

Chapter 1 : History Of Macedonia – “The Burden of the Balkans” • By M. Edith Durham

*The Burden of the Balkans (Illustrated Edition) (Dodo Press) [M. Edith Durham] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Mary Edith Durham () was a British traveller, artist and writer who became famous for her anthropologist accounts of life in Albania in the early 20th century.*

Anastasia Karakasidou Wellesley College t the outbreak of the First Balkan War in , a young political correspon- dent left Vienna on the 25th of April, traveling by train to Belgrade. Although he had visited the Balkans before, he was still impressed with the natural beau- ty of the landscape, and still intrigued with what he called this "multicultural, motley, culturally and politically confused East. Third class carriages, by contrast, were filled with a mix of peoples communicating in an "incredible language made up of Bulgarian, German, Serbian, and French words. The correspondent repeatedly comments on the lack of industry in the countries he visits. Ottoman rule did not make the Balkans European. While some cities, such as Belgrade, show him signs of modernization, possessed with the vitality of po- litical and cultural life, his impression of the countryside is that it remains so dis- tant from modernity, inhabited by ignorant peasants whom also comprised the bulk of army recruits. During the last decade or so, many of us have read accounts by Western jour- nalists and travelers, diplomats and politicians, or scholars and humanitarian aid workers, that give similar impressions of the Balkans: Maria Todorova has crafted an excellent historical analysis of the ways Europeans have "imagined" the Balkans over the past two centuries. And there has been some lively discussion of how the discourses of Balkanism have been employed in the Western gaze over this troubled region. There are a great number of are- nas in which such discourses are expressed and performed. He charged that there was never any genuine effort to address the economic needs and cultural development of the Balkan peoples. Europeans, he argued, have an abstract and moralistic humanitarian view of the Balkans, and a rather paternalistic hope to find a way to help a few different "tribes" live together peacefully. Such characterizations will be familiar to those who study the history of European colonial empires. The product of this approach, he suggested, would be a "hereditary object" of European diplomacy. This is not a comforting prediction, yet in a sense it is pre- cisely what we have witnessed. To him, the world was heading with evolutionary inevitability toward the creation of petty states within a grander universalizing system, and doing so at the expense of cultur- al, social, and economic diversity. One cannot disregard the fact that financial interests represented by the so-called Great Powers were very much present, and at stake, in the Balkans. They ran banks and insurance companies, they built railways and roads, they transported and shipped goods. But these economic interests were often masked, as this correspondent noted, by a European rhet- oric of moral responsibility, of helping the Balkan peoples make the transition to modern nation-statehood. One cannot study power simply by attempting to deduce it from economic relationships. The naked face of European imperialism was certainly in evi- dence in the early twentieth century Balkans. But we need to look beyond economic models to address the mechanisms of truth that empowered the "Europeans" to intervene in Balkan affairs. Hegemonic European discourses of truth, such as that of modernity, are created through power relationships exercised in the production of such truth. It is this entanglement of truth and power, Foucault suggested, that creates the "right" to p0wer. Yet, many people who live in the Balkans continue to harbor a sense of their own lingering distance from the dominant-dare I say hegemonic-Western European model s. Ironically, many of the constituents for whom he presumed to speak had dif- ferent feelings. To them, the European governments were powerful potential al- lies, or at least what we might today call peace-keepers, an outside force they hoped would prevent things from going out of control. During the nineteenth century, the Great Powers of Europe began to extend political and financial support to various national groups struggling for emanci- pation from Ottoman rule. Such activities were an active aspect of the globaliz- ing discourse of progress and evolution that dominated intellectual thought of that era, and often rationalized in terms of establishing sovereign states with both the power and the authority to govern specific territorial populations. Yet in the process, the peoples of the Balkans were drawn into emotional, and often re- ligious, debates and conflicts that were profoundly influenced by the factionalist partisanship of new state politics. The

protagonists in those regional conflicts spoke and performed not only for the benefit of local constituencies, but also for European audiences. The record of the words and deeds of the protagonists in the Balkan struggles shows that many were imitating a sense of Europeanness, performing as it were to a community of modernity and prosperity in which they longed to be included. To many at that time, the Great Powers of Europe represented security, and some welcomed Great Power involvement in the hopes of attaining financial support for their cause of independence and modernization. More recent developments show us how this neo-dependency relationship has been reinforced and professionalized through international peace-keeping efforts today. Macedonia

Before turning my attention to those more recent developments, it might be helpful to sketch the historical framework around which this argument is based. Let me begin, then, with what Trotsky called that "ever-seething cauldron," Macedonia. In the 1890s, the first "committees" for the liberation of Macedonia were established in Sofia. Most of their functions which included educational, religious, and military activities concentrated on appealing to local as well as European audiences. The Congress of Berlin had not resolved tensions in and over Macedonia. In fact, in some ways, those diplomatic treaty negotiations had exacerbated tensions by denying Bulgarian sovereignty to large portions of the region. As tensions mounted between competing national liberation campaigners, many in the region possessed faith in the capabilities and influence of the Great Powers, and were convinced that one or another would assist them in their struggle for independence and modernity. The establishment in 1895 of the IMRO, an organization committed to an aggressive, even violent agenda of national agitation, was one of several high profile events that played to dual audiences at home and abroad. Even Trotsky was aware that nationalist protagonists in the Balkans were performing acts of aggression for European attention. Alarm is also expressed over the claims of some Europeans that Greek partisans represented the real obstacle to peace in the region, as well as the calls for the removal from Macedonia of Greek diplomats and bishops implicated in the armed cause. As one Greek official noted, the "watchful eye of Europe" was always cast on this troubled part of the world. Pick your poison, but neither simplification should preclude the other. The fact remains that, more than a century has passed since the Congress of Berlin, and the ethnonational conflicts of the Balkans have yet to be resolved. Clearly, something has gone terribly awry. The sword has failed to cut the "Gordian knot" of the Balkans, and diplomacy has been unable to resolve its complex tangle of relationships. Nations were established, then communist revolutions were undertaken, followed by unorthodox experiments of nations within socialism, only to fall short in their promises. Even economic liberalization and political democratization have not realized dreams of prosperity, security, and community—although capitalism has a masterful power to homogenize, and many hope it may yet inevitably succeed where its rival, communism, failed. Many diplomats and observers also saw the recent Balkan wars as inevitable. One could even suggest that the war in Kosovo happened because expert pronouncements concluded that it was inevitable. At the risk of sounding cynical, I might also suggest that this inevitability also served to fulfill the power/truth prophecies of both Western diplomats and local protagonists, thus excusing their failures while also justifying their efforts. In this vein, it is important to look more carefully at the widespread proclamations of miraculous-like success surrounding peace-keeping or peace-making efforts in present-day Macedonia. Many have been struck by the apparent fact that the forewarned "inevitable" "spillover" effect of war did not spread to that proverbial tinderbox of the Balkans, Macedonia. But we must be careful not to race toward the premature conclusion that history has ended, lest our complacency and inattention find us in an awkward position of congratulating ourselves for avoiding a conflict we have only delayed. Macedonia, it is often said, is surrounded by "four wolves," namely, Greece, Serbia, Albania, and Bulgaria, each allegedly ready to partition the republic between themselves. There is no doubt that the willingness of local politicians to enter into flexible power-sharing arrangements, combined with the proactive and early involvement of U.S. Yet it is important to note that the Greek-imposed embargo left political elites in Macedonia with few viable options other than to conform to international pressures for a peaceful resolution of conflict. The model that was developed for and with the people of Macedonia followed Western European political and economic principles. Ackerman argues that a well-crafted "art of preventive diplomacy" pressured various political leaders to adopt "European" compromises. Ethnic Albanian leaders gradually abandoned their demands for regional autonomy, attaining a

degree of local self-determination without violence and bloodshed. Similarly, ethnic Serbs were also recognized as an official minority, in return for abandoning secessionist rhetoric. Nationalism, it would appear by such accounts, has been erased from the face of Macedonia. Even the VMRO nationalists abandoned their nationalistic rhetoric of the cultural superiority of the Macedonian Slavs, reputed descendants of Alexander the Great. The result has been heralded as a victory in a battle for hearts and minds that was fought largely on a cultural, rather than military, front. Laudable as those moralistic sentiments may be, they are also suggestive of a continuing notion of political and cultural superiority emanating from the West. Viewed in a more critical light, peace-keeping efforts in Macedonia may also be interpreted as a case study in the art of careful manipulation, and "art of preventive democracy," structured around Western European models of international relations. If we truly seek to build viable and lasting foundations for peaceful coexistence and exchange, it is incumbent upon us to pose Foucaultian questions about the relationship of neo-diplomatic dependency to new globalized regimes of subjugation. The influence of global forces on local politics in Macedonia is by no means a new development. Yet despite the lessons of history, diplomats of the Great Powers are playing much the same roles today as they were at the turn of the last century. As Camp has suggested, the goal of European diplomats in the Western Balkans, and in Macedonia in particular, is to create a classic "buffer state," a "consociational" democracy in which the elites of various ethnic groups would share power and eventually develop a sense of mutual trust. Let us consider first the situation of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. The coalition had been headed by Ljubco Georgijevski, a self-styled poet whom at this point in his political career styled himself more as a nationalist, than as a Europeanist. In the process, he enticed eight deputies, apparently dissatisfied nationalists, to defect from the VMRO. Georgijevski, who like a morphing Power Ranger had shed his earlier nationalist mantle to adopt a more accommodating position in his interaction with international officials, was now accused by the opposition of being "anti-Macedonian. Ralston, put it , "to have a robust presence Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE declared the elections had been marred by violence and rule violations not only in the west, but also and around the capital, Skopje. While Western diplomats employed many machinations to help keep the governing coalition in power, many foreign observers have voiced skepticism that the current government will survive until parliamentary elections schedule for next year, especially in the wake of violent clashes with ethnic Albanian rebels in recent months. It appears that armed groups of ethnic Albanians began to operate openly in villages near the Macedonian border with Kosovo in late February, , and early March, although reports of illicit border-crossings and arms smuggling had been surfacing much earlier. NATO authorities unsuccessfully tried to seal the border to prevent such movement of men and weapons. For example, President of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski, often portrayed as a "calm and reasonable" man, called the armed ethnic Albanians "die-hard remnants of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army" with "cowardly criminal attacksn-"criminals," in other words, who sought to harm the common interests of Macedonia. Fighting was even reported in the hills around Skopje, the national capital. Now those issues have surfaced again. The recent violence suggests, however, that Westerners are not the only ones promoting a "European option" for Macedonia. In return, the European Union and the OSCE will work with the Macedonian government to promote peace, stability, and economic competition in the region. Gligorov praised the presence of U. The quest for modernity, and its recognition, is still very much in the hearts and minds of Balkan peoples today, though it remains elusive to many. Beginning about ten years ago, large numbers of young women in Skopje began to transform their body imagery in radical ways, consciously altering their bodies in whatever manner they can conceive or afford to better approximate European models. Enthusiasm for such practices has waned in recent years, however, reflecting a sense that the promised economic and cultural renaissance was never fully realized. It is important to bear in mind, apropos our discussion of power, truth, and right in the neo-dependency relations of preventive diplomacy, that all the new states of the Balkans are potential candidates for E. In a sense, the spirit of the Truman Doctrine continues to overshadow Western diplomacy in the Balkans today, as gifts and rewards are extended to loyal allies among local elites. In September , the foreign ministers of the E. Their products will have a tariff-free and quota-free entry into E. The case of Greece warrants brief mention here. Greece now has a new

"Balkan profile," heralded as a "bridge" between the Balkans and the European Union. It is coming to play an increasingly influential role in developing close economic and political relations between all Balkan states. Greek businessmen are deeply involved in the construction of international transport and telecommunications networks in these new states.

Chapter 2 : The Burden of the Balkans - Livros na Amazon Brasil-

The Burden of the Balkans Anastasia Karakasidou Wellesley College. At the outbreak of the First Balkan War in , a young political correspondent left Vienna on the.

My aim is a far humbler one. I wish to give the general reader a somewhat truer idea of the position of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula than he usually possesses. He believes that the horrors of which he hears are caused by the rising of these same Christians against the tyranny of their Moslem rulers, and, thus believing, he hastens to offer them his sympathy and help, and to beg the British Government to intervene on their behalf. I hope in the following pages to show him that these troubles are largely of racial, not religious, origin. The Christians who have revolted did not rise, as he fondly believes, on behalf of Christianity. Nor do they represent by any means the Christian population of the country. The revolt was purely political, and part of a long and complicated scheme to obtain a large additional territory for Bulgaria. The truth of this is proved by the fact that the revolutionary party directs its attacks not only upon Moslems, but murders Christians of all the other Balkan races when opportunity occurs. I have been begged by others not to tell all that I have seen and heard. It is impossible to please everyone. Want of space naturally prevents my giving the details of this, my sixth, tour in the Balkan Peninsula, but I have tried to tell a plain tale of the main facts. Such success as I met with I owe entirely to the kindness of those who helped me on my way. The mistakes are all my own. Will you do something for us? I inquired cautiously what this odd job might be. Its comprehensiveness staggered me. Now, if you would explain it to the Consul. You have very little to do with him. Why trouble about him? It is surely not necessary to like all the foreign Consuls. He is often pathetically like a child, who tells you what fine things he is going to do when he is grown up. It is doubtful, indeed, whether one race ever will understand another. It has certainly never done so yet. But the story of the past that has set him at that particular window and coloured his view is more easily arrived at, and explains many things. Without some knowledge of it, travel in the Near East is but dull work, for us in the West to realize. Internally, there were the problems of the fourteenth century still unsolved. Externally, they were faced with those of the twentieth century, Western and insistent. But in truth it is nothing so simple. It is the question of the slow waning of Ottoman might and the consequent resurrection of, and struggle for supremacy between the subject peoples which began at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and has yet to be fought to its close. And the problem is not limited to any one spot; it extends not only over the whole of that part of the Balkan Peninsula which is still under the Sultan, but also over lands ruled by other nations. They appear to have been closely allied in race. Their form of speech is unknown. He died in the year B. There is a surprising amount of excitement about him, for the blood of the oldest inhabitants of the land is still with us. That the modern Albanian is the more or less direct descendant of the primitive savage people of the Balkans is a fact which, I believe, no one now disputes. To-day Greek and Albanian alike claim him enthusiastically, and along with him, of course, his Macedonian lands. Nor are they the sole claimants. There is no theory too wild to flourish in the Balkans, but this, perhaps, is the maddest of all. This annoyed the Greeks and the Albanians extremely, for the insurrection was being worked solely for Bulgarian ends. Alexander died, but the aborigines had one other burst of glory. Its peoples have never yet fought their differences to an end, but have always been overpowered by a common foe. Rome swept down on the struggling mass of Thracians, Illyrians, Greeks, and Macedonians. They parcelled out the peninsula into Roman provinces and its fierce peoples, whose delight was in war, soon formed the flower of the Roman army. Diocletian and Constantine the Great, to mention only the most celebrated, were of Illyrian blood. There is nothing new under the sun. In our own time Illyrian blood has again swayed the fortunes of Rome; Crispi, Prime Minister of Italy, was of Albanian origin, and Italy once more looks covetously at the Illyrian coast. Into this land of fierce tribesmen, dotted with Roman colonies and joined by Roman roads, came other wild peoples, who poured in from the strange dark lands beyond the Danube. It was the day of the shifting of thenations, and they moved in resistless thousands. Of the many who came and killed and plundered, but claim no territories today, we have no space to tell; but the coming of the Slavs is an all-important fact in the history of the Balkans. These early days are dim, and dates are uncertain;

all that it is safe to say is that Slav tribes were drifting over the Danube probably as early as the third century A. By the end of the sixth century this dribbling immigration became an invasion. Slavs poured in in irresistible numbers; they disputed the lands with the original inhabitants, driving them before them to the mountains, as the Saxons did the Britons, and settled as village communities on the undulating, well-watered plains. These Slavs are described as an agricultural, herd-tending people. Like the people they displaced, they were divided into clans, which were ruled by independent chiefs Zhupans, who quarrelled freely among themselves, but met and discussed matters of common interest, and were loosely held together by a headman elected by themselves, who recognised the suzerainty of the Byzantine Emperor. This tribal state, which is common to the childhood of most races, would not be noteworthy in this brief sketch were it not for the strange fact that neither Slav nor Albanian has yet quite outgrown it, and it has proved a source of weakness which has largely influenced the fate of each. By the end of the seventh century Slavs were settled as far south even as modern Greece. They seem to have formed the rural population of the plains, while the Greeks inhabited the towns and the sea-coast. Yes, I have heard so much that I understand it, but I will not soil my mouth by repeating their dirty words! It is in our blood. It is like cats and dogs. The Albanian has fought for his land with all its invaders in turn, and is doing so still. He is at once the oldest and the youngest thing in the Balkan Peninsula. He and his rights and wrongs are at the bottom of most of its problems, and any scheme for the settlement of them which does not give him space to develop on his own lines is foredoomed to failure. This is the first of the great Balkan hatreds. The second is not far to seek. In the reign of Constantine IV. Who they were, and what tongue they spoke, is unknown. They came from the wild lands north of the Black Sea, and are believed to have been allied to the Huns and Fins. A ferocious race, not divided into tribes, but led by a Khan, whose rule is said to have been despotic, they burst into the land and poured over it, dealing death and destruction. They sacrificed their prisoners to their gods, and were noted even in those very un squeamish days for their cruelty. Displacing such local chieftains, both Slav and Thracian, as they found in power, they rapidly mastered a large part of the lands already settled by the Slavs. The Timok River, then as now, was their western frontier. The separate histories of Servia and Bulgaria began, and it should be noted that by this time the Roman Empire of the East, in which the Greek element had been coming more and more to the front, was now become definitely Greek in character. The Bulgars spread south at first, and aimed at Byzantium. Such was the terror they inspired that the weakly Emperors at first bought peace, but a peace of short duration. A long and bloody period of fighting began. The Bulgars seized Sofia, and outwitted the Byzantine army, and, having captured the Emperor Nicephorus, they beheaded him, and made a drinking-cup of his skull, a grim form of jest not unpopular in those days. They then took Adrianople, and forced their way even to the gates of Byzantium, were bought off at a heavy price, and only returned northwards after wasting all the neighbouring lands. Such was the coming of the Bulgar, a foe alike to Greek, Serb, and the aboriginal tribes, and thus, as early as the seventh and eighth centuries, were sown the seeds of a plentiful crop of hatreds, from which the Balkan peoples reap an annual and a bitter harvest. The Bulgar to-day is hated even worse than the Turk; the grudge against him is an older one, and his present action impedes the settling of Balkan affairs. The Bulgars, being the dominant race, poured southward and conquered both Greek and Slav. The detached Slavonic tribes fell an easy prey to the Bulgar Prince and his united army, and the Byzantine Emperors could do little more than protect their own capital. Then a notable thing happened. The Bulgar conquered the Slav, but the Slav absorbed him. He adopted Slav customs and the Slav tongue. Of his own language nothing is now known to exist, unless a few untranslatable words in an early list of Kings belong to it. But broad, flat faces, high cheek-bones, dark, straight hair, narrow eyes, and thick lips still show a large admixture of non-Slavonic blood in the folk of many districts. Christianity had already made some way among the Slavs who were in contact with the Greeks. The Bulgars were a pagan people. The final conversion of both Serb and Bulgar was brought about towards the close of the ninth century by Greek priests, of whom there are said to have been seven, under the leadership of the celebrated missionary brothers, Cyril and Methodius of Salonika. They preached and conducted the services in the Slav language, into which Cyril translated the Scriptures, using for this purpose an alphabet said to be of his own construction, which is the origin of the alphabets still used by all the orthodox Slav peoples of to-day. As there is at this time no mention made of another tongue, it is safe to

assume that the original Bulgarian one had dropped out of use, and that Slavonic was not yet differentiated into Servian and Bulgarian. He hastened the conversion of his people by beheading the unwilling; and being desirous of more freedom in ecclesiastical matters than the Greeks were disposed to allow him, he sent an envoy to Pope Nicholas with questions on Christianity and a request to be allowed a Bulgarian Archbishop. The Pope gave no definite answer anent the Archbishop, but solved the other difficulties. When I was at Ochrida two recurred to me very forcibly. What must we do now? His evidence must be voluntary. Some were cured and some were not. What must we do with the stone now?

Chapter 3 : Full text of "The burden of the Balkans"

Book digitized by Google from the library of the New York Public Library and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

When Byzantium was attacked by the Latins, Michael Angelo Comnenus, vaguely related to the imperial family, put himself at the head of the people of South Albania at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and founded a large State called the Despoty of Epirus, which ultimately included Epirus, Thessaly, the Ochrida districts and part of North Albania Page 75 Quote: To this end he spent much time in Macedonia. It is a loose, and therefore misleading term. The truth is, that in a district which has no official frontiers, and never has had any stable ones, there are people of six races, who, as we have seen, all have causes to be considered. I shall speak only of the part I have stayed in- the districts of Lakes Ochrida and Presba. Here there are Greeks, Slavs, Albanians, and Vlachs. Of Turks, except officials and such of the army as may be quartered on the spot, there are few. The Albanians, I believe, are all Moslem. Should there be any Christians they would be officially classed as Greeks. These Slav-speaking peasants in the districts I visited are the lowest and least intelligent of all the folk I knew in the Balkan Peninsula or elsewhere. They are truly pitiable examples of the human race. Less capable than the other peoples, they have fallen undermost of all in the struggle for existence, though in many districts they are numerically superior. Some attribute their degraded condition entirely to oppression. This I believe to be only partially true. They have probably suffered the most because they are the unfittest. Were it not for the fat lands that they inhabit, it is doubtful whether the other nations would hasten to claim kindred with them. Of the Albanians and Greeks who worked for us I must speak very highly. It is this mass of ignorant, low-typed population that politicians struggle to manipulate, and from them that the Russo-Bulgarian State was to have been largely wrought. With the appointment of the Bulgarian Exarch in I came the Bulgarian propaganda throughout this district. The Christian population, which till then had been united, and called itself Greek, was torn in twain and thereby weakened. The money and energy of the people was used up on party quarrels and political plots Page Quote: Bulgarian Bishops, under Russian protection, are still able to plan brigand bands to raid Serb and Greek villages, under the noses of the reform officers, and Greek and Serb organize rival bands to defend themselves. And while Austria subsidizes Albanian Beys in Kosovo Vilayet, Russian officers ride round Greek villages and swear they shall have no help unless they say they are Bulgar. As for the alternative plan, which is favoured by some, and greatly disliked by others of the Christian peoples whose interests are concerned that of appointing a Christian European Governor to a State to be arbitrarily mapped out and called Macedonia-it might stave off for a time the partition of the territories that must ultimately take place, but as it would rest on no historical, geographical, or racial basis, it would do little more. For the crux of the whole matter is not Turk versus Christian any longer. Maria, told me triumphantly that it had consisted of no less than men, who had all escaped. They go armed to a village, and they offer the people a petition to sign. It is to ask for a Bulgar priest, and to say they are Bulgars. They do not wish to change their priest, but if they do not sign they will be shot We Greeks have had enough of this. I myself have had to give money to them. Otherwise I should have been shot from behind a wall the first time my business took me outside the town. Now we have sworn an oath we will stand it no longer. We shall organize Greek bands, and for every Greek that is shot we shall kill ten Bulgars. Nor has there been another attack upon the Moslems, but the Bulgars have occupied themselves throughout the summer by making attacks upon Greek villages, which the Greeks have continued to avenge Page Quote: I tried to get it in the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Turkish edition; also in the Albanian and Serb if possible, and there was a perfect library of tales all quite different Page Quote: That, being Bulgar, neither Serb, Greek, nor Albanian had a good word to say for him was a matter of course Page Quote: She was a stout, elderly party, with a good deal of presence. I perceived she intended to sit the Bishop out. The Bishop looked at her. She gazed over his head. For a little while he ignored her. Then he said suddenly to the child:

Chapter 4 : The burden of the Balkans / by M. Edith Durham.

Excerpt. Tm: diplomat, the geographer, the archaeologist, I do not pretend to be able to teach. My aim is a far humbler one. I wish to give the general reader a somewhat truer idea of the position of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula than he usually possesses.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Although he had visited the Balkans before, he was still impressed with the natural beauty of the landscape, and still intrigued with what he called this "multicultural, motley, culturally and politically confused East. Third class carriages, by contrast, were filled with a mix of peoples communicating in an "incredible language made up of Bulgarian, German, Serbian, and French words. The correspondent repeatedly comments on the lack of industry in the countries he visits. The autocratic character of the Balkan monarchies installed by the European monarchs , and the behavior of their armies, compelled him to conclude that the mere departure of [End Page] Ottoman rule did not make the Balkans European. While some cities, such as Belgrade, show him signs of modernization, possessed with the vitality of political and cultural life, his impression of the countryside is that it remains so distant from modernity, inhabited by ignorant peasants whom also comprised the bulk of army recruits. During the last decade or so, many of us have read accounts by Western journalists and travelers, diplomats and politicians, or scholars and humanitarian aid workers, that give similar impressions of the Balkans: Maria Todorova has crafted an excellent historical analysis of the ways Europeans have "imagined" the Balkans over the past two centuries. And there has been some lively discussion of how the discourses of Balkanism have been employed in the Western gaze over this troubled region. There are a great number of arenas in which such discourses are expressed and performed. Today, I would like to turn our critical gaze to one such arena, that of international diplomacy. He charged that there was never any genuine effort to address the economic needs and cultural development of the Balkan peoples. Europeans, he argued, have an abstract and moralistic humanitarian view of the Balkans, and a rather paternalistic hope to find a way to help a few different "tribes" live together peacefully. Such characterizations will be familiar to those who study the history of European colonial empires. The product of this approach, he suggested, would be a "hereditary object" of European diplomacy. This is not a comforting prediction, yet in a sense it is precisely what we have witnessed. European history regards many of the Balkan states as "officially" created in , at the Congress of Berlin, following the Russo-Turkish War. To him, the world was heading with evolutionary inevitability toward the creation of petty states within a grander universalizing system, and doing so at the expense of cultural, [End Page] social, and economic diversity. One cannot disregard the fact that financial interests represented by the so-called Great You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 5 : The burden of the Balkans, (Book,) [calendrierdelascience.com]

The Burden of the Balkans has 19 ratings and 0 reviews. Mary Edith Durham () was a British traveller, artist and writer who became famous for he.

If parliament does not approve, ZaeV says he will call a general election. ZaeV underlines that the time has come for a different Balkans, which will have left behind biases and its reputation as a powder keg, to become a source of stability. ZaeV praises Alexis Tsipras for his courage during negotiations, and in a message to New Democracy leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis, he says that Balkan leaders should recognise challenges and rise to the occasion. How likely is it to find the 11 votes you need in order to pass the constitutional review by the Parliament? In accordance with the strategic priorities – membership in NATO and The EU, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia undertook the obligation to prepare a proposal of draft amendments to constitutional changes, which has been the following stage as established in the Prespa Agreement between our country and the Republic of Greece. Considering the historical importance and the urgency that the moment calls for, the Government I lead took an initiative and made a decision to submit the proposal of draft amendments to constitutional changes to the Parliament, and with that, asked from the Parliament to begin with this procedure. Now, all Members of Parliament, regardless of political affiliation, have a historical duty in service of the citizens, to secure the road for our country towards stability, security and economic prosperity. The people made a very important choice. The majority of citizens who voted on the referendum supported one question, one vision and one goal for the future of our country, which is only a step away to accomplish. The fulfillment of this vision is now in the hands of every Member of Parliament, separately and depends on them. They need to make a decision demonstrating that they want to make our country a safe and good place to live for every citizen. If they are not found, are you obviously going to hold elections? If the Members of Parliament from VMRO-DPMNE continue to refuse to take responsibility and remain on the positions that threaten the future of our country, the parliamentary majority will vote for early elections. In the past period, the politics of the government I lead, strengthened and deepened the friendship with all our neighbors. The Government succeeded to close all open bilateral issues by respecting the principles of open dialogue, mutual understanding and readiness for finding solutions. Today, our country has no open issues with any of our neighbors. We respect all our neighbors and we are building our friendship by investing in development of the cooperation and the trade. At the same time, we support and encourage the efforts of all our neighbors to solve open issues and overcome the misunderstandings in the interest of their bilateral relations, but also in the interest of the stability, cooperation and prosperity of the whole region. We believe that problems are solved with implementing new politics instead of marking new borders. I believe that solving the dispute between our countries and our people is a historical moment and source of stability for the Balkans and for Europe. The scenario of border changes, as a follow-up to developments in FYROM, how do you evaluate it? Only united together, the countries of our region can develop faster, easier, and accomplish the shared EU aspirations through mutual cooperation for creating better living conditions for the citizens. The Republic of Macedonia supports a positive solution for Kosovo. A solution that will improve the well-being of Serbs, Albanians and all other citizens living in Kosovo. A solution that will guarantee the peace, security and prosperity of Serbia, Kosovo and the whole region. It is crucial for all leaders here in this region to be united around our common goals, and those are lasting peace, regional cooperation, economic development and EU membership. Why do you think you did not get the best possible participation in the referendum? In order to reach the census threshold, there were supposed to be a turnout of On the referendum held on the 30th of September At elections or a referendum, the people who go out and vote are those that make the decision. Since the referendum was consultative, and not mandatory, it is now up to the Members of Parliament, chosen by the people, to make a decision respecting and following the interests of the citizens, the country and their personal duty. If it ever happened again, would you avoid something? Perhaps the great support from the West, which some people think that it served as a boomerang? At a time when we are setting the future course of our country, all our friends from the international community have acknowledged this is a historical

moment and have approved the politics of our government on the road to EU and NATO. The success is easier to reach when you have supportive friends. Our friends have told us to bravely remain on the road we are paving for reaching prosperity and well-being for all our citizens and for all people in the region. Their aspiration to see our country as equal partner in the great alliances is sincere and strong. Our friends from the international community assist the process to confirm that they acknowledge our identity and statehood – that is a demonstration of respect for all the citizens of our country. How crucial was the role of Russia in this story? Do you think there was an involvement, what kind and to what extent? We nurture traditionally friendly relations with the Russian Federation and we will continue to develop our relations and cooperation. The economic and cultural cooperation, as well as cooperation in the area of agriculture, is on a very high level and we expect it to intensify. I am convinced there is awareness, and there has to be awareness, that world peace is a global interest, and for that we need stable and secure countries that develop according to the path they have chosen. Those are our strategic goals, our right and responsibility, for which there is no alternative. We are careful and we follow the situation. The overwhelming majority of the Greek people – as depicted in the Gallups – opposes the agreement. What is your message to the dissenters? We are fully aware that there are political circles in your country that find this to be a very sensitive issue. Our message is one and the same for the ruling and oppositional political factors in Greece, and in fact, to all the citizens: Let us maintain the good spirit and strong political will from Prespa and allow that spirit to guide us and establish our relations in the future. Together, we have a unique chance to send a strong signal for stability in the region and Europe, together we have an opportunity to mark a success in history as a serious investment for the future. It is our duty to continue to secure the conditions on both sides for a political ambient that will allow for complete fulfillment of the contract. We are setting the risks to minimum, since much is at stake to leave things to chance. We believe there is no better agreement for both sides, than this one. The crucial question for those who put the negotiation in the balance is: The obligations and duties for both countries stem from the provisions and the spirit of the Agreement between both sides. I do not want to discuss about concessions, and who gave someone something or took something away. I want to discuss about the solutions in the Agreement that have unlocked an issue that was seriously entangled and blocked. The key is in the solutions that open up perspectives for the future, and not in the concessions. The solution for the name of our country and for recognizing the specificity of our identity, which as Macedonian comes from our unique traits, which are different from the Hellenic, should be found in the solutions that envisage changes in our Constitution, with guarantee for inviolability of the borders. According to your wording, those are the concessions that our country is making. Both sides in the Agreement for solving the dispute have a serious homework assignment that needs to be worked on. Both governments in the Agreement have clearly and precisely predicted all the steps that need to be made, or the processes that need to be initiated in order to secure the institutional support for their realization. One of those processes is creating conditions for secure parliamentary and political majority for implementing the constitutional changes. In practice, can there be a smooth coexistence when so many large sections of the population on both sides of the border disagree? The majority of the citizens in both countries want a solution, want peace, stability and progress. I see my country, including the other Balkan countries in the same way that my citizens see it: Modern, economically stable and socially responsible state according to the EU standards and the standards of the members states of the Union. It is time to give the world a different Balkans, A Balkans of countries that have left their prejudices and historical concessions behind, and have shifted focus towards the well-being of their citizens, towards building good-neighborly relations. A region that produces peace, cooperation, connectivity, dynamic fluctuation of people and ideas. We recognize good will on the other side too. The atmosphere of goodwill, political maturity and readiness for overcoming this issue, we can come to a solution very soon. Let us not miss the moment. Let us not seek answers that are good for one side only. Let us keep on searching for the true answer, mutually acceptable for both sides. In the negotiations, we reached a point when we considered that the name Ilinden Macedonia provides a good basis for a final solution. Then we agreed that we will ask for a wider political consensus in both countries. In all complex processes there are successful and unsuccessful steps, but most importantly, we overcame that situation and found a solution that is acceptable for both sides. What other names were

seriously considered during the negotiation? Other names that were discussed during the negotiations are the ones that came as suggestions from mediator Nimetz, that were generally with geographical or time adjective. We accepted a geographical point of reference, confirming the undisputable geographical and territorial facts. Was there any time you feared that the deal would not be achieved? I assure you that the whole process, from the moment it was taken over by ministers Kotzias and Dimitrov and their teams, and since me and Prime Minister Tsipras and our teams got involved, we were driven by the motivation and focus for finding a solution. Of course, the highly respected and experienced mediator Matthew Nimetz was here, but he was wise and knew when to actively participate and when it was more important to let us walk alone through the labyrinth towards the solution. Such a complex and sensitive problem requires delicate, careful and responsible behavior in every moment. That is how we have been behaving in this whole process. How would you characterize the negotiating stance of Athens throughout the last critical period? I characterize it as a strong political will to change the image of the Balkans, to provide the region a new Balkans, a Balkans of the 21st century, in which the past and the shadows of history will not interfere as unsolvable problems in the common European future. We were motivated by the wish to provide the world with a solution that is an outcome of a European approach in searching for answers. I accepted to fully invest myself, as a person and as a politician, to provide a solution for my country and my fellow citizens for the blockade that we have been facing for more than 3 decades. The Greek government had a genuine interest to solve the issue. At the same time, they advocated your national interests strongly, as we did ours. Negotiations were not easy. But we realize that if we have courage to make a compromise then it would benefit both countries, stability in region and consolidate Euro-Atlantic structures. I want to personally thank Prime Minister Tsipras for having that courage and for sharing the vision of a peaceful and prosperous Balkans as integral part of EU. In the end, was your meeting with the representative of the New Democracy, Maria Spyraiki, accidental or not? And how many meetings were there? I had a brief coffee conversation with Ms. Maria Spyraiki, at the hotel where I was staying, close to the European Parliament, as I did with many MEPs or politicians from different countries during that visit to Brussels.

Chapter 6 : The Burden of the Balkans | Anastasia Karakasidou | Academic Room

This bar-code number lets you verify that you're getting exactly the right version or edition of a book. The digit and digit formats both work.

Chapter 7 : Project MUSE - The Burden of the Balkans

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

Chapter 8 : The Burden of the Balkans by Mary Edith Durham

Anthropological Quarterly () At the outbreak of the First Balkan War in , a young political correspondent left Vienna on the 25th of April, traveling by train to Belgrade.

Chapter 9 : The Burden of the Balkans (Illustrated Edition) (Dodo Press) : M Edith Durham :

The burden of the Balkans () [Reprint] by Durham, M. E. (Mary Edith), and a great selection of similar Used, New and Collectible Books available now at calendrierdelascience.com