

**Chapter 1 : Narco News: Ecuadorians Condemn the Presence of Alvaro Uribe**

*Feb 25, 2008. The report, prepared by the Democratic staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, was released as President Bush prepared to host a drug summit of.*

Squeezing one end of the balloon forces the air to the other side – clamping down on cocaine production and trafficking in one area of the Andes simply pushes it into another region or country. If efforts are made to eliminate production in the new area, production simply moves back to the original area in a cyclical process which continues as long as there are individuals willing to risk jail to reap the economic rewards. This displacement is the crucial factor behind the failure of enforcement-based approaches to counter-drug strategy in South America – cocaine production process that has been pushed around Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia for at least forty years. The balloon effect is the element that historic U.S. enforcement strategies that appear to be successful in one area prove to be paper tigers, as the effects of Plan Colombia on Peru have demonstrated. Rather than being defeated, many of the traffickers who previously operated in Colombia have displaced cocaine production to Peru, where they find it easier to operate. As in Colombia, there is a ready supply of agricultural labor willing to grow coca in exchange for a better financial stake, and in Peru the state security forces do not have the resources to prevent drug-related activity over the entire country. Indeed, many of the features that were characteristic of Colombia in the 1980s could also be applied to parts of Mexico from onward. These included extreme levels of violence, lack of state authority, control of territory by illegal entities, and a militarized government response. Fortunately, Peru has so far largely been spared the violence experienced by Colombia and Mexico in their attempts to deal with drug trafficking. If Humala were to adopt a militarized approach like the governments of Colombia and Mexico, however, it is possible that violence in the country could escalate, particularly if the Sendero Luminoso mounts a renewed concerted campaign alongside the traffickers. Not only is an enforcement-first approach likely to simply lead to displacement, it also entails some significant challenges in Peru that requires the exercise of resources arguably beyond the capacity of the state to make skilful use of these resources. Eliminating illegal coca is a difficult problem in many parts of the country – eradication is a highly controversial policy among coca farmers, who have used violence to resist government eradication efforts. Rumours that trafficking organisations are beginning to produce strains of coca which can be grown at lower altitudes and maintain a high level of quality may explain the expansion of cultivation outside of traditional growing areas. Certainly, rebel forces are involved in the drug trade, allowing them to amass a large amount of money for use in the political struggle or personal enrichment. Eradication and interdiction efforts allow the Shining Path to win the propaganda war and gain the support of disgruntled coca farmers. It also provides an opportunity to launch attacks on government forces when they enter rebel-controlled territory to destroy coca crops and re-assert state control. A lack of resources, weak state territorial control, challenging terrain, the involvement of the Sendero Luminoso, and above all the balloon effect are challenges which will not be surmounted by policy issues focused on enforcement. There will be little if any impact on the overall production of cocaine in South America. Similar drug war policies have failed to produce meaningful results for more than three decades, and a fundamental shift in attitude and policy is needed in the Western Hemisphere to tackle the issue of illegal drugs. It is not unreasonable for the U.S. Leaving aside the dire current state of U.S. The majority of peasant farmers do not want to take part in illegal activity, but the financial rewards and the chance to improve the lives of their families make participation too tempting an opportunity to reject. The implementation of a more holistic strategy emphasising economic and alternative development over eradication and interdiction would represent a step in the right direction. USAID does currently provide money for alternative development to Peru, but the proviso that a farmer must eradicate percent of their coca before entering a U.S. Taking the money currently spent on counter-narcotics efforts in Peru and redistributing it to other aid sectors to which Washington currently spends far too little, such as education, economic growth and trade, and agricultural development, could also help stimulate the licit economy. A more impactful holistic strategy requires a great deal of resources and a long term political commitment to supporting economic and alternative development. Moreover, the approach must recognize

that cocaine production in the Andes does not confine itself to the national borders of individual countries. It is a fluid, mobile entity which can only be countered through a pan-Andean effort, not piecemeal country-by-country solutions. The dilemma of drug usage cries out for the governments of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia to cooperate to tackle the displacement issue together. A broad, international agreement on the implementation of a counter-drug strategy which focuses on alternative development, collaboration, and the sharing of resources, and which mandates a commitment to this approach for decades, is needed to avoid the pitfalls of temporary political gains sought by policymakers at the national level. The Peruvian and Colombian governments are generally on the same page when it comes to combating drugs, and the two countries enjoy a robust list of agreements that promote joint cooperation to tackle drug trafficking along their common border. The Bolivian situation, however, is more complicated as the Morales administration views coca production in a different light due to its status as a fundamental cornerstone of Bolivian culture. Adopting a new approach would not mean the end of enforcement and control efforts altogether. Ideally, even more resources would be made available in terms of eradicating drug crops and interdicting drugs and traffickers, but the relative importance of these elements would be reduced in the overall strategy. Clearly this would require the mobilization of far greater financial resources to be conveyed to counter-drug policies than are currently provided. But there is nothing to suggest it will be any less effective than the past forty years of the war on drugs, which has not witnessed a stellar performance. The primary responsibility for enabling change in the way that Latin American nations deal with drug production lies with the United States. As the source of anti-drugs assistance for Latin American nations, and the main source of demand for Latin American cocaine, Washington must lead the way in halting a failing policy and moving in a new direction, one which at the very least cannot fail to be more effective. It is time to try something different. Exclusive rights can be negotiated. For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: Congressional Research Service, 7 June As well as launching regular attacks on soldiers in the VRAE, the rebels have also attacked infrastructure sites such as natural gas plants. In Morales expelled the U. Ambassador to Bolivia, Philip Goldberg, along with DEA agents from the country in , resulting in the severing of diplomatic ties for three years. In a similar incident, in May Morales expelled USAID from the country, accusing them of conspiring against the Bolivian people and his government. For more information, see: British Broadcasting Corporation News. Country Development Cooperation Strategy

### Chapter 2 : A Review of the Andean Initiative

*The Andean Regional Initiative includes a strategy, and being simple people in the Executive Branch, we call it the strategy of the three Ds. The first D is democracy, by which we mean not just support for political institutions, but support for administration of justice, human rights, municipal governments, anti-corruption and education.*

### Chapter 3 : Andean drug strategy a failure - UPI Archives

*But failure to make convincing strides also has weakened congressional support, even among some Republicans who thought the original Andean strategy was well-conceived.*

### Chapter 4 : The Balloon Effect, In Effect: Humala, Peru, and the Drug Dilemma (Part 2 of 2) – COHA

*In the transit countries of the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, the plan enlisted the U.S. military, the Coast Guard and U.S. and foreign law enforcement to block shipments and crack down.*