

**Chapter 1 : Outside in - Involvements with reality Â» Blog Archive Â» SF Communism**

*will argue that the analysis of 'authentic historicality' in Being and Time s shows the link between the authenticity of Dasein and Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism.*

Heidegger remained at Freiburg im Breisgau for the rest of his life, declining a number of later offers, including one from Humboldt University of Berlin. He resigned the rectorate in April , but remained a member of the Nazi Party until even though as Julian Young asserts the Nazis eventually prevented him from publishing. Evans , Heidegger was not only a member of the Nazi Party, but "enthusiastic" about participating. His resignation from the rectorate owed more to his frustration as an administrator than to any principled opposition to the Nazis, according to historians. No punitive measures against him were proposed. Hermann was told of this at the age of Arendt was Jewish , and Blochmann had one Jewish parent, making them subject to severe persecution by the Nazi authorities. He helped Blochmann emigrate from Germany before the start of World War II and resumed contact with both of them after the war. He considered the seclusion provided by the forest to be the best environment in which to engage in philosophical thought. In particular, the language is obfuscatory and the logical sequence between one sentence and the next is obscure throughout. Heidegger thought the presence of things for us is not their being, but merely them interpreted as equipment according to a particular system of meaning and purpose. For instance, when a hammer is efficiently used to knock in nails, we cease to be aware of it. This is termed "ready to hand", and Heidegger considers it an authentic mode, saying that the given "past" has presence in an oversimplified way when reduced to possible future usefulness to us. Heidegger claimed philosophy and science since ancient Greece had reduced things to their presence, which was a superficial way of understanding them. Rather, Husserl argued that all that philosophy could and should be is a description of experience hence the phenomenological slogan, "to the things themselves". But for Heidegger, this meant understanding that experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being. Heidegger argues that describing experience properly entails finding the being for whom such a description might matter. Heidegger thus conducts his description of experience with reference to " Dasein ", the being for whom Being is a question. In everyday German, "Dasein" means "existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger criticized the abstract and metaphysical character of traditional ways of grasping human existence as rational animal, person, man, soul, spirit, or subject. Dasein, then, is not intended as a way of conducting a philosophical anthropology , but is rather understood by Heidegger to be the condition of possibility for anything like a philosophical anthropology. The marriage of these two observations depends on the fact that each of them is essentially concerned with time. That Dasein is thrown into an already existing world and thus into its mortal possibilities does not only mean that Dasein is an essentially temporal being; it also implies that the description of Dasein can only be carried out in terms inherited from the Western tradition itself. For Heidegger, unlike for Husserl, philosophical terminology could not be divorced from the history of the use of that terminology, and thus genuine philosophy could not avoid confronting questions of language and meaning. Being and Time Being and Time German title: In Being and Time, Heidegger investigates the question of Being by asking about the being for whom Being is a question. Heidegger names this being Dasein see above , and he pursues his investigation through themes such as mortality, care , anxiety, temporality, and historicity. Being and Time influenced many thinkers, including such existentialist thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre although Heidegger distanced himself from existentialism â€”see below. The Turn[ edit ] See also: Heidegger often went for a walk on the path in this field. Richardson [55] to at least reflect a shift of focus, if not indeed a major change in his philosophical outlook, which is known as "the turn" die Kehre. For example, in Mark Wrathall [60] argued that Heidegger pursued and refined the central notion of unconcealment throughout his life as a philosopher. Its importance and continuity in his thinking, Wrathall states, shows that he did not have a "turn". Heidegger understands the commencement of the history of Western philosophy as a brief period of authentic openness to being, during the time of the pre-Socratics , especially Anaximander , Heraclitus , and Parmenides. This was followed, according to Heidegger, by a long period increasingly dominated by the forgetting of this initial openness, a period which

commences with Plato , and which occurs in different ways throughout Western history. Heidegger sees poetry and technology as two contrasting ways of " revealing. Technology, on the other hand, when it gets going, inaugurates the world of the dichotomous subject and object, which modern philosophy commencing with Descartes also reveals. But with modern technology a new stage of revealing is reached, in which the subject-object distinction is overcome even in the "material" world of technology. The essence of modern technology is the conversion of the whole universe of beings into an undifferentiated "standing reserve" Bestand of energy available for any use to which humans choose to put it. Despite this, some commentators have insisted that an agrarian nostalgia permeates his later work. What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger and the ground of History[ edit ] Heidegger believed the Western world to be on a trajectory headed for total war, [66] and on the brink of profound nihilism [67] the rejection of all religious and moral principles , [68] which would be the purest and highest revelation of Being itself, [69] offering a horrifying crossroads of either salvation or the end of metaphysics and modernity ; [70] rendering the West a wasteland populated by tool-using brutes, characterized by an unprecedented ignorance and barbarism [71] in which everything is permitted. Augustine of Hippo[ edit ] Recent scholarship has shown that Heidegger was substantially influenced by St. Although he later worked less on Aristotle, Heidegger recommended postponing reading Nietzsche, and to "first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years". Both informed the argument of Being and Time. Heidegger claimed to have revived the question of being, the question having been largely forgotten by the metaphysical tradition extending from Plato to Descartes , a forgetfulness extending to the Age of Enlightenment and then to modern science and technology. In pursuit of the retrieval of this question, Heidegger spent considerable time reflecting on ancient Greek thought , in particular on Plato, Parmenides , Heraclitus , and Anaximander, as well as on the tragic playwright Sophocles. This dating of the influence is much too late. On the relation between the two figures, Gadamer wrote: Dostal understood the importance of Husserl to be profound: Dahlstrom concluded his consideration of the relation between Heidegger and Husserl as follows: Heidegger read The Will to Power as the culminating expression of Western metaphysics, and the lectures are a kind of dialogue between the two thinkers. Adorno, on the other hand, pointed to the dialectic reflection of historical situations, the sociological interpretations of future outcomes, and therefore opposed the liberating principles of intuitive concepts because they negatively surpassed the perception of societal realities. Reinhard May refers to Chang Chung-Yuan who stated "Heidegger is the only Western Philosopher who not only intellectually understands Tao, but has intuitively experienced the essence of it as well. It can be shown, moreover, that in particular instances Heidegger even appropriated wholesale and almost verbatim major ideas from the German translations of Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics. A clearer impact of Heidegger in Iran is associated with thinkers such as Ahmad Fardid and Reza Davari Ardakani who have been closely associated with the unfolding of philosophical thinking in a Muslim modern theological legacy in Iran. This included the construction of the ideological foundations of the Iranian Revolution and modern political Islam in its connections with theology. The Heidegger controversy[ edit ].

**Chapter 2 : Authentic Historical Technology Patent Print Art by Industrial Prints – IndustrialPrints**

*A notion of authentic historicality, giving rise to a genuine grasp of history, in its resonance with Marx and Marxism, is one which is intensively discussed in the French reception of Heidegger, negatively by Jean-Francois Lyotard, Pierre Bourdieu and Emmanuel Faye, positively by Bernard Stiegler, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe.*

Because people everywhere regard the destining of Being only in terms of history and represent the latter as a happening, they attempt in vain to interpret such happening in terms of what is stated in Being and Time about the historicality of Dasein not of Being. By contrast, the sole possible way for thinking to anticipate the later thought of the destining of Being coming from Being and Time is to think through what is presented in Being and Time concerning the Destruktion of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings. The Heidegger Circle Annual, 2 And yet, this retrospective indication, coming from the later perspective of the history of Being, oversimplifies what is at stake in the historicality of Dasein, and in particular conceals a key element in what is at stake in understanding the transition from the historicality of Dasein to the history of Being. For what Heidegger states here in implies that one could separate the issue of the historicality of Dasein from the task of Destruktion, something that is emphatically not the case in Being and Time. There, the theme of Destruktion is introduced explicitly in terms of the historicality of Dasein: It is this intrinsic connection between Destruktion and the his- toricality of Dasein that I would like to pursue in these remarks, with a view to better understanding just how the fundamental ontology of Dasein anticipates and opens onto what would later be called the his- tory of Being. My underlying thesis – and it is, I hope to show, an uncontroversial one – can be stated straightforwardly: To begin with, let us undertake a brief survey of how Destruktion is understood by the early Heidegger in some of his lectures that predate Being and Time. The idea of phenomenological critique, which would soon become understood as Destruktion, was, however, not to be taken in a negative sense, Heidegger insisted. The tradition must be dismantled [abgebaut]. It must take its point of departure from the present day das Heute , and resist the tendency to- ward system. The notes that form the appendix to this volume, which may stem from a later period, are quite explicit in naming Destruktion: In section 6 of the Introduction to his magnum opus, Heidegger again depicts the task of Destruktion in terms of a regression to the original sources from which the dominant concepts and categories of ontology were drawn, a going back that undoes the concealments of the history of ontology and that performs a critical role in relation to the present. This point, I shall later suggest, is of particular significance in understanding the fate of Destruktion itself. The tradi- tion even brings such provenance [Herkunft] in general into oblivion. It is Greek ontology itself that is thus responsible for such concealment, Heidegger insists: It is ancient Greek ontology and its heritage, therefore, that face the initial task of Destruktion. If transparency regarding its own history is to be at- tained for the question of Being itself, then what is needed is a loosening up of the congealed tradition and a liberation from the concealments it has brought about. We understand this task as the Destruktion of the transmitted content of ancient ontology, accom- plished by way of the guiding thread of the question of Being, to arrive at the original experiences from which the initial and subsequently leading determinations of Being were acquired. Yet that history is a non-history, insofar as the question of Being has not been explicitly posed as a question ever since the Greek beginning: Such are, in outline, the task and framework of Destruktion as presented in Being and Time, a project that will be maintained at least over the next two years, as documented in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology and Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Heidegger himself later – much later – concedes as much. What, then, is the path that leads from the Destruktion to a precursory insight into the destining of Being? The path, I want to suggest, cannot simply be a delineation of the project of Destruktion itself, but must entail reflection upon the insight that gives rise to and grounds the necessity of Destruktion: The key reflection here, I would propose, is found in section 76 of Being and Time. And its theme is Dasein itself, being-in-the-world itself as having been there, and as transmitted through its traces: It must have as its object nothing other than the possible, possibility itself. Such historiological inquiry is undertaken not out of mere historical interest, for the purposes of disclosing what was or was not possible in the past, but as an openness toward and retrieval of possibility to come. For what

becomes apparent here is that Dasein does not project itself " does not project its own Being as possibility " and that to suggest that it does as in fact occurs in the hermeneutic phenomenology of Being and Time is not only phenomenologically inaccurate and misleading, but inevitably attributes to Dasein a kind of subjectivity: Thinking is " this says: Being has embraced its [i. Thought in a more original way, such favoring means the bestowal of their essence as a gift. From this favoring Being enables thinking. Yet it is important to see 34 From Destruction to the History of Being that this destinal character of Being becomes manifest only in and through a projection of authentic historiography and its rootedness in the authentic historicity of Dasein. On the one hand, this implies that insight into the destinal character of Being cannot, therefore, come about via reflection on the project of Destruction alone, but entails an appreciation of how Destruction, as a historiographical project, is grounded in the historicity of Dasein. On the other hand, it implies that the later thought of the history of Being as destinal cannot itself be thought without historiographical presentation of the history of philosophy, of the traces left by Dasein that has been there. It is important to remember that in Being and Time, the Destruction of the history of philosophy was not yet fully accomplished, but only intimated in its necessity by reference to the Greek beginning and its subsequent transformations, and projected for Part Two of the investigation. Rather, as concealments, they are at the same time the manifold ways in which Being has destined itself positively, not beyond, but in and through its very withdrawal, its self-concealment. In showing that the horizon of our understanding of Being exceeds that horizon of presence that was determinative for the Greek beginning, Heidegger noted in his Le Thor seminar of , the analytic of Dasein enables us to delimit the meaning of Being in its non-metaphysical sense. With this, he states, the Destruction has attained its goal. The history of metaphysics thereby receives a fundamentally different significance. Not only that, however: Pagination cited for Sein und Zeit follows that of the first edition Halle a. Indiana University Press, See, in particular, *ibid.* Critique is a positive hearing-out of genuine motivations. Non-genuine motivations are no motivations at all, and can be understood as non-genuine only in terms of the genuine. What is phenomenologically genuine demonstrates itself as such, it does not need some further theoretical criterion. Translated by John van Buren in *Supplements: State University of New York Press, , Freedom is the realm of destining that on each occasion brings a revealing onto its path. The Art of Existing New Jersey: Humanities Press, , chapter 9. Essays in His Earliest Thought, eds. SUNY, , chapter 7, note 8.*

**Chapter 3 : Martin Heidegger - Wikipedia**

*translation throughout, I use the term "historicality" when referring to Dasein's authentic process of historizing as Being-in-the-world as Being-with others. 3 James Magrini, "Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, Technology, and the.*

From Resoluteness to Releasement Published: From Resoluteness to Releasement, Continuum, , pp. The ambition of the undertaking does credit to its writer, but it may be over-ambition to attempt to cram into fewer than pages a discussion of this deeply contested domain. While the line of discussion is broadly well conceived, lucidly presented and well defended, it is likely that those criticised en route to its conclusions will be less than satisfied by the inevitable brevity of the treatment of their views. This is a book which would have been better, if it were longer. Even so, there is much to admire, and the following will delineate its method of procedure, its strengths, and its limitations, and, in passing, what seem to this reviewer anyway, to be the principal casualties of some self-imposed limit on the number of words to be committed to paper. There is an interesting agreement between those who see Heidegger as having been a Nazi all along and those who see him as an inspiring thinker, all along, in their respective commitments to a single trajectory of thought. While the latter claim is moot, it is clearly the case that this introduction does not in fact delineate the torso of the enquiry, as carried out in *Being and Time*. As has often been remarked, the re-thematisation of *Mitsein* as authentic generationality and historicality is incomplete and prevents the transition from taking place. Through *Phenomenology to Thought* It also returns to consider the earlier essay on truth, while failing to point up the connection back to resoluteness, as the ontological-existential condition for the arrival of a conception of truth, in *Being and Time*. Readings of these would have rebalanced a discussion which runs more in terms of the subjectivising notions of turn and shift, to the elision of the eventualising notions of transition and change. Against the overarching intent of the reading, the discussion in chapters two and five thus turns more into a questioning of what Heidegger might have meant, and how his commentators have responded to him, as opposed to a focus on what calls for thought. The tone of the Conclusion underlines the difficulty: Two of the principal targets of this analysis are Michael Zimmerman and Bret W. The diagnosis is that, whereas in *Being and Time* the forgetting of being *Seinsvergessenheit* calls for resoluteness in taking up again the task for thinking, in "The Question Concerning Technology" a deepening oblivion of being *Seinsverlassenheit* requires a more nuanced attentiveness to what has gone missing: The reading of "The Question Concerning Technology" in chapter four is the high point of the book, and could be thought to demonstrate what writing in the mode of releasement is like, by contrast to the writing of *Being and Time*, in the mode of resolution: For the transition from resolution to releasement is not just a shift in terminology, or of ontological commitment: This is not simply a question of human beings somehow coming to recognise that there is a topic here to be enquired about, but of transformations of the human, which may lead to a deepening incapacity to respond to the forgetting and oblivion of being. The virtues of his lucid discussions are many: It makes comprehensible the transitions from an analysis of being, *Sein* and *Dasein*, to a focus on *beyng Sein, Seyn* and *Ereignis*, although an understanding of the shift of register between being and *beyng* is assumed rather than argued. Lectures from , and *Logic as the Question of the Essence of Language: Lectures from* In the context of assessing degrees of Nazism, the politics of this are further complicated by the indelible marking of the German language and its literature by the contribution of German Jews. A notion of authentic historicality, giving rise to a genuine grasp of history, in its resonance with Marx and Marxism, is one which is intensively discussed in the French reception of Heidegger, negatively by Jean-Francois Lyotard, Pierre Bourdieu and Emmanuel Faye, positively by Bernard Stiegler, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. This, at the time, had the virtue of neutralising the then raging controversy about reading the works of Nazi sympathisers, which has slightly less force now. For Heidegger is precisely developing the discussion of resoluteness, of the event of being and of a releasement, into an attunement to that event, as a critique of the notion that a theory of judgment, as available to human cognition, can supply an adequate theory of truth. For Heidegger, truth is on the side of being, or *beyng*, and thus exceeds the compass of any theory of judgment focused on human

reasoning. On this basis then Heidegger seeks to think the possibility and actuality of change, and of the conditions of judgment, as crisis turning points in which human existence itself is at stake. However, he does not grasp the connections from the ontologising of truth, to a critique of grounding truth in judgment and in a conception of language focused on assertion. Again Habermas has much to offer here, because of his insistence on the communicative, informational and indeed technological workings of language, expanding its philosophical significance well beyond any Aristotelian, or Husserlian emphasis on predication, assertion and judgment. It is also explicitly a strategy, abandoning the philosophical claim on an eternal truth. Arendt and Marcuse appear to accept that historical change takes place at a level beyond the reach of reflection, within constituted communities of communicative competence, and beyond the reach of analysis of powers of judgment. This text is still functioning within an academic discipline called philosophy, taking for granted established protocols of proof and performance, and, clearly, some operation of shared criteria and terms of reference is unavoidable. It would, however, be beneficial if the discussion of Heidegger on releasement might be released from such domesticating protocols, to open out the question, what remains of the classical virtues of scholarship, and close reading, of philosophical enquiry into the possibility of meaning and the formation of concepts, of predication and the formation of judgment. Indeed the very role and function of such philosophical enquiry within educational provision for a humanity to come are issues for Heidegger, already in , in the *Kriegsnotseminar*, the seminar in the time of military exigency. These instabilities eject Heidegger from the comfort zone of secure disciplinary demarcations, and any reading of him should take this into account. Once ontology, disclosing and releasement are given precedence over conviction, calling and resolution, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to legitimate any authority for the authorial voice, and thus, for Heidegger, historicity and temporality are more genuine candidates for the status of authenticity than any authorial voice.

**Chapter 4 : From Destruktion to the History of Being | William McNeill - calendrierdelascience.com**

Crowell S. () *Authentic Historicality*. In: Carr D., Chan-Fai C. (eds) *Space, Time, and Culture. Contributions to Phenomenology (In Cooperation with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology)*, vol

Drawing substantially on the work of Bernard Stiegler, as well as Jacques Derrida, her method of analysis is less oriented in a Heidegger-studies approach per se, and more geared toward re-directing Heideggerian themes in service of specific questions. She entertains a number of provocative theses. Among these theses are the following: I will say at the outset that I believe the study is actually much more effective on this score than it is on a philosophy of education front. Or vice versa, to see something in a particular aspect is to have it phenomenologically near. In other words, following Kant, the schematizing condition of perception is imaginative. This notion restates the hermeneutic turn in Heidegger, that any state of human understanding, any state of meaning, is always already interpretive. Kouppanou regards imagination *Einbildungskraft* as a core concept here because it unifies the schematization bound up in technology as *Gestell* with education conceived as *Bildung*. In other words, maybe there is not as sharp a distinction between *Gestell* and other, more originary manifestations of being as one may think. Kouppanou highlights the current trend in education to demand measurement in terms of assessment, outcomes, research outputs, and so forth. The human subject in this situation is understood according to a pre-defined set of conditions, and her education is directed toward predetermined measures for future productivity. According to this text, education means being brought into light from out of darkness. As Heidegger holds, this moment is the advent of metaphysics, and likewise of knowledge conceived as adequate representation modelled after the actual thing. Pre-given standards are contained in the model, rather than discovered in the nearness afforded by *aletheia*. These accounts concern production that is not derived metaphysically. As Chapter One concludes, a principal question for Kouppanou becomes that of a middle ground between originary presencing and subjective imagination; that is, are there modes in which human beings can conjure or fashion images which nonetheless emerge from out of the originary presence of things? For Kouppanou, this is a question as to whether technologically-mediated images can afford nearness in a fashion akin to the nearness afforded by works of art. The distinction between poetic and non-poetic image opens up a whole new discussion concerning types of images *Bild*, types of forming *Bilden*, their relation to imagination *Ein-Bildungskraft* as the one being affected in receiving and producing forms of imagining, and ultimately their connection with *Bildung* as the very process concerned with human formation. Thus, she regards nearness as intimately bound up with education. For Kouppanou, this overlaps with the phenomenon of authentic temporality, by which one allows the voice of conscience to be heard. This overlap is made evident in the temporal aspect in which everyday engagement with things derives from a temporal, historical origin. Our everyday world-involvement is already interpretive, and this interpretation is typically framed by the historical reception of the given. This as-structure works forwards as well as backwards in time. Authentic temporality entails a seeing-as that frames what is to come, from out of the nearness of what is present. Language is likewise a mode for Heidegger through which the nearness of things is gathered. The point Kouppanou leverages here is that the Greek conception of *phantasia*, understood as a microcosm for nearness and imaging, is at once passive and active. On one hand, it characterizes the human capacity for receiving appearances from outside oneself as the having of appearances show up in the form of images. Another way to describe this structure, Kouppanou continues, is to understand nearness as coextensive with temporal experience as Heidegger understands the latter. For Heidegger, time is the result of synthesis, an originary association that allows past, present, and future to come together and give time. This original nearness of moments allows time consciousness and consciousness in general. Without this bringing-near of past and present, and presence and absence, time cannot be formed. Or what is the same, Heideggerian temporality is conditioned by the underlying synthesis or formation manifested in imagination, with nearness operating as a crucial component. The third chapter explores these issues in greater depth. One aspect Kouppanou highlights in further analyzing the futural character of imagination is the moment of vision, the *augenblick*, as a poetic image. Similarly, as was observed in the look at imagination in Kant, the notion is

that the image-formation of authentic temporality does indeed stem from both a subjective foundation and one that responds to things. However, she also adds the rejoinder that nearness is not a concept that can be expressed propositionally. It does not refer to an objective orientation in space or a property neatly predicable in a sentence. Rather, it is an interpretive mode in which things appear to one. In this light, Kouppanou suggests that the linguistic origin of the notion of nearness qua metaphor merits further discussion. This is to say, everyday human perception occurs through metaphorizing of sensation, given that all seeing is in fact seeing-as. To say that perception metaphorizes the stuff of things is to regard perception as imaginative, as a kind of image formation. Kouppanou finishes out the chapter by again invoking the role of productive imagination by way of Kant. This is to say that, as concomitant with productive imagination, perception also engages the retentive aspect of time-consciousness by which images are frozen as schemas that inform future experience. In brief, perception is imaginative reproduction. In what follows I will summarize these studies briefly before taking up the final two chapters of the book. Whereas, Kouppanou wants to suggest here that such a divide between the poetic or originary, and the technological, is artificial, given that technology is embedded in historicity. Technology is to blame, according to Heidegger, for creating a false sense of nearness that results in rootlessness. Simply put, authentic temporality cannot occur outside the sway of technology. In other words, the later Heidegger seems to allow for historical being to occur as a disclosure of truth from without. However, Kouppanou suggests that the concept of imagination remains in play for Heidegger by virtue of informing his position on the relation of truth, language, and art. In particular, the function of metaphor as a proto-linguistic imaginative stuff underlying poetic experience suggests that imagination still figures into the primordial disclosures of being occasioned by art. Thus, poetic experience can still be regarded as imaginative in its foundations. In this vein Kouppanou writes: This in turn provides us with an opportunity to reconsider poetic image as a mode of presencing that does not belong to language exclusively. Kouppanou highlights the primacy of the human hand for Heidegger in the creation of works fostering true nearness, as the hand is integral to both traditional handicraft and originary language conceived as gesture. A pervasive ambiguity Kouppanou identifies here in Heidegger is the equal role of the hand in making use of differentiated, external being. It would be a mistake to claim, as Heidegger seems to suggest, that works of the hand constitute self-contained, holistic processes of creation. Both make use of beings external to themselves in fostering their brands of nearness. It is not sufficient to claim that modern technology is problematic simply because it maximizes nearness and totally removes distance. The final two chapters of the book engage the findings of Chapters One through Six as they pertain to education and technology in current times. Of particular emphasis for Kouppanou is the type of nearness fostered by the imaginative schematization prevalent in the World Wide Web and social media. Kouppanou then grafts this reasoning onto the digital being of the contemporary computerized world. The digital world is not simply the alienated world of technology; for human Dasein the digital world is still being-in-the-world. This view has been developed by other Heideggerian philosophers including Michael Eldred. A core assumption of these passages is that the online experience fostered in media such as Facebook is always derivative from the meaning-structures embedded in intentionality. In the final chapter, Kouppanou addresses these issues as they pertain to the philosophy of education. Online experience in this light is one of the individual perpetually being formed or educated from without. The danger Kouppanou sees here is the metaphorization or formation of the human latent in the pervasive reach of computing technology. For, technology, like handicraft is not merely metaphorized being in its own right; technology also leads its user to become metaphorized. This phenomenon has been documented in empirical science, as research has shown different types of media cause the human brain to rewire itself. This book is a very impressive piece of scholarship for an early-career researcher. Stylistically I believe the chapters proceed somewhat quickly at times, jumping from one dense source to another in often rapid fashion, when the author might in fact benefit from covering less material and proceeding more slowly. The connections between the chapter topics also sometimes suffer from a similar feeling of disjointedness, where the inclusion of certain topics and subtopics comes off as unmotivated and ad hoc. The first four chapters of the book, along with Chapter Six, come across much more cohesively in contrast. However, these are all small caveats given the strong total contribution of the book. The final chapter

in which education takes center stage reads somewhat more like an appendix, whereas the chapters dedicated to Heidegger are more focused on making sense of a complex line of inquiry in his thought.

**Chapter 5 : Using Technology to Support 'Authentic' Learning**

*In Heidegger's Neglect of the Body, Technology and Authentic Historicality Leisure and Openness to Mystery Conclusion: Embodied Dwelling Notes Index.*

Select Page Authentic Learning Students use technology tools to link learning activities to the world beyond the instructional setting rather than working on decontextualized assignments. The Authentic characteristic involves using technology to link learning activities to the world beyond the instructional setting. This page provides greater detail about the Authentic learning characteristic of the Technology Integration Matrix. To see the entire matrix or to locate other characteristics, return to the Matrix. Descriptors for typical teacher activity, student activity, and instructional settings for Authentic learning are provided below, along with links to all of the Authentic learning video lesson pages and additional resources. Authentic Learning Descriptors for Each of the Five Levels

**Entry Level** Students use technology to complete assigned activities that are generally unrelated to the world beyond the instructional setting. The teacher assigns work based on a predetermined curriculum unrelated to the students or issues beyond the instructional setting. Resources available via technology in the instructional setting include primarily textbook supplementary material and reference books or websites, such as encyclopedias.

**Adoption Level** Students have opportunities to apply technology tools to some content-specific activities that are related to the students or issues beyond the instructional setting. The teacher directs students in the conventional use of technology tools for learning activities that are sometimes related to the students or issues beyond the instructional setting. The setting includes access to information about community and world events and primary source materials.

**Adaptation Level** Students begin to use technology tools on their own in activities that have meaning beyond the instructional setting. The teacher creates instruction that purposefully integrates technology tools and provides access to information on community and world issues. The teacher directs the choice of technology tools but students use the tools on their own, and may begin to explore other capabilities of the tools. The setting includes access to information outside of school and primary source materials.

**Infusion Level** Students select appropriate technology tools to complete activities that have a meaningful context beyond the instructional setting. Students regularly use technology tools, and are comfortable in choosing and using the tools in the most meaningful way for each activity. The teacher encourages students to use technology tools to make connections to the world outside of the instructional setting and to their lives and interests. The teacher provides a learning context in which students regularly use technology tools and have the freedom to choose the tools that, for each student, best match the task. The setting provides a variety of technology tools and access to rich online resources, including information outside of the school and primary source materials, that are available in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of all students.

**Transformation Level** Students explore and extend the use of technology tools to participate in projects and higher order learning activities that have meaning outside of school. Students regularly engage in these types of activities that may have been impossible to achieve without technology. The teacher encourages innovative use of technology tools in higher order learning activities that support connections to the lives of the students and the world beyond the instructional setting. The setting includes technology tools and online resources that allow for student engagement with the local or global communities. A variety of technology tools are available with robust access for all students simultaneously to information outside of the school and primary source materials.

**Chapter 6 : Martin Heidegger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*1. Technology, Busy-ness, and Authentic Historicality According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, is the history of metaphysics, a type of reï-,ection "con-*

Messkirch was then a quiet, conservative, religious rural town, and as such was a formative influence on Heidegger and his philosophical thought. In he spent two weeks in the Jesuit order before leaving probably on health grounds to study theology at the University of Freiburg. In he switched subjects, to philosophy. He began teaching at Freiburg in From this platform he proceeded to engage deeply with Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and, perhaps most importantly of all for his subsequent thinking in the s, two further figures: Dilthey whose stress on the role of interpretation and history in the study of human activity profoundly influenced Heidegger and Husserl whose understanding of phenomenology as a science of essences he was destined to reject. In Husserl took up a post at Freiburg and in Heidegger became his assistant. Heidegger spent a period of reputedly brilliant teaching at the University of Marburg , but then returned to Freiburg to take up the chair vacated by Husserl on his retirement. Published in , *Being and Time* is standardly hailed as one of the most significant texts in the canon of what has come to be called contemporary European or Continental Philosophy. A cross-section of broadly analytic reactions to Heidegger positive and negative may be found alongside other responses in Murray *Being and Time* is discussed in section 2 of this article. During the short period of his rectorship he resigned in Heidegger gave a number of public speeches including his inaugural rectoral address; see below in which Nazi images plus occasional declarations of support for Hitler are integrated with the philosophical language of *Being and Time*. After Heidegger became increasingly distanced from Nazi politics. After the war, however, a university denazification committee at Freiburg investigated Heidegger and banned him from teaching, a right which he did not get back until One year later he was made professor Emeritus. Exactly when this occurs is a matter of debate, although it is probably safe to say that it is in progress by and largely established by the early s. If dating the turn has its problems, saying exactly what it involves is altogether more challenging. Indeed, Heidegger himself characterized it not as a turn in his own thinking or at least in his thinking alone but as a turn in *Being*. This uncompromising text was written in 1927, but was not published in German until and not in English translation until Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, He was buried in Messkirch. According to this latter gloss, the linguistic constructions concerned which involve hyphenations, unusual prefixes and uncommon suffixes reveal the hidden meanings and resonances of ordinary talk. In any case, for many readers, the initially strange and difficult language of *Being and Time* is fully vindicated by the realization that Heidegger is struggling to say things for which our conventional terms and linguistic constructions are ultimately inadequate. It was meant to have two parts, each of which was supposed to be divided into three divisions. What we have published under the title of *Being and Time* are the first two divisions of the intended part one. The reasons for this incompleteness will be explored later in this article. For the young Heidegger, then, it is already the case that phenomenological analysis starts not with Husserlian intentionality the consciousness of objects , but rather with an interpretation of the pre-theoretical conditions for there to be such intentionality. Thus the unity of the different modes of *Being* is grounded in a capacity for taking-as making-present-to that Aristotle argues is the essence of human existence. For more on the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, see e. Consider some philosophical problems that will be familiar from introductory metaphysics classes: Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? These questions have the following form: But Heidegger does, which is why he raises the more fundamental question: This is one way of asking what Heidegger calls the question of the meaning of *Being*, and *Being and Time* is an investigation into that question. The question of the meaning of *Being* is concerned with what it is that makes beings intelligible as beings, and whatever that factor *Being* is, it is seemingly not itself simply another being among beings. But to think of *Being* in this way would be to commit the very mistake that the capitalization is supposed to help us avoid. For while *Being* is always the *Being* of some entity, *Being* is not itself some kind of higher-order being waiting to be discovered. As long as we remain alert to this worry, we can follow the

otherwise helpful path of capitalization. Heidegger means by this that the history of Western thought has failed to heed the ontological difference, and so has articulated Being precisely as a kind of ultimate being, as evidenced by a series of namings of Being, for example as idea, energeia, substance, monad or will to power. In this way Being as such has been forgotten. So Heidegger sets himself the task of recovering the question of the meaning of Being. In this context he draws two distinctions between different kinds of inquiry. The first, which is just another way of expressing the ontological difference, is between the ontical and the ontological, where the former is concerned with facts about entities and the latter is concerned with the meaning of Being, with how entities are intelligible as entities. The second distinction between different kinds of inquiry, drawn within the category of the ontological, is between regional ontology and fundamental ontology, where the former is concerned with the ontologies of particular domains, say biology or banking, and the latter is concerned with the a priori, transcendental conditions that make possible particular modes of Being i. For Heidegger, the ontical presupposes the regional-ontological, which in turn presupposes the fundamental-ontological. As he puts it: The question of Being aims at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. Being and Time 3: So how do we carry out fundamental ontology, and thus answer the question of the meaning of Being? It is here that Heidegger introduces the notion of Dasein Da-sein: That said, one needs to be careful about precisely what sort of entity we are talking about here. As Haugeland notes, there is an analogy here, one that Heidegger himself draws, with the way in which we might think of a language existing as an entity, that is, as a communally shared way of speaking. This appeal to the community will assume a distinctive philosophical shape as the argument of Being and Time progresses. The foregoing considerations bring an important question to the fore: Here there are broadly speaking two routes that one might take through the text of Being and Time. The first unfolds as follows. If we look around at beings in general—from particles to planets, ants to apes—it is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be e. More specifically, it is human beings alone who operate in their everyday activities with an understanding of Being although, as we shall see, one which is pre-ontological, in that it is implicit and vague and b are able to reflect upon what it means to be. Mulhall, who tends to pursue this way of characterizing Dasein, develops the idea by explaining that while inanimate objects merely persist through time and while plants and non-human animals have their lives determined entirely by the demands of survival and reproduction, human beings lead their lives Mulhall , This gives us a sense of human freedom, one that will be unpacked more carefully below. The second route to an understanding of Dasein, and thus of what is special about human beings as such, emphasizes the link with the taking-as structure highlighted earlier. Sheehan develops just such a line of exegesis by combining two insights. These dual insights lead to a characterization of Dasein as the having-to-be-open. In other words, Dasein and so human beings as such cannot but be open: The two interpretative paths that we have just walked are not necessarily in conflict: Dasein stands out in two senses, each of which corresponds to one of the two dimensions of our proposed interpretation. Second, Dasein stands out in an openness to and an opening of Being see e. As we have seen, it is an essential characteristic of Dasein that, in its ordinary ways of engaging with other entities, it operates with a preontological understanding of Being, that is, with a distorted or buried grasp of the a priori conditions that, by underpinning the taking-as structure, make possible particular modes of Being. Heidegger puts it like this: This resistance towards any unpalatable anti-realism is an issue to which we shall return. But what sort of philosophical method is appropriate for the ensuing examination? In the Heideggerian framework, however, phenomenology is not to be understood as it sometimes is as the study of how things merely appear in experience. Presupposed by ordinary experience, these structures must in some sense be present with that experience, but they are not simply available to be read off from its surface, hence the need for disciplined and careful phenomenological analysis to reveal them as they are. So far so good. But,

in a departure from the established Husserlian position, one that demonstrates the influence of Dilthey, Heidegger claims that phenomenology is not just transcendental, it is hermeneutic for discussion, see e. For Heidegger, this hermeneutic structure is not a limitation on understanding, but a precondition of it, and philosophical understanding conceived as fundamental ontology is no exception. Thus Being and Time itself has a spiral structure in which a sequence of reinterpretations produces an ever more illuminating comprehension of Being. As Heidegger puts it later in the text: What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right way! In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. Being and Time And this is a tension that, it seems fair to say, is never fully resolved within the pages of Being and Time. The best we can do is note that, by the end of the text, the transcendental has itself become historically embedded. More on that below. Heidegger argues that we ordinarily encounter entities as what he calls equipment, that is, as being for certain sorts of tasks cooking, writing, hair-care, and so on. Indeed we achieve our most primordial closest relationship with equipment not by looking at the entity in question, or by some detached intellectual or theoretical study of it, but rather by skillfully manipulating it in a hitch-free manner. Entities so encountered have their own distinctive kind of Being that Heidegger famously calls readiness-to-hand. The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is! as equipment. While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects i. Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent. The carpenter becomes absorbed in his activity in such a way that he has no awareness of himself as a subject over and against a world of objects. Phenomenologically speaking, then, there are no subjects and no objects; there is only the experience of the ongoing task e. Heidegger, then, denies that the categories of subject and object characterize our most basic way of encountering entities. He maintains, however, that they apply to a derivative kind of encounter. When Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of the universe e. With this phenomenological transformation in the mode of Being of entities comes a corresponding transformation in the mode of Being of Dasein.

Chapter 7 : Anna Kouppanou: Technologies of Being in Martin Heidegger - Phenomenological Reviews

*authentic historicality* "fate and repetition" looks as if it, least of all, could supply the phenomenal basis for bringing into the shape of an ontologically grounded problem what is at bottom intended in the question of the 'connectedness' of life.

Technology and the Politics of Education Published: January 07, Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: There is always room for criticism see infra of an undertaking this ambitious. That positive potential, he submits, is "a species of philosophical perfectionism," only accessible once the aspects of his earlier view responsible for "his disastrous politics" have been identified and rejected 5. Chapter 1 begins by noting the importance that Heidegger accords metaphysics as providing the "foundational justification" for intelligibility within a certain epoch. On the problem of providing a theory across epochs, Thomson thinks that Heidegger came to recognize that "there is no substantive, transhistorically binding fundamental ontology" and eventually thought better of his early pretensions to understand the meaning of being in general in favor of his later doctrine of "ontological historicity. Moreover, Thomson lets Heidegger off far too easily here given his robust use of the operative notions Epoche, Seynsgeschick and Seynsentzug across epochs. There is also good reason to suppose that the common structural dynamic that Heidegger claims to find, as a matter of historical fact, instantiated in these epochs, including our own, is not only this or that indispensable ontotheology, but more importantly, the ways in which being makes itself present and absent in the course of human dealings with things and with one another. *Utrum subiectum metaphysicae sit ens in quantum ens, sicut posuit Avicenna, vel Deus et intelligentiae sicut posuit Commentator Averroes?* In other words, Aristotle seemed to many of his readers to leave mixed signals as to whether the subject matter of these studies is beings insofar as they exist ontology or the first being theology or somehow both. However, given the tradition of the Aristotelian problem, if it is true in some sense that Heidegger "clarified only slowly" his own understanding of ontotheology 13n. In any case, Thomson elaborates how Heidegger deconstructs these double groundings into various epochal constellations of intelligibility, a line of succession that supposedly ceases with Nietzsche who "ironically" both implodes and completes the metaphysical project. There is obviously a sense, exploited here by Thomson, in which the label of "ahistoricism" simply does not apply to Heidegger, at least not without further ado, given his sensitivity to the historicity of ontotheologies, not least in the contemporary world. Whether Heidegger is thereby fully vindicated remains problematic; for certain purposes, perhaps those that Feenberg finds warranted, his thinking may not be sufficiently concrete, despite his prescience regarding the deworlding of human subjects. In a footnote in Chapter 2 Thomson claims that Heidegger "never abandons the search for the conditions of the possibility of intelligibility" 54 n. The concept of authentic historicality distinguished here from historicity is, according to Heidegger himself in , the basis of his political engagement. In this connection Thomson lucidly glosses the fact that one of the stated, long-range aims of the project begun in *Being and Time* is to provide an ontological grounding of positive sciences and historiography in particular. Matters are complicated, however, by the fact that Thomson, while placing so much weight on the project of fundamental ontology, is in the awkward position of not being able to tell us what precisely he takes Heidegger to mean by it in *Being and Time*, since he claims that it took Heidegger the better part of the following decade to clarify what it is. In any case, he contends that by Heidegger comes to see that "there was no substantive fundamental ontology waiting beneath history to be recovered" Thus, in advancing the authoritarian claims of the Rectorial Address, Heidegger plainly gets ahead of himself, Thomson avers, since he had by no means explained the subordinate relation of positive sciences to fundamental ontology and, indeed, presumably with good reason, since such a conception of fundamental ontology is untenable. Moreover, the primordial historicity of *Dasein* affirmed in *Being and Time* seems plainly at odds with the pretensions of transhistoricity that Thomson attributes to fundamental ontology. Of course, this discrepancy may simply indicate deep incoherencies and confusions besetting the project announced in *Being and Time*. Yet, even if one were to accept this less generous interpretation, a great deal more needs to be considered to make the case that Heidegger in the ensuing years clung to that ill-fated project

as Thomson reconstructs it up to the time of the Rectorial Address. His general claim that the philosophical mistake motivating -- at least in good measure -- the pretensions of reforming the university and providing intellectual guidance to National Socialism stems from the very project of Being and Time is, in my view, highly credible. However, I think that a version of his claim could be made not only more precise but even more compelling with the qualifications such an account would provide. Thomson expands insightfully on the awakening of a "fundamental comportment" involved here, more a "hearkening" than a "resoluteness" or "releasement" a consideration of die Grundstimmung der Verhaltenheit might be helpful here; see p.

**Chapter 8 : Heidegger's Neglect of the Body**

*Educational Technology And Authentic Learning Educational technology plays a significant role in designing and developing authentic learning. Its role is not only to provide instruction effectively and efficiently but more importantly, to provide students with an experience they otherwise wouldn't have.*

Technology, some experts say, can contribute substantially to the active, experiential learning that Dewey advocated decades ago. Some of these schools are finding that various technologies can help them reach this goal, say experts. A pupil doing a research project on a planned landfill site can create a multimedia report—text, graphics, sound, and video—and present it to a community group or store it for other students to use as a resource. Instead of working on hypothetical problems, students increasingly are using technology to address some of the same issues and problems as adults. In some cases, such as when students collect data as part of a scientific research project, their work is contributing directly to advancing professional knowledge. The power of information technology is doubling every few years for the same cost, notes Christopher Dede, director of the Center for Interactive Education Technology at George Mason University. Moreover, the means for delivering this information are being revolutionized. Unfulfilled Promise If such promises have a familiar ring, they should. Yet desks are still arranged in rows, teachers lecture more often than not, and textbooks serve as a de facto curriculum. In fact, computers and other technologies sometimes have reinforced the present, antiquated educational practices: Until educators begin to create classroom environments that promote authentic learning, they will be using only a fraction of the power of current and forthcoming technologies, Sullivan and others believe. Linking Up While the probable impact of future developments in information processing and communications is debated, existing technologies already are playing an important supporting role in promoting authentic learning. One of the most exciting, experts say, is in the area of computer-assisted telecommunications. Increasingly, students are able to team up with students at other schools even in other countries to work on joint projects or just to swap electronic mail. Another poignant example is cited by Chris Morton, director of information systems in Yorktown Heights, N. During the Persian Gulf war, students in one New York high school traded electronic mail messages with students in Israel who gave regular accounts of Scud missile attacks. Students not only swapped information on breaking events as they occurred; they discussed their attitudes and opinions about war, Morton reported in a recent ETRC publication. An article in a recent Scientific American on uses of Internet recounted how a researcher stationed in Antarctica described his experiences via E-mail to a 3rd grade class in Las Vegas. Things have changed since the days when scratchy audio recordings supplemented filmstrips as students watched passively. Or students can search through multimedia resources, save pieces of text, video, and sound, and later synthesize them in new ways as part of a project. Students routinely use computers to prepare multimedia projects or presentations, says Karen Peterson, technology coordinator for the school. Opportunities to stimulate the human senses through multimedia. What will these developments mean for schools? As schools tap into these new capacities, the curriculum is bound to become more fluid and personalized, some experts predict. In the future, single mega-sources like textbooks will fade in influence as learners scan vast electronic resources to find the information they need, some experts say. But where Kessler and others see exciting potential in curriculums that tap into these new capabilities, some see dangers: But is that necessarily learning? Much of the current discussion around multimedia and telecommunications applications centers on home entertainment and business uses. How the coming technological revolution will affect schools is another issue. Enter the periodical title within the "Get Permission" search field. To translate this article, contact permissions ascd. Learn more about our permissions policy and submit your request online.

**Chapter 9 : The Link Between Technology and Authentic Learning - Educational Leadership**

*A new climate in school reform welcomes technology as never before. Case studies show that as a tool for complex, authentic tasks, technology will be a powerful performer. Television in the s, computers in the s, videodiscs and artificial intelligence in the s—all were predicted to.*

The Shroud of Turin is a linen cloth that some believe to have been used to cover the body of Jesus Christ after his death. The shroud, first mentioned outside the gospels in 1269, measures about 4m47 long by 1m13 wide. It is also called the Shroud of Turin simply because it resides permanently in the city of Turin, Italy, although it is regularly exhibited elsewhere. The shroud bears markings that seem to be traces of a crucified man. Apparently, the fabric was folded over the body, half over the man and half underneath. What do scientists and researchers think of the Turin Shroud? It depends on who you ask, for this subject is one of the most discussed and controversial topics around the relics of Christ. So, some experts consider the Turin Shroud to be authentic, while others consider it a fairly sophisticated hoax. Some even claimed that the shroud was never intended to be more than a work of art. However, this explanation seems unlikely due to the unique design of the shroud, a style that had never been observed in any earlier major artwork. This fact leads most experts to conclude that the shroud is either authentic or deliberately designed to look authentic. The main criticism against the authenticity of the shroud is based on carbon dating tests. Despite this, other researchers suggest that this date could be distorted because the fibres of the shroud are soiled by microscopic bacteria and fungi, which have developed over the last hundreds of years. They believe that the presence of these microbes rejuvenates the test of the shroud by at least a thousand years, and this may not be totally false. There are, however, a large number of scientists who consider that these two arguments are irrelevant because of what they claim to be a lack of reliability in the carbon dating method. The sceptics of the shroud also accuse that the facial and bodily features of man have strange proportions. However, other experts argue that many people have certain physical characteristics that are disproportionate, or that the tissue is involved. There are literally dozens of arguments for and against the authenticity of the Turin Shroud. These contradictory claims may lead the casual observer to conclude that there is a scientific impasse regarding the shroud, and this seems to be the case. Also, and unfortunately, when presented with opposing opinions in a debate on Christianity, the casual mostly non-believing observer tends to accept the non-Christian viewpoint because he believes that he is less influenced by religion, and therefore more scientific. However, it is often the case that non-Christian scholars seek to refute the Christian point of view as fervently as Christian scholars seek to support it. A perfect example is the recent discovery of an ancient bone box engraved with the following message in Aramaic: Jacques, son of Joseph, brother of Jesus. When the news of this discovery was made public, some researchers, seeking to minimize the historicity of the Christian faith, declared that the box was a hoax before they had even seen and analyzed it. Today, the reality is that no one can say with certainty whether the Shroud of Turin is authentic or a hoax. The best we can do is to analyze all the information and then decide for ourselves.