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Chapter 1 : Social Sciences | Owlcation

9 - *The Case of the Bosnian Muslims: Relevance for the Social Sciences Selected Bibliography About the Book and Author*

Teaching about Conflict and Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since 1992, a bitter and bloody war has raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina, part of the former country of Yugoslavia. The United Nations has tried to settle the conflict. And leaders of the U. This Digest provides facts and explanations about 1 the peoples and places of the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina; 2 the collapse of Yugoslavia and the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina or "Bosnia;" and 3 the causes, conditions, and consequences of the Bosnian war. Finally, sources of information and materials for teachers are listed. Yugoslavia was a country of about 23 million people located in southeastern Europe, across the Adriatic Sea from Italy. More than 15 ethnic groups lived in the former Yugoslavia. The majority of the population, however, belonged to one of six related Slavic groups: From the Middle Ages to 1918, most of these people lived in one of two empires, which dominated this part of Europe: Serbia and Montenegro, though, had small independent kingdoms by the turn of this century. These served as a base for the construction of Yugoslavia Land of the South Slavs in 1918, following World War I, which was a monarchy headed by the Serbian ruling house. He wanted to throw out the enemy occupiers and transform Yugoslavia into a socialist state. The country was divided into six republics: Each republic corresponded to one of the six South Slav ethnic groups, but all had minorities. Inflation and unemployment rose sharply. Tales of corruption and mismanagement in firms all over the country racked the economy. In 1989, revolutions toppled Communist governments throughout central and eastern Europe. The revolutionary spirit spread to Yugoslavia and helped lead, unfortunately, to devastating civil wars, the most tragic of which has been the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In April, 1990, Slovenia, one of the republics inside Yugoslavia, held free elections. The Croats followed suit. The Communists were swept from power. In June, 1991, the two republics declared their complete independence. After a fierce but short war, the JNA pulled out of Slovenia. But by the end of the year, rebel Serbs in Croatia had taken over one-third of the country. Serbs and Croats are still fighting in three areas of Croatia. The southern republic of Macedonia has also seceded. Ethnic tensions run high there too. Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia in 1992. At this time, the population of Bosnia was about 43 percent Bosnian Muslim, 33 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat. The capital, Sarajevo, was famous as a cosmopolitan, tolerant, ethnically mixed city. Most Serbs and Croats of Bosnia vowed that they would not live under a government dominated by Muslims. In the spring of 1992, Serbs rebelled, with support from the republic of Serbia, and a nasty civil war began, which has continued to this day. Bosnian Croats soon entered the war, sometimes joining Bosnian Muslims to resist the Serbs, but more often fighting Muslims to seize territory, for occupation only by Croats. There is no doubt that all sides are now perpetrating heinous acts of violence. All of the ethnic groups are suffering, at home and on the front. One can, however, assert that the Muslims, because of huge campaigns of rape and "ethnic cleansing" aimed at them, have suffered the most in quantitative terms. To date more than 100,000 people, mostly in Bosnia, have been killed in the civil wars. There are over two million refugees, many living in camps or with relatives in Croatia. Large numbers of displaced persons have also fled to Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, and Germany. Over 80 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been occupied by Serb and Croat forces, with most of this territory under control of Serbians. The war has been conducted viciously by all sides. We hear a great deal about front-line casualties. There are also gruesome scenes on television of funerals and hospitals being bombarded, marketplaces raked with machine-gun fire, children shot in buses as they are evacuated from long-besieged cities, and concentration camps holding abused, starving internees. The vast majority of the casualties in these civil wars have been civilians. Repositories of vast cultural importance, such as libraries, mosques, and monasteries have been deliberately targeted for destruction by the warring groups, especially the Serbs. The extreme brutality of this war can be attributed in large part to historic animosities and cultural divisions

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between contending groups. They set up a notorious concentration camp at Jasenovac and began ridding their country of minorities. Serbs, Muslims, Jews, and Gypsies all suffered. Thus the long-standing rivalry between Serbs and Croats, which in earlier centuries had had interludes of substantive literary and political cooperation, was poisoned by viciousness on all sides in World War II. These memories live on today. Unfortunately, the history of struggle between Christians and Muslims in the Balkans is longer and bloodier. Each has viewed the other as the "infidel" since the Muslim Turks arrived in Europe as conquerors in the fourteenth century. But the war is less religious than cultural and of course political and economic ; identification with Islamic and Christian culture Catholic in the Croatian case, Orthodox in the Serbian is more important than differences of belief. Further, the literature and folklore of the region abound in sagas of holy war, armed uprising against evil foreign governments, and noble bloodshed. The tradition of the blood feud existed in many areas into the twentieth century. All the rival groups have long memories of both real and imagined injustices done to them throughout history, and each group seems to want revenge for past wrongs inflicted on them by one or more of the other groups. The numbers of deliberate civilian casualties and prevalence of "ethnic cleansing" evoke memories of the genocide of World War II. People worry that the world has too soon forgotten the need for preventing another Holocaust. The war is especially important for Europe because it has created large numbers of refugees who are an economic drain on their host countries. Services provided vary among centers; several produce newsletters.

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Chapter 2 : Bosniaks - Wikipedia

Get this from a library! The Bosnian Muslims: denial of a nation. [Francine Friedman] -- Although their plight now dominates television news worldwide, the Bosnian Muslims were until recently virtually unknown outside of Yugoslavia.

It is considered a useful tool to help us avoid making the wrong decisions, but just how well can it be applied in real life? The strange twist in the story is that what makes it so exceptionally sad and tragic is not what you might think. Any murder is tragic, but it is not the murders He was a convict, an escape artist, a fugitive, a master of disguise, and a detective. What is cultural bias and how can we counter it? It describes the roles of the key players and how they collected and analysed big data to influence not only groups of potential Trump voters, but also targeted individuals based on their Facebook profiles. This article summarizes important research and findings. How can we know? Includes photos and videos of historical and modern berdaches. What are the characteristics, problems, and advantages of these years? This is an account of the events surrounding the murders including home videos and footage of a police interview. Can they do that? Here you can learn about different types of gender bias and the effect they can have on society. Family Photo When most teenagers have a Friday off school, they sleep in, maybe get together with friends, or bum around the house in pajamas all day. When year-old Alyssa Bustamante of Missouri had a Friday off from There is not as much subliminal messaging happening in the US now as previously reported, but there could be subtle messages that are received unconsciously. Messaging has probably been used by or political operatives, yet it may not work. According to the matching hypothesis, people date those of similar attractiveness to their own. Get the feeling you are not alone? Your life is being monitored by some unknown person or organization?

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Chapter 3 : Republika Srpska (1995) - Wikipedia

** Introduction: Ethnicity, the Concept of a Nation, and the Bosnian Muslims * Origin of the Bosnian Muslims * Bosnian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire * Bosnian Muslims Under Austro-Hungarian Rule * Bosnian Muslims in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes * Bosnian Muslims in World War II * Growth of Bosnian Muslim Nationalism Under Tito.*

Its Nature, History, Factors and Manifestations Arrival of Aid Agencies and Mujahidun Bosnian Students of Islam in the Muslim World Audio and Video Tapes Unlike the population of Serbia, majority of Bosnians accepted Islam during the following two centuries. The position of these two schools in Bosnia remained practically unchallenged until the recent aggression on Bosnia. However it was confined to small Islamic intellectual circles in Sarajevo, a few Islamic publications and the classrooms of the Faculty of Islamic studies without stronger roots in Muslim population. However his discussions were not taken as attacks on Hanafi madhhab since he did not advocate change of the ritual practice. He also criticized wahhabism as a reformist school. He did not question their intentions and as a modernist appreciated their position on certain issues like opposition to taqlid, popular sufizm, etc. However his critique is general and distant since wahhabism was not around in Bosnia at his time. The Osmanli state was organized according to the principle of organic unity of religious and political authority whereby Islamic religious institutions were a part of the state administration. Not only judges qadis and Friday prayer preachers khatibs, but also muftis, mudarrises, and imams were under state jurisdiction and very often state officials. Consequently there was little autonomy in interpretation and practice of Islam in Bosnia at the time. Sporadic heterodox movements like Hamzawis were quickly extinguished in. On the contrary, Christians, mainly Orthodox Christians had their independent religious administration² which made them ready for the dramatic political change in Bosnia in when the Osmanli state succumbed to the international pressure to allow Austro-Hungarian empire to occupy Bosnia. That was a cultural earthquake, which found Muslims totally unprepared. Late Ottoman and Hapsburg Times Sarajevo: Pazar with some students. The aim of the IC is that all of its members should live in conformity with Islamic norms. That is being achieved through promotion of good and prevention of evil Article V. The IC protects the authenticity of the Islamic norms and assures their interpretation and application. Several points are worthy of special emphasis here. The state however did not respond positively at least in the case of one organization Active Islamic Youth. Second, belonging to the universal community of the Ummah is put side by side with the belonging to the particular country and ethnic group. Third, the Hanafi madhhab is said to be binding in interpretation and application of Islamic norms. Understandably some of these provisions proved to be unacceptable to the reformists. The provision about the Hanafi madhhab is unacceptable only to some of them since they claim that they would be happy with the application of any authentic Sunni madhhab in Bosnia. Much more controversial with the reformists is the provision about the Islamic tradition of Bosnian Muslims, which in fact sometimes contradicts the provisions on the role of the Hanafi madhhab. Actually it is this tradition that Bosnian Muslims know and follow. Until recently very few people knew much about Islamic law and its various madhahib. The book was well received and the Cultural Center King Fahd hosted its official launching. The practice of strict adherence to the old Hanafi textbooks was criticized by the early Muslim reformers in Bosnia at the outset of the 20th century who advocated introduction of new, original textbooks. The IC started to rebuild its educational system only in s. The comparative studies were introduced in Islamic educational institutions. As he fell to the disgrace with Communist authorities, a remarkable personality of al-Azhar graduate Dr. He was the most famous member of the first post-WWII study group that went to al-Azhar in s after the establishment of the close relations between Yugoslavia and Egypt. However, his reformist ideas were confined to class, and were cautious and mild. Several factors contributed to that. He himself was not trained in Islamic studies, obviously did not fell under the influence of any particular reformist movement, and was aware of the limits of religious freedom in Socialist Yugoslavia. Yet by 8 First volume recently translated and published by the Faculty of Islamic Studies Sarajevo, Prosvjetitelj i reformator

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Sarajevo: Ljiljan, , The volume is about to be published soon by the Faculty. One of the signs of the adoption of comparative method in Islamic learning in Bosnia was the project of the translation of Fiqh al-Sunnah in late s within the IC. The book was almost translated when somebody drew the attention of the Islamic authorities that it was a comparative Islamic law book. The project was stopped and very soon the war started. Recently the project was revived. These, however, are not the only institutions where Bosnians acquire Islamic knowledge. Hundreds of Bosnians are currently enrolled at various universities throughout mainly Muslim world. In addition the IC employs as religious leaders imams many graduates from non-Islamic universities. However, since September 11 things have changed. The media identified the HSC and these two organizations as the sources of extremism, while some of their employees and members were arrested or questioned by local police or international forces SFOR with regard to their links to terrorism. When the pressure reached its peak in the president of the IC Dr. In , when the Austro-Hungarian Empire granted autonomy to the IC waqf was considered the biggest private owner in the country with individual waqfs. In s that number rose to 1, However in and every important waqf except mosques and few waqfs was expropriated and nationalized, and all but one madrasa closed. Similar provision existed in the constitution unlike the previous constitutions. The IC of Yugoslavia put the ban on the activities of tariqas in Bosnia in Their property was confiscated and taken either by the IC or state. Today there are a few thousand sufis in Bosnia nobody appears to know the exact number following mainly Naqshibandiyyah and Qadiriyyah orders. Sufis were also leaders of several reformist and protest movements. During the recent war many sufis were actively engaged in jihad and today some are active in inviting non-Muslims to Islam. Sufi orders are unevenly spread in Bosnia. The number of sufi lodges tekke today is about Its Nature, History, Factors and Manifestations The contemporary Islamic revival in Bosnia, which is generally apolitical, started in s due to several factors: The main manifestations of revival until were: The dominant feature of the Islamic revival in Bosnia during this period was that its only institutional framework was the IC. Alternative organizations were practically unheard off since the dissolution of the Young Muslims Society in s. This would dramatically change after April Arrival of Aid Agencies and Mujahidun The Islamic revival in Bosnia underwent radical changes from the beginning of the aggression on Bosnia in April This provided an opportunity for Muslim aid workers and several hundreds of freedom fighters mujahidun from all over the world who joined Muslims in their defense to preach and proselytize freely. Highly religious and motivated they brought with them specific understanding of Islam and tried their best to inculcate those ideas into Bosnian minds. The salafi and Wahhabi ideas on wider scale surfaced for the first time. For instance the issue of niqab was almost unheard of in Bosnia from until although prior to it was the rule. When the mujahidun arrived first in they brought hope and courage to Bosnian Muslims who felt alone in their fight against Serbian and then Croatian aggressors. However, as the time passed they became a problem in the relation with the West. In fact, the Dayton agreement asked for their departure from Bosnia. The number of graduates of Islamic studies outside the country often sent by mujahidun and aid agencies dramatically increased and the Islamic literature in both Arabic and English arrived in significant amounts see below. Finally, economic power of local population was practically reduced to nothing and the foreign aid agencies became the prime donors of Islamic revival. Subsequently the first alternative Islamic organizations, which were symbols and catalyst of Islamic revival at the same time, were established. This was almost a rule since the prime mover for the donors of those organizations was religiosity. Majority of the members of these organizations are young men from rural areas although urban, well educated youth is well represented as well. Their numbers are however uncertain and may reach a few thousands. After the end of the war the aid agencies first and then Bosnians themselves opened Islamic kindergartens, halal food restaurants and meet shops. The sympathy for global Islamic issues such as Palestine and Chechnya was revived together with the revival of jihadi spirit. This means that all the manifestations of Islamic revival from s and s were intensified except for the Islamic political organizations. After when the so called Democratic Alliance led by the Social-democratic Party came to power and especially after September 11, things are getting back to the pre situation in many regards. Today, for instance, it is almost impossible to

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find a foreign donation for mosque construction. Bosnian Students of Islam in the Muslim World Besides relief agencies and mujahidun, another, in the long rang perhaps the most important vehicle for the transmission of reformist ideas from the Middle East to Bosnia are students. The IC in Yugoslavia did not have any higher education institution from until During s and s no Bosnian is known to have embarked on higher Islamic studies. The first group of Bosnian students went to Al-Azhar in Their usual destinations during the following two decades were Egypt, Libya and Iraq, all countries with some kind of Socialist regime. However with exception of Dr. All this time salafi type reformism was alien to Bosnia. Yet, 21 See www. Those were also turbulent years within the IC when the old guard of pro-Socialist leaders were put under pressure to step down. By that time a dozen of Bosnians was already studying Islam in Saudi Arabia some even at postgraduate level but they kept low profile and did not travel home often because some of more outspoken activists among them were denied passports eg.

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Chapter 4 : Bosnian Muslims, Bosniaks | calendrierdelascience.com

The Bosnian Muslims have survived through it all, even thriving during certain periods, most notably when they were recognized by Tito as a calendrierdelascience.comlously tracing their turbulent history and assessing the issues surrounding Bosnian Muslim nationhood in Yugoslavia, Friedman shows us how the mixed secular and religious identity of the.

Such diversity produces diverseness in the cultural, ethnic and national background of individuals. Names, however, often lack the potential to hold multiple intended messages about individuals and might be subject to interpretations not intended by the name givers. In this paper, one part of this multitude is examined: As the materials used for the socio-onomastic study of this topic are obtained from the Internet, the aim of this paper is to discuss web discourse on Bosnian Muslim naming. In fact, thus far I have failed to find sources which discuss the religious composition of the Bosniak population in detail, probably because authorities have failed to agree on a census or a similar method of determining the exact ethnic and religious composition of the population of 1 University of Helsinki. In any case, Bosniak naming is predominantly Muslim, by tradition, culture and anthropological mores, and I have not tried to distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim Bosniak naming in this article and further, this material is not suitable for it. Finding significant and systematic differences between two such closely related groups in the same environment is difficult, and this study does not focus on such findings. Bosnia-Herzegovina Today In Bosnia-Herzegovina today there is a very visible and natural turn towards the origins of Islam after the wars in the 90s. But how large are the differences and what kind are they in comparison with the situation of the s or the s? What has changed is visible in the rituals, attitudes and content of the daily life of individuals. Also, it seems that mostly non-Muslims â€” Christians, the irreligious, those who with fondness remember a multicultural, secular Sarajevo â€” comment on the growing visibility of Islam, not the devoutly religious Muslims themselves. Apart from possible hardships in family histories in the 20th century, the overall economic hardships and political uncertainty make daily life more difficult Merdzanic Thus luxuries such as understanding and tolerance for others are less prevalent than before. A further change is that the earlier diaspora of gastarbeiters is now a diaspora of former refugees and highly educated young professionals. It has been estimated that 1. Mixed marriages are largely avoided in rural settings, but in cities they are rather frequent. When commenting on names in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sorabji writes: Names always were, and remain today, indications of the affiliation of individuals. Although her life has been lived mainly outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, I have included her here because many of her relatives were situated in Bosnia and she tells about how her family gave names to their children. The name Muhamed was given less often because it was seen as obligating the bearer to be a true Muslim, which could be unsustainable during stormy times, especially under communist rule. As time went on, those who worked in the cities began to seek more modern names. Mothers wanted their children to have similar names, like Alma for a daughter and Almer for a son, Jasmina and Jasmin, and others that had no real meaning but were merely concocted. Here we have two versions of it in English: On Doomsday you will be called by your names and the names of your fathers â€” so chose [sic! Schimmel , 14 It is reported that the Prophet peace be upon him said: The only important thing about names is that they do not have an ugly meaning. And that they are not characteristic of non-believers. You cannot in Bosnia give a child a name like Marija or for example David, but Merjem or Davud are possible. Current Name Books Books on naming often aim to advise parents on the difficult task of giving appropriate names to their children. Here two contemporary guides for Muslim naming are compared, and a book on modern names in Bosnia- Herzegovina is presented. The advice given to parents in these naming guides is very similar; both books naturally recommend giving beautiful names which were names of good examples or good persons. Both warn against giving shortened names as official names. Both, as expected, advise against names that the Prophet advised against. Name books such as these, of course, take a stand on the question on spelling, as the names are given

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in writing in the books, so in ambiguous cases the writer needs to choose among alternate spellings. The book includes lists of names characteristic of these three ethnic groups and found in Maglaj in various sources, but predominantly in school registers. The full list of web materials used in this article is given at the end of the article. How representative are web discussions on names and naming of the overall discourse on names and naming in the area? The question of whether a part of a social phenomenon is representative of the entire social phenomenon is often difficult to answer in any case; whether anything on the web can be representative of a social phenomenon is perhaps even more difficult to answer, since interaction in writing on the web leaves out many aspects of human interaction. Perhaps this material is comparable to sampling techniques such as snowball sampling; the selection is not complete, and what you get depends on where you start, as well as persistence, hard work, expertise and good sampling design "and luck. A general characteristic of all of the web threads used is that most only list names without commentary. When Muslim naming which comes up in all the threads; the Muslim forums are obviously all about Muslim naming is mentioned, the most frequent question is: What then is Muslim in this context? These three categories are described in greater detail below. In the most frequent situation seen in the discourses in these materials, the parents have found a name and wonder whether it is Muslim, as in the first example below. Please help, I would like to know if Nora is a Muslim name. In two weeks, God willing, our daughter will be born, I found the name on one web page NORA - light but we are not certain that it is a Muslim name. The second name is Lana - delicate. In principal we do not deal with the interpretation of the meaning of individual names because there are volumes on the theme of Muslim names and those who want to know the meaning of individual names may turn to those volumes. Arabs give the name NUR to female children, and that means light. As far as we know the female name Nura exists in our community, whereas Nora does not. In my opinion he is here advising against choosing that name. There are those who will inquire about whether a name is good or not at their local mosque, and the rijaset is probably a web version of the answer you might get there. In the web discussion it is not mentioned whether an imam was asked, but there are mentions of other people who have wanted to give the same name who received a negative answer. Within this category there is a sub-group where participants in the naming discussions refer to an authority on Islam such as the international Muslim community, often represented by a website or the customs of a Muslim country. Many of the questions in this category are also questions on spelling and pronunciation. In the web discussions some of the more unusual spellings reflect a wish to adhere to Arabic. A common comment in this category is seen in the excerpt below, where an individual experience of foreign Muslims is translated into something that is representative of Muslims elsewhere. For almost all the names mentioned "they are not strictly Muslim they are not given only to children of the Muslim denomination because people from that region interpret that their name has the importance of a beautiful meaning and not which faith it belongs to. Here a local foreign community somewhere in the world outside Bosnia has also discussed Bosnian naming and found it strange that names are divided between the nationalities as they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Traditional Bosnian Muslim Names The subject of what is Bosnian, reclaiming Bosnian names and using names that are traditional comes up in some of the discussion threads, as the example below states: Although, honestly, I think that we Bosniaks need to preserve and we have a right to Slavonic names " Now I am not talking about the typical names Christians give, but names such as Badema " etcâ€. For instance, I do not know one Badema who is not Muslim, at least by birth, and Badema is a character in an old Bosnian tale Badem djevojka. I remember an old grandpa whose name was Karanfil " Also I see nothing bad in searching for names from the Bogumil times " They are our forefathers, the Bosnian language is our language, and I do think it would be indifferent of us to give that up " islambosna. This is part of an answer on islambosna; the whole thread discusses which names are Muslim and which are not, and this comment is about traditional Bosniak names. A number of posts promote traditional Bosnian Muslim names in addition to the Slavonic ones mentioned in this example such as Alija instead of new, fashionable Muslim names with foreign spellings. In general, I would say that this category of traditional Bosnian Muslim names does not stand out in the web discussions. It is not probable that a Bosniak

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parent would need peer support on whether Alija or a similar, traditional name is Muslim or not. And I would expect that in a later analysis of web discourse, this category would be called traditional Bosniak names, but for now my general impression is that Bosnian Muslim better describes the discourse on these names. Neutral Names Many parents want names that are neutral, either because the parents are of different denominations discussed further below , or because they do not want their child to be marked with a nationality or ethnic group. In the first example, the Muslimness of this post is unknown. I need a neutral international name for our second boy. We would consider also religious names, but only neutral ones. This example comes from ringeraja; the discussion goes on to say that it is impossible to have religious names that are neutral. On the other hand, the name Sara has really gained in popularity in recent years in Bosnia- Herzegovina; it really seems to be both neutral in the sense that Sara is common both internationally and within the different local groups and religious. Sara is exceptional also with regards to its history in the Third Reich. The name mentioned here, Damir, is also perceived as non- denominational, but as parents on the forums have joked it seems to be overrepresented in advertising in Bosnia-Herzegovina in recent years. A common feature of neutral names is that they are intended to gather two different denominations in one name, as the following example shows: My husband and I are in a mixed marriage Muslim and Catholic and God willing we are expecting our first [baby]. The doctor says it is [a girl]. This means the child will be neither Muhamed nor Franjo. J J I have a couple of names, but none of them really sound right to me. I am not enthusiastic about any of them. I will mention some names to you which are now on our short list: The name ENEA is somehow uncommon to me and maybe the most beautiful one of all mentioned, but whomever I mention it to, they look at me with a question mark above their heads. What do you think about that name????????? All of the examples Vana here gives Nives, Ella, Mia, Naomi, Enea are generally perceived as international, including the way that they are spelled. The others are rather direct: The current sociopolitical climate forces parents to choose between expressing a Bosniak Muslim identity which Aldrin calls social positioning or expressing an identity without a denomination. Also, in comparison with the books, the web now documents discussions that would not have been documented before “ discussions between neighbours or friends would never have come into the hands of a far-away researcher. In the nature of web discussions, of course, lies the fact that they are not easily authenticated; for all we know there might be one person logged on as several persons discussing naming with themselves. But why would anyone do that? And would not such fictional writing still mirror the actual world in some ways? It would seem that parents and parents-to-be are using the web discussion forums for peer support and in order to exchange thoughts on a variety of subjects. Certainly, some names do show origin; others are not intended to. Conclusions The results of the socio-onomastic examination of Muslim web discourses on names in Bosnia-Herzegovina were that three categories were found. These categories are positions that the discussants seem to take when names are discussed. The second position is the promotion of traditional Bosnian Muslim names, sometimes called Bosniak names. And the third position is the choice of neutral names that can be given in mixed families or when parents do not want the names of their children to mark them ethnically. References Agencija za statistiku BiH.

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Chapter 5 : "Ethnicity and War in the Balkans," by Mark Mazower

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He maintained power by suppressing political opponents and controlling the media. Milosevic pursued nationalist policies involving strong ethnic prejudice. He was the first sitting head of state in history to be charged by an international tribunal for alleged war crimes violating international laws of war. He was indicted formally charged with a crime by an international tribunal in May for crimes against humanity murder of large groups of people and later charges were added for genocide the deliberate destruction of a racial, religious, or cultural group. Nor are we the devils you have made us out to be. His parents were both of Montenegrin background. His mother, Stanislava Milosevic, was a schoolteacher. Both later committed suicide. His father died in and his mother hanged herself in Milosevic studied law at Belgrade University, where he became active in politics. At eighteen years of age he joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which later in became known as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Communism is a system of government in which the state controls the economy and a single party holds power. Milosevic became head of the ideology guiding ideas committee of the student branch. During this time, he made friendships through the party that would be critical to his later climb to political prominence. One key friend was Ivan Stambolic , president of Serbia in the s. Entering the business world Following graduation with his law degree, Milosevic became an economic advisor to the mayor of Belgrade in In , he married a childhood friend, Mirjana Markovic. Mirjana was a professor and also politically active in the League of Communists. They had two children, a son and a daughter. In , Milosevic went to work in an executive position for Tehnogas, a state-owned natural gas company. In just five years, he became its president. His banking business took him on frequent travels to the United States and France, where he learned English and French. A political rising star As he did in business, Milosevic rose fast in politics. Serbia had long been in a region of political instability. Following World War I 18 and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire , the Serbian kingdom joined the kingdom of Montenegro and various ethnic groups who had been ruled by the Ottomans. Together these groups formed Yugoslavia. The Serbs held political dominance. When World War II broke out in , the German army and its allies overran Yugoslavia and divided it for military occupation. In , Communist forces pushed the Germans out, and a new Yugoslavian government formed; it was composed of six republics. Josip Tito strictly ruled the new Yugoslavia, suppressing all ethnic hostilities, until his death in Mounting ethnic tensions led to an eight-person shared presidential position. Milosevic became active full time in the League of Communists by , when he began serving as an advisor to former law school friend Stambolic. In that position, Milosevic became a prominent leader in Serbian politics. He gained much popularity among Serbs by publicly protesting the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo, a southern province of Serbia dominated by ethnic Albanians who controlled local governments. Milosevic charged ethnic persecution including police brutality. Milosevic claimed Serbian leaders including Stambolic, who was now head of the League of Communists of Serbia were not doing enough to protect Serbs. He remained president of Serbia. As party leader, Milosevic quickly began orchestrating elections of Serbs into key regional political positions, including in Kosovo itself in early He had an Albanian leader in Kosovo arrested. With the growth of Milosevic support in Serbian politics, the Serbian assembly ousted Stambolic as president in , replacing him with Milosevic. This was a very unpopular move in Kosovo, where Albanians greatly outnumbered Serbs. As a result, the new Serbian leaders in Kosovo ruled harshly, so as to keep Albanians under control. This caused alarm in other Yugoslavian provinces and among international human rights organizations. With a declining economy, there was a growing clamor for economic and political reform in Serbia. Milosevic wanted to maintain strong government control over the economy, known as socialism. Milosevic adopted populist promotes the interests of common people strategies, while at the same time promoted socialist state control of the economy. Breakup

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of Yugoslavia With the collapse of the Soviet Union and European Communist governments in , nationalism belief that a particular nation and its culture, people, and values are superior to those of other nations rose in importance as the unifying influence of ethnic groups. The LCY separated into various political parties. He also guided the adoption of a new Serbian constitution by September that gave the president strong powers. In December, the first elections under the new constitution were held. Milosevic retained his political leadership of Serbia and his Socialist Party won a large majority of the vote for other elected positions. In the Kosovo province, most ethnic Albanians boycotted the elections. The elections showed that Milosevic was truly a popular leader among Serbs. This idea, referred to as Greater Serbia, created an anti-Serbian backlash in other Yugoslav republics. Elections led to new governments in the other Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia. The new leaders promised greater political independence for their regions. In , Milosevic was unwilling to accept a proposal from leaders of Croatia and Slovenia to create a new Yugoslavia composed of a loose confederation of largely independent states. The old federation of Yugoslavia had lost political unity. In March of that year, Milosevic declared that the federation was officially dead and Serbia was politically independent. This change gave the Serbs and Milosevic greater domination in domestic politics in their own country. In response, Slovenia and Croatia both declared their political independence in June Macedonia did the same in September and Bosnia-Herzegovina in March With the departure of these various former Yugoslav states, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed in May It included only Serbia and Montenegro. Though Dobrica Cosic was elected the first president of the Federal Republic, Milosevic held the true power from his Serbian president position. The Srebrenica Massacre On June 2, , prosecutors presented evidence at the war crimes trial of Slobodan Milosevic concerning the mass murder of Bosnians by Bosnian Serbs known as the Srebrenica Massacre. Until then, many Serbs had not heard of the extent of the tragedy or had been unwilling to accept that it actually occurred. However, after the evidence was presented at the trial, the Serbian public became outraged by the past actions of their special forces. Criminal investigators estimated that the Serb special forces under the direct command of General Ratko Mladic " murdered 8, Bosnian Muslim males of all ages. In the early s, conflicts between various ethnic groups in Yugoslavia escalated. Once such conflict occurred between the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, who had begun calling themselves Bosniaks in When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their political independence from Yugoslavia in October , Serbian president Milosevic vowed to carve out some Bosnian territory for Serbia. Fighting between Bosniaks and Serbs followed. While the Bosnian Serb forces were well equipped with tanks and artillery, the Bosniaks were poorly armed. One key area the Serbs wanted was Srebrenica, a Bosnian Muslim area dividing surrounding areas primarily inhabited by Bosnian Serbs. Serbs decided to get rid of all Bosniaks living in Srebrenica. By early , Serbian forces had isolated Srebrenica from other Bosnian Muslim areas. Its population was running out of food, medicine, and water. The United Nations sent a small contingent of troops to help establish peace and get supplies to Srebrenica. By the situation was near catastrophic. Citizens were starving to death. In early July, Serbian special forces made their move and entered UN-controlled areas. As the group of lightly armed UN troops stood aside, the Serbs began the mass killings of the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs would move through the crowds of panicked Bosnians, picking out males to be executed. Endless truckloads of males were taken from Srebrenica to killing sites in the country for execution. They were often bound, blindfolded, and shot with automatic rifles. Then bulldozers pushed the bodies into mass graves. Many people were wounded and buried alive with the dead. Women, children, and the elderly were placed on buses to be displaced to Bosnian territory elsewhere. Hundreds of the women and female children were raped while on their way to other territories. Thousands of males initially escaped and attempted a long march to safe areas, but most were killed by Serb forces who tracked them down and fired on them with tanks, machine guns, and artillery. Many committed suicide, sensing the futility of the situation. Within only a few days, the massacre was over. In an effort to hide or destroy the evidence of mass murders, in late Serbs moved many of the graves using heavy equipment. Reports by the few survivors led to investigations. By , the UN had recovered about six thousand bodies in an effort to document the mass killings. They searched for and excavated mass graves.

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Mladic and other Serb military officers were indicted for genocide and various other war crimes. Investigators claimed it took considerable planning to kill so many people in only a few days.

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Chapter 6 : Onder Cetin - calendrierdelascience.com

Focusing on the particular case of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), this article aims to demonstrate why research on perpetrators of genocide and war crimes is important, to highlight the limitations of personality-based explanations and to illustrate the complexity of perpetrator behaviour.

Twenty-nine raped women Logistic regression analysis showed that significant predictors of pregnancy were younger age OR, 0. Seventeen women had artificial abortion, while 12 gave birth to healthy children. Suicidal thoughts and impulses after the rape were significant predictor of artificial abortion OR, Discussion Our study showed that rape was a strong trauma, resulting in various psychiatric disorders in all women in the study, including long-term depression, social phobia, PTSD, and sexual dysfunctions. The studies into consequences of war-time rapes on civilians 18 , 19 or female veterans 20 , 21 often connected the trauma of rape with chronic PTSD, a disorder characterized by a continuous re-experience of the trauma, avoiding behavior, and symptoms of hyperarousal. The importance of studying PTSD relates to the occurrence of chronic PTSD, because of its severe psychopathology and not acute stress reactions, which are more likely to result in complete resolution of symptoms 5. Rape, together with other superimposed war-related traumatic events, resulted in high long-term prevalence rates of depression and social phobia in women victims included in our study. It might be possible that the genesis of this phenomenon is partially related to the traditional background of the victims under study. According to their testimonies, the posttraumatic period was characterized by reduced subjective confidence, feelings of worthlessness, and disgrace they thought they had brought to their families. The women tended to avoid social situations because they were concerned about the feelings of their family members and friends who knew about the rape, and because of fear of blame. However, causal mechanisms could not be easily inferred from data we collected and the psychological responses to the trauma of rape were individually specific for each woman. Almost a half of women in our study got pregnant as a result of rape. Women who were raped once, compared with those repeatedly raped, had seven times higher risk of pregnancy. This finding suggests an association between prolonged exposure to stress and conception, but the mechanisms of this interaction are still unclear and require further investigation. Most women said that the unwanted pregnancy made their mental recovery more difficult. Women who had experienced suicidal thoughts after the rape were more likely to have artificial abortion, which may indicate that they suffered particularly humiliating trauma. According to the results of a US study, rape-related pregnancy rate is 5. However, this rate can change in war circumstances, especially when women are systematically raped. Female sexual dysfunctions include hypoactive sexual desire, sexual arousal disorder, orgasmic disorder, and postcoital dysphoria In our study, it was not possible to identify the type of sexual dysfunction on the basis of information collected via clinical interview. We showed that single women or those in relationships but not married had more difficulties in posttraumatic period due to more prominent sexual dysfunctions. This result is consistent with previous findings showing that these symptoms persisted for years after the assault It also suggests that marriage itself provides a certain level of protection and support. Also, we found that more Bosniak Muslim than Croat women thought the relationship with their partner worsened after the trauma. This could be explained by the fact that Bosniak women come from a more traditional culture. In societies with patriarchal social structure, victims refuse to talk about the trauma and do not want the event to be documented even in medical files. Victims often refuse any kind of psychiatric treatment and professional help 25 , To overcome these problems in dealing with victims of rape, we used the testimony method developed by the Chilean psychologists Cienfuegos and Monelli to obtain information about the repressive Pinochet regime, but it proved to have therapeutic effect on the victims of torture 14 , 15 , The testimony method was used in almost all participants. While giving the testimony, the victim has a chance to perceive the trauma from another perspective. A raped woman moves from the role of victim to the role of witness, which is an important psychotherapeutic step. After that, the victims are much more inclined

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to accept psychiatric help. Gradually, they become ready to talk openly about the event, allow the therapist to have an insight into their condition, and go through a diagnostic procedure. It might be an advantage to have therapists of the same cultural and social environment as the victims, because it may foster better personal contact and understanding between them. Also, there is no need for a translator as a third party person. Most women in our study did not know their rapists before the traumatic event, which suggests that the rapes were committed not only by paramilitary soldiers from the country, but also by the members of military and paramilitary units from other parts of former Yugoslavia. Rapes in these cases might have been more violent and humiliating, and women were more likely to have suicidal thoughts and impulses after the rape. Bassiouni reported that the number of committed rapes decreased with the increase of media attention for war events in this region 28 , which indicates that war commanders may have been able to control the perpetrators. Almost two-thirds of women were raped repeatedly. Besides, some women were forced to witness rapes of other women, usually their mothers, daughters, and neighbors, which were extremely humiliating and painful events. Limitations of our study are related to the nature of the problem that we explored. Although the assessments were performed by an experienced psychiatrist trained to work with the war victims, especially victims of sexual assaults, two independent assessments could have increased both reliability and validity of the data. However, the study was performed during the war and early post-war period when the applied study design was the only one possible to carry through successfully. In conclusion, war-time rapes left deep and lasting consequences on the mental health of the victims and their families. Many suffered from depression and social phobia, which were often comorbid. As causal relations between the trauma and its consequences could not be completely revealed from the data we collected, future studies are needed to establish to what extent the psychological consequences depend on a multi-dimensional nature of trauma in situations of war. Abusive experiences and psychiatric morbidity in women primary care attenders. Associations among symptoms of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder and self-reported health in sexually assaulted women. *J Nerv Ment Dis.* Wilken J, Welch J. Management of people who have been raped. Shanks L, Schull MJ. *International Humanitarian Law, treaties and documents.* Ethnic cleansing and post-traumatic coping, war violence, PTSD, depression, anxiety, and coping in Bosnian and Croatian refugees: War violence, trauma and the coping process: Sexual torture of women as a weapon of war – the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. History of camps [in Croatian]. *Putevima pakla kroz srpske koncentracijske logore u* Cienfuegos AJ, Monelli C. The testimony of political repression as a therapeutic instrument. Ager I, Jensen SB. Testimony as ritual and evidence in psychotherapy for political refugees. *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 3rd revision ed.* American Psychiatric Association; American Psychiatric Press, Inc. Stressor characteristics and post-traumatic stress disorder symptom dimensions in war victims. Posttraumatic stress disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey. Fontana A, Rosenheck R. Duty-related and sexual stress in the etiology of PTSD among women veterans who seek treatment. *Am J Obstet Gynecol.* Women in war-torn societies. Problems with sexuality after sexual assault. *Annu Rev Sex Res.* Systematic raping of women in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rape, torture, and traumatization of Bosnian and Croatian women: Testimony psychotherapy in Bosnian refugees:

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Chapter 7 : Psychological Consequences of Rape on Women in War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Muslim Names the Bosnian Way Muslim in the cities in the s, and there was a vast gap between religious life in rural settings and religious life in urban settings - a gap which still exists (Pickering , 83).

Set up a corridor between Semberija and Krajina. Establish a corridor in the Drina river valley, that is, eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states. Establish a border on the Una and Neretva rivers. Divide the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Bosniak parts and establish effective state authorities in both parts. Ensure access to the sea for Republika Srpska. Serbia in the Yugoslav Wars and Ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian War Since the beginning of the war, the VRS Army of Republika Srpska and the political leadership of Republika Srpska have been accused of war crimes , crimes against humanity , genocide , ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population, creation and running of detention camps variably also referred to as concentration camps and prisoner camps , and the destruction of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian cultural and historical heritage. Independent observers generally agree that Bosnian Serbs bear the overwhelming preponderance of rapes and other war crimes. Serbs were the first to commit atrocities, carried out 90 percent of war crimes, and were the only party who systematically attempted to "eliminate all traces of other ethnic groups from their territory". Ethnic cleansing of non-Serb population was particularly common in the territories of Bosanska Krajina region and Drina river valley. In many instances the procedure was conducted through well organized and efficient bureaucracy set up by the Republika Srpska authorities such as in the case of Banja Luka. Those and other cases of ethnic cleansing dramatically changed the demographic picture of Republika Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many Republika Srpska officials were also indicted for creation and running of detention camps, in particular Omarska , Manjaca , Keraterm , Uzamnica and Trnopolje where thousands of detainees were held. Many Catholic churches in the same territory were also destroyed or damaged especially during In addition to sacred monuments many secular monuments were also heavily damaged or destroyed by VRS forces such as the National Library in Sarajevo. While the individuals responsible for destruction of national heritage have not yet been found, or indicted, it has been widely reported by international human rights agencies that the "Bosnian Serb authorities issued orders or organized or condoned efforts to destroy Bosniak and Croatian cultural and religious institutions". Republika Srpska it was found that: In , the United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ICTY at The Hague for the purpose of bringing to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since In , a list of nearly 28, individuals who, according to the Republika Srpska authorities, were involved in Srebrenica massacre alone was released; of those allegedly responsible still hold the positions in the local government of Republika Srpska. The trials of all suspected war criminals are expected to last for years to come. Two days after international judges in The Hague ruled that Bosnian Serb forces had committed genocide in the killing of nearly 8, Muslims in Srebrenica in These allegations claimed that ethnic Serb civilians were killed, including Serbs living in Sarajevo, by the Bosniak and Croat authorities and that Republika Srpska authorities have acted as a response to those alleged crimes. As a result of Operation Storm , nearly , Serbs fled from Croatia and a large portion of them found refuge in Bosnia especially in Republika Srpska. Also during and after the war when Dayton Agreement was signed , some Serbs left Sarajevo and other parts of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity particularly after the territorial provisions were enforced to comply with the Dayton agreement. Numerous detention camps were established, and executions occurred, in the parts of Sarajevo firmly held by Serb forces i. Furthermore, various international and state agencies have reported that most Serbs killed in Sarajevo were killed by and from the VRS positions that surrounded Sarajevo and were counted as part of the total 12, civilian casualties. Such reports have been backed by forensic analysis and medical records that were kept at the Sarajevo hospitals.

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Chapter 8 : Muslim Names the Bosnian Way | Johanna Virkkula - calendrierdelascience.com

The ICJ was also, probably for the first time in its history, faced with a case in which the principal, underlying dispute was actually within the applicant state itself, between the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and the Bosnian Serbs, whose army committed the Srebrenica genocide, and who actively tried to obstruct the progress of the Genocide.

Muslimani Orientation Identification and Location. One of six republics in the former Yugoslavia, it was internationally recognized as an independent state in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Muslims share the country with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, whose identification and political orientation are largely synonymous with those of the neighboring countries of Serbia and Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been claimed by both these neighboring peoples, but the Muslims have contested their claims. The Bosnian Muslims identify themselves as belonging to a distinct ethnic group or nation and, contrary to the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, consider Bosnia and Herzegovina their only homeland. The Bosnian Muslims were the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war. They lived among Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and other Bosnians in cities, towns, and villages throughout the country. The largest concentrations of Muslims were in the central and eastern parts and in the northwestern area of the country. During the war Muslims were expelled from or killed in the territories controlled by the Croat or the Serb armies. Others fled from cities under siege and bombardment. The Muslims have traditionally dominated the cities as evident in the cultural expression of the capital city of Sarajevo. Since the Bosniak population has been concentrated in the major cities that were under Bosnian Muslim control during the war: The federation with the Bosnian Serb-controlled "Republika Srpska" forms the two state entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina established by the Dayton Accord. As a consequence of the past war, communities of Bosniaks can be found throughout Europe, with the largest number in Germany. According to the national census for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims accounted for 51.1%. However, as a consequence of the war this number has been reduced and it is difficult to ascertain the exact post-war population because of the dislocation caused by military action, forced expulsions and massacres, ethnic cleansing, and political manipulation. In July 1995, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was estimated at 3.8 million. During the war hundreds of thousands of Muslims either fled or were systematically expelled from their homes. In addition, thousands were killed in massacres. For instance, when the city of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia was taken by Serb forces in July 1995, it is believed that more than seven thousand Muslim men were massacred, 7,000 were missing, and approximately four thousand bodies were found in mass graves. The war, and particularly the strategy of so-called ethnic cleansing, had left over two million Bosnians, Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and others displaced within the country or living as refugees abroad. An estimated 100,000 people were killed during the war. One of the provisions of the Dayton Accord was the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their prewar homes. Six years after the accord was signed an estimated 600,000 people have returned to the municipalities they lived in before the war almost 50% of these people returned to the Federation entity, but a majority were not able to go back to their prewar homes. Bosniaks share a language with their Serb and Croat neighbors within Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia. It is a Slavonic language whose official name before the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was Serbo-Croat. Since the dissolution of this state and its division into ethnically based nation-states this common language has taken on three different designations: Serbian the eastern Ekavski variant using the Cyrillic alphabet, the official language of the Serbian population; Croatian the western Ijekavski variant using the Latin alphabet, the official language of the Croatian population; and Bosnian which is of the Ijekavski variant and uses the Latin alphabet, the official language of the Bosniak population. The last variant is distinguished from the Croatian mainly by a variation in vocabulary. In Bosnia was conquered by the Ottoman Empire after a century and a half of fighting. In the following centuries a large number of the local people Christians belonging to the Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox churches and, some scholars argue, the Bosnian Church—the "heretical" church of the Bosnian king whose members were

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persecuted by Rome and Catholic Hungary converted to Islam , the religion of the conquering state. Those who converted came from a broad cross section of society. The Bosnian gentry were probably among the first to embrace Islam and the securing of property and privileges may have been a motivating factor but peasants and members of other socioeconomic categories followed suit. The Ottoman administration favored those who shared their faith. They had access to education and could hold office in the administration. A Bosnian Muslim elite grew up that obtained the right to own land. The peasants who worked on their land were usually Christians. In the Ottoman Empire various groups had been identified and administered on the basis of religion. The Christian churches were a significant force in the national movements in Croatia and Serbia in the nineteenth century. Gradually, these movements expanded into neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina and over time Catholic and Orthodox Bosnians came to see themselves as Croats and Serbs with an allegiance to the "national centers" of Zagreb and Belgrade , respectively. A Bosnian Muslim national movement developed much later, and had a smaller popular base. It was mainly a response to a Serb and Croat nationalist denial of the existence of a separate Bosnian Muslim identity and claims that Bosnian Muslims were ethnically Serbs or Croats. However, the Bosnian Muslims refused to become either Serbianized or Croatianized. Since its independent status in the Middle Ages , Bosnia and Herzegovina has been under the political control of different state powers. The Ottoman empire , the Habsburg empire, and the Yugoslav kingdom all discriminated against one community or segment of the population while favoring another. In postwar Yugoslavia, the communist partisans led by Marshal Tito developed a complex system for the balance of power between the largest ethnic groups to make sure that no ethnic group or nation within the multinational Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was favored or became dominant. The main competition for power had historically been between Serbia and Croatia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the two met in their hegemonic aspirations for territory expressed through their coreligionists and ethnic brethren. Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus a potential source of instability in the new socialist Yugoslavia. Tito may have calculated that the Muslims could be used as a stabilizing factor. This gave them the equal status with Serbs and Croats that Muslim activists had long demanded. None of the three constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina had carried an ethnonym that directly identified it with the country. In the case of the Muslims their religious rather than ethnic affiliation and territorial identity was stressed, while for the Bosnian Catholics and Orthodox Christians it was their affiliation with a political and territorial entity outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Explicitly or implicitly they sought a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines. The Muslims were caught in between together with Bosnians of ethnically mixed parentage , as they neither identified with a political unit outside of Bosnia or had military or political support from a neighboring patron state. The Muslim political leadership and population favored a united multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslims became the victims of genocide perpetrated by the Serbian side and were the hardest hit by "ethnic cleansing. The degree to which people coexisted and interacted varied locally. Some traditions, customs, and rituals were regionally based and shared by people of all three backgrounds. However, during World War II Bosnia and Herzegovina had been the scene of a ferocious civil war and a war against the German and Italian occupying forces. Issues and historical memories from that war inspired nationalist rhetoric and became a motivating force for the war. Settlements Before Muslims lived throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina but there were sharp regional variations in ethnic composition. For instance, in Cazin in the northwest and Janja in the northeast, Muslims made up 95 percent of the population. In some areas, such as that surrounding Banja Luka, Muslims lived among a Serb majority, while in western Herzegovina Muslims lived among a Croat majority. In other regions Muslims and Croats or Muslims and Serbs were found in almost equal numbers. The major cities are often divided into an old city center and a new part characterized by high rise tower blocks. The city centers were divided into mahalas or neighborhoods that traditionally had been inhabited by one ethnic group. In Sarajevo certain mahalas in the old city had been inhabited by urban Muslim families for generations. In rural areas Muslims lived in separate villages or hamlets or in ethnically mixed ones. In ethnically mixed villages the different groups lived in separate or clearly defined areas or

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families with different ethno-religious backgrounds lived as next door neighbors. Settlements typically consisted of brothers with their families. The ideal for a young married man was to set up his own household in a new house. As a result of industrial development in Yugoslavia after World War II wage labor became widely available, and in the s migrant labor opportunities abroad made sons independent of their fathers. The traditional communal patrigroup household called *zajednica* "community" became less common as brothers left the household at a much earlier age and established their own households. During the past war most ethnically mixed villages were socially and physically destroyed. After , in Federation territory of central Bosnia, Bosniacs and Croats began to return to life in mixed villages. The war destroyed most prewar economic activities. During the war people lived off small plots of land, by receiving food aid and remittances from abroad, and by engaging in black market activities. The unemployment rate was an estimated 80 percent and remains at 40 percent. There are no distinct subsistence or economic activities in which Bosniaks engage. Although there are full-time farmers, agriculture is typically of the subsistence variety: Rural households derive income mainly from industry and labor migration and supply the household economy from small agricultural holdings. Agricultural products such as milk, butter, and eggs are sold at the local market mainly by women. From the s until the dissolution of Yugoslavia many Bosnians engaged in labor migration, primarily to Germany and Austria. When the labor market in Europe became more restricted in the s, men left for Canada and Australia. Yugoslav companies were involved in construction work in the Middle East , and Bosnian men worked in that region. The money they earned often was invested in projects in their home country such as the building of a new house or invested in a private business. In larger cities and market towns Bosniaks engage in traditional handicrafts: Coppersmiths make traditional plates, coffee grinders, coffee sets, and tables. Silversmiths and goldsmiths make traditional filigree jewelry. Shoemakers make traditional slippers and leather shoes. Bosnian Muslim artisans also make traditional pottery, and some women weave traditional kilims or knit colorful and richly patterned woolen socks that they sell in the marketplace. Both men and women are involved in wage labor in industry, education, the health services, and public administration. During the second half of the twentieth century when men left rural areas to work in industry in nearby cities and abroad, agriculture and sheep herding became female centered. This trend is changing as there are few opportunities for wage labor in postwar Bosnia. During Ottoman rule , Bosnia had a feudal system with Muslim *begs*, or landlords, at the top. The Muslim landlords made up 2 percent of the Muslim population, but most of the sharecroppers *kmets* who worked on their land were Christians. There were some Muslim *kmets*, but most Muslim peasants were freeholders and did not have to make obligatory payments to a landlord. The *kmets* had to give over a third of the annual crop to a Muslim landlord and another tenth in levies to the state.

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More than two million Bosnian Muslims were ethnically cleansed in the Balkan region; of these, , were killed while the others were forced to flee their homes and become refugees.

Ethnicity and War in the Balkans Mark Mazower University of Sussex "Tolerance marks the respect with which these peoples of varying faiths mingle their common lot," observed an American painter arriving in Sarajevo in Glancing at the peaceful little stalls where Christians, Mussulmans, and Jews mingle in business, while each goes his own way to cathedral, mosque or synagogue, I wondered if tolerance is not one of the greatest of virtues. The casual reader of the international press over the past two years has been left in little doubt that the most obvious feature of the war in the former Yugoslavia, and perhaps its prime cause, is "ethnicity. Contemporary geo-politicians seize on the war in Bosnia as evidence that--ethnicity is replacing ideology as the motor of global conflict. This is a great burden for a small war to bear. In what follows, I wish to explore both what has been said about Bosnia, and what is happening there, in order to raise some doubts about the current obsession with "ethnic identity. His political outlook, however, is based upon a deeper conceptual division of Europe according to which a primitive southeast is contrasted with a developed and civilized North -West with an intermediate, largely Catholic, zone desperately trying to distance itself from its former Communist neighbors and to assert its more civilized character. Thus, the "Third World"--a site of competition among the two more developed worlds and still benighted by traditional values--became the province of anthropology: In this admittedly rough outline, the place of politics was filled in the Third World by tribal, religious, and family sentiments and passions. Invoking the tensions of a supposedly irrational, traditional and ultimately primitive society becomes not simply a way of separating the Balkans from the rest of Europe, but of dispensing with further analysis of the war. The deeper implication is that peace and democracy are unattainable without the "radical surgery" of a David Owen to separate the different ethnic groups by fighting, if necessary, or population transfer and partition. Taken further, such views suggest that in the absence of a thorough-going secularization and modernization, the chances for democracy are slim. Now what gives this type of analysis its plausibility is the obvious ethnic diversity of the Balkans. History and topography have combined to make Bosnia perhaps the most ethnically variegated region in what was always one of the most ethnically mixed parts of Europe. The first is conceptual: It does not refer to language, the usual marker of ethnic identity in Eastern Europe, since Serbo-Croat in one form or another is spoken throughout the region. Nor is it a question of biological or physical differences--Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are visually indistinguishable and apparently descended from the same Slavic peoples. It is fairly clear that the primary criterion of ethnic identity is religion. Yet religion can hardly have been said to have been the main cause of the fighting, even if it has provided useful symbols for mass mobilization. The second problem is historical: In fact, it was really only fifty years ago, during the Second World War, that ethnic criteria exercised a major influence on the course of conflict. The Croatian ustache genocide of the local Serb population is commonly cited in this regard. Both ustache and chetniks recruited and selected their victims on the basis of ethnic exclusivism. Yet many Croats and Serbs did not join their ranks, and indeed opposed them. Similarly some Albanians and Bosnian Muslims formed militias which collaborated with the German and Italian occupiers, while others fought them in the partisan movement. It is difficult, in other words, to see even the Second World War in terms of an ethnic conflict. To what extent were ethnic tensions evident in Communist society? Again, the evidence is far from clear. On the one hand, the national leadership in Belgrade drew upon the language of ethnicity to facilitate its handling of local politics in the various provinces; on the other hand, marriage across ethnic lines was extremely common, particularly in Bosnia. Urbanization probably encouraged such a trend. Yet even in the villages, where everyone knew who was a Serb, and who a Croat, consciousness of ethnic identity can hardly have been said to have led to social conflict under Communism. In Bosnia as in much of Eastern Europe, localism was as important in shaping affiliations

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and loyalties as ethnicity. In Sarajevo, the inhabitants of each and every ethnic background referred to themselves as Sarajevli "Sarajevans" , contrasting themselves with the uncultured peasantry of the villages. And in those same villages, women of various ethnic backgrounds often achieved a greater intimacy in daily life with each other than with women of similar ethnicity from other villages. One might say that the memory of the violence of the Second World War had at least two opposite effects: As studies of village life in post-Civil War Greece have shown, it was often a new generation which took the lead in this process by the simple expedient of falling in love across the ethnic divide, or leaving for the towns. Thus in the current conflict it is clear that some of the Serb leadership, such as General Ratko Mladic, fall into the first group, while others, like the Serb Chief of General Staff in the Bosnian Government Army, fall into the second. It is easy to see why some commentators have interpreted the Bosnian war in terms of an assault by the village on the city. That mutual suspicion exists between town and country is not in doubt. Yet that is hardly what prompts wars to break out. The massive armaments superiority which enabled the Bosnian Serb nationalists to begin hostilities in was not manufactured in barns and stables. Moreover, rapid urbanization in the postwar period has blurred the distinction between urban and rural populations. The leaders of the Bosnian Serbs are, like many of their followers, urban professionals who moved out of their native villages several decades ago. What, then, were the causes of the Bosnian war and what is their relation to the issue of ethnicity? The key seems to me to lie in the relationship of ethnicity not to history or society, but to politics and power. At the same time, however, it is useful to note that a vital element of his strategy has been the deliberate inculcation of a sense of ethnic allegiance, whether through grandiose public spectacles or through the state-controlled media. History, in particular the massacres of the Second World War, have been pressed into service as a way of building public support for an increasingly militarized policy. Thus we now find Serb nationalists referring to themselves as chetniks and to their Croat opposite numbers as Ustache, after the movements of half a century ago. As for the immediate causes of the war in Bosnia, they are fairly clear-cut. Fighting started in March-April when the war in Croatia petered out. Because this was no spontaneous conflagration but a planned assault. Following the same tactics as in Croatia earlier, but enjoying even greater superiority in armaments, a combination of Serbian paramilitary units and Army troops attacked key towns and expelled the non-Serb population. What is germane to my subject is the impact of the war upon the question of ethnic identity. It has, to put it simply, created new realities. Fully one-third of all marriages in Bosnia had been inter-marriages; these people, together with many others who were not inclined at the start of hostilities to identify themselves exclusively in terms of one or another ethnic group, have come under tremendous pressure to do so. This, of course, was the aim of the Serbian nationalists in starting the fighting. But Western policy has pushed increasingly in the same direction, as international negotiators, notably David Owen, insisted upon treating the conflict in terms of ethnicity. Similarly, the fighting which broke out between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia in the spring of was directly attributable to the Owen-Vance plan which proposed the creation of ethnically-distinct cantons in the area. Villages were radicalized along ethnic lines, not because of ancient memories or past atrocities, but because of a vicious struggle for power induced by Western "peace" proposals. It is worth noting that at the same time that this fight between former allies was going on, Muslim and Croat forces in northeastern Bosnia were continuing to cooperate against the Serbs, as indeed they still do. If true, this must surely lead us to ask what the impact of peace might be. The lesson of the last war seems to be that the impact varies according to the individual. But this innocuous conclusion is in itself revealing since it suggests that ethnic divisions created by war are not necessarily decisive in shaping postwar social relations. What matters is the nature of the political system which emerges at the same time. Let us generalize a little from the Bosnian experience. I have tried to explain some reasons to be cautious in ascribing a central causal role to ethnicity in starting this war. The temptation to talk about "age-old ethnic hatreds" should be avoided. But does this then lead us to a world of "imagined communities"? Is a sense of ethnic identity a purely modern invention? There is much to be said for this view. As I have mentioned, one cannot-- in my view--understand the war in Bosnia without focusing upon Milosevic and the role of the state apparatus in Belgrade, whose

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virtual monopoly of both the means of coercion and of communications gave it great power in shaping popular opinion. Moving away from Bosnia, too, the Anderson thesis has much to commend it. Greek historians stress the role played by the newly-independent nineteenth-century state in making Greeks out of a variety of Albanians, Vlachs, Slavs and other Orthodox Romioi, many of whom spoke little or no Greek. Conversely, it is the absence of a state that seems to explain the tardy development of a Macedonian national identity and the non-development of nationalism in poor, isolated areas of Eastern Europe like Poleshie-- in eastern inter-war Poland-- whose inhabitants were said to identify themselves as late as simply by saying: The administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire separated communities on the basis of religion. Individuals could cross the boundary from one group to another with relative ease, as indeed on occasions could entire populations like the Donmeh, followers of the False Messiah Sabbetai Zevi who converted en masse from Judaism to Islam in the seventeenth century, or the present-day Bulgarian and Greek Pomaks, who are Islamicised Slavs. Even so, differences of dress, custom, and culture marked the various communities. The important point is that for most of Ottoman history it does not seem to have been ethnic diversity that constituted the major source of tension. Class antagonisms--between landlords and peasants--and struggles within communities over religious practice seem to have been the major motives for riot, insurrection, and conflict before the latter half of the nineteenth century. The klefts and brigands who plagued much of Ottoman Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were essentially profiteers, as likely to prey upon their fellow-Christians as upon Muslims. Only later were they transformed by the myth-making propensities of nationalist intelligentsias into the heroic pioneers of national liberation. The modern state became available as the instrument of the dominant ethnic group to create a model citizenry in its own image. The League of Nations created a system of minority rights guarantees as a safeguard, but this remained ineffectual throughout the inter-war period. Czechoslovakia was exceptional in the moderation of its official policy towards minorities. More typical, perhaps were countries like Poland, where the army burned scores of villages in its campaign of pacification against Ukrainian nationalists. In Yugoslavia, the Serb-dominated police and military suppressed all signs of Macedonian and Croat unrest. The result was to stimulate the emergence of counter-nationalisms, originally expressed in demands for autonomy and decentralization, but intensified during the Second World War with chilling results. A metaphor is hardly an explanation. As I suggested in the case of Bosnia, unless one postulates a sort of mass self-deception, one must simply accept that ethnicity was not a major issue in the daily life of most people through most of the postwar decades. It would be more useful to say that Communism constituted a new structure of power--one to which people became accustomed and in which issues of ethnic identity possessed only a limited importance. The question to answer then becomes why things changed in the new political configuration which followed the collapse of Communism in Yugoslavia so that nationalism again became the key to politics. The places to look will be in the corridors of power in Belgrade, Zagreb, and elsewhere rather than the villages and mountains of "traditional Balkan society.