

# DOWNLOAD PDF THE GOOD MAN AND THE UPRIGHT CITIZEN IN ARISTOTLES ETHICS AND POLITICS DAVID KEYT

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*This essay deals with Aristotle's complex account in Politics III.4 of the good man and the upright citizen. By this account the goodness of an upright citizen is relative to the city of which he is a citizen, whereas the goodness of a good man is absolute.*

Obviously, I am well aware that Aristotle lived over years ago; indeed, I would have to be pretty ignorant to be reading him to this degree and not be aware of that fact I have now completed almost his whole corpus - minus his zoological writings and his Eudemian Ethics. Also, I am fully aware that societal conditions do change, in both subtle and not so subtle ways. I am sure my goodreads friends are not guilty of this degree of naivety. I remember debating someone on the American founding fathers and whether their ideas were still relevant to our current political situations! This is obviously an extreme example of how clueless people can be when it comes to ideas and their relationship to progress. My feeling is that if you are arguing that past thinkers held demonstrably different ideas when they spoke about freedom, equality, rights, laws, ethics - etc etc et al " then you are simply playing a game of equivocation and using time as an accomplice in your charade. I know my goodreads friends are not this extreme at least I hope. Why read philosophy if one considers its ideas to have a shelf life? I am cognizant of the warnings my friends provided and those warnings are not without merit, but with the preceding introduction, hopefully, I have provided a defense for the following review. If one provides sources and evidence, I will certainly take it seriously. I want to first off address one issue that was brought forth in a comment. Aristotle and Plato did not have any experience of the exact kind of democracy we know of today. Aristotle believed in equality, but it was an equality of similars, i. Sharing in that similar condition qualified them as equals. Slaves, women, and children were not included in citizenship in the Greek city-states; and Aristotle did indeed follow this precedent. That is certainly one way that democracy has changed. Of course, these changes were made relatively recently. Basing equality on being human alone is an element that was added to democratic ideals subsequently one should probably note that Christian ethics was largely the influence behind this innovation. There were, however, reasons for including status e. That is something I am going to get into below when I talk about the dangers of democracy that have always existed. That is not to say that I support the ancient Greek perspective on this question. Any system that does not take into account inherent human value into questions of equality is a system that is not at all just - except in an equivocal sense. One should note that there is absolutely no question that all political systems in the West including here in America are rooted in a Greco-Roman precedent. This is as undeniable as that our ethics and morals not to mention religious ideals are rooted in a Judeo-Christian precedent. I am certainly of the opinion that those who first wrote on these topics still have something to teach us; and those ideas are often still applicable. As we move further away from the preceding, the worse society will be. In like manner, the earliest writers on the political systems that inspired ours are still entirely relevant. People often do not have much of a grasp of what occurred in the Greek city-states. The Greeks experimented with different forms of government. I cannot stress this enough. The political systems that are referred to in Plato and Aristotle removing the speculative elements they added were tested. Aristotle was very wary of the kind of political abuses that were possible within a democracy. He believed as did Cicero that every person should be respected in their property. Not respecting the property rights of people was a sure way to bring about revolution. Is this no longer a problem in our American republic? If you think that, guess again. If a party is harboring socialists that do not respect the above fundamental human right of property, you know the same situation that Aristotle and Cicero wrote about is possible even today. Aristotle mentions in more than one place that democracies often descend into very specific abuses. Often it came in the form of some politician scapegoating the well-to-do. This is exemplified in the following quote: This is a risk of democracy. He noted numerous examples where democracy would shift into oligarchy and back again " all eventually descending into tyranny. Aristotle was incredibly critical of a pure democracy. This is where the majority have absolute

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control over the minority. Aristotle calls this the worst form of tyranny. Interestingly enough, the percentages just provided are pretty close to what we have here between Liberals and Conservatives respectively not taking into account moderates like myself in America. The mitigating control to this pure democracy is what Aristotle calls the constitutional government. He includes the constitutional government under the heading of democracy, but he undoubtedly considered them distinct. The constitutional government is more what we would term today a constitutional republic technically, democracy and republic are the same in ancient Greek sources, but in modern parlance they are distinct. This is what we have here in the United States. Indeed, Aristotle saw this as the best form of government. This is exemplified by the following quote: Men think that what is just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom and equality mean the doing what a man likes. Losing this balance can be catastrophic as this following quote make clear: He was suspicious of democracies for this reason. In democracies, everyone wants to be equal, but in the words of George Orwell, some want to be more equal than others. Part of the problem for Aristotle and other political thinkers of his day was to develop a system that would minimize, if not eliminate, inequities in a populace, and allow them a role in government, without sacrificing more competent voices for less competent voices. Obviously, the ancient Greek attempt to minimize incompetent say in government is not correct, but one has to at the same time acknowledge that a vast percentage of the population that exists in any society and in any period of time are not competent enough to have any political power. Very few people in a given population are knowledgeable enough to have an informed opinion on government. Aristotle, with other Greeks, probably assumed if one had gained a certain position or status, it indicated more competence; men were seen as more competent mentally than women; slaves lacked the status and education to be citizens; children were not yet competent prior to proper education. I provide this quote of Aristotle as an example of his position: We must acknowledge this while also condemning their attempts at controlling this through such an unjust method. Aristotle seems to acknowledge above that even those who were citizens were often ignorant. A tyranny of the majority happens when a populace is too ignorant and too self-seeking to make sound political decisions. The American founding fathers set up a very particular system to curb the tyranny of the majority. Ignorant factions of a country can easily become tribalist and disinterested in the health of society as a whole. This is a precursor to social unrest and civil war, i. What happens, for instance, when a disenfranchised group gains citizenship and every societal benefit that comes with citizenship? For some of these, this development will be seen as an adequate if not an optimal outcome. For others, it will simply not be good enough. The desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others that have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may or may not be just. Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. What is at play here? The same ignorant human tendency Cicero also took note of: Once equality is attained, the wise and good will consider this adequate, but those who are neither wise nor good will not consider this adequate. This is not an archaic and inapplicable human tendency, it is still very much present in democracies. Pure democracy is mob rule. Can a democracy be a healthy breeding ground for political parties that harbor socialists, communists and anarchists? Having a constitution is a safeguard against these kinds of corrupting influences. Aristotle was also concerned about the wearing away of a constitution. Removing tenets little by little over time. Not too long ago, a president instituted something called the Patriot Act that was a serious breach of the constitution. This allowed data collection and other things that compromised the rights of citizens. Aristotle was aware that in his day, tyrants utilized informants to infiltrate almost every aspect of societal life. Aristotle knew rightly that these are the tactics of tyrants and they are not desirable for a free society. The preceding are the thoughts I had while reading this. Every review is simply a collection of my thoughts on anything I read. I am very far from believing that what Aristotle wrote about is irrelevant today. Indeed, I feel quite the opposite. Like the Nicomachean Ethics, which was the preceding volume to the Politics, Aristotle believed in moderation. He believed in a political balance between freedom and law,

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democracy and constitutional government. He was suspicious of extremes. I think that was an astute appraisal of politics. We would do well to take the same position in regards to politics today. I am giving the book a 4 star review. The book caused me to reflect quite a bit. I also find his defense of infanticide incredibly abhorrent, but it is hardly surprising when one considers his position on the value of children.

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## Chapter 2 : 20th WCP: Aristotle's Political Virtues

*This essay deals with Aristotle's complex account in Politics III.4 of the good man and the upright citizen. By this account the goodness of an upright citizen is relative to the city of which he.*

David Keyt - - Topoi 4 1: These justifications are compatible with each other since they apply to different situations. The polises where democracy and true aristocracy are justified contain no godlike men, and the polis in which democracy is justified differs from that in which true aristocracy is justified in containing a large group of free men who individually have little virtue Pol. Each of the justifications is a valid deductive argument. Aristotle affirms the major premiss they share on the basis of a twofold appeal to nature. The principle of distributive justice, the concept as distinguished from the various conceptions of distributive justice, is itself according to nature Pol. Consequently, the question of the status of these three justifications, whether they are purely hypothetical or not, is a question about the minor premiss or premisses of each. Hence the justification of democracy is not purely hypothetical. Nor is the justification of absolute kingship. The minor premisses of the aristocratic argument describe a situation where all of the free men in a given polis have sufficient wealth for the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues and where all of the older free men of the polis are men of practical wisdom. In the Politics Aristotle makes only the modest claim that such a situation is possible: It is not possible for the best constitution to come into being without appropriate equipment [that is, the appropriate quality and quantity of territory and of citizens and noncitizens]. Hence one must presuppose many things as one would wish them to be, though none of them must be impossible Pol. But Aristotle appears to subscribe to the principle that every possibility is realized at some moment of time Top. This principle together with the claim that the situation described is possible entails that the situation sometimes occurs. The relativist, along with everyone else E. What he denies is that there is any basis for ranking these various conceptions of justice or for singling one out as the best Plato, Theaet. But he departs from Plato in his conception of nature. Thus in appealing to nature Aristotle does not appeal to a transcendent standard. Nor does he appeal to his main criterion of the natural, namely, happening always or for the most part.

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## Chapter 3 : Aristotle's Political Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. David Keyt - - Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (2) details This essay deals with Aristotle's complex account in Politics III.4 of the good man and the upright citizen.*

Passages in Aristotle are cited as follows: Politics is abbreviated as Pol. Most translations include the Bekker page number with column letter in the margin followed by every fifth line number. Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press, University of Chicago Press, , revised edition. Harvard University Press, University of North Carolina Press, Saunders, Politics Iâ€™II Also of interest is the Constitution of Athens, an account of the history and workings of the Athenian democracy. Although it was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, it is now thought by most scholars to have been written by one of his pupils, perhaps at his direction toward the end of his life. A reliable translation with introduction and notes is by P. Ethics and Politics , London: Cambridge University Press, Keyt, David, and Fred D. Kraut, Richard, and Steven Skultety eds. Critical Essays, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras eds. A Critical Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, University of California Press, Methuen, ; reprinted, New York: Frank, Jill, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Keyt, David, Nature and Justice: Nichols, Mary, Citizens and Statesmen: University of Chicago Press, , pp. Susemihl, Franz, and R. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle, London: Veogelin, Eric, Order and History Volume 3: Louisiana State University Press, Studies of Particular Topics 1. Fundamentals of the History of His Development, Oxford: Cambridge University Press, , pp. Oxford University Press, , pp. Rowman and Littlefield, , pp. Aristotelian Political Philosophy Volume 1 , Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, , pp. Critical Essays, Lanham MD: Reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Rowe and Malcolm Schofield eds. SUNY Press, , pp. Pennsylvania State University Press, Reason or Rationalization, Chicago: Hintikka eds Discovering Reality: Political Economy Ambler, Wayne H. Foundational Thinkers and Business Ethics, Chicago: Oxford University Press, pp. Cambridge University Press, , â€™ In David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Fondation Hardt, , pp. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy eds. Essays Presented to G. Akademie Verlag, , pp. University of California Press, , pp. Vander Waert, Paul A. Education Burnyeat, Myles F. Cornell University Press, Law Brooks, Richard O. Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: Yale University Press, Living Well and Living Together, Chicago: Chicago University Press, State University of New York Press, University of Notre Dame Press, , â€™ Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson eds Liberalism and the Good, London: Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: University of Notre Dame Press,

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## Chapter 4 : David Keyt, The meaning of $\hat{\rho}\hat{\alpha}\hat{\iota}\hat{\nu}\hat{\nu}\hat{\alpha}\hat{\nu}$ in Aristotle's ethics and politics - PhilPapers

*Title: The Good Man and the Good Citizen in Aristotle's "Politics" Created Date: Z.*

Aristotle, Justice, Politics, Cosmopolitanism Abstract It is often thought that Aristotle restricts the scope of justice to existing communities. Against prominent treatments of this problem, this paper argues that while Aristotle does indeed restrict the scope of justice, he recognizes eudaimonic reasons to cultivate co-operative and benevolent relations and to eschew manipulative and exploitative ones. His limitation of justice to existing communities thereby avoids the unsavory implications often attributed to it. Downloads Download data is not yet available. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford University Press, Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, University of California Press, Essays for Gail Fine and Terence Irwin. Princeton University Press, Natural Law and Natural Rights. Living Well and Living Together. University of Chicago Press, Goodman and Robert Talisse eds. State University of New York Press, The Ethics of Aristotle. Longmans, Green, and Co, With notes, 2nd ed. A Critical Guide, A Brief History of Justice. Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy, The Value of Living Well. The Varieties of Moral Experience. The Politics of Aristotle, Volume 1. Anton and Anthony Preus eds. Ethics in the Public Domain. Happy Lives and the Highest Good. Aristotle on Political Community. Volume 1, The Ancient Mediterranean World, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cornell University Press, The Problems of a Political Animal: Berkeley and Los Angeles:

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## Chapter 5 : Aristotle and the Scope of Justice | Journal of Ancient Philosophy

*the polis, a natural entity, and man by nature, being a political animal; Aristotle, the most inclusive community as natural, as being the most sovereign; concept of natural existence, and notion of an unnatural condition;*

References and Further Reading 1. However, like the other ancient philosophers, it was not the stereotypical ivory tower existence. It is noteworthy that although Aristotle praises the politically active life, he spent most of his own life in Athens, where he was not a citizen and would not have been allowed to participate directly in politics although of course anyone who wrote as extensively and well about politics as Aristotle did was likely to be politically influential. As a scholar, Aristotle had a wide range of interests. He wrote about meteorology, biology, physics, poetry, logic, rhetoric, and politics and ethics, among other subjects. His writings on many of these interests remained definitive for almost two millennia. They remained, and remain, so valuable in part because of the comprehensiveness of his efforts. For example, in order to understand political phenomena, he had his students collect information on the political organization and history of different cities. The question of how these writings should be unified into a consistent whole if that is even possible is an open one and beyond the scope of this article. This is because Aristotle believed that ethics and politics were closely linked, and that in fact the ethical and virtuous life is only available to someone who participates in politics, while moral education is the main purpose of the political community. As he says in *Nicomachean Ethics* at b30, "The end [or goal] of politics is the best of ends; and the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions. We are likely to regard politics and politicians as aiming at ignoble, selfish ends, such as wealth and power, rather than the "best end", and many people regard the idea that politics is or should be primarily concerned with creating a particular moral character in citizens as a dangerous intrusion on individual freedom, in large part because we do not agree about what the "best end" is. In fact, what people in Western societies generally ask from politics and the government is that they keep each of us safe from other people through the provision of police and military forces so that each of us can choose and pursue our own ends, whatever they may be. This has been the case in Western political philosophy at least since John Locke. Development of individual character is left up to the individual, with help from family, religion, and other non-governmental institutions. The reader is also cautioned against immediately concluding from this that Aristotle was wrong and we are right. The reference above to "*Nicomachean Ethics* at b30" makes use of what is called Bekker pagination. This entry will make use of the Bekker pagination system, and will also follow tradition and refer to *Nicomachean Ethics* as simply *Ethics*. There is also a *Eudemian Ethics* which is almost certainly by Aristotle and which shares three of the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and a work on ethics titled *Magna Moralia* which has been attributed to him but which most scholars now believe is not his work. The translation is that of Martin Ostwald; see the bibliography for full information. Some of the reasons for this should be mentioned from the outset. Aristotle did write for general audiences on these subjects, probably in dialogue form, but only a few fragments of those writings remain. This is also one reason why many students have difficulty reading his work: Many topics in the texts are discussed less fully than we would like, and many things are ambiguous which we wish were more straightforward. But if Aristotle was lecturing from these writings, he could have taken care of these problems on the fly as he lectured, since presumably he knew what he meant, or he could have responded to requests for clarification or elaboration from his students. Secondly, most people who read Aristotle are not reading him in the original Attic Greek but are instead reading translations. This leads to further disagreement, because different authors translate Aristotle differently, and the way in which a particular word is translated can be very significant for the text as a whole. There is no way to definitively settle the question of what Aristotle "really meant to say" in using a particular word or phrase. Third, the Aristotelian texts we have are not the originals, but copies, and every time a text gets copied errors creep in words, sentences, or paragraphs can get left out, words can be changed into new words, and so forth. It may be

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clear from the context that a word has been changed, but then again it may not, and there is always hesitation in changing the text as we have it. This, too, complicates our understanding of Aristotle. These controversies cannot be discussed here, but should be mentioned. For more detail consult the works listed in the "Suggestions for further reading" below. Carnes Lord and others have argued based on a variety of textual evidence that books 7 and 8 were intended by Aristotle to follow book 3. Rearranging the text in this way would have the effect of joining the early discussion of the origins of political life and the city, and the nature of political justice, with the discussion of the ideal city and the education appropriate for it, while leaving together books which are primarily concerned with existing varieties of regimes and how they are preserved and destroyed and moving them to the conclusion of the book. It is possible that Aristotle never finished writing it; more likely there is material missing as a result of damage to the scrolls on which it was written. The extent and content of any missing material is a matter of scholarly debate. Fortunately, the beginning student of Aristotle will not need to concern themselves much with these problems. It is, however, important to get a quality translation of the text, which provides an introduction, footnotes, a glossary, and a bibliography, so that the reader is aware of places where, for example, there seems to be something missing from the text, or a word can have more than one meaning, or there are other textual issues. These will not always be the cheapest or most widely available translations, but it is important to get one of them, from a library if need be. Several suggested editions are listed at the end of this article. Put simply, these kinds of knowledge are distinguished by their aims: The productive and practical sciences, in contrast, address our daily needs as human beings, and have to do with things that can and do change. Productive knowledge means, roughly, know-how; the knowledge of how to make a table or a house or a pair of shoes or how to write a tragedy would be examples of this kind of knowledge. This entry is concerned with practical knowledge, which is the knowledge of how to live and act. According to Aristotle, it is the possession and use of practical knowledge that makes it possible to live a good life. Ethics and politics, which are the practical sciences, deal with human beings as moral agents. Ethics is primarily about the actions of human beings as individuals, and politics is about the actions of human beings in communities, although it is important to remember that for Aristotle the two are closely linked and each influences the other. The fact that ethics and politics are kinds of practical knowledge has several important consequences. First, it means that Aristotle believes that mere abstract knowledge of ethics and politics is worthless. Practical knowledge is only useful if we act on it; we must act appropriately if we are to be moral. Aristotle believes that women and slaves or at least those who are slaves by nature can never benefit from the study of politics, and also should not be allowed to participate in politics, about which more will be said later. But there is also a limitation on political study based on age, as a result of the connection between politics and experience: Aristotle adds that young men will usually act on the basis of their emotions, rather than according to reason, and since acting on practical knowledge requires the use of reason, young men are unequipped to study politics for this reason too. So the study of politics will only be useful to those who have the experience and the mental discipline to benefit from it, and for Aristotle this would have been a relatively small percentage of the population of a city. Even in Athens, the most democratic city in Greece, no more than 15 percent of the population was ever allowed the benefits of citizenship, including political participation. Athenian citizenship was limited to adult males who were not slaves and who had one parent who was an Athenian citizen sometimes citizenship was further restricted to require both parents to be Athenian citizens. Aristotle does not think this percentage should be increased - if anything, it should be decreased. Third, Aristotle distinguishes between practical and theoretical knowledge in terms of the level of precision that can be attained when studying them. Political and moral knowledge does not have the same degree of precision or certainty as mathematics. Therefore, in a discussion of such subjects, which has to start with a basis of this kind, we must be satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch: However, the principles of geometry are fixed and unchanging. The definition of a point, or a line, or a plane, can be given precisely, and once this definition is known, it is fixed and unchanging for everyone. However, the definition of something like justice can only be known generally;

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there is no fixed and unchanging definition that will always be correct. This means that unlike philosophers such as Hobbes and Kant, Aristotle does not and in fact cannot give us a fixed set of rules to be followed when ethical and political decisions must be made. Instead he tries to make his students the kind of men who, when confronted with any particular ethical or political decision, will know the correct thing to do, will understand why it is the correct choice, and will choose to do it for that reason. Such a man will know the general rules to be followed, but will also know when and why to deviate from those rules. I will use "man" and "men" when referring to citizens so that the reader keeps in mind that Aristotle, and the Greeks generally, excluded women from political participation. In fact it is not until the mid 19th century that organized attempts to gain the right to vote for women really get underway, and even today in the 21st century there are still many countries which deny women the right to vote or participate in political life. A discussion of this concept and its importance will help the reader make sense of what follows. According to Aristotle, everything has a purpose or final end. If we want to understand what something is, it must be understood in terms of that end, which we can discover through careful study. If you wanted to describe a knife, you would talk about its size, and its shape, and what it is made out of, among other things. But Aristotle believes that you would also, as part of your description, have to say that it is made to cut things. This is true not only of things made by humans, but of plants and animals as well. Suppose you were to describe an animal, like a thoroughbred foal. You would talk about its size, say it has four legs and hair, and a tail. Eventually you would say that it is meant to run fast. If nothing thwarts that purpose, the young horse will indeed become a fast runner. What is it that human beings are meant by nature to become in the way that knives are meant to cut, acorns are meant to become oak trees, and thoroughbred ponies are meant to become race horses? According to Aristotle, we are meant to become happy. After all, people find happiness in many different ways. However, Aristotle says that living happily requires living a life of virtue. Someone who is not living a life that is virtuous, or morally good, is also not living a happy life, no matter what they might think. They are like a knife that will not cut, an oak tree that is diseased and stunted, or a racehorse that cannot run. In fact they are worse, since they have chosen the life they lead in a way that a knife or an acorn or a horse cannot. Someone who does live according to virtue, who chooses to do the right thing because it is the right thing to do, is living a life that flourishes; to borrow a phrase, they are being all that they can be by using all of their human capacities to their fullest. Human beings alone have the ability to speak, and Aristotle says that we have been given that ability by nature so that we can speak and reason with each other to discover what is right and wrong, what is good and bad, and what is just and unjust. Note that human beings discover these things rather than creating them. We do not get to decide what is right and wrong, but we do get to decide whether we will do what is right or what is wrong, and this is the most important decision we make in life. So too is the happy life: And this is an ongoing decision. It is not made once and for all, but must be made over and over again as we live our lives. Aristotle believes that it is not easy to be virtuous, and he knows that becoming virtuous can only happen under the right conditions. The community brings about virtue through education and through laws which prescribe certain actions and prohibit others. And here we see the link between ethics and politics in a different light: Lawgivers make the citizens good by inculcating [good] habits in them, and this is the aim of every lawgiver; if he does not succeed in doing that, his legislation is a failure. It is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. The translation we will use is that of Carnes Lord, which can be found in the list of suggested readings.

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### Chapter 6 : Project MUSE - Aristotle's "Best Regime"

*"Aristotle and the Ancient Roots of Anarchism" and "The Good Man and the Upright Citizen" specify what Keyt takes to be Aristotle's ideal constitution and its relationship to the modern question of why citizens should obey the law.*

Preliminaries Aristotle wrote two ethical treatises: In any case, these two works cover more or less the same ground: Both treatises examine the conditions in which praise or blame are appropriate, and the nature of pleasure and friendship; near the end of each work, we find a brief discussion of the proper relationship between human beings and the divine. Though the general point of view expressed in each work is the same, there are many subtle differences in organization and content as well. Clearly, one is a re-working of the other, and although no single piece of evidence shows conclusively what their order is, it is widely assumed that the Nicomachean Ethics is a later and improved version of the Eudemian Ethics. Not all of the Eudemian Ethics was revised: Perhaps the most telling indication of this ordering is that in several instances the Nicomachean Ethics develops a theme about which its Eudemian cousin is silent. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on this work. Page and line numbers shall henceforth refer to this treatise. It ranges over topics discussed more fully in the other two works and its point of view is similar to theirs. Why, being briefer, is it named the Magna Moralia? Because each of the two papyrus rolls into which it is divided is unusually long. Just as a big mouse can be a small animal, two big chapters can make a small book. A few authors in antiquity refer to a work with this name and attribute it to Aristotle, but it is not mentioned by several authorities, such as Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, whom we would expect to have known of it. No one had written ethical treatises before Aristotle. The Human Good and the Function Argument The principal idea with which Aristotle begins is that there are differences of opinion about what is best for human beings, and that to profit from ethical inquiry we must resolve this disagreement. He insists that ethics is not a theoretical discipline: In raising this questionâ€”what is the good? He assumes that such a list can be compiled rather easily; most would agree, for example, that it is good to have friends, to experience pleasure, to be healthy, to be honored, and to have such virtues as courage at least to some degree. The difficult and controversial question arises when we ask whether certain of these goods are more desirable than others. To be eudaimon is therefore to be living in a way that is well-favored by a god. But Aristotle never calls attention to this etymology in his ethical writings, and it seems to have little influence on his thinking. No one tries to live well for the sake of some further goal; rather, being eudaimon is the highest end, and all subordinate goalsâ€”health, wealth, and other such resourcesâ€”are sought because they promote well-being, not because they are what well-being consists in. But unless we can determine which good or goods happiness consists in, it is of little use to acknowledge that it is the highest end. One important component of this argument is expressed in terms of distinctions he makes in his psychological and biological works. The soul is analyzed into a connected series of capacities: The biological fact Aristotle makes use of is that human beings are the only species that has not only these lower capacities but a rational soul as well. The good of a human being must have something to do with being human; and what sets humanity off from other species, giving us the potential to live a better life, is our capacity to guide ourselves by using reason. If we use reason well, we live well as human beings; or, to be more precise, using reason well over the course of a full life is what happiness consists in. Doing anything well requires virtue or excellence, and therefore living well consists in activities caused by the rational soul in accordance with virtue or excellence. No other writer or thinker had said precisely what he says about what it is to live well. But at the same time his view is not too distant from a common idea. As he himself points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with virtue b30â€”1. He says, not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity. Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul. At the same time, Aristotle makes it clear that in order to be happy one must possess others goods as wellâ€”such goods as friends, wealth, and power. Someone who is friendless, childless, powerless, weak, and ugly will simply not

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be able to find many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can accomplish will not be of great merit. To some extent, then, living well requires good fortune; happenstance can rob even the most excellent human beings of happiness. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists, the highest good, virtuous activity, is not something that comes to us by chance. Although we must be fortunate enough to have parents and fellow citizens who help us become virtuous, we ourselves share much of the responsibility for acquiring and exercising the virtues. Suppose we grant, at least for the sake of argument, that doing anything well, including living well, consists in exercising certain skills; and let us call these skills, whatever they turn out to be, virtues. Even so, that point does not by itself allow us to infer that such qualities as temperance, justice, courage, as they are normally understood, are virtues. They should be counted as virtues only if it can be shown that actualizing precisely these skills is what happiness consists in. What Aristotle owes us, then, is an account of these traditional qualities that explains why they must play a central role in any well-lived life. But perhaps Aristotle disagrees, and refuses to accept this argumentative burden. In one of several important methodological remarks he makes near the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he says that in order to profit from the sort of study he is undertaking, one must already have been brought up in good habits<sup>6</sup>. The audience he is addressing, in other words, consists of people who are already just, courageous, and generous; or, at any rate, they are well on their way to possessing these virtues. Why such a restricted audience? Why does he not address those who have serious doubts about the value of these traditional qualities, and who therefore have not yet decided to cultivate and embrace them? Addressing the moral skeptic, after all, is the project Plato undertook in the *Republic*: He does not appear to be addressing someone who has genuine doubts about the value of justice or kindred qualities. Perhaps, then, he realizes how little can be accomplished, in the study of ethics, to provide it with a rational foundation. Perhaps he thinks that no reason can be given for being just, generous, and courageous. These are qualities one learns to love when one is a child, and having been properly habituated, one no longer looks for or needs a reason to exercise them. One can show, as a general point, that happiness consists in exercising some skills or other, but that the moral skills of a virtuous person are what one needs is not a proposition that can be established on the basis of argument. This is not the only way of reading the *Ethics*, however. For surely we cannot expect Aristotle to show what it is about the traditional virtues that makes them so worthwhile until he has fully discussed the nature of those virtues. He himself warns us that his initial statement of what happiness is should be treated as a rough outline whose details are to be filled in later<sup>7</sup>. His intention in Book I of the *Ethics* is to indicate in a general way why the virtues are important; why particular virtues—courage, justice, and the like—are components of happiness is something we should be able to better understand only at a later point. His point, rather, may be that in ethics, as in any other study, we cannot make progress towards understanding why things are as they are unless we begin with certain assumptions about what is the case. Neither theoretical nor practical inquiry starts from scratch. Someone who has made no observations of astronomical or biological phenomena is not yet equipped with sufficient data to develop an understanding of these sciences. The parallel point in ethics is that to make progress in this sphere we must already have come to enjoy doing what is just, courageous, generous and the like. We must experience these activities not as burdensome constraints, but as noble, worthwhile, and enjoyable in themselves. Then, when we engage in ethical inquiry, we can ask what it is about these activities that makes them worthwhile. We can also compare these goods with other things that are desirable in themselves—pleasure, friendship, honor, and so on—and ask whether any of them is more desirable than the others. We approach ethical theory with a disorganized bundle of likes and dislikes based on habit and experience; such disorder is an inevitable feature of childhood. But what is not inevitable is that our early experience will be rich enough to provide an adequate basis for worthwhile ethical reflection; that is why we need to have been brought up well. Yet such an upbringing can take us only so far. We seek a deeper understanding of the objects of our childhood enthusiasms, and we must systematize our goals so that as adults we have a coherent plan of life. We need to engage in ethical theory, and to reason well in this field, if we are to move beyond the low-grade form of virtue we acquired as children. His project is to make ethics an

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autonomous field, and to show why a full understanding of what is good does not require expertise in any other field. There is another contrast with Plato that should be emphasized: In Book II of the Republic, we are told that the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself and for the sake of its results. Plato argues that justice should be placed in this category, but since it is generally agreed that it is desirable for its consequences, he devotes most of his time to establishing his more controversial point—that justice is to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B, then B is better than A; therefore, the highest kind of good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of anything else. To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one must show that all other goods are best thought of as instruments that promote A in some way or other. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and friendship in order to show how these goods, properly understood, can be seen as resources that serve the higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be pursued. That is why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part. Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and therefore to happiness, although there may be special circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule, to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit of virtue over the course of a lifetime. Virtues and Deficiencies, Contenance and Incontinence Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue. Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues temperance, courage, and so on, and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc. All free males are born with the potential to become ethically virtuous and practically wise, but to achieve these goals they must go through two stages: This does not mean that first we fully acquire the ethical virtues, and then, at a later stage, add on practical wisdom. Ethical virtue is fully developed only when it is combined with practical wisdom. A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected. Like anyone who has developed a skill in performing a complex and difficult activity, the virtuous person takes pleasure in exercising his intellectual skills. Furthermore, when he has decided what to do, he does not have to contend with internal pressures to act otherwise. He does not long to do something that he regards as shameful; and he is not greatly distressed at having to give up a pleasure that he realizes he should forego. Aristotle places those who suffer from such internal disorders into one of three categories: 1. Some agents, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or some other emotion; and this countervailing influence is not completely under the control of reason. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous person does. 2. Others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. The explanation of akrasia is a topic to which we will return in section 7.

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## Chapter 7 : Works by David Keyt - PhilPapers

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In this paper I shall go a step further: My aim is to show that Aristotle maintains that the best states are knit together so tightly that the interests of one person are the same as the interests of all and that the virtues he describes in his ethics are meant to be exercised in the governance of such a state. Courage, for example, is a disposition toward a particular behavior in battle: States, not individuals, go to war; so only people who live in or act with states could be properly courageous. Likewise, Aristotle declares that political justice or, apparently equivalently, simple justice is "found in a life lived in an association for the sake of self-sufficiency" a , that is, in a state Pol. In particular, he defines distributive justice as "the distribution of honors, wealth, or whatever can be divided among those who share in the political system" V. This is clearly the task of a political leader 6. Rectificatory justice is an attribute of someone who can restore equality in private exchanges, namely, a judge 4. So the paradigmatic exercises of courage and justice, at least, occur in performing tasks of governance. Since those who exercise political authority are most able to gratify their desires for pleasure, they exercise the greatest degree of moderation in choosing not to do so. Among the so-called social virtues of book IV, magnanimity and proper pride are realized by attaining some suitable position of superiority, and though he does not quite say so, Aristotle surely has in mind positions of political leadership. In short, Aristotle clearly thinks the paradigmatic exercises of courage and justice are in political activities and hints, at least, that the greatest exercise of moderation as well as the exercise of magnanimity and proper pride also occur in the exercise of political power. He goes on in the next chapter to contrast the life of practical virtue with the contemplative life: One of the two optimal lives is the political life. Aristotle simply does not envision a life of private moral virtue. Likewise, discussing practical wisdom phronesis in N. VI, Aristotle ascribes this virtue to those like Pericles who manage households and are statesmen, for they understand what is good for themselves and for humankind VI. Insofar as they have practical wisdom, they also possess all moral virtues VI. There is an interesting, albeit brief, comparison of the practical wisdom of the statesman with that which a private individual might possess in VI. The practical wisdom that enables a Pericles to decide what is best for a state is but one type of practical wisdom; other species enable one to decide what is best for oneself, for a household, or for litigants in a legal case 8. Common opinion would have it that of these four, the practical wisdom that concerns an individual is most properly called by this name; and indeed, it regards those who even worry about the best for others as busybodies ba9. However, Aristotle thinks this common opinion must be revised because there can be no individual good without household and polis a. However, he apparently revises common opinion by identifying the practical wisdom concerned with governing a state with that concerned with the individual; as the opening sentence of VI. If this interpretation of VI. In short, in the Ethics a life of virtue is public rather than private. II Let me turn now to the evidence for this conclusion in the Politics. Where there is only person of truly outstanding abilities, he ought to rule as king. At issue is not which constitution will best govern and provide for the needs of its citizens but which will allow its citizens the opportunity to realize the greatest virtue. Rule is an honor that ought to be distributed to people who merit it 12 and an opportunity for them to exercise virtue. It is, thus, clear that Aristotle conceives of political activity as the exercise of virtue. It may be thought, though, that the opportunities that politics provides for virtuous acts are limited to the small number who rule the best states. On the contrary, Aristotle thinks that, ideally, a state should provide all citizens opportunities to realize their virtues to the extent they are capable. This I surmise from three of his claims: First, he defines the citizen as someone for whom "it is possible to share koinonon in the deliberations and judgments of rule" III. But deliberation and judgment are exercised in the large number of administrative and judicial tasks necessary in any state; such as, managing the young or the old, taking care of public markets, and providing for defense. Aristotle takes note of them see IV.

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Citizenship, the capacity to share in the deliberations and judgments of rule, must extend to all who are capable of any of these tasks. Third, Aristotle takes one task of the rulers of a state to be the distribution of all these offices to those capable of them. It follows, then, that it is not only the monarch or the aristocrat who has the opportunity to exercise virtue but, ideally, each citizen can realize his capacity for virtue in executing any of the manifold tasks of government. Two more texts from the Politics taken together lend support to my thesis. The first is the detailed discussion of the offices of polities in the last three chapters of book IV. Aristotle divides the offices into legislative ch. The former deals with states whose leaders are not morally good; the latter with states whose leaders are good. Discussing the offices of a polity, Aristotle says nothing about specific virtues. Still, the division of offices would seem to reflect different virtues. The judicial branch should exercise rectificatory justice; the legislative requires practical wisdom cf. But citizens of polities do not have or cannot be counted upon to have these virtues and, besides, they are often chosen for tasks by lot. In exercising these tasks, they perform acts that resemble acts of virtue. For citizens of polities, the value of the state is that by simply following its laws, they come to participate, insofar as they can, in acts of virtue. That this is so we can see from the account Aristotle gives of the relation between good man and good citizen in Politics III. For there Aristotle maintains that only the ruler will have practical wisdom: Practical wisdom is the only virtue peculiar to the ruler. Though the other [virtues] must likely be common to ruler and ruled, the virtue of the ruled is not practical wisdom but true opinion. There need be no contradiction, for prior to the text quoted Aristotle distinguishes between the justice, courage, and moderation of the citizen and that of the ruler b; cf. Though the quoted text says that citizens and rulers share some virtues, the two groups need not possess the same forms of each virtue. Yet citizens exercise these "virtues" in performing the tasks required of them as citizens. Lacking practical wisdom, ordinary citizens partake of the virtues to the extent they can through political activity governed by wise rulers. Just as the value of the best state to ordinary citizens is the degree of virtue it allows them to exercise, the value of lesser states to citizens performing much the same tasks should also be the degree of virtue such states allow its citizens to exercise. Both groups would be guided by true belief rather than practical wisdom. Only the ruler of the best state has virtues that spring from practical wisdom, that is, genuine virtues; and the thesis of III. The discussion of this chapter is confusing, for Aristotle pays more attention to showing why the two cannot be identified. His main point is that since a person is a good citizen by performing well any of the many tasks of citizenship, there are many ways to be a good citizen; but there is just one way to be a good person. But this objection misses what I take to be the main point of the discussion, that tasks other than rule do not require practical wisdom. What makes the ruler alone exercise human virtue is that he alone has this central virtue that is necessary for the most proper exercise of all other moral virtues. Hence, the ruler alone is humanly good; and, more to the point here, human goodness is realized through rule and only through rule. We can appreciate this notion by considering two striking images in Politics III. Aiming to explain how the ruler has practical wisdom and the ruled true belief, Aristotle compares their relation to that between a flute player and flute maker b Earlier in the Politics and in the Physics, he had subordinated arts of making to arts of using, arguing in the latter work that users know forms and makers matter; since an instrument is made to be used, the user directs the maker. Why is rule so important? The answer can only be that the ruler alone exercises genuine virtue because he alone has practical wisdom. The ruler can direct the citizen because he understands the end their activities serve; in contrast, they, not grasping that end, can have only true belief. Apparently, rule is the only activity aside from philosophy undertaken for its own sake. It is the only proper realization of moral virtue. A second powerful image in III. Just as the different sailors on boat work together to preserve the boat, so too the different citizens perform different jobs to preserve the state. Plato often compares the ruler to a ship captain, but here Aristotle emphasizes that though sailors work together to preserve the ship, they each have different tasks to perform, and for each task there is a distinct virtue. Thus, for the pilot to be a good sailor requires a skill different from that required by the rower or lookout. Likewise, the tasks of citizenship are manifold. Indeed, they will vary among different states. Strikingly, Aristotle presumes that all work together: The preservation of the ship is the

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task ergon of them all. Likewise among citizens, though all are unlike, the preservation of the association is their task, and the state is an association. Therefore, the virtue of the citizen must exist relative to the state. If this seems impossible, we have only to think of a football team: Just as individuals could neither develop nor exercise their skills apart from the team, there would not be virtue apart from the state. In an ideal state, individual interest and common interest merge. III It should now be clear that governing the state is a way to exercise virtues and at least plausible that it is the best way to realize the virtues. However, that it is only the ruler who can fully realize virtue through the state leads us to inquire further about private exercises of virtue. It is not enough for my thesis to show the possibility of realizing virtue through political activity; I must also exclude other paths. The contemplative is an example of a private realization of virtue. However, it exercises intellectual rather than moral virtues. It lacks the external goods to exercise the highest degree of moral virtue N. We must look elsewhere. There are some virtues that seem private: But the first three, at least, also have public expressions that would seem greater in respect of their greater scope than private virtues. As for moderation, I have already suggested that the position of a ruler offers him opportunities for indulging his desires that make his proper exercise of desire all the more laudable. Hence, even the exercise of seemingly private virtues is dwarfed by their more public manifestations. As Aristotle puts it in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, the good of the state is "more noble and divine" than the good of any individual; "to secure and preserve [it]" is "greater and more complete" I. So, too, the ability to secure the good for the state is more noble and divine than the ability to secure the good for oneself:

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*in extreme cases; on these issues, I largely agree with David Keyt, "The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle's Ethics. and. Politics," in. Freedom.*