence a man cannot merit eternal life without grace, although he can perform works which lead to such good as is connatural to him, such as labour in the field, eat, drink, have friends, and so on, as is said by Augustine (or by another, in Contra Pelagianos 3; Hypognosticon 3, cap. 4).

Questions, in turn, are subdivided into 3, Articles. First Part QQ, Art. Second Part QQ, Art. General principles of morality including a theory of law. Morality in particular, including individual virtues and vices. Third Part 90 QQ, Art. The person and work of Christ, who is the way of man to God; the sacraments. Aquinas left this part unfinished. The third part proper is attended by a posthumous supplement which concludes the third part and the Summa, treating of Christian eschatology, or "the last things". Additionally, there are two very small appendices which discuss the subject of purgatory. The Summa has a standard format for each article, which can be explained by taking another article Pt. A short counter-statement, beginning with the phrase *sed contra* "on the contrary", is then given; this statement almost always references authoritative literature, such as the Bible, Aristotle, or the Church Fathers. For example, Aquinas states that "it was fitting for Christ to lead a life of poverty in this world" for four distinct reasons, each of which is expounded in some detail. These replies range from one sentence to several paragraphs in length. The arguments from authority, or *sed contra* arguments, are almost entirely based on citations from these authors. Some were called by special names: He was considered the most astute philosopher – the one who had expressed the most truth up to that time. The main aim of the Scholastic theologians was to use his precise technical terms and logical system to investigate theology. Writer of the dominant theological text for the time: The Jurist or The Legal Expert *iurisperitus*: Ulpian a Roman jurist, the most-quoted contributor to the Pandects. Marcus Tullius Cicero, famed Roman statesman and orator who was also responsible for bringing significant swathes of Greek philosophy to Latin-speaking audiences, though generally through summation and commentary in his own work rather than by translation. Aquinas refers to the works of Dionysius, whom scholars of the time thought to be the person mentioned in Acts. However, they were most likely written in Syria during the 6th century by a writer who attributed his book to Dionysius hence the addition of the prefix "pseudo-" to the name "Dionysius" in most modern references to these works. Aquinas also cites the Islamic theologian al-Ghazali Algazel. Rabbi Moses Maimonides was a Jewish rabbinical scholar, a near-contemporary of Aquinas died, before Aquinas. The scholastics derived many insights from his work, as he also employed the scholastic method. Notable points made by the Summa[edit] Theology is the most certain of all sciences because its source is divine knowledge which cannot be deceived and because of the greater worth of its subject matter, the sublimity of which transcends human reason. That is, its being and the conception of being man has or can imagine of it for example, a mountain of solid gold would have essence – since it can be imagined – but not existence, as it is not in the world are separate in all things – except for God, who is simple. Thomas felt that it can be proved by human reason alone that God created the universe, reason alone could not determine whether the universe actually began at some point in time or was eternal, but only divine revelation from the Book of Genesis proves that. Thomas was a member. Being a monk is greater than being married and even greater in many ways than being a priest, but it is not as good as being a bishop. Both monks and bishops are in a state of perfection. The structure of the Summa Theologiae is meant to reflect the cyclic nature of the cosmos, in the sense of the emission and return of the Many from and to the One in Platonism, cast in terms of Christian theology: The procession of the material universe from divine essence, the culmination of creation in man, and the motion of man back towards God by way of Christ and the Sacraments. It begins with God and his existence in Question 2. The entire first part of the Summa deals with God and his creation, which reaches its zenith in man. The First Part, therefore, ends with the treatise on man. The ethics detailed in this part are a summary of the ethics Aristotelian in nature that man must follow to reach his intended destiny. Since no man on his own can truly live the perfect ethical life and therefore reach God, it was necessary that a perfect man

bridge the gap between God and man. Thus God became man. The third part of the Summa, therefore, deals with the life of Christ. Summary of key opinions in the Summa[edit] The following is from the New Schaffâ€”Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge [30] a public-domain work: The Summa, Part I: Theology[edit] St. He worked on it from the time of Clement IV after until the end of his life. What was lacking was added afterwards from the fourth book of his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard as a supplementum, which is not found in manuscripts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It consists of three parts. Part I treats of God, who is the " first cause , himself uncaused" primum movens immobile and as such existent only in act actu â€” that is, pure actuality without potentiality, and therefore without corporeality. His essence is actus purus et perfectus. This follows from the fivefold proof for the existence of God; namely, there must be a first mover, unmoved, a first cause in the chain of causes, an absolutely necessary being, an absolutely perfect being, and a rational designer. In this connection the thoughts of the unity, infinity , unchangeability, and goodness of the highest being are deduced. As God rules in the world, the "plan of the order of things" preexists in him; in other words, his providence and the exercise of it in his government are what condition as cause everything which comes to pass in the world. Reprobation , however, is more than mere foreknowledge; it is the "will of permitting anyone to fall into sin and incur the penalty of condemnation for sin". The effect of predestination is grace. Since God is the first cause of everything, he is the cause of even the free acts of men through predestination. Determinism is deeply grounded in the system of St. Thomas; things with their source of becoming in God are ordered from eternity as means for the realization of his end in himself. On moral grounds, St. Thomas advocates freedom energetically; but, with his premises, he can have in mind only the psychological form of self-motivation. Nothing in the world is accidental or free, although it may appear so in reference to the proximate cause. From this point of view, miracles become necessary in themselves and are to be considered merely as inexplicable to man. From the point of view of the first cause, all is unchangeable, although from the limited point of view of the secondary cause, miracles may be spoken of. In his doctrine of the Trinity , Aquinas starts from the Augustinian system. Since God has only the functions of thinking and willing, only two processiones can be asserted from the Father; but these establish definite relations of the persons of the Trinity, one to another. The relations must be conceived as real and not as merely ideal; for, as with creatures relations arise through certain accidents, since in God there is no accident but all is substance, it follows that "the relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to the thing". From another side, however, the relations as real must be really distinguished one from another. Therefore, three persons are to be affirmed in God. Man stands opposite to God; he consists of soul and body. The "intellectual soul" consists of intellect and will. Furthermore, the soul is the absolutely indivisible form of man; it is immaterial substance, but not one and the same in all men as the Averroists assumed. As certain principles are immanent in the mind for its speculative activity, so also a "special disposition of works" â€” or the synderesis rudiment of conscience â€” is inborn in the "practical reason", affording the idea of the moral law of nature so important in medieval ethics. The Summa, Part II: The first part comprises quaestiones, and the second part comprises The two parts of the second part are usually presented as containing several "treatises". The contents are as follows: First part of Part II: Treatise on the last end qq. Acts peculiar to humans qq. Treatise on the theological virtues qq. God sways the intellect; he gives the power to know and impresses the species intelligibiles on the mind, and he sways the will in that he holds the good before it as aim, creating the virtus volendi. Here the Areopagitic ideas of the graduated effects of created things play their part in St. The second part of the Summa two parts, Prima Secundae and Secunda Secundae follows this complex of ideas. Thomas develops his system of ethics, which has its root in Aristotle. In a chain of acts of will, man strives for the highest end. They are free acts, insofar as man has in himself the knowledge of their end and therein the principle of action. In that the will wills the end, it wills also the appropriate means, chooses freely and completes the consensus. Whether the act is good or evil depends on the end. The "human reason" pronounces judgment concerning the character of the end; it is, therefore, the law for action. Human acts, however, are meritorious insofar as they promote the purpose of God and his honor.

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By repeating a good action, man acquires a moral habit or a quality that enables him to do the good gladly and easily. This is true, however, only of the intellectual and moral virtues which St. Thomas treats after the manner of Aristotle ; the theological virtues are imparted by God to man as a "disposition", from which the acts here proceed; while they strengthen, they do not form it. The "disposition" of evil is the opposite alternative. An act becomes evil through deviation from the reason and from divine moral law. Therefore, sin involves two factors: Sin has its origin in the will, which decides against reason for a "changeable good". Since, however, the will also moves the other powers of man, sin has its seat in these too. By choosing such a lower good as its end, the will is misled by self-love, so that this works as cause in every sin.