

## Chapter 1 : World War I for Kids: Changes in Modern Warfare

*That is, war is paradoxically an expression of our basest animal nature and the exemplar of our most vaunted and valued civilized virtues. You will learn some basic military history and sociology in this course as a lens for the more important purpose of seeing the broader social themes and issues related to war.*

Types of war War must entail some degree of confrontation using weapons and other military technology and equipment by armed forces employing military tactics and operational art within a broad military strategy subject to military logistics. Studies of war by military theorists throughout military history have sought to identify the philosophy of war , and to reduce it to a military science. Modern military science considers several factors before a national defence policy is created to allow a war to commence: Biological warfare , or germ warfare, is the use of weaponized biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi. Chemical warfare involves the use of weaponized chemicals in combat. Poison gas as a chemical weapon was principally used during World War I , and resulted in over a million estimated casualties, including more than , civilians. Civil war is a war between forces belonging to the same nation or political entity. Conventional warfare is declared war between states in which nuclear , biological , or chemical weapons are not used or see limited deployment. Insurgency is a rebellion against authority, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents lawful combatants. Information warfare is the application of destructive force on a large scale against information assets and systems, against the computers and networks that support the four critical infrastructures the power grid, communications, financial, and transportation. Total war is warfare by any means possible, disregarding the laws of war , placing no limits on legitimate military targets , using weapons and tactics resulting in significant civilian casualties , or demanding a war effort requiring significant sacrifices by the friendly civilian population. Unconventional warfare , the opposite of conventional warfare, is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict. War of aggression is a war for conquest or gain rather than self-defense; this can be the basis of war crimes under customary international law. War of liberation , Wars of national liberation or national liberation revolutions are conflicts fought by nations to gain independence. The term is used in conjunction with wars against foreign powers or at least those perceived as foreign to establish separate sovereign states for the rebelling nationality. From a different point of view, these wars are called insurgencies, rebellions, or wars of independence. Military history The percentages of men killed in war in eight tribal societies, and Europe and the U. Keeley, archeologist The earliest recorded evidence of war belongs to the Mesolithic cemetery Site , which has been determined to be approximately 14, years old. About forty-five percent of the skeletons there displayed signs of violent death. The advent of gunpowder and the acceleration of technological advances led to modern warfare. According to Conway W. Henderson, "One source claims that 14, wars have taken place between BC and the late 20th century, costing 3. For comparison, an estimated 1,, people died from infectious diseases in the 20th century. All of these forms of warfare were used by primitive societies, a finding supported by other researchers. Scarcity of resources meant defensive works were not a cost-effective way to protect the society against enemy raids. At the end of each of the last two World Wars, concerted and popular efforts were made to come to a greater understanding of the underlying dynamics of war and to thereby hopefully reduce or even eliminate it altogether. These efforts materialized in the forms of the League of Nations , and its successor, the United Nations. According to the U. Bureau of the Census , the Indian Wars of the 19th century cost the lives of about 50,

**Chapter 2 : The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future by David J. Lonsdale**

*Chapter 1 The Nature of War "Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind.*

The first issue to be considered is what is war and what is its definition. The student of war needs to be careful in examining definitions of war, for like any social phenomena, definitions are varied, and often the proposed definition masks a particular political or philosophical stance paraded by the author. This is as true of dictionary definitions as well as of articles on military or political history. Cicero defines war broadly as "a contention by force"; Hugo Grotius adds that "war is the state of contending parties, considered as such"; Thomas Hobbes notes that war is also an attitude: For example, the notion that wars only involve states-as Clausewitz implies-belies a strong political theory that assumes politics can only involve states and that war is in some manner or form a reflection of political activity. This captures a particularly political-rationalistic account of war and warfare, i. We find Rousseau arguing this position: The military historian, John Keegan offers a useful characterization of the political-rationalist theory of war in his *A History of War*. It is assumed to be an orderly affair in which states are involved, in which there are declared beginnings and expected ends, easily identifiable combatants, and high levels of obedience by subordinates. The form of rational war is narrowly defined, as distinguished by the expectation of sieges, pitched battles, skirmishes, raids, reconnaissance, patrol and outpost duties, with each possessing their own conventions. As such, Keegan notes the rationalist theory does not deal well with pre-state or non-state peoples and their warfare. If war is defined as something that occurs only between states, then wars between nomadic groups should not be mentioned, nor would hostilities on the part of a displaced, non-state group against a state be considered war. An alternative definition of war is that it is an all-pervasive phenomenon of the universe. Accordingly, battles are mere symptoms of the underlying belligerent nature of the universe; such a description corresponds with a Heraclitean or Hegelian philosophy in which change physical, social, political, economical, etc can only arise out of war or violent conflict. Heraclitus decries that "war is the father of all things," and Hegel echoes his sentiments. Interestingly, even Voltaire, the embodiment of the Enlightenment, followed this line: All animals are perpetually at war with each other Air, earth and water are arenas of destruction. Alternatively, the Oxford Dictionary expands the definition to include "any active hostility or struggle between living beings; a conflict between opposing forces or principles. This perhaps indicates a too broad definition, for trade is certainly a different kind of activity than war, although trade occurs in war, and trade often motivates wars. The OED definition also seems to echo a Heraclitean metaphysics, in which opposing forces act on each other to generate change and in which war is the product of such a metaphysics. So from two popular and influential dictionaries, we have definitions that connote particular philosophical positions. The plasticity and history of the English language also mean that commonly used definitions of war may incorporate and subsume meanings borrowed and derived from other, older languages: Such descriptions may linger in oral and literary depictions of war, for we read of war in poems, stories, anecdotes and histories that may encompass older conceptions of war. Both could recognize the presence or absence of war. War certainly generates confusion, as Clausewitz noted calling it the "fog of war", but that does not discredit the notion that war is organized to begin with. The Latin root of bellum gives us the word belligerent, and duel, an archaic form of bellum; the Greek root of war is polemos, which gives us polemical, implying an aggressive controversy. An alternative definition that the author has worked on is that war is a state of organized, open-ended collective conflict or hostility. This is derived from contextual common denominators, that is elements that are common to all wars, and which provide a useful and robust definition of the concept. This working definition has the benefit of permitting more flexibility than the OED version, a flexibility that is crucial if we are to examine war not just as a conflict between states that is, the rationalist position, but also a conflict between non-state peoples, non-declared actions, and highly organized, politically controlled wars as well as culturally evolved, ritualistic wars and guerrilla uprisings, that appear to have no centrally controlling body and may perhaps be described as emerging spontaneously. The political issue of defining war poses the first philosophical problem, but once

that is acknowledged, a definition that captures the clash of arms, the state of mutual tension and threat of violence between groups, the authorized declaration by a sovereign body, and so on can be drawn upon to distinguish wars from riots and rebellions, collective violence from personal violence, metaphorical clashes of values from actual or threatened clashes of arms. For example, if it is claimed that man is not free to choose his actions strong determinism then war becomes a fated fact of the universe, one that humanity has no power to challenge. The implication is that man is not responsible for his actions and hence not responsible for war. Wherein lies its cause then becomes the intellectual quest: Some seek more complicated versions of the astrological vision of the medieval mind e. In a weaker form of determinism, theorists claim that man is a product of his environment-however that is defined-but he also possesses the power to change that environment. Again, the paradoxes and intricacies of opinions here are curiously intriguing, for it may be asked what permits some to stand outside the laws that everybody else is subject to? But thinkers here spread out into various schools of thought on the nature of choice and responsibility. Such concerns obviously trip into moral issues to what extent is the citizen morally responsible for war? Descriptive and normative problems arise here, for one may inquire who is the legal authority to declare war, then move to issues of whether that authority has or should have legitimacy. Here, some blame aristocracies for war e. Vico, *New Science*, sect. These may be divided into three main groupings: Example theories include those that claim man to be naturally aggressive or naturally territorial, more complex analyses incorporate game theory and genetic evolution to explain the occurrence of violence and war cf. Richard Dawkins for interesting comments on this area. The problem leads to questions of an empirical and a normative nature on the manner in which some societies have foregone war and on the extent to which similar programs may be deployed in other communities. For example, what generated peace between the warring tribes of England and what denies the people of Northern Ireland or Yugoslavia that same peace? To some this is a lament-if man did not possess reason, he might not seek the advantages he does in war and he would be a more peaceful beast. To others reason is the means to transcend culturally relative differences and concomitant sources of friction, and its abandonment is the primary cause of war cf. John Locke, *Second Treatise*, sect. Proponents of the mutual benefits of universal reason have a long and distinguished lineage reaching back to the Stoics and echoing throughout the Natural Law philosophies of the medieval and later scholars and jurists. It finds its best advocate in Immanuel Kant and his famous pamphlet on *Perpetual Peace*. In every man, of course, a beast lies hidden-the beast of rage, the beast of lustful heat at the screams of the tortured victim, the beast of lawlessness let off the chain, the beast of diseases that follow on vice, gout, kidney disease, and so on. In other words, human biology can affect thinking what is thought, how, for what duration and intensity, and can accordingly affect cultural developments, and in turn cultural institutions can affect biological and rational developments e. Students of war thus need to explore beyond proffered definitions and explanations to consider the broader philosophical problems that they often conceal. Hobbes is adamant that without an external power to impose laws, the state of nature would be one of immanent warfare. That is, "during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. Communitarians of various hues reject the notion of an isolated individual pitted against others and prompted to seek a contract between themselves for peace. For instance, the communitarian view of war implies that Homeric war is different from war in the Sixteenth Century, but historians might draw upon evidence that the study of Greek warfare in the *Iliad* may influence later generations in how they conceive themselves and warfare. Others reject any theorizing on human nature. Kenneth Waltz, for example argues: This danger here is that this absolves any need to search for commonalities in warriors of different periods and areas, which could be of great benefit both to military historians and peace activists. However, once the student has considered, or is at least aware of the broader philosophical theories that may relate to war, an analysis of its ethics begins with the question: Again, due notice must be given to conceptions of justice and morality that involve both individuals and groups. War as a collective endeavor engages a co-ordinated activity in which not only the ethical questions of agent responsibility, obedience and delegation are ever present but so too are questions concerning the nature of agency. Similarly, should individual Field Marshalls be considered the appropriate moral agent or the army as

a corporate body? Just war theory begins with an assessment of the moral and political criteria for justifying the initiation of war defensive or aggressive, but critics note that the justice of warfare is already presumed in just war theory: Thus the initial justice of war requires reflection. Pacifists deny that war, or even any kind of violence, can be morally permissible, but, as with the other positions noted above, a variety of opinions exists here, some admitting the use of war only in defense and as a last resort defencists whereas others absolutely do not admit violence or war of any sort absolutist pacifists. Moving from the pacifist position, other moralists admit the use of war as a means to support, defend, or secure peace, but such positions may permit wars of defense, deterrence, aggression, and intervention for that goal. Beyond what has been called the pacificistic morality in which peace is the end goal as distinct from pacifism and its rejection of war as a means, are those theories that establish an ethical value in war. For example, as a vehicle to forge national identity, to pursue territorial aggrandizement, or to uphold and strive for a variety of virtues such as glory and honor. In this vein of thought, those who are now characterized as social darwinists and their intellectual kin may be heard extolling the evolutionary benefits of warfare, either for invigorating individuals or groups to pursue the best of their abilities, or to remove weaker members or groups from political ascendancy. The morality of war traipses into the related area of political philosophy in which conceptions of political responsibility and sovereignty, as well as notions of collective identity and individuality, should be acknowledged and investigated. Once war commences, whatever its merits, philosophers disagree on the role, if any, of morality within war. Many have claimed morality is necessarily discarded by the very nature of war including Christian thinkers such as Augustine, whereas others have sought to remind warriors both of the existence of moral relations in war and of various strictures to remain sensitive to moral ends. Sociologically, those going to and coming back from war often go through rites and rituals that symbolize their stepping out of, or back into, civil society, as if their transition is to a different level of morality and agency. For the ethicist, questions begin with identifying morally permissible or justifiable targets, strategies, and weapons-that is, of the principles of discrimination and proportionality. Writers disagree on whether all is fair in war, or whether certain modes of conflict ought to be avoided. The reasons for maintaining some moral dimensions include: A useful distinction here is between absolute war and total war. Total war, on the other hand, describes the absence of any restraint in warfare. Moral and political responsibility becomes problematic for proponents of both absolute and total war, for they have to justify the incorporation of civilians who do not work for the war effort as well as the infirm, children, and the handicapped and wounded who cannot fight. Supporters of absolute warfare may argue that membership of a society involves responsibilities for its protection, and if some members are literally unable to assist then all other able-bodied civilians have an absolute duty to do their part. The literature of war propaganda relates well here, as does the penal morality for those who refuse and the definitional politics of the wide range of people who may not wish to fight from conscientious objectors to traitors. Similar issues dog those who support total warfare in which the military target traditionally sacrosanct people and entities: Supporters may evoke the sliding scale that Michael Walzer describes in *Just and Unjust Wars*, in which graver threats to the body politic may permit the gradual weakening of moral constraints. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sect. Others merely state that war and morality do not mix. Summary The nature of the philosophy of war is complex and this article has sought to establish a broad vision of its landscape and the connections that are endemic to any philosophical analysis of the topic. The subject matter lends itself to metaphysical and epistemological considerations, to the philosophy of mind and of human nature, as well as to the more traditional areas of moral and political philosophy. To begin a philosophical discussion of war draws one onto a long and complex intellectual path of study and continual analysis; whereas a cursory announcement of what one thinks on war can be, or points to, the culmination of thoughts on related topics and a deduction from one to the other can and should always be made.

**Chapter 3 : War, The Philosophy of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy**

*StoryCorps is proud to present "The Nature of War" alongside "1st Squad, 3rd Platoon" and "The Last Viewing" to honor Veterans Day. The stories come from StoryCorps' Military Voices Initiative, which aims to bridge the gap between veterans and civilians.*

Consider the more modern versions and other relevant books shown below. *Vom Kriege*, by Carl von Clausewitz, ed. It was edited by the esteemed German scholar Werner Hahlweg and is considered the standard and most accurate edition. Buy the best translation—recommended for serious readers. This quite readable translation appeared at the close of the Vietnam War and—principally for marketing and copyright reasons—has become the modern standard. Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, *Marie von Clausewitz: A rich biography of Countess Marie von Clausewitz that also sheds enormous light on the life, ideas, influences upon, and character of the great military thinker himself.* WE propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations—therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts the whole should be kept constantly in view. We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will. Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say physical force for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law, is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not properly belonging to war. Utmost use of force. Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities, to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side. If the wars of civilised people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of states in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition and its relations war arises, and by it war is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things do not belong to war itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. The fight between men consists really of two different elements, the hostile feeling and the hostile view. In our definition of war, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events, by any extreme hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilised nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this difference is not inherent in a state of barbarism, and in a state of culture in themselves it arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, etc. In short, even the most civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other. We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the war of a civilised nation

entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the Government, and to imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling of passion in such a way that at last the physical masses of combatants would no longer be required; in reality, their mere relations would suffice—a kind of algebraic action. Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until the facts of the last war taught it better. If war is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. If it does not originate in the feelings, it re-acts more or less upon them, and this more or less depends not on the degree of civilisation, but upon the importance and duration of the interests involved. Therefore, if we find civilised nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on war, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of war, is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilisation. We therefore repeat our proposition, that war is an act of violence, which in its application knows no bounds; as one dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which in the conception, must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme with which we meet first reciprocal action. We have already said that the aim of the action in war is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this in theoretical conception at least is necessary. If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand; but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the war, should therefore be a change for the worse, at least, in idea. The worst position in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of war, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it according to probability. From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of warfare. Now war is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be making war; therefore what we have just said as to the aim of action in war applies to both parties. Here then is another case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, I have to apprehend that he may defeat me, then I shall be no longer my own master, but he will dictate the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action and leads to a second extreme second reciprocal action. If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the will. The sum of the available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends although not entirely upon numbers; but the strength of volition, is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of the power to be contended with, we can then take a review of our own means, and either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or in case we have not the resources to effect this, then do our best by increasing our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the same; therefore there is a new mutual enhancement, which in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme. This is the third case of reciprocal action, and a third extreme with which we meet third reciprocal action. Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of war an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If adhering closely to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world. Even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could easily be ascertained, still we must admit that the human mind

would hardly submit itself to this kind of logical chimera. There would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power, which would be in opposition to other principles of statecraft; an effort of will would be required disproportioned to the proposed object, and which therefore it would be impossible to realise, for the human will does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties. But everything takes a different form when we pass from abstractions to reality. In the former everything must be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the one side as well as the other, striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? It will if 1, War becomes a completely isolated act, which arises suddenly and is in no way connected with the previous history of the states; 2, If it is limited to a single solution, or to several simultaneous solutions; 3, If it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete, free from any reaction upon it, through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it. With regard to the first point, neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even as regards that factor in the sum of resistance, which does not depend on objective things, viz. This will is not an entirely unknown quantity; it indicates what it will be to-morrow by what it is to-day. War does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment; each of the two opponents can, therefore, form an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does; instead of judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do. But, now, man with his incomplete organisation is always below the line of absolute perfection, and thus these deficiencies, having an influence on both sides, become a modifying principle. The second point gives rise to the following considerations: But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality here again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme. Yet every war would necessarily resolve itself into a single solution, or a sum of simultaneous results, if all the means required for the struggle were raised at once, or could be at once raised; for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means, then if all the means have been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be supposed. All hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first, and form in reality only its duration. But we have already seen that even in the preparation for war the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception—a material standard into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme: It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application, that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. These forces are the armies actually on foot, the country, with its superficial extent and its population, and the allies. In point of fact the country, with its superficial area and the population, besides being the source of all military force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in war, providing either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same. Now it is possible to bring all the moveable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, etc. Further, the co-operation of allies does not depend on the will of the belligerents; and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other, this co-operation is frequently not afforded until after the war has commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of power. That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously affected by the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time, is contradictory to the nature of war. Now this, in itself, furnishes no ground for relaxing our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the first result, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would purposely expose himself, and also because the first decision, although not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events, the greater it is itself. But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men to take refuge in that expectation owing to the repugnance, in the human mind, to making excessive efforts; and therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used. Whatever one belligerent omits from weakness, becomes to the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts, and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale. Lastly, even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered state often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political

combinations. How much this also must modify the degree of tension and the vigour of the efforts made is evident in itself. In this manner the whole act of war is removed from under the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgment to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it; and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the laws of probability. Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions but individual states and governments, once the war is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found. From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly. Here, now, forces itself again into consideration a question which we had laid aside see No. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his are, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether.

Chapter 4 : On War - Wikipedia

*In , Specialist Justin Cliburn deployed to Iraq with the Oklahoma Army National Guard. While serving in Baghdad, Justin formed an unlikely friendship with two Iraqi boys who lived nearby.*

But I try to take a long view. Look back over the course of history. There are many moments that could have been called break points because of technology. People at the time thought the world would be fundamentally different because of that technology. Gunpowder would be an example. Use of gas in World War I. Atomic and nuclear weapons. The nature of war was probably best explained and articulated by the Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote the classic *On War*. In the book, he lays out the nature of war, which is, first of all, fundamentally uncertain. There is no way to predict how any war will turn out. As he said, it has its own dynamics as it unfolds. You have the element of friction on the battlefield, for example. All of these have an interplay that causes the friction that leads to uncertainty. What is changingâ€”in fact, is always changingâ€”is the character and form of war, and the technology is what influences that character and form. The Prussian military writer and strategist Carl von Clausewitz wrote the book on the nature of war, the essence of which has not changed to this day, Van Riper argues. The nature of war is immutable, though the character and form will change. The difficulty is that those who put forth this argument believe that something fundamentally has changed, and you can change very quickly without thinking your way through it. They want to apply the technology without the brainpower. My experience has been that those who focus on the technology, the science, tend towards sloganeering. It does a great disservice to the American military, the American defense establishment. In a sense, they make war more antiseptic. They make it more like a machine. So they can lead us the wrong way. They can cause people not to understand this terrible, terrible phenomenon. When it comes to fighting a war, there will always be human factors that technology cannot surmount, Van Riper believes. Courtesy of the Department of Defense But technology evolves. Is it vitally important to continue to pursue new technology? Anyone who understands war would never deny the place of technology. It has a very prominent place, a very important place. The American nation needs to invest all that it can afford in new technologies for the military. It just needs to be very careful that that investment supports an operating idea or concept. Worst of all would be for technology to lead the military instead of the ideas leading the development of the technology. The first thing you have to understand is how you plan to fight in the future or in a particular engagement, a particular war. The art of war and the science of war are not coequal. The art of war is clearly the most important. The art is the thinking. It is the intellectual underpinnings of war. The science is represented by the weapons. Advanced technology gives American forces the ability to see enemies from great heights and in total darkness, but enemy combatants can still hide. Was that a new kind of battlefield? In the case of Afghanistan, I saw a unique combination, a new organization, in which special operational forces were working directly with what in the past would have been assets we would have identified as strategic air assetsâ€”B bombers in particular. You had something nobody had envisioned before. The forces in theater and on the ground were able to adapt the tactics and techniques they used to what they faced. I think one of the fundamental lessons that should have been learned from Afghanistan is the ability to understand another culture. While Coalition forces initially rolled like a juggernaut across Iraq, they came to face an unconventional war against well-armed insurgents. Courtesy of the Department of Defense What is the response to the new ways America is fighting? If I had watched what happened in Afghanistan and was an enemy of the United States, there are a number of things I would have been concerned about. And I would have wanted to have prepared myself not to be affected by them. First, of course, is precision-guided munitions. So how do I avoid being a target? There are a number of things you can do in terms of reducing your signatures or disguising who you are. War is about adapting. Many enemies are not frightened by that overwhelming force. They put their minds to the problem and think through: Critiquing a war game The U. What is the overall purpose of a war game? War games are to learn a number of different things. You could learn about a new type of doctrine, the style that you want to incorporate some tactic or technique or procedure. Or you could have a new operating concept, a brand new idea of how you wanted to

fight in the future. So war games can be for experimenting with new ideas, or they can be practicing current ideas to become more proficient or to gain greater insight into those ideas. Military What was your experience with Millennium Challenge? I had a great deal of concern about the ideas that they were experimenting with in this particular exercise. Unfortunately, from where I sat, and I think I had a pretty good view, these ideas were never truly tested. Yet the conclusion drawn at the end of the exercise was that they had been and that they were worthy of adoption by our operating forces. They are fundamentally flawed. They have no true intellectual content. Others we could have used, particularly, for example, in what would be called the low-intensity phase. Was the game rigged? There were accusations that Millennium Challenge was rigged. I can tell you it was not. It started out as a free-play exercise, in which both Red and Blue had the opportunity to win the game. However, about the third or fourth day, when the concepts that the command was testing failed to live up to their expectations, the command then began to script the exercise in order to prove these concepts. This was my critical complaint. They leaned heavily on systems analysis of decision-making. So do you think Millennium Challenge was a waste? What I saw in this particular exercise and the results from it were very similar to what I saw as a young second lieutenant back in the s, when we were taught the systems engineering techniques that Mr. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson] had implemented in the American military. We took those systems, which had good if not great utility in the acquisition of weapon systems, to the battlefield, where they were totally inappropriate. As part of Millennium Challenge , U. Military Part of your victory in Millennium Challenge was based on your knowledge that the U. How did you take advantage of that? My belief at the outset of Millennium Challenge was that Blue believed it had a monopoly on preemption, and it would strike first. And, of course, in any war game I was familiar with up to that point, that had never been the case. Now that it was announced policy that we reserved the right to do that, the Blue force was going to take full advantage of it and plan to strike first. As I looked at an ultimatum that gave me less than 24 hours to respond to what literally was a surrender document, it was clear to me that there was no advantage in any of this diplomacy. I was very surprised that the Joint Forces Command personnel who had argued for using all of the elements of national power—the economic, the diplomatic, the political information—in some sort of coherent fashion, really came at Red with a blunt military instrument. So it was clear to me that this was not going to be negotiated, this was going to be a fight. And if it was going to be a fight, I was going to get in the first blow. No surrender How could the military have planned for Operation Iraqi Freedom differently? I have not been surprised by the things that have occurred since late spring, early summer in Iraq. One thing that we saw in this war, there was no surrender. There was no point in time where someone in authority said, "The government of Iraq surrenders to the Coalition forces. Courtesy of the Department of Defense There is the famous question of "boots on the ground"—the size of the force that captured Baghdad. Was the small force size a vindication of transformational concepts? There were sufficient forces to capture Baghdad. But what we call follow-up forces—exploitation forces and reserves—were not available. Imagine on the day that we seized Baghdad, if we had follow-up armed forces, exploitation forces, continue up into what we now know as the Sunni Triangle, go into Tikrit, instead of having that long lag time. If there had been a lot of so-called boots on the ground at the beginning, you might have convinced a lot of people that the war was over at that time. Other than the actual attack on Baghdad, it was not very well thought through.

**Chapter 5 : The Nature of War – StoryCorps**

*The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars.*

It is the result of planetary influence. Somewhere up there two or three planets have approached too near each other: Gurdjieff War may be understood in many ways. Materialists see it simply as an outgrowth of our animal instincts and the battle for survival while others may see a more conspiratorial hand at play. There is another view, one found at the heart of esotericism, especially that of the Fourth Way taught by the spiritual teacher G. It is a view that argues war comes not from inside man or from governments, economics or politics, but from outside. It ultimately derives from various configurations and interactions of the planets, especially the Moon, and from the fact man exists in such an undeveloped state that he is totally unprotected from such influences. Unless we understand this and take full conscious control of our lives, we will be bounced back and forth by not only planetary forces but by the ebb and flow of everyday existence. Gurdjieff called this lack of control the influence of the Law of Accident. The Ray of Creation To fully appreciate this model we need to consider the esoteric cosmology of Gurdjieff. In the Fourth Way model this Ray includes increasing levels of laws and diminishing degrees of freedom. The Absolute has 1 law and represents the true freedom of the perfect Individual, while dead matter has laws. The Earth has some 48 laws and the Moon 96, and there is a special relationship between the Earth and the Moon that we will examine in more detail later. The significance of this Ray is that it shows how the Earth with 48 laws is under the influence of both forces from above and below. And when planets align their influences increase, hence the power of the Law of Accident accelerates. This may seem all rather cosmological but these forces have a direct relation to the nature of man and on human behaviour. While we think we are aware and have a sense of independent will and autonomy, in the Fourth Way and other esoteric traditions it is argued this is an illusion. We are robots controlled by the influences of the planets on both an individual and collective level, unless we directly and wilfully take control. The Kundabuffer One of the primary ways these forces influence mankind is through that strange organ known as the Kundabuffer. The Kundabuffer is described by Gurdjieff as the creator of illusion – it causes us to daydream and believe we are awake when we are actually asleep. It creates buffers or denial mechanisms that stop us seeing the world as it really is, and allows us to be controlled by the ebb and flow of the planets and other forces. The term Kundabuffer is seen by many as an adaptation of the Vedic concept of Kundalini. Kundalini is a psycho-physical force located at the base of the spine; it controls the organism on psychological, etheric and perhaps even physical levels through the seven Chakras. Kundalini and the Chakras operate like cosmic antennae receiving influences from the planets and beyond. Initiates can use these forces to great benefit, but in the average person they are simply mechanisms of control. The chakric system has both positive and negative potential. Kundalini is the power of Kali, the goddess of gnosis and also illusion. She spins the web of Maya illusion and deceives mankind, inviting them to awaken and see through her game. As Maya she is the goddess of destruction and is depicted in either a four-armed or ten-armed form. Her skin is dark blue and she has red eyes filled with lust and rage. She has fangs and her tongue lolls. She wears a skirt of human arms and a garland of heads. Woe to those who approach her without gnosis, but to those who see through her illusion she becomes either a mother or a lover. The two forms of Kundalini are important as they represent the human condition, enslaved to illusion and controlled by the planets, or awakened and in a state of self-awareness. Food for the Moon: The Lunar Path The Moon plays a significant role in this process. It is ruled by 96 laws and is at the lowest ebb of the Ray of Creation save dead matter itself. It is a dead parasite planet feeding on the energies of Earth, recycling them back into the world sphere. In the Tantras we learn the secret of the Moon – it is the gateway of the unawakened dead. In the Fourth Way, Buddhism and many other esoteric schools, mankind does not naturally have a spirit or self – a true individual identity must be forged through action. When an unawakened being dies the karmic factors that make up their experiences are cycled through the lunar sphere and reincarnated on Earth. Or have you once experienced a tremendous

moment when you would have answered him: As we have no conscious control over them, they influence us is at their whim. In traditional magical practise each planet has a spirit and an intelligence. According to Francis Barrett in *The Magus*, the intelligence is an evolving force trying to awaken man while the spirit is an enslaving force trying to deceive. In many ways this model reflects the two modes of Kundalini and Kali on a much larger scale. It feeds on human karmic factors and recycles them back to Earth endlessly, and has far greater effects. Furthermore, its goal is to become a planet in its own right. According to the inner teachings of G. Ouspensky, Rodney Collin and Boris Mouravieff, the spirit of the Moon absorbs some of the life force before it transmits the karmic factors back to Earth in a long and slow trek to once again become a living planet. Since it broke off from Earth, it is a bitter soul, lonely, barren and angry, feeding off the energy of others and attempting to reboot its lifecycle. As part of this process, certain unique alignments allow the Moon to increase its influence, causing disaster and suffering that helps accelerate its access to life energies and hence shorten its quest to once again become a living planet. Of course scientists argue this has a minimal physical effect on the Earth, and this may or may not be true, but the spiritual influence of this event cannot be underestimated. The role of violence and sacrifice to release life force has always been known since the earliest times, with the use of blood sacrifice and the manipulation of war by earthly leaders. What is less known is the cosmic use of war by the lunar sphere for its own ends. While many pagans see the Moon as a symbol of the natural cycles of Earth, other older traditions see the Sun as the bringer of life and the Moon as a destructive force that must be kept under its submission. In such a system the Moon is seen as the bringer of war and pestilence when individuals and collectives do not control its baneful influence. The attack on Libya began on 19 March and certainly represents the irrationality of war. Of course we do not hear about these factors in the news since the attack on Libya has been carefully media managed and has more in common with a psy-op than a civil war. As the Moon feeds war and destruction, delusion is spread individual to individual, mind to mind, and memes of collective madness take hold. Magical Idealism and the Solar Way Is it possible to escape the force of the Moon or are we just enslaved by cosmic influences? Whether we discuss the Fourth Way of G. For Evola the Solar Way involves the philosophy of Magical Idealism whereby the subjective universe of the individual is harnessed to create a unique inner world from which a true Self can be forged. This process is uniquely personal, and while using the transmissions of the esoteric Tradition, is not limited to the moribund forms of religion or political philosophies. This I or Self is not forged simply through contemplation or knowledge but through action and deed. It is the true heroic path and it is only the hero who can overcome the power of the Moon, ascend the Ray of Creation and be reborn as an immortal through the power of the Sun. If you appreciated this article, please consider a digital subscription. Dear Friends, HumansAreFree is and will always be free to access and use. If you appreciate my work, please help me continue. Subscribe for daily articles:

**Chapter 6 : StoryCorps: The Nature of War**

*The nature of war describes its unchanging essence: that is, those things that differentiate war (as a type of phenomenon) from other things. War's nature is violent, interactive, and fundamentally political.*

Preserve formatting in description only supported in some calendar applications Close The Nature of War: Well it begins at two places practically. It begins on the farms of this country, and in the mines of this country. No war transformed natural environments as much as World War II, a total, global conflict that saw massive fighting across two continents and two oceans and drew resources from around the planet. More than any previous war, World War II achieved this mobilization in many countries. The United States played a decisive role in that war and the story of its astoundingly rapid acceleration of military capacity is well known. Yet the environmental dimension of American involvement has hardly been explored until now. This workshop and the resulting edited volume will examine American involvement in World War II through an environmental lens, focusing on how the war reshaped American landscapes, institutions, and environmental thinking, and how wartime developments helped shape the contours of postwar American environments and environmental thinking. It will also explore the ways in which American environmental endowments structured and delimited the U. In exploring the case of World War II, the workshop will delve into broad questions of the relationship among environment, war, and security, both in the United States and globally. The aim is an edited volume that will be engaging enough for undergraduates and general readers but deep enough for scholars. It will interest students of World War II, military history, international relations, and environmental history and studies. In this "gross national product" war, we will probe how natural resource considerations factored into American military and diplomatic strategy. We will survey where U. How did equipping a huge military operation and supplying Allies reshape American environments and source areas far afield? What were the environmental costs of that industrial expansion, including the accumulating toxic pollution left as a post-war legacy, in emergency circumstances where the immediate environmental consequences could hardly be taken into account? How were mining and forestry intensified and reshaped? Key Questions In what ways did nature and natural resources shape practices, events, and ideas during the war? How did nature and natural resources shape American military strategy or larger war policy? How important was nature to the history of World War II? What new resource mobilization methods, economic patterns, technologies, institutions, and ideas regarding nature emerged during the war? What seeds of future changes were planted? How did the relationship between the state and nature shift because of the war? How did the war and war imperatives transform American landscapes? What were the "changes in the land"? What new spatial or geographical arrangements emerged? Was the war purely a declension story for nature or are there other narrative frames that make more sense? What were the social and cultural politics of these changes? Is the concept of militarized landscapes useful? What other metaphors describe wartime changes in the relations between people and nature? Ultimately, how transformative was the war in environmental history of the U. Would the changes you examined have developed no matter what?

## Chapter 7 : Carl von Clausewitz: ON WAR. Book 1, Chapter 1

*The Changing Nature of War. Is a philosophy of doubt the better counsel in deciding to go to war? By Stanley Kober, January 11, Is a philosophy of doubt the.*

These advances changed the nature of warfare including battle strategies and tactics. Scientists and inventors on both sides worked throughout the war to improve weapon technology in order to give their side an edge in the fight. War in the Air World War I was the first war where the airplane was used. Initially, airplanes were used to observe enemy troops. However, by the end of the war they were used to drop bombs on troops and cities. They also had mounted machine guns that were used to shoot down other planes. They had mounted machine guns and cannon. The first tanks were unreliable and hard to steer, however, they became more effective by the end of the war. A tank during the Battle of the Somme by Ernest Brooks Trench Warfare Much of the war along the western front was fought using trench warfare. Both sides dug long lines of trenches that helped to protect the soldiers from gunfire and artillery. Trench warfare caused a stalemate between the two sides for many years. Neither side gained ground, but both sides lost millions of soldiers. Changes in Naval Warfare The most dangerous ships during World War I were large metal-armored battleships called dreadnoughts. These ships had powerful long-range guns, allowing them to attack other ships and land targets from a long distance. Besides this battle, Allied naval ships were used to blockade Germany to prevent supplies and food from reaching the country. World War I also introduced submarines as a naval weapon in warfare. Germany used submarines to sneak up on ships and sink them with torpedoes. They even attacked Allied passenger ships such as the Lusitania. New Weapons Artillery - Large guns, called artillery, were improved during World War I including anti-aircraft guns to shoot down enemy planes. The majority of the casualties in the war were inflicted using artillery. Some large artillery guns could launch shells nearly 80 miles. Machine gun - The machine gun was improved during the war. It was made much lighter and easier to move around. Flame throwers - Flame throwers were used by the German Army on the western front in order to force the enemy out of their trenches. Chemical weapons - World War I also introduced chemical weapons to warfare. Germany first used chlorine gas to poison unsuspecting Allied troops. Later, the more dangerous mustard gas was developed and used by both sides. By the end of the war, troops were equipped with gas masks and the weapon was less effective. They later changed the name to tank, which was what the factory workers called them because they looked like a large water tank. The main form of transportation of troops during the war was the railroad. Armies would build new railroads as they advanced. British soldiers in the trenches used a bolt-action rifle. They could fire around 15 shots in a minute. Large artillery guns needed as many as 12 men to aim, load, and fire them. The first tank was the British Mark I. The prototype of this tank had the code name "Little Willie. Learn More about World War I:

**Chapter 8 : War - Wikipedia**

*fundamental nature of war. The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to this end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force.*

Hunsang Kim December 19, "Clausewitz, you know nothing of war! Clausewitz had a negative attitude on war and had nothing positive to contribute to strategists. He also did not know about the context of strategy: His airy Kantian generalizations have distracted politicians, people, and military professionals from the true nature of war long enough. Strategists should be careful not to overvalue Clausewitz for his efforts to avoid war by explaining the complicated or interactive nature of war. Rather, strategists should turn to Jomini for understanding the nature of war because he clearly provides ways to develop good strategies. In the *On War*, Clausewitz defines that war as an act of force to compel the enemy to do your will. This view on the nature of war reflected the wicked nature of human mind. His theory of war as an extension of politics is rooted in the paradox of the trinity: The logic of his understanding about the nature of war and his theory are conflicted with each other because the theory reversed the unreality of war to reality of war. In other words, the nature of war itself is unlimited, while the theory of war is limited by politics, according to Clausewitz. It is an ironic thought process to go back to what he initially defines war from his later theory. So, all the things he was trying to explain his initial definition of war, not the nature of war. It is apparent that his true intention was to avoid war through understanding or propagating the absolute status of war. However, his efforts seem obsolete because the strategic connection between government, military, and people always have conflicted with one another. War is inevitable, by its nature, like an object suspended between three magnets. He did not answer to a fundamental question, rather he questioned, "How to develop a theory to maintain a balance between ends, ways, and means? The *Art of War*. The thorough analysis on the relations between wars and histories represent that war was unavoidable for the nature of politics between warring parties. Jomini emphasized that the politicians must conclude whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war. Not only did he thoroughly understand the nature of war, but also knew the intercourse of societies: Jomini also understood strategic context ends, ways, and means. He claimed that strategic objectives need to be explicitly expressed. The strategic objective derived against the backdrop of issues, trends, and challenges threats and opportunities that affects those elements. He also stressed that the ends the political objectives should be ends-driven, not resource-driven. The responsibilities of setting ends in politicians and people have responsibilities to provide means resources ; in turn, military professionals are in charge of developing ways. Thus, he concluded that a good strategy must be relative to: While it may be true that a certain character of war is an act of force to compel enemies to do your will, it is clearly much more than that. Its violence alone cannot account for the actual experiences of the United States in wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Ways of wars that United States has conducted since World War II have been primarily asymmetric and based on the limited political objectives. With the advent of nuclear weapons and sophisticated biological and chemical weapons, or weapons of mass destruction WMD , the United States has relied on these weapons as a deterrent to those with similar capabilities. At the same time, the United States has withheld their use, viewing them as a last-resort measure to be employed only when our survival is at stake. Strategists need to understand not only the desperate nature of war problems but also to have capabilities to develop desperate ways to solve the war problems. Jomini, in contrast, claimed that the nature, extent, and conduct of a war vary upon different objectives and kinds of wars. In national wars, formidable combinations of politicians, military, and people are the most prominent nature of all. This can be applied to a united nation filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their independence. Jomini well explained the status of this kind of war: Thus, the true intention of his remarkable efforts, *The Art of War*, is to direct strategists to adapt the indirect ways to different circumstances for political objectives. From his view, political ends either can only be limited or unlimited. This view came into conflicts with his other view that war is a form of social intercourse. This dichotomy approach had flaws in duplicating that war is thus permeated by intelligent forces. He meant war is, like politics, not that of art or science. Strategists have this

metaphor for the nature of strategic problems, such as offensive or defensive, symmetrical or asymmetrical, reprisal or denial, standardized or tailored, and strategy by intent or by default. His encyclopedic analysis in intercourse of history of wars and societies, from land and sea warfare including amphibious operations, diplomacies, and economics, had revealed variable characters of wars. He dealt at length with a number of practical subjects logistics, sea power that Clausewitz had largely ignored. Unfortunately, Jomini made a mistake flailing his fist away at Clausewitz. He was in charge of that mistake. However, his remark, "Clausewitz, you know nothing of war! In his remarkable efforts in *The Art of War*, he succeeded in teaching civilian leaderships about the nature of war and the wisdom of using military forces. As well as military leadership, how to develop a way to achieve political objectives thorough understanding about the nature and theory of war.

### Chapter 9 : Understanding the nature and theory of war through Jomini's view - Strategy

*The nature of war was probably best explained and articulated by the Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote the classic *On War*. In the book, he lays out the nature of war.*