

Chapter 1 : Just war theory | Revolv

The moral principles of the Just War Tradition _____. help to set the military professional apart All members of the U.S. military are bound by the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions.

Just war theory Save Just war theory Latin: The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure war is morally justifiable through a series of criteria , all of which must be met for a war to be considered just. The criteria are split into two groups: The first concerns the morality of going to war, and the second the moral conduct within war. Just war theory postulates that war, while terrible, is not always the worst option. Important responsibilities, undesirable outcomes, or preventable atrocities may justify war. A few ennoble the virtues of the soldier while declaring their apprehensions for war itself. The historical aspect, or the "just war tradition", deals with the historical body of rules or agreements that have applied in various wars across the ages. In it, one of five ruling brothers asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified, and then a long discussion ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots; no attacking people in distress , just means no poisoned or barbed arrows , just cause no attacking out of rage , and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just conduct" appropriate to the context of war. A study found that the just war tradition can be traced as far back as to Ancient Egypt, "demonstrating that just war thought developed beyond the boundaries of Europe and existed many centuries earlier than the advent of Christianity or even the emergence of Greco-Roman doctrine. In *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* book 22 sections 69â€”76, Augustine argues that Christians, as part of a government, need not be ashamed of protecting peace and punishing wickedness when forced to do so by a government. Augustine asserted that this was a personal, philosophical stance: The sacred seat of virtue is the heart. They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill. But, say they, the wise man will wage Just Wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. Mark Mattox writes that, for the individual Christian under the rule of a government engaged in an immoral war, Augustine admonished that Christians, "by divine edict, have no choice but to subject themselves to their political masters and [should] seek to ensure that they execute their war-fighting duty as justly as possible. Proper Authority is first: Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence. Soldiers must also fight for this intention. Both are fountains of knowledge; both come from God. It stated that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind. Diplomatic resolution is always preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are: In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack. War to punish a guilty enemy. A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: It is necessary that the response be commensurate with the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war. Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war. Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages. It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort. Under this doctrine expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans , and wars for glory are all inherently unjust. Doctrine The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church â€”sometimes mistaken as the "just war theory"[23][24]â€”found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church , in paragraph , lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force": It is important to remember that "it is one thing to wage a war of self-defence; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation. The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. Nor does the mere fact that war has unfortunately broken out mean that all is fair between the warring parties". The Charter of the United

Nations intends to preserve future generations from war with a prohibition against force to resolve disputes between States. Like most philosophy, it permits legitimate defence and measures to maintain peace. In every case, the charter requires that self-defence must respect the traditional limits of necessity and proportionality. Therefore, engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions. International legitimacy for the use of armed force, on the basis of rigorous assessment and with well-founded motivations, can only be given by the decision of a competent body that identifies specific situations as threats to peace and authorizes an intrusion into the sphere of autonomy usually reserved to a State. Francisco de Vitoria criticized the conquest of America by the Kingdom of Spain on the basis of just war theory. Although the criticism can be made that the application of just war theory is relativistic, one of the fundamental bases of the tradition is the Ethic of Reciprocity, particularly when it comes to in bello considerations of deportment during battle. If one set of combatants promise to treat their enemies with a modicum of restraint and respect, then the hope is that other sets of combatants will do similarly in reciprocation, a concept not unrelated to the considerations of Game Theory. Just war theorists combine a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just war theories are attempts "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice". Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin defined only three types of just war[31], all of which share the central trait of being revolutionary in character. In that manner, Lenin shunned the more common interpretation of a defensive war as a just one -- often summarized as "who fired the first shot? Which side initiated aggressions or had a grievance or any other commonly considered factor of jus ad bellum mattered not at all, he claimed; if one side was being oppressed by the other, the war against the oppressor would always be, by definition, a defensive war anyway. Any war lacking this duality of oppressed and oppressor was, in contradistinction, always a reactionary, unjust war, in which the oppressed effectively fight in order to protect their own oppressors: Clearly, the application of the term "defensive" war, or war "for the defence of the fatherland" in such a case would be historically false, and in practice would be sheer deception of the common people, of philistines, of ignorant people, by the astute slaveowners. Precisely in this way are the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie deceiving the peoples by means of "national ideology" and the term "defence of the fatherland" in the present war between slave-owners for fortifying and strengthening slavery. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuriesâ€”that violence is an evil that can, in certain situations, be condoned as the lesser of evilsâ€”is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, right intention from the older war theory that first evolved around AD, it has rejected two premises that underpinned all medieval just wars, including crusades: A contemporary view of just cause was expressed in when the US Catholic Conference said: Some theorists such as Brian Orend omit this term, seeing it as fertile ground for exploitation by bellicose regimes. Competent authority Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. The importance of this condition is key. Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a system that represses the process of genuine justice. A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice". Probability of success Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success; Last resort Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted or are clearly not practical. It may be clear that the other side is using negotiations as a delaying tactic and will not make meaningful concessions. Proportionality The anticipated benefits of waging a war must be proportionate to its expected evils or harms. This principle is also known as the principle of macro-proportionality, so as to distinguish it from the jus in bello principle of proportionality. In modern terms, just war is waged in terms of self-defense, or in defense of another with sufficient evidence. Jus in bello Once war has begun, just war theory jus in bello also directs how combatants are to act or should act: Distinction Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of

distinction. The acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no legitimate military targets, committing acts of terrorism and reprisal against civilians, and attacking neutral targets. Moreover, combatants are not permitted to attack enemy combatants who have surrendered or who have been captured or who are injured and not presenting an immediate lethal threat or who are parachuting from disabled aircraft except airborne forces or who are shipwrecked. Proportionality Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. Combatants must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a legitimate military objective. This principle is meant to discern the correct balance between the restriction imposed by a corrective measure and the severity of the nature of the prohibited act. Military necessity Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of military necessity. An attack or action must be intended to help in the defeat of the enemy; it must be an attack on a legitimate military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction. Fair treatment of prisoners of war Enemy combatants who surrendered or who are captured no longer pose a threat. It is therefore wrong to torture them or otherwise mistreat them. Combatants may not use weapons or other methods of warfare that are considered evil, such as mass rape, forcing enemy combatants to fight against their own side or using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled e. Catholic church, issued a letter that all Catholics were to support the war. Our Lord Jesus Christ does not stand for peace at any price Every true American would rather see this land face war than see her flag lowered in dishonor I wish to say that, not only from the standpoint of a citizen, but from the standpoint of a minister of religion I believe there is nothing that would be of such great practical benefit to us as universal military training for the men of our land. If by Pacifism is meant the teaching that the use of force is never justifiable, then, however well meant, it is mistaken, and it is hurtful to the life of our country. And the Pacifism which takes the position that because war is evil, therefore all who engage in war, whether for offense or defense, are equally blameworthy, and to be condemned, is not only unreasonable, it is inexcusably unjust. Jus post bellum concerns justice after a war, including peace treaties, reconstruction, environmental remediation, war crimes trials, and war reparations. Jus post bellum has been added to deal with the fact that some hostile actions may take place outside a traditional battlefield. Jus post bellum governs the justice of war termination and peace agreements, as well as the prosecution of war criminals, and publicly labeled terrorists. This idea has largely been added to help decide what to do if there are prisoners that have been taken during battle. The actual fault lies with the aggressor, so by being the aggressor they forfeit their rights for honorable treatment by their actions. This is the theory used to justify the actions taken by anyone fighting in a war to treat prisoners outside of war.

Chapter 2 : Just War Theory | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The jus ad bellum criterion of "proper authority" limits the decision-making authority to go to war to the most senior military commanders. False In order for a war to be considered just, it must meet most of the criteria of jus ad bellum.

Pre-Christian[edit] The Indian Hindu epic, the Mahabharata , offers one of the first written discussions of a "just war" dharma-yuddha or "righteous war". In it, one of five ruling brothers asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified, and then a long discussion ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots; no attacking people in distress , just means no poisoned or barbed arrows , just cause no attacking out of rage , and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just conduct" appropriate to the context of war. A study found that the just war tradition can be traced as far back as to Ancient Egypt, "demonstrating that just war thought developed beyond the boundaries of Europe and existed many centuries earlier than the advent of Christianity or even the emergence of Greco-Roman doctrine. In Contra Faustum Manichaeum book 22 sections 69â€”76, Augustine argues that Christians, as part of a government, need not be ashamed of protecting peace and punishing wickedness when forced to do so by a government. Augustine asserted that this was a personal, philosophical stance: The sacred seat of virtue is the heart. They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill. But, say they, the wise man will wage Just Wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. Mark Mattox writes that, for the individual Christian under the rule of a government engaged in an immoral war, Augustine admonished that Christians, "by divine edict, have no choice but to subject themselves to their political masters and [should] seek to ensure that they execute their war-fighting duty as justly as possible. Proper Authority is first: Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence. Soldiers must also fight for this intention. Both are fountains of knowledge; both come from God. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. February Learn how and when to remove this template message The School of Salamanca expanded on Thomistic understanding of natural law and just war. It stated that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind. Diplomatic resolution is always preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are: In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack. War to punish a guilty enemy. A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: It is necessary that the response be commensurate with the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war. Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war. Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages. It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort. Under this doctrine expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans , and wars for glory are all inherently unjust. Doctrine[edit] The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church â€”sometimes mistaken as the "just war theory" [23] [24] â€”found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church , in paragraph , lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force": It is important to remember that "it is one thing to wage a war of self-defence; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation. The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. Nor does the mere fact that war has unfortunately broken out mean that all is fair between the warring parties". The Charter of the United Nations intends to preserve future generations from war with a prohibition against force to resolve disputes between States. Like most philosophy, it permits legitimate defence and measures to maintain peace. In every case, the charter requires that self-defence must respect the traditional limits of necessity and

proportionality. Therefore, engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions. International legitimacy for the use of armed force, on the basis of rigorous assessment and with well-founded motivations, can only be given by the decision of a competent body that identifies specific situations as threats to peace and authorizes an intrusion into the sphere of autonomy usually reserved to a State. Although the criticism can be made that the application of just war theory is relativistic, one of the fundamental bases of the tradition is the Ethic of Reciprocity, particularly when it comes to in bello considerations of deportment during battle. If one set of combatants promise to treat their enemies with a modicum of restraint and respect, then the hope is that other sets of combatants will do similarly in reciprocation, a concept not unrelated to the considerations of Game Theory. Just war theorists combine a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just war theories are attempts "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice". Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin defined only three types of just war [31], all of which share the central trait of being revolutionary in character. In that manner, Lenin shunned the more common interpretation of a defensive war as a just one -- often summarized as "who fired the first shot? Which side initiated aggressions or had a grievance or any other commonly considered factor of jus ad bellum mattered not at all, he claimed; if one side was being oppressed by the other, the war against the oppressor would always be, by definition, a defensive war anyway. Any war lacking this duality of oppressed and oppressor was, in contradistinction, always a reactionary, unjust war, in which the oppressed effectively fight in order to protect their own oppressors: Clearly, the application of the term "defensive" war, or war "for the defence of the fatherland" in such a case would be historically false, and in practice would be sheer deception of the common people, of philistines, of ignorant people, by the astute slaveowners. Precisely in this way are the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie deceiving the peoples by means of "national ideology" and the term "defence of the fatherland" in the present war between slave-owners for fortifying and strengthening slavery. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuries -- "that violence is an evil that can, in certain situations, be condoned as the lesser of evils" is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, right intention from the older war theory that first evolved around AD, it has rejected two premises that underpinned all medieval just wars, including crusades:

Chapter 3 : Jus post bellum - Wikipedia

The Just War Tradition: Select True or False: Jus ad bellum and jus in bello govern all aspects of war. True Select True or False: While the moral burden of jus in bello falls primarily on military leaders, political leaders often play a key role in establishing targeting policy, approving specific targets, and developing rules of engagement.

By Joe Carter Note: If a nation is able to meet all of the moral requirements for going to war jus ad bellum as well as the moral requirements for waging war jus in bello they will find they have a new set of moral requirements after warfare is concluded. While just post bellum is the newest addition to the just war tradition, the concept has always been inherent in thinking about the morality of war. After all, as Aristotle says in his Politics, the proper telos end or function of war should be peace. This is why thinking jus post bellum is an essential addition to the Christian jus war tradition. Unfortunately, despite the importance of the topic, it has been given less thought than jus ad bellum or jus in bello and no set criteria have yet been agreed upon. One of the first attempts to clearly define jus post bellum principles was offered by Michael Schuck in a article in Christian Century magazine. Shuck proposed three principles: A more elaborate set of principles was presented by just war scholar Briand Orend, who outlines seven post-bellum principles whose violation would contradict the rules of just war: The peace settlement should be both measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed. The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty. Distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the country one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive postwar measures. Financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. Soldiers and political leaders from all sides should face fair and public international trials for war crimes. Reforming of decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime. Navy chaplain Louis V. Iasiello also outlined seven principles he says should set the moral parameters of behavior in the post-combat phase of war: Whenever practical and possible, they must provide the essentials of life food, clothing, shelter, medicine, etc. Of equal importance is the direction of post bellum care to other at-risk groups and those who cannot easily care for themselves, most notably the sick, the elderly, and some groups of women. But more thought needs to be done and the area is ripe for fresh Christian thinking on what we owe our enemies after the fighting has ended. Next in this series: The just war tradition and terrorism.

Chapter 4 : Just war theory - Wikipedia

SUMMARY. The just war tradition (JWT) arose from a desire to have the Christian faith influence the terrible necessity of warfare. Just War Tradition allows Christians to evaluate potential conflicts and to influence other conflicts once they have begun.

References and Further Reading 1. Introduction Historically, the just war tradition--a set of mutually agreed rules of combat--may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar enemies. That is, when an array of values are shared between two warring peoples, we often find that they implicitly or explicitly agree upon limits to their warfare. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people, sharing a moral identity with whom one will do business in the following peace, that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve and what kind of relations should apply in the aftermath of war. In part, the motivation for forming or agreeing to certain conventions, can be seen as mutually benefiting--preferable, for instance, to the deployment of any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts, or the kinds of action that have proved to be detrimental to the political or moral interests to both sides in the past. Regardless of the conventions that have historically formed, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that the lack of rules to war or any asymmetrical morality between belligerents should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all equally. That is, just war theory should be universal, binding on all and capable in turn of appraising the actions of all parties over and above any historically formed conventions. The just war tradition is indeed as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors to limit the outbreak or to rein in the potential devastation of warfare. They may have involved consideration of women and children or the treatment of prisoners enslaving them rather than killing them, or ransoming or exchanging them. Commonly, the earlier traditions invoked considerations of honor: Robinson notes that honor conventions are also contextually slippery, giving way to pragmatic or military interest when required. The just war theory also has a long history. Parts of the Bible hint at ethical behavior in war and concepts of just cause, typically announcing the justice of war by divine intervention; the Greeks may have paid lip service to the gods, but, as with the Romans, practical and political issues tended to overwhelm any fledgling legal conventions: Augustine provided comments on the morality of war from the Christian perspective railing against the love of violence that war can engender as did several Arabic commentators in the intellectual flourishing from the 9th to 12th centuries, but the most systematic exposition in the Western tradition and one that still attracts attention was outlined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. In the *Summa Theologicae*, Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the traditional just war theory as discussed in modern universities. He discusses not only the justification of war but also the kinds of activity that are permissible for a Christian in war see below. The most important of these writers are: In the twentieth century, just war theory has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war. Conference proceedings are regularly published, offering readers a breadth of issues that the topic stirs: What has been of great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade, the dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only remain intact on the battlefield but their role and hence their explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate. In the political circles, justification of war still requires even in the most critical analysis a superficial acknowledgement of justification. But, arguably, such acts do remain atrocities by virtue of the just war conventions that some things in war are deemed to be inexcusable, regardless of the righteousness of the cause or the noise and fog of battle. Yet increasingly, the rule of law - the need to hold violators and transgressors responsible for their actions in war and therefore after the battle - is making headway onto the battlefield. In chivalrous times, the Christian crusader could seek priestly absolution for atrocities committed in war, a stance supported by Augustine for example; today, the law courts are seemingly less forgiving: Nonetheless, the idealism of those who seek the imposition of law and responsibility on the battlefield cf. And in some cases, no just war conventions and hence no potential for legal acknowledgement of malfeasance, exist at all; in such

cases, the ethic of war is considered, or is implicitly held to be, beyond the norms of peaceful ethics and therefore deserving a separate moral realm where "fair is foul and foul is fair" Shakespeare, Macbeth I. In such examples e. The continued brutality of war in the face of conventions and courts of international law lead some to maintain that the application of morality to war is a nonstarter: But there are those of a more skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war: But as there are several ethical viewpoints, there are also several common reasons laid against the need or the possibility of morality in war. Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if military victory is sought then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and time. However, intrinsicists who claim that there are certain acts that are good or bad in themselves may also decree that no morality can exist in the state of war: Alternatively, intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause the argument from righteousness is a sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means are necessary to gain a victory or to punish an enemy. A different skeptical argument, one advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons alters war so much that our notions of morality and hence just war theories become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare for example, the timing, range, and potential devastation they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework: Whilst skeptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue that there are long-term benefits to having a war convention. For example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counter-revenges. Intrinsicists, on the other hand, can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war; for example, hospitals and densely populated suburbs. The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague or restrictive when it comes to war. Consequentialism is an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military or political needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: In principle such a prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers. Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war *jus ad bellum* tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war *jus ad bellum* from those that govern just and fair conduct in war *jus in bello* and the responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war *jus post bellum*. The three aspects are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations. One can immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor consequentialist they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this provides just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems. Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of *jus ad bellum*. Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. But unless "aggression" is defined, this proscription is rather open-ended. The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external threat interventionism. Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed for example, to pursue and punish an aggressor, or to pre-empt an anticipated attack. In recent years, the argument for preemption has gained supporters in the West: By acting decisively against a probable aggressor, a powerful message is sent that a nation will defend itself with armed force; thus preemption may provide a deterrent and a more peaceful world. Unfortunately, false flag operations tend to be quite common. Realists may defend them on grounds of a higher necessity but such moves are likely to fail as being smoke screens for political rather than moral interests. War should always be

a last resort. This connects intimately with presenting a just cause “all other forms of solution must have been attempted prior to the declaration of war. The resulting damage that war wrecks tends to be very high for most economies and so theorists have advised that war should not be lightly accepted: Yet the just war theorist wishes to underline the need to attempt all other solutions but also to tie the justice of the war to the other principles of *jus ad bellum* too. The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here. If a government is just, i. A historical example can elucidate the problem: What allegiance did the people of France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong so long as the state is not tyrannical and imposes war when it should be the guardian of peace ; whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty, and the right of declaring war to defend themselves against the government or from a foreign power is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government. The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. According to Kant, possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds, the most pertinent here being the value of self-interest itself. Acting with proper intent requires us to think about what is proper and it is not certain that not acting in self interest is necessarily the proper thing to do. On the other hand, a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i. On that account, the realist may counter that national interest is paramount: The issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be considered before declaring war. The next principle is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced in the following questions. Should one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are too prohibitive? Would it be right to crush a weak enemy because it would be marginally costless? Is it not sometimes morally necessary to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in , for the sake of national self-esteem or simple interests of defending land? Historically, many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: Victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. However, the thrust of the reasonable success principle emphasizes that human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds. The final guide of *jus ad bellum* is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. This principle overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of *jus in bello*. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back.

Chapter 5 : Just War Tradition - Christian Research Institute

In fact, however, the classic just-war tradition began, not with a presumption against war, but with a passion for justice: The just prince is obliged to secure the "tranquility of order," or peace, for those for whom he accepts political responsibility, and that peace, to repeat, is composed of justice, security, and freedom.

Gibson points out that writers drawing on just-war reasoning have reached diametrically opposed conclusions on Syria, even those who share similar ideological commitments he notes contrasting opinions in both First Things and the National Catholic Reporter. I believe, however, that just-war reasoning is as healthy as ever, and that Gibson misreads the current state of the tradition. Just-war theorists and Christian pacifists have long engaged in a dialogue which has enriched and clarified the just-war tradition rather than confused it. There is certainly truth in this observation, but recent popes and the U. Catholic bishops have also continued to teach that armed force could be justified in limited cases such as self-defense or a humanitarian catastrophe, using arguments drawn from the just-war tradition. This is problematic in two ways. First, although some advocates of just peacemaking might see their work as an alternative to just-war reasoning, others see the two as complementary. The just-war tradition itself sees the resort to violence as a regrettable, if sometimes necessary, response to conflict, so if conflict can be mitigated through peacemaking efforts without resorting to war, then that is perfectly consistent with the just-war tradition. There are, however, real disagreements among advocates of the just-war tradition. One could also note disagreement over the authority of international institutions, in particular the United Nations Security Council, and the binding force of its decisions, a disagreement critical to discussions of not only Iraq and Syria, but also the NATO intervention in Kosovo in These disagreements, however, do not signal a just-war tradition in disarray, but rather quite the opposite. The article suggests, though, that he envisions it as providing clear, indisputable answers to policymakers. Although undoubtedly just-war reasoning would be a failure if it did not help political and military leaders make their decisions, it is a mistake to expect clear and indisputable answers. One can confidently assert that just-war reasoning, to draw on the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, is an exercise of the virtue of prudence, the virtue of dealing well with situations that present us with complex, ambiguous dilemmas. Similarly, the Methodist theologian Daniel Bell has recently written that the just-war tradition is better understood less like a checklist of criteria and more like an outgrowth of Christian discipleship. In this sense, then, disagreement is not necessarily a sign of weakness or confusion, but rather an ongoing process of discernment. Likewise, the just-war tradition should be understood as what the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre means by a tradition, a community of discourse over time. Its practitioners are bound together by a shared vision, but continuously disagree amongst themselves as their tradition encounters new developments in the world and engages with ideas from other traditions. With this in mind, it is only natural that there would be vigorous disagreement within the just-war tradition in response to the dramatic changes in international politics of recent decades, such as the development of a unipolar or nearly unipolar world, the acceleration of globalization, the rise of transnational actors, etc. In fact, disagreement is a sign of health, since lockstep agreement in the face of such a fluid reality would more likely signal the rigidity that arises from the failure to adapt rather than real clarity. The just-war tradition has had a profound impact on the waging of war in the contemporary world. Limiting ourselves to the U. Debates on when to engage in wars and how to fight them take place within a restricted range of options; the consensus that exists, in part through the influence of the just-war tradition, is hidden from view precisely because it involves decisions that are no longer viable options. For example, the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, a formative figure in the just-war tradition, only considered three just-war criteria: It is only beginning in the sixteenth century that just-war theorists began to seriously consider the effects of war on civilians, introducing principles meant to limit those effects. The debate over preemptive war seems to re-introduce the idea of justified wars of aggression, but even here we are talking about preemptive action against aggressive acts, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction. There is widespread agreement that certain causes for war are simply off the table, even causes that in earlier centuries would have been accepted by just-war theorists. One could argue that these more

restrictive interpretations of the just-war tradition have resulted from the increasingly destructive potential of modern warfare rather than through any real progress in the tradition itself, but it is precisely through the use of ethical reasoning that just-war theorists have revised and limited the tradition in light of these technological changes. Therefore, as a tradition of discerning the appropriate response to conflict, the just-war tradition is in good health. As the continuing conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere demonstrate, however, the endeavor to bring moral and legal norms to bear on conflict remains as precarious as ever.

Chapter 6 : A brief introduction to the just war tradition: Jus in bello | ERLC

*The Just War Tradition: An Introduction (American Ideals and Institutions) [David D. Corey, J. Daryl Charles] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Reclaiming the just war tradition Politicians, pundits, and scholars have cited the principles of "just war" to defend military actions from Iraq to Afghanistan to Libya.*

Just War Tradition allows Christians to evaluate potential conflicts and to influence other conflicts once they have begun. It also allows Christians to see God as present and active even amid the violence and destruction of warfare. Although not a settled doctrine, JWT is a consensus of Christian and secular sources, and helps Christians to practice their faith in a responsible fashion in the public square. He has kept U. Clinton has discovered the two truths that every president this century has had to learn: What is the place of the Christian faith in all this? How can Christians evaluate whether any proposed U. How can the killing of human beings be squared with the Christian faith? Are Christians left with only three choices: This article will examine a fourth option, just war tradition JWT. We will see how it gives Christians an intellectual and theological matrix through which to evaluate potential and actual conflicts, as well as guidelines for how wars ought to be fought. Just War Tradition is a broad consensus, not a settled doctrine. It was developed over centuries by theologians and jurists who desired to apply Scripture and moral wisdom even to the most brutal of human enterprises, and who wanted to bring Christian charity and justice even to warfare. Its broad consensus does, however, allow thoughtful people to bring their faith to bear on difficult issues in the secular political arena. He stated that not only was violence at odds with the Christian faith, but the idolatry and emperor sacrifice required of the Roman military made army service doubly prohibitive for the Christian. Ambrose of Milan ca. It also reflects a more thorough exegesis of Scripture that was continued in the work of Augustine Augustine saw that Christianity was not incompatible with war, but was to influence it toward the proper methods and ends: Augustine reasoned that what had been truly evil about war was not necessarily the deaths incurred, but that part of war which had been left too long without the influence of the faith: During the Middle Ages and beyond, jurists and theologians continued to wrestle with how moral wisdom, compassion, and justice could be brought to bear on war and conflict. As a result, several broad streams of thought – both sacred and secular – came together to form the larger context of Just War Tradition. When President Clinton argued that the United States had a moral duty to send 20, ground troops to Bosnia, many Americans were unconvinced. Despite the triumph of the Gulf War, the specter of Vietnam was brought up again and again: Christians were particularly unsure. Could they support the president? Just War Tradition has developed five criteria which ought to be satisfied before troops are sent into an arena of potential conflict. This category is designed to insure that the proper authorities are calling for the war. Just wars are not private revolutions. In the United States, the Congress has the power to declare war, thereby helping to ensure that there will be vigorous debate before the wholesale commitment of American ground forces. Any potential conflict must be evaluated as to the cost and benefits. Are the potential gains worth the possible costs and sacrifice – both with regard to finances and human lives? Will the destructiveness of the proposed conflict outweigh any enhancement of other human values? Clearly, this category requires foresight; the difficulties involved do not absolve a country from this responsibility. Is the risk of getting mired in a ground war worth the cost? As the Union troops in the Civil War battle for Fredericksburg found out, getting in may prove much harder than getting out. The Goal of Peace. This criterion requires that just wars be fought with the final, realizable goal of peace in mind. Not only should there be a strategy to win; there should be a peace that can be achieved. It was this element that disturbed many Americans about the committing of U. War as the Last Resort. Nonviolent means of persuasion should always be attempted for a reasonable amount of time before resorting to war. In the modern political climate, there are numerous means that can serve to achieve the desired end of peace: But, there are times when diplomacy fails. Once a decision has been reached that war is unavoidable, how should a nation conduct itself in warfare? These criteria for jus in bello justice in battle are proportionality and noncombatant immunity. In conducting a battle just as much as in determining to enter a war, likely goods must be weighed against likely evils. The cost in human lives was simply not worth any potential benefits.

This was an example of proportionality in action. As the Gulf War demonstrated, it is often possible to destroy a military target with a comparatively small load of explosives because of the pinpoint accuracy of the weapon. Not only does this advance in accuracy meet proportional goals, but it also provides better protection for civilians. This criterion requires that civilians not be directly and intentionally targeted. While it is true that wars inevitably kill some civilians, such killing must be an unintended and indirect product of attacks on the military. Modern-day terrorists and guerrilla fighters pose grave threats to the doctrine of noncombatant immunity. Intentionally locating their command headquarters or military targets within civilian areas, these groups use civilians as human shields for their acts of terror. Ironically, when they hide behind civilians in this way, terrorists are paying those nations that adhere to JWT a compliment, acknowledging that such nations do not make it a practice to kill civilians intentionally. Saddam Hussein repeatedly hid military targets in the middle of residential neighborhoods. Tomahawk Cruise missiles, however, often proved more than a match for such tactics, flying around hospitals and schools in order to destroy legitimate targets. Nimble, quick, tight-turning, the Zero was a scourge for the Americans and British who faced it. The Japanese government constructed the plane of paper-thin aluminum, with neither armor for the pilot nor self-sealing gas tanks — the Japanese were willing to sacrifice such pilot protection to make a lighter plane. Later on, such calculations came back to haunt them. American Air Corps P Lightnings and Navy Corsairs — both heavily armored — could take massive punishment and then turn the Zeros into fireballs. In addition, the Japanese pilots often were not provided with parachutes. Zhukov expressed disbelief that the United States fed German prisoners the same rations as American G. When Ike explained that it was best to treat German prisoners well because of the Geneva standards of decency and because ill-treatment would doubtlessly inspire Hitler to treat Allied prisoners even more harshly, Zhukov was astounded: They have surrendered and cannot fight any more. Young, who had recently requested a demotion to private because he was losing his hearing, began to inch forward toward the machine gun nest. His lieutenant barked at him to stay put. He soon came under withering fire that nearly cut off his legs. In extreme agony, Young kept crawling within five yards of the machine gun, where he found a small depression that sheltered him from the rain of bullets. With his last gasp of strength, Young pulled out a grenade, then reared up and back, bringing himself out of the protection of the ground. A blast of machine gun fire caught him full in the face, killing him just as he released the grenade. But his aim was true. The grenade landed squarely in the middle of the machine gun nest, killing every enemy soldier. The thin, pale, bespectacled Young had saved his patrol. Two seamen were killed and Gilmore was badly wounded on the conning observation tower. Unable to make it to the hatch, Gilmore did the only thing he thought he could to save his crew. Despite the protests of his officers and crew, he ordered the sub to dive, leaving himself to die on the surface. Howard Gilmore had died in order to save his 69 men. In fact, nearly two of every three men who so far have received the medal did not live to see their award. Why is it so moving to read the story of a Roger Young or a Howard Gilmore? We respect such courage because we know that to give all one has, to give all that a person holds dear in this world, is to act outside oneself. It is a pointer, however humanly expressed, toward God, who expressed Himself in the ultimate act of self-sacrifice on Calvary. This is a courage that transcends even the horrible carnage of war. The Lord is speaking in the immediate context of His own coming death on the cross. But there is no need to restrict His saying to that context. Jesus is pointing out that self-sacrifice is the indication of agape in action. His own sacrifice would be the ultimate fulfillment of that. Human awe in the face of bravery is nearly universal. Despite the killing, the terror, the horror of war, there can emerge an inexplicable, yet undeniable, transcendence. This transcendence is not simply a function of zealous patriotism. Rather, it remains a pointer to the God whom even stark tragedy cannot drive away. The likelihood is that terrorists and guerrillas will continue to press the limits of noncombatant immunity, threatening to bring as many people as possible into the circle of war in order to achieve their ends. Any country that desires to adhere to Just War Tradition must not return terror for terror. Instead, despite temptations to the contrary, it must strive as much as possible to adhere to the jus in bello criterion of noncombatant immunity. Other moral concerns involve nuclear weapons themselves. Not long after the destruction of Hiroshima in , debate began on the morality of nuclear weapons. Such debate has focused on two main issues that are seen by some to overturn the concept of just war altogether: Some

scholars are convinced that the tremendous destructive capacity of nuclear weapons places them entirely outside the scope of JWT. They are simply too destructive, too powerful to categorize in the traditional categories of jus in bello.

Chapter 7 : The Just-War Tradition in Crisis? | Catholic Moral Theology

A scholar of war and religion, Perabo examines Russian Orthodox responses to and characterizations of the Russo-Japanese War, in order to demonstrate the limitations of the just war tradition in encompassing Christian conversations about war.

Jean Bethke Elshtain, Professor, University of Chicago and Co-chair, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Professor Elshtain is a political philosopher whose task has been to show the connections between our political and our ethical convictions. He is the author of numerous works, including *Cross, Crescent, and Sword: My name is Melissa Rogers*. The Forum serves as a clearinghouse of information and as a town hall on issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs. The co-chairs of the Forum are E. It has come to my attention that, quite unintentionally, we have scheduled this event during a Muslim prayer time. Apparently this conflict has prevented some of our Muslim friends from joining us today. I appreciate the fact that someone brought this to my attention and apologize for the schedule conflict. I know that we all share the deep sadness of fellow Americans over the incalculable losses suffered through the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the wake of these attacks, we are facing a host of critical issues, and, of course, religion has much to say about these issues. Today we discuss the just war tradition, its origins and principles and the ways in which it might apply to a war on terrorism. We are fortunate to have speakers today who are three distinguished scholars on the topic of ethics and the use of military force. Each of them is a prolific and critically acclaimed author on this subject, as well as many others. There is really no way to do justice to their reputations and the breadth of their knowledge and writing in just a few moments. So please know that all I can do is give you just the barest glimpse of their work. International Politics, an Ethical Discourse. And in a moment she will join us to discuss the origins, background and basic principles of the Just war theory. Her friend and colleague Michael Walzer calls her a truly independent, deeply serious, politically engaged and wonderfully provocative political theorist. Professor Hauerwas is the Gilbert T. Rowe professor of theological ethics in the Divinity School and professor of law at Duke University. A Primer in Christian Ethics. Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War. Cavanaugh said, and I quote: Finally, Professor James Turner Johnson will join us in discussion. Professor Johnson is a professor of religion and associate member of the Graduate Department of Political Science at Rutgers University. So I welcome all our speakers. I will ask Jean Elshtain to join us first, and then we will welcome your joining into the discussion. Thank you very much for being with us today. Good afternoon and thank you very much, Melissa. From President George W. Bush to the average man and woman on the street, Americans are evoking the language of justice to characterize our response to the despicable deeds perpetrated against innocent men, women and children on September 11th. When they do this, they tap into a complex tradition called Just war. He comes to the conclusion that wars of aggression and aggrandizement are never acceptable, but there are occasions when resort to force may be tragically necessary; not a normative good, but tragically necessary. What then makes the use of force justifiable? For Augustine, the most potent justification is to protect the innocent, and the innocent in the scheme of things are those in no position to defend themselves, to protect them from certain harm. If one has compelling evidence that harm will come to persons unless action involving coercive force is taken, a requirement of neighbor love may be a resort to arms. According to Augustine, it is better for the Christian to suffer harm rather than to commit it. But are we permitted to make that commitment to non-self-defense for others? I would say not. That response involves just punishment, not in order to inflict grievous harm on the non-combatants of a country or a group whose operatives have harmed your citizens, but to interdict in order to prevent further harm and to punish those responsible for the harm that has already occurred. And this, of course, takes place in a world that international relations theorists called a world of self-help. And in responding in a way that abides by certain limits, one reaffirms a world of moral responsibility and justice. When a wound as grievous as that of September 11 has been inflicted on a body politic, it would be irresponsible, it would be a dereliction of duty, it would be a flight from the serious vocation of politics to fail to respond. The Christian tradition also tells us that government is instituted by

God. This does not mean that every government and every public official is godly, but rather that he or she is charged with a solemn responsibility for which there is a divine warrant. Now, the just war tradition offers a way to exercise that responsibility. It attempts to steer a course between, on the one hand, the sort of anything goes ethic of realpolitik, often associated with thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes. But the just war tradition rejects as well an effort that forswears action, if that action commits the country to the use of armed force in a responsible and limited way. None of the goods human beings cherish, including the free exercise of religion, can flourish absent a measure of civic peace and security. If evil is permitted to grow, good goes into hiding. Evildoers that lurk and plot in darkness and secret, that operate stealthily and that refuse to accept responsibility for wrongdoing, perpetrate harm beyond the immediate violent event. It is they who try to force good into hiding. The simple but profound good that is moms and dads raising their children, men and women going to work, citizens of a great city making their way on streets and subways, ordinary people buying airplane tickets in order to visit the grandkids in California, men and women en route to transact business with colleagues in other cities, the faithful attending their churches, synagogues and mosques without fear. Make no mistake about it. It is not, of course, the peace of the kingdom promised by scripture. That awaits the end time. Beating swords into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks, a world in which nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more, is a vision connected with certain conditions, as Kenneth Anderson reminds us in a recent articles in *The Times Literary Supplement*. So it assumes a kind of unity of order and the rule, a singular rule of a law that applies to all of that distinction. Well, we are not there yet, to put it mildly. As Martin Luther observed, if the lion lies down with the lamb, the lamb must be replaced frequently. It is a good we charge our public officials with maintaining. If we live from day to day in fear of deadly attack, the other goods that we cherish become difficult. Human beings are fragile creatures. We cannot reveal the fullness of our being, including our deep sociality, if airplanes are flying into buildings and cities become piles of rubble, composed in part of the mangled bodies of victims. We can neither take the civic peace for granted, as we have learned so shockingly, nor shake off our responsibility for helping to respect and to promote the norms and rules whose enforcement is constitutive of civic peace. Saint Augustine taught us that we should not spurn worldly vocations, including " and his famous example is the vocation of the judge; tragic because he or she can never know with absolute certainty whether punishment is being meted out to the guilty and not the innocent. Now, public officials are charged with protecting a people. These are our sons and daughters. This is their right authority, or what they do. The job they do flows from right authority; another vital dimension of the just war tradition, right authority, and one aimed at limiting freelance opportunistic and individualistic violence. It is often difficult to separate combatants from non-combatants, but one is obliged to try. The restraints internal to the just war tradition encode the notion of limits to the use of force. Many of these rules and stipulations have been incorporated into various international agreements, including several Geneva conventions. During and after a conflict we assess the conduct of a war fighting nation by how its soldiers, its warriors conducted themselves. Did they rape and pillage? Were they under careful rules of engagement, or was it a free-for-all? I think we are obliged not to respond simply cynically to this attempt to limit the damage that is done. That is, pains have been taken to underscore the codes of ethics that derive from the just war tradition in our military academies and in the training of our Army, our Marines, our Navy and our Air Force. Indeed, it is my impression talking to students, looking at the curricula of institutions, that no group in the country pays more attention to this question of the restraint, ethical restraint on the use of force than does the United States military in its academies, in its training centers. That means we do not kill or threaten to kill nearly 6, civilians because that number of our own civilians have been murdered by perpetrators who scarcely deserve the name of either a soldier or a warrior. We put soldiers into combat rather than unleashing terrorists. The soldier puts himself at risk as surely as the firefighter. Revenge repudiates all limits. Just punishment observes restraints. The course thus far chartered by the administration is admirable in its complexity, its nuance and its restraint. The use of military force is planned, at least at this point, as one part of an overall strategy that involves, as you all know, decoding messages, cutting off money flows, and many other ways to go about dealing with this issue. One sign that the President and his advisors are aware of the need for restraint is their renaming a mission that was first dubbed, as many of you know,

Operation Infinite Justice, with a more modest name that does not suggest a utopian goal. And that was done almost immediately once the name was given. And why should they die? Simply because they are Americans? If you were in those buildings and you were an American, you were slated for death. The terrorists do not issue a set of demands. That is why one does not negotiate. There is nothing to negotiate about if the end your opponent has stated clearly is your own complete obliteration. At some point the word breaks off and the call to responsible action begins. On September 11 we sustained a greater loss of life in a single day than ever before in our history, easily topping the previous norm for a day of death, which was the Battle of Antietam. Americans tell us that they are prepared for this different kind of war. So you can see the public is making certain kinds of discriminations as well. The American people favor doing everything possible to limit this damage.

Chapter 8 : A brief introduction to the just war tradition: Jus post bellum | ERLC

While just post bellum is the newest addition to the just war tradition, the concept has always been inherent in thinking about the morality of war. After all, as Aristotle says in his Politics, the proper telos (end or function) of war should be peace.

Chapter 9 : The Just War Tradition: An Introduction by David D. Corey

Just war theory (Latin: jus bellum iustum) is a doctrine, also referred to as a tradition, of military ethics studied by military leaders, theologians, ethicists and policy makers.