

Chapter 1 : Reflections on the politics of climate change

The Politics of Climate Polarized views about climate issues stretch from the causes and cures for climate change to trust in climate scientists and their research. But most Americans support a role for scientists in climate policy, and there is bipartisan support for expanding solar, wind energy.

Updated on 20 November The previous version of this content can be found here. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice. Climate change politics had got its start in the mid- to late s, as climate science became more and more accessible to policy makers and the general public. Yet prior to , climate politics was only touched upon in major publications on international relations, with the exception of policy journals. Climate change was frequently referenced in articles on a range of topics, but it was not the primary focus of analysis. The recent years have seen an explosion in literature focusing on the topic, however. The potential for massive economic, political, and ecological dislocation from the consequences of climate change as well as from the potential policies to address the problem have since resulted in an extensive literature, with scholars addressing aspects of climate politics from every paradigm within international relations, as well as drawing on research in numerous other related disciplines. In addition, efforts to address the consequences of climate change have evoked controversial ethical and distributive justice questions that have produced an important normative literature. Overall, the literature on climate politics centers on two issues: Most scientists agree that the observed temperature increases are consistent with the anticipated effects of the vast increase in levels of greenhouse gases GHGs in the atmosphere that have resulted from the burning of fossil fuels as well as other human activities. The overall warming has produced long-term shifts in average regional temperatures, precipitation, and sea levels, and this pattern is expected to accelerate as the quantities of GHGs emitted continue to increase. While the scientific discussion of anthropogenic climate change can be traced to the late 19th century, the focus on the politics of climate change has much more recent origins. Climate change emerged as a political issue during the mid to late s, and its rise as a focus of social science research paralleled the explosion in research within the field of global environmental politics that also began during the late s and has continued through to the present Stevis, The field of global environmental politics has established itself within the larger realm of international relations as a center of interdisciplinary work incorporating research from geography, economics, history, law, biology, and many others. While this interdisciplinary approach is one of the great strengths of global environmental politics, it also makes it difficult to define the boundaries and monitor the literature in this immense field. These strengths and difficulties are fully apparent in the study of climate politics. Climate change is characterized by substantial scientific complexity. The potential for massive economic, political, and ecological dislocation from the consequences of climate change, as well as from the potential policies to address the problem, have resulted in an extensive literature, with scholars addressing aspects of climate politics from every paradigm within international relations, as well as drawing on research in numerous other related disciplines. Dryzek, Norgaard, and Schlosberg provide a good overview of the vast range of complex issues posed by climate change and attempts to address the problem. The unsettled nature of international and domestic policy responses to climate change has created openings for research on climate politics to have a significant impact on the global response. Scholars have thus sought to address a set of analytical and normative questions that have profound practical consequences for climate policy. How do we define climate change as a political problem? How do we explain the political response, or lack thereof, to the threat of climate change? How can obstacles to cooperation be overcome? What policies should be utilized to address the problem? What values should shape the responses to climate change? As scholars have analyzed these questions within the primary international relations paradigms, they have initiated a number of compelling critiques of these paradigms. The most important critiques reflect the overwhelming rejection by many climate politics scholars of the state as the primary focus of analysis within neorealism and neoliberalism. In addition, the climate politics scholarship has produced substantial critiques of the epistemic community literature and added substantially to the literature on environmental ethics and distributive justice. The literature on the

politics of climate change largely reflects the shifts that have occurred in the study of global environmental politics over the past 25 years. In reviewing this literature, it is inevitable that some areas of scholarship will not be fully represented. The focus here will be primarily on climate politics scholarship within the field of international relations. This will exclude important research in related disciplines such as economics and sociology, as well as within the political science sub-field of comparative politics. There is also a sizeable literature outside of the English language that will only be touched upon in the essay. Despite these limitations, the objective is to offer a review of the historical development of climate politics and to characterize the current state of climate scholarship within the larger field of global environmental politics. This review will proceed with an overview of the major publication outlets for climate politics research and a brief review of the historical development of the study of the politics of climate change. The remainder will be organized around two types of questions that drive much of the literature on climate politics. First, analytically, how do we explain the successes and failures of the international political response to the problem of climate change? Second, from a normative perspective, how should the international community respond to climate change? Each question taps into a range of literatures that will be discussed in subsections below. This is a rather crude way of reviewing the field, but it provides a basic organizational structure for analyzing the current state of climate politics scholarship.

Publication of Climate Politics Research In reviewing the literature on climate politics and the most prominent publication outlets, a number of interesting observations emerge. First, prior to 1980, very little had been published in the major international relations journals with the exception of the policy journals. The international law journals and particularly the American Journal of International Law and the Stanford Journal of International Law stood out for their substantial coverage of climate policy and law as the issue emerged as a political problem. Prior to 1980, International Organization, the European Journal of International Relations, Journal of Peace Research, and World Politics had not published any articles primarily analyzing climate politics. In part, the lack of articles in the top journals reflects the nature of climate change as a single environmental problem, which may be more effectively addressed within the context of larger studies of global environmental politics. Additionally, there was a methodological bias in the early study of climate politics toward qualitative case studies comparing a small number of cases over time or variation in responses to climate change across a limited number of states. Up until recently, there had been very little quantitative research published on climate politics. The more dedicated journal outlets for scholarship addressing the politics of climate change have consistently been the more specialized journals focused on global environmental politics and foreign policy. Climatic Change, an interdisciplinary journal that began publishing in 1980, focuses primarily on scientific issues, but it provided one of the first outlets for research on climate politics Kellogg, 1980; Brown Weiss, 1980; Fleagle, 1980. In the early 1980s, several additional outlets for climate politics research emerged: Global Environmental Change first published in 1980, the Journal of Environment and Development, 1980, and Environmental Politics. These journals, along with occasional publication of articles by other international relations and international law journals, provided the primary outlets for the publication of climate politics articles from 1980 through 1990. Three new journals began publishing in 1990 and immediately became major locations for the publication of international climate politics research. Global Environmental Politics has emerged as the preeminent publication for environmental research within the field of international relations, and International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics has established itself as an outlet for a range of research related to global environmental politics, international environmental law and policy, and comparative responses to international environmental problems. Finally, Climate Policy has established itself as an important dedicated journal for climate policy and politics research. All three have consistently published large numbers of high quality articles on the politics of climate change. In recent years there has been an explosion in publications related to climate change beyond the journals described above. It also reflects a shift in the questions being asked. Increasingly, climate scholarship has focused on the relationship between the consequences of climate change and conflict Thiesen et al. After publishing no articles primarily focused on climate change prior to 1980, the Journal of Peace Research published 19 articles related to climate change between 1980 and 1990, and the European Journal of International Relations published 6 articles primarily addressing climate change between 1980 and 1990. Books on various aspects of the politics of climate change began to

appear in the late s, and the number of publications has ballooned in recent years. A review of this literature reflects the great diversity of approaches to the broader study of global environmental politics in terms of theoretical paradigms, the types of questions being posed, and levels of analysis. The quantity of publications related to climate politics continues to increase dramatically, and the range of outlets has expanded with the increasing scholarly, political, and public attention directed at climate change. The Politics of Climate Change: Historical Origins While scientists had been studying the forces influencing climate and climate change for over years, climate change did not emerge as a salient political issue until the mid to late s Kellogg, Physical scientists spearheaded the initial publications addressing the politics of climate change by defining the problem and making climate science accessible to policy makers and the general public. These researchers also initiated the debates surrounding appropriate policy responses Hempel, Ross and Paterson , pp. The early literature on climate politics also established the foundation for the various strands of scholarship that became more fully formed over the subsequent years. Yet others assessed the viability of various policies to reduce GHG emissions Grubb, ; Grubb, a ; Mintzer, All of these strands of scholarship were present in a nascent form as climate change emerged as a political issue, but it was not until the mids that these areas of inquiry began to reach analytical maturity. The works of Paterson , Rowlands b , and Luterbacher and Sprinz stand out as major markers in the transition from the early debates to more narrowly focused theoretical studies and policy analyses. From the perspective of international relations theory, global environmental politics was heavily influenced by the neoliberal institutionalist literature of the s, and the early theoretical literature on climate politics similarly approached the issue from this perspective Sebenius, ; Ward, Paterson provides a transition to a more diverse application of theories to the politics of climate change. Paterson , p. He argued for the need to begin to focus on the relationship between domestic politics and international relations in understanding international negotiations. He also introduced a constructivist approach to analyzing changes in the understanding of climate change and appropriate solutions. The study of climate politics increasingly divided into more theoretical research focused on explaining climate politics within the context of the various international relations paradigms and normative research related to how this problem should be addressed, by whom, and with which policies and institutions. The remainder of the review is split between discussions of analytical research and normative research. This is an artificial divide. Many of the works reviewed here do not fall neatly on one side or the other, but this approach provides a way of thinking about the questions asked and the approaches to addressing them. The historical and legal analyses will be taken up briefly first because they have formed a smaller part of the international relations scholarship on climate change. The other approaches will be addressed in more detail in the sections below. One of the starting points for analyzing climate politics is historical. How do we understand the basic history of climate change as a political problem and the resultant global response? These works typically address additional theoretical questions, but they provide important histories, analyses of the major legal issues, and starting points for those studying climate politics. There is also a substantial literature related to international climate law that will not be reviewed here due to its tangential relationship to international climate politics and space limitations, but Gray, Trasofsky, and Carlane provides a good entry point to issues of international climate law. This literature has focused more specifically on legal innovations and how climate law relates to other areas of law such as the environment, trade, and security. The interdisciplinary journal International Environmental Agreements: International Relations Paradigms Within global environmental politics, the analysis of climate politics typically begins from one or more of the core paradigms of international relations theory: The historical materialist approach has not been used as extensively in the climate politics literature and will not be discussed below, but its emphasis on the state and capital accumulation, as well as the Gramscian focus on hegemony, provides tools for analyzing national climate policies Paterson, , pp. A common theme in the climate politics literature is that the focus of the neorealist and neoliberal paradigms on states as the primary actors does not provide an adequate explanation for climate politics. Much of this literature on climate change has been devoted to expanding the theoretical focus beyond the state as the dominant actor to include a more prominent role variously for international institutions, intergovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations NGOs , and subnational groups as actors in their own right that are capable of altering global

climate politics”often independently of state action. There has also been a growing emphasis on transnational relations in analyzing climate politics. These alternative perspectives will be addressed in subsequent sections. While few scholars would deny the importance of power, national interests, and conflict in the climate negotiations, most have argued that realism has not provided a sufficient explanation for the interests and strategies pursued in the climate negotiations, and the outcomes of the international climate negotiations have not been fully consistent with an exclusive focus on national interests and relative power positions among states.

Chapter 2 : Politics of Climate Change - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies

The one constant on climate is change. With or without life on earth, climate change would rage, ice ages come and go, seas rise and fall.

So why are governments still grappling over issues of policy and politics after all these decades? To explain how perceptions about climate change are evolving, Uscinski gives an example from growing up in the s. We were told there would be glaciers and the food supply would dry up. Living in New Hampshire, I believed it was getting colder. Rejecting scientific consensus is nothing new and "there are just as many conspiracy theories on the left," he adds. But in the case of climate change, because about 40 percent of the U. UM professor Kenny Broad , director of the Abess Center for Ecosystem Science and Policy , is in a unique position to see what causes some of the differing views in science and policy as it relates to climate change. Humans are trial and error learners, says Broad, who was a National Geographic Explorer of the Year. Climate change, like many environmental issues, is slow, creeping, and largely invisible. It does not evoke the emotional responses that trigger the same instinctual fear response that, say, stumbling upon a rattlesnake or lion in the wild, might. Broad is collaborating with faculty and students across a variety of academic disciplines to try to make these environmental issues more salient, which should make it easier for new policies to be supported. They need to relate the impacts of these changes to the economic, cultural, and moral issues that they care about. It has a unique joint J. Even the words used in describing climate changeâ€”positive or negativeâ€”influence opinion. Her research explores how people process information and make decisions using eye tracking, facial expression analysis, and even brain activity recordings. Mormann has been designing sophisticated surveys and behavioral experiments to examine how people perceive the severity of climate change. It dawned on me that this lack of familiarity could change perception," she says. Mormann hopes that these and other behavioral findings will ultimately help policymakers develop and implement more effective communication and policy strategies for climate change and other pressing issues. How the whole discussion of climate change is framed could impact its perception and our motivation to address it. Kelly , professor of economics in the School of Business Administration, says the complex nature of climate change inhibits governments from establishing clear policy. Creating effective renewable energy policies is also a complex endeavor, says Felix Mormann, associate professor in the School of Law and a scholar on the legal, policy, and economic challenges of adopting a sustainable energy future. We hope that this research will find its way into thoughtful policymaking and market mechanisms on both sides of the Atlantic. Right now, virtually all nonrenewable energy sources externalize their environmental costs," Mormann says, pointing to Miami Beach for example, where taxpayers are footing the bill to handle flooding caused by sea-level rise. None of this is priced in quite properly. Economic, environmental, and social sustainability all have to go hand in hand. There are ways to streamline processes that would improve outcomes while saving everybody time and money. That is a really big contribution law and policy can make in this space. He has a favorite cartoon to illustrate. In it, two residents stand on a city street, waist-deep in water. One says, "I wonder when the city is going to do something about trash pits. So far he has hosted workshops, commissioned the creation of sea-level elevation maps, attended Rising Tides Summits with fellow mayors from around the country, and written letters urging Florida presidential candidates to speak to their constituents to address the challenges of climate change and sea-level rise.

Chapter 3 : How the science of persuasion could change the politics of climate change - MIT Technology Review

More and more ordinary people are beginning to connect the dots between extreme weather, rising climate related death tolls, collapsing ecosystems, refugee/resource crises, and other grave anomalies.

The larger burden falls on developed countries, because, the treaty argues, these nations share more responsibility for the current level of pollution. The treaty will enter into force in 2005. Global Warming Skeptics Make a Plan Oil and gas giant ExxonMobil had lobbied against the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it would be too expensive and that it put too much of the burden on developed nations. Then Lee Raymond, the chief executive, became personally convinced that the science was wrong, too. Exxon begins funding groups to research his theory, including the Global Climate Science Team, which writes up a national plan to challenge the science behind climate change. The petition boasts, at last count, more than 31,000 signatures but only 39 are climatologists, and several environmental groups critical of the petition found questionable names, including that of Geri Halliwell, better known as Ginger Spice, on the list. The petitioners, though, say they remove fraudulent names when they find them. Bush declines to send the Kyoto Protocol to Congress for ratification, effectively withdrawing the United States from the agreement. The administration rejects the treaty because it puts more of the burden for reducing emissions on industrialized nations instead of developing ones. Canada withdraws shortly after the U.S. He does not support the Kyoto treaty. We recognize that greenhouse gas emissions are one of the factors affecting climate change. They call it pollution. We call it life. An Inconvenient Truth is Released After losing his bid for the presidency in 2000, former Vice President Al Gore launches a campaign to educate people about the dangers of global warming. Fox News Attacks Gore With the success of An Inconvenient Truth, Gore becomes the face of climate change advocacy as well as the target of global warming skeptics. In his acceptance speech, Gore speaks of the problem as an urgent danger: Once again, it is the 11th hour. The penalties for ignoring this challenge are immense and growing, and at some near point would be unsustainable and unrecoverable. With more lead authors and 2,000 expert reviewers, the report is widely deemed the most definitive to date on global warming. Other funders step into the void, including the American Petroleum Institute and the Koch brothers, major donors to conservative causes. By 2008, according to Bob Brulle, a professor of sociology and environmental science at Drexel University who has tracked this funding, two linked groups named DonorsTrust and Donors Capital Fund, will come to make up 25 percent of all funding for climate-change skeptics. John McCain, expresses support for cap-and-trade legislation, which would require manufacturers, power plants and others responsible for major carbon emissions either to reduce pollutants or buy credits to offset them. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, back a mandatory cap on carbon emissions. He also states that greenhouse gases are a problem and likely to increase. Companies that exceed the cap could lease additional credits from companies that produce less than the allotted amount, creating a financial incentive to reduce emissions. The energy bill is intended to reduce pollution from global warming and to move the U.S. In a larger shift, only 57 percent of Americans believe there is solid evidence the earth is warming at all down from 71 percent a year before. Global warming critics say the emails prove that scientists manipulated key evidence that debunked climate change and that they disprove the groundbreaking IPCC report from 2001. Several independent investigations later find that while the scientists should have been more open about their work, they did not manipulate data. The investigations also show that none of the emails affect the scientific consensus on climate change. The IPCC defends its report: The map at left, from NASA, shows how much warmer temperatures were during this decade compared to average temperatures recorded between 1951 and 1980, which NASA notes is a common reference period for climate studies. Republicans Take Control of the House Midterm elections bring a sweeping victory for House Republicans, including the first wave of Tea Party candidates, many of whom stridently oppose climate change. Republican Majority Eliminates House Committee on Global Warming Republican House Majority Leader John Boehner says that in order to eliminate waste in the government, climate change will be handled by the science committee. And the idea of spending trillions and trillions of dollars to try to reduce CO2 emissions is not the right course for us. Gingrich backtracks Gingrich, now running for the Republican

presidential nomination, denounces the ad he made with Pelosi on Fox News, saying: Public Opinion Turns Partisan A Pew Research Center poll finds a modest rise in the number of people who believe that human activity is to blame for global warming, up to 38 percent from 34 percent in But the partisan divide remains stark: While 51 percent of Democrats and 40 percent of Independents say it is mostly because of human activity; only 19 percent of Republicans and 11 percent of Tea Party Republicans agree. Climate Skeptics Turn to Schools Texas and Louisiana require teachers to teach both sides of the climate change issue as valid scientific positions , while Tennessee and Oklahoma introduce similar legislation. Study Examines Public Opinion on Climate Change A report studies why public opinion has turned against belief in climate change: More droughts and floods and wildfires are not a joke.

Chapter 4 : The politics of climate change in the United States | Global Warming | Al Jazeera

"The Politics of Climate Change stands out in the crowded terrain of climate change publications by placing politics - rather than science or economics - at the center of the analysis there is much to recommend this book. It is up to date, with discussions of the recent global financial crisis and the change of leadership in the US.

October 4, The Politics of Climate Polarized views about climate issues stretch from the causes and cures for climate change to trust in climate scientists and their research. There are also major divides in the way partisans interpret the current scientific discussion over climate, with the political left and right having vastly divergent perceptions of modern scientific consensus, differing levels of trust in the information they get from professional researchers, and different views as to whether it is the quest for knowledge or the quest for professional advancement that drives climate scientists in their work. When it comes to party divides, the biggest gaps on climate policy and climate science are between those at the ends of the political spectrum. Across the board, from possible causes to who should be the one to sort this all out, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans see climate-related matters through vastly different lenses. Perhaps it follows, then, that liberal Democrats are much more inclined to believe a wide variety of environmental catastrophes are potentially headed our way, and that both policy and individual actions can be effective in heading some of these off. And, a majority of conservative Republicans believe that each of the six actions to address climate change can make no more than a small difference. Democrats are especially likely to see scientists and their research in a positive light. Few in either party say climate scientists should have no role in policy decisions. To the extent there are political differences among Americans on these issues, those variances are largely concentrated when it comes to their views about climate scientists, per se, rather than scientists, generally. Majorities of all political groups report a fair amount of confidence in scientists, overall, to act in the public interest. And to the extent that Republicans are personally concerned about climate issues, they tend to hold more positive views about climate research. Liberal Democrats are especially inclined to believe harms from climate change are likely and that both policy and individual actions can be effective in addressing climate change. Among the political divides over which actions could make a difference in addressing climate change: The stakes in climate debates seem particularly high to liberal Democrats because they are especially likely to believe that climate change will bring harms to the environment. Among this group, about six-in-ten say climate change will very likely bring more droughts, storms that are more severe, harm to animals and to plant life, and damage to shorelines from rising sea levels. But Republicans with higher science knowledge are no more or less likely to hold these beliefs. These are some of the principle findings from a new Pew Research Center survey. Most of the findings in this report are based on a nationally representative survey of 1, U. The margin of sampling error for the full sample is plus or minus 4 percentage points. But, they come from a range of age and education groups and from all regions of the country. There are wide differences in beliefs about climate issues and climate scientists between this more concerned public and other Americans, among both Democrats and Republicans alike. At the same time, this more concerned public is quite optimistic about efforts to address climate change. Majorities among this group say that each of six different personal and policy actions asked about can be effective in addressing climate change. Further, those with deep concerns about climate issues are much more inclined to hold climate scientists and their work in positive regard. This group is more likely than others to see scientists as understanding climate issues. Conservative Republicans stand out as more negative in their overall views about climate change news coverage. Public ratings of the media may be linked to views about the mix of news coverage. Confidence in scientists and other groups to act in the public interest Though the survey finds that climate scientists are viewed with skepticism by relatively large shares of Americans, scientists overall " and in particular, medical scientists " are viewed as relatively trustworthy by the general public. Asked about a wide range of leaders and institutions, the military, medical scientists, and scientists in general received the most votes of confidence when it comes to acting in the best interests of the public. On the flip side, majorities of the public have little confidence in the news media, business leaders and elected officials. Confidence in either group is about the same or only

modestly different across party and ideological groups. Confidence in the news media, business leaders and elected officials is considerably lower; public views about school and religious leaders fall in the middle. People in both political parties express deep distrust of elected officials, in keeping with previous Pew Research Center studies showing near record low trust in government. Strong bipartisan support for expanding solar, wind energy production One spot of unity in an otherwise divided environmental policy landscape is that the vast majority of Americans support the concept of expanding both solar and wind power. The public is more closely divided when it comes to expanding fossil fuel energies such as coal mining, offshore oil and gas drilling, and hydraulic fracturing for oil and natural gas. While there are substantial party and ideological divides over increasing fossil fuel and nuclear energy sources, strong majorities of all political groups support more solar and wind production. These patterns are broadly consistent with past Center findings that climate change and fossil fuel energy issues are strongly linked with party and ideology, but political divisions have a much more modest or no relationship with public attitudes on a host of other science-related topics. Boom for home solar ahead? Their reasons include both cost savings and help for the environment. Western residents and younger adults ages 18 to 49 are especially likely to say they have considered, or already installed, solar panels at home. One-in-five Americans aim for everyday environmentalism; their political and climate change beliefs mirror the U. How different are the actual behaviors of Americans who live out their concerns for the environment all the time from the rest of the public? They are more likely to buy a cleaning product because its ingredients would be better for the environment, but again, most do so no more than sometimes. And they are no more likely than other Americans to reduce and reuse at home by composting, having a rain barrel or growing their own vegetables. Nor are environmentally conscious Americans more likely than other people to have spent hobby and leisure time hiking, camping, hunting or fishing in the past year. There is one way in which environmentally conscious Americans stand out attitudinally, however. They are much more likely to be bothered when other people waste energy by leaving lights on or not recycling properly.

The conference is considered the first major global recognition of man's role in climate change, and will provide the foundation for the United Nations' panel to study the issue nine years.

Scientists know that the Earth is warming and that humans are the reason. We also know that the Earth will continue to warm in the future; however, we can do something about it. We can dramatically change the trajectory. Why are there so many people who try to deny the evidence? Well, the why is something I will try handling in my next post. Here, I want to describe where things are, as I see them. Mind you, this is only my perspective, living in the USA, working on climate science and climate communication on a daily basis. For various reasons, acceptance of climate science breaks down along ideological lines. First, a majority of people in every state in the US believes, for instance, that the Paris Accord is a good thing, that the USA should participate. It turns out, however, that there is higher acceptance of climate science and acceptance of the importance of action on the coasts California, Oregon, Washington, New York, etc. There are exceptions to this rule but I am generalizing. It also turns out that the more liberal your politics are, the more likely you are to accept the science and the solutions. With respect to politics, the results are stunning. Vast majorities of Democratic and independent voters are supportive. Interestingly, small majorities of even conservative Republicans are supportive. There are other correlations. For instance, the more religious, particularly conservatively religious someone is, the more likely they are to doubt or deny the science. But again, this is a generalization and it has exceptions. In fact, some religious leaders have become climate-action leaders. Perhaps the best example is Pope Francis. Now, I am not saying that conservatives are not as intelligent as liberals, I am just pointing out that certain political and religious ideologies correspond to viewpoints on science. A hugely important work on the underlying motivations of people who deny the reality of climate change was performed by Dr. Naomi Oreskes in her book and accompanying movie Merchants of Doubt. So, if you look far and wide to find a scientist who claims humans are not a major influence on climate, it is very likely that scientist is not very knowledgeable about the topic, does not work in the area very much, or has a history of faulty research. Conversely, the scientists who accept the consensus view are more likely to publish more, do more research and just know more. However, if you talk to people on the street, this view breaks down. I see this in my own interactions with people. I often run across general audience members who have a pretty good grasp of the science but they discount the effects. Or, people who know very little about the science but they fully accept it. What is most astonishing to me is where this all leaves us. Donald Trump has announced that America will withdraw from the Paris climate treaty. My view is, it would be better for us to leave the agreement so we cannot sabotage it from the inside. But, only time will tell. But back to where this leaves us. We have a situation in the USA and around the world where certain countries and certain political groups have inextricably aligned themselves with one or another side of this issue. For instance, in the USA, denial of human-caused climate change has become a litmus test for Republican candidates. The same is true in other countries. But, their wholesale denial of the reality of climate change is doing just that. From a political standpoint, if we think about the silly things President Trump is doing and how it will affect the world, the one thing he may be most remembered for is his climate inaction. Climate change will have very long lasting consequences that we will be dealing with long after he is gone. Frankly, no challenge we are facing except perhaps a potential nuclear war presents the consequences that climate change does. And this, sadly, will be the legacy of conservatives in my country. As we wake up to more severe weather, more droughts, heat waves, rising seas, severe storms, the world will remember that these issues could have been solved long ago but for an ideology and tribalism. It will be the job of scientists, historians, and the media to continually remind people of this. Climate change could have been solved. You cannot blame this on me! People need to be accountable for their actions. If you are someone who has stood in the path of climate action, you own the results. And that is the sad part. Because as I mentioned earlier, this means a significant part of the population will be tarred with the legacy of climate change. And that population does not, as a rule, want the climate to change. No one wants sea levels to rise or droughts to increase. But this observation does

not change the fact that without the obstruction of climate action, we would be in a very different place. Another sad result is that my country has become a pariah – we have gone from leader to obstructionist on climate change. To call your country what it is, to be honest about our strengths and our shortcomings, to work to make your country better, to never settle for status quo – that is patriotic. And as a patriot, I will hope for, and work for change. Next time, I will give my personal opinion about why some people are more likely to deny the reality of climate change. Again, these will be from my personal observations and discussions with others. I am not claiming to be an expert in psychology or similar sciences. I hope you will read my next post.

Chapter 6 : The Politics of Climate Change Need to Be Anti-Elitist

Climate politics presents difficulties for study given its interdisciplinary nature and the scientific complexities involved in climate change. Climate change politics had got its start in the mid- to late s, as climate science became more and more accessible to policy makers and the general public.

The following syllabi are representative of this program. Because courses develop and change over time to take advantage of dynamic learning opportunities, actual course content will vary from term to term. The syllabi can be useful for students, faculty, and study abroad offices in assessing credit transfer. Read more about credit transfer. Students learn how to read scientific papers and analyze the policy process at local, national, and international levels. Students visit farms, fishing communities, food processors, and food transportation companies, while examining the history and political economy of food production in each country visited. It provides students with skills related to gathering, analyzing, and interpreting information from a range of sources, maximizing the knowledge provided by local contexts. The course intends to assist students in assessing their own cultural assumptions and in understanding people from different cultures. The seminar provides a framework for a cumulative project involving data collection and qualitative research undertaken in each of the countries visited. Sites Sites Please note that in order to take advantage of dynamic learning opportunities, program excursions may occasionally vary. Here, you will begin your examination of climate change through the framework of environmental justice, understanding race, class, and gender as key social determinants of vulnerability to climate impacts. You will delve into the history of global governance in climate change negotiations and learn current US and California climate policy. You will explore the fossil fuel industry and its impacts on low-income urban and rural communities and be introduced to the scientific basis of anthropogenic climate change. You will also meet activists, social entrepreneurs, and civil society professionals involved in climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. You will spend your first week here in Hanoi, the capital city of this one-party, nominally socialist country. You will learn about the consequences of highland dams for downstream communities and ecosystems; visit Tam Giang Lagoon, the biggest fresh water lagoon in the region, to learn how changing climate patterns are affecting aquaculture farming; and travel to the Cham Islands to learn about their strategies for adapting to climate change. In Hoi An, a UNESCO World Heritage site, you will live with a local family, join with farmers who are part of a budding organic farming movement in the region, and learn about rural-urban dynamics and the ability of coastal cities to adapt to the effects of climate change. Finally, you and your group will travel south to Ho Chi Minh City, the largest city in Vietnam, where you will reflect on your time in Vietnam. Rabat, Casablanca, the Atlas Mountains 4 weeks Next, you will travel to Morocco, which, like Vietnam, is on the front lines of climate change. Morocco has very little oil or gas and has been making massive investments in renewable energy, in particular, wind and solar power. You will travel to the Atlas Mountains, where you will visit a community struggling to defend its local water source and meet with farmers striving to modernize their small-scale agricultural practices. Cochabamba, La Paz, Lake Titicaca 5 weeks You will conclude the program in Bolivia, a politically complex country especially vulnerable to climate change. You will reflect on your learning throughout the program during an end-of-semester retreat in the Amazonian region of Chapare. He has a BA in environmental studies from Oberlin College, an MA in international educational development from Columbia University, and an EdD in international and comparative education, also at Columbia. His teaching and research engage with environmental policy in education through the lenses of political ecology, environmental justice, globalization, and critical policy studies. He is an alum fall and former program assistant spring , " of an SIT program in Brazil. A San Francisco native, Sarah grew up dancing with the Destiny Arts Youth Performance Company, which combats the alienation of capitalist structures through dance, theater, and martial arts. She has performed in all strata of venues, from Radio City Music Hall to the Thar Desert, and has facilitated numerous anti-oppression experiential education programs on power and privilege. She directed an all-girls traveling high school, cultivating critical consciousness in teens so they develop a habit of questioning what it means to be human while practicing radical empathy. After ten years

studying and living in the US, Phuong moved back to Vietnam in late 2008. From 2009 to 2011, she was the representative of Freeland Foundation in Vietnam, an international NGO combating crimes against nature and humanity. Currently, Phuong is an independent consultant in the field of education, environmental issues, and communication campaigns in Vietnam. He worked as project manager in several companies including OCP, the Moroccan phosphates state company, and as a temporary professor in Bouchaib Doukali University. He is currently working as consultant in construction management services. Moroccan association for an international water agreement. Ismael was exiled from Bolivia in 1976 and dedicated himself to his work in ethnographic and documentary film production. He sees his work as an effort to educate the world about the problems of his own country, Latin America, and the world. Since 2000, he has dedicated his academic efforts to decolonization and presently to climate change studies. Duygu Avci, PhD Candidate, Traveling Faculty

Duygu is an economist and sociologist working on environment-development relations in different contexts of the Global South. She completed her undergraduate studies in economics and sociology at the Middle East Technical University and holds an MA in economics from Bogazici University. In her PhD research, she explores transformative politics in environmental struggles based on a comparative analysis of two local mining conflicts in Ecuador and Turkey. Her work is situated at the intersection of development studies, political ecology, and ecological economics, and she is studying multiple society-environment interactions, including socio-environmental struggles, environmental governance, environmental justice, and sustainable development. She has researched and taught in different countries, including Turkey, Ecuador, Colombia, and the Netherlands. Upon graduation, Jessie worked in Chicago for several years, providing support to low-income community college students, developing a free bilingual adult education program, and organizing volunteers for youth programs. In 2003, Jessie moved to Cochabamba, Bolivia, to write analyses on human rights issues and political dynamics in Bolivia. Jessie assisted in coordinating the first few semesters of the IHP: Climate Change program in Bolivia. Homestay placements are arranged by a local coordinator who carefully screens and approves each family. Students frequently cite the homestay as the highlight of their program. Read more about SIT homestays. You will live with a host family for between two and four weeks at each program site, with the exception of the first location. Family structures vary in every place. For example, the host family may include a single mother of two small children or a large extended family with many people coming and going all the time. You will need to be prepared to adapt to a new life with a new diet, a new schedule, new people, and possibly new priorities and expectations. Career Paths Career Paths A diversity of students representing different colleges, universities, and majors study abroad on this program. Many of them have gone on to do amazing things that connect back to their experience abroad with SIT. Learn what some of them are now doing. Recent positions held by alumni of this program include: Research assistant for the United Nations, conducting work in Ecuador Truman Scholarship recipient, continuing research at the postgraduate level Fulbright recipients, returning to work in the countries the program visits Intern at EcoPeace Middle East, Amman, Jordan Cost and Scholarships Cost and Scholarships SIT Study Abroad is committed to making international education accessible to all students. This award can be applied to any SIT program. Qualified students must complete the scholarship portion of their application. Content and logistics for field programs in San Francisco, Vietnam, Morocco, and Bolivia Cost of all lecturers who provide instruction to students in: Break expenses are not covered by program fees; students are responsible for these. All accommodations during the entire program period. This includes during orientation, time in all four countries, urban and rural stays, all excursions, and the final retreat. Accommodation is covered either by SIT Study Abroad directly, through a stipend provided to each student, or through the homestay. All homestays in Vietnam, Morocco, and Bolivia All meals for the entire program period. Students may choose to take advantage of frequent flyer or other airline awards available to them, which could significantly lower their travel costs. Each student must bring a smart phone that is able to accept a local SIM card with them to their program, or they must purchase a smart phone locally. This is an estimated range based on student surveys from past semesters. For the entirety of the break period, students will be responsible for all of their expenses, including travel and room and board. Discretionary Expenses Personal expenses during the program vary based on individual spending habits and budgets. While all meals and accommodations are covered in the

room and board fee, incidentals and personal transportation costs differ depending on the non-program-related interests and pursuits of each student. To learn more about personal budgeting, we recommend speaking with alumni who participated in a program in your region. See a full list of our alumni contacts. Please note that free time to pursue non-program-related activities is limited. Fees and additional expenses are based on all known circumstances at the time of calculation. Due to the unique nature of our programs and the economics of host countries, SIT reserves the right to change its fees or additional expenses without notice. If your institution has an agreement with SIT and charges fees different from those assessed by SIT, please contact your study abroad advisor for more details.

Chapter 7 : Politics of Climate Change - Anthony Giddens - Google Books

Indeed, political affiliation was the demographic variable most strongly correlated with people's beliefs about climate change, with people who vote for more liberal political parties being more.

Subjects Description Climate change is now a mainstream part of the international political agenda. It has become clear that it is not solely a technical issue, to be resolved by scientists, but a political issue with political implications at all levels of global governance. Indeed, some may argue that few long-term problems in international affairs are more important than this one. The purpose of this book is to reveal and apply some of the latest thinking on the implications of climate change for international affairs, and to explore how various proposals for tackling climate change will affect interstate relations in coming years. Chapters by scholars of international relations, international political economy and international law contribute to current discussions of climate change, doing so in way that is accessible to students, stakeholders, government officials and informed laypersons. Some questions considered in the book include the following: How has the discussion of climate change affected interstate relations? How does this problem, and how do environmental issues more generally, challenge international relations theory? How do international climate politics influence domestic politics, and vice-versa? How would climate change or action taken to tackle it affect the balance of power or balance of influence? Is climate change a matter of international security or international justice or both and how does the answer to this question affect policy responses of governments? Which states are likely to benefit or suffer from the various proposals to address climate change? What are the legal, ethical and political implications of the uneven distribution of the impacts of climate change? This book was previously published as a special issue of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Table of Contents 1. Harris Dynamics of Climate Politics 2. A Climate of Obstinacy: The Climate Regime and Domestic Politics: The Case of Russia Liliana B. Domestic Incentives and Climate Politics: Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analyzing the Discourse Maria Julia Trombetta 9. Inequality in Global Climate Policy: Breaking the North-South Impasse J. Timmons Roberts and Brad Parks Constructing the Climate Regime Paul G. Harris About the Editor.

Chapter 8 : Politics of (Climate) Change | Climate Change - a special report from the University of Miami

The science of climate change is clear. Scientists know that the Earth is warming and that humans are the reason. We also know that the Earth will continue to warm in the future; however, we can.

As it happens, the academic literature offers insights on what drives such shifts in political sentiment, and it very much conforms with the approach that the Niskanen Center and other groups are taking. For the most part, people first align themselves with groups, often political parties, that appeal to them on the basis of their own experiences, demographics, and social networks. They then entrust the recognized leaders of their self-selected tribe to sort out the details of dense policy and science for them, while vigorously rejecting arguments that seem to oppose their ideologies—in part because such arguments also effectively attack their identity. In many ways, the climate-change debate is ensnared in the culture wars that have consumed US politics over the last three decades. In the late s, nearly 70 percent of Americans across the political spectrum expressed a similarly high level of concern about the issue, according to Gallup polling. But a gap has steadily widened along party lines in the decades since, driven at least in part by a deliberate campaign of climate denial by conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, and the Heartland Institute, scholars say. The major takeaway from all this is a pretty obvious, if somewhat radical, departure from the way we tend to think about spreading political messages and advancing laws: Instead, the goal should be to change the minds of the elites. When they send clear and consistent signals, mass opinions that seemed strong and fixed can swing in the other direction, Mullin says. The bad news is the ones you do have to change can be particularly stubborn ones. Depoliticize the issue So how do you even begin to convince the conservatives who could actually drive debates and change policies? When Taylor sits down across from them, his standard opening goes: But I changed my mind, and let me explain why I did. Incorrect email format By signing up you agree to receive email newsletters and notifications from MIT Technology Review. You can change your preferences at any time. View our Privacy Policy for more detail. No one is receptive to being called dumb or a lackey of corporate interests, Taylor says. Carbon pollution costs real people real money. Republicans generally oppose new taxes, of course. But in this case, they strongly prefer a market mechanism that nudges business behavior to environmental rules that strictly dictate corporate actions. Pick the right policies Former congressman Bob Inglis, a South Carolina Republican, also argues that the GOP will come around to a carbon tax, particularly if parties can reach a grand bargain that includes the rollback of regulatory efforts like the Clean Power Plan. Related Story The carbon-capture era may finally be starting Analysis of a newly approved tax credit shows it could make an immediate dent in industrial emissions and narrow the financial gap for power plants. Inglis lost his House seat in the Republican primary to a Tea Party-backed challenger, at least in part because of his advocacy for a carbon tax. Now he oversees RepublicEn, an initiative to encourage GOP leaders across the nation to embrace the cause. That could present opportunities to push through policies that achieve progress in both. In fact, there are signs of growing bipartisan support for clean energy, at least partially driven by the fact that deeply red states have become big generators of jobs in wind and solar power. You can create green jobs without cutting carbon pollution. There are fortunes at stake, and many will continue to fight hard and dirty to protect their financial interests. Taylor acknowledges that some groups are still simply beyond reach, noting early conversations with the Koch-backed Heritage Foundation and Competitive Enterprise Institute went nowhere. But he says the Niskanen Center has already convinced some Republican lawmakers to come around, though none he can yet name publicly.

Chapter 9 : IHP: Climate Change: The Politics of Food, Water, and Energy

In fact, political predisposition is by far the most influential factor in determining a person's "perceptions and attitudes about climate change," noted Mullin and Patrick Egan, an.

Paul Rogers, " Climate change: Among them, in Britain, are the second-world-war coalition government led by Winston Churchill, the cross-party consensus which helped secure agreement in Northern Ireland , and the post-devolution coalitions in Scotland and Wales. Challen, referring to the political strategy of "triangulation" espoused by Bill Clinton, argues that "true consensus should beat cynical triangulation any day. They are also clear about the context: Both too are very concerned about the international geopolitics of climate change, especially the participation of China - even as it announces its own ambitious plans for emissions-reduction via a massive investment into renewable energy - in the post-Kyoto framework. But if there are such problems, why then should an engaged theorist and a thoughtful politician each conclude that political consensus can be reached and become an instrument of progress on climate change? And how is such an outcome possible? The why and the how The answer to the "why" question is relatively straightforward. Climate change is a long-term issue, in which policy requires patience and consistency for its effects to emerge: Anthony Giddens identifies the challenge as "one of the core problems that democratic countries face - how to construct plans that survive successive changes of government". The answer to the "how" question is more difficult, in terms of policy - both within and between countries. If the work of consensus-building is central, it must also be part of a larger political strategy. Giddens has a great deal to say about how electors can be persuaded to be more enthusiastic than polls suggest they currently are about taking action on climate change. He talks about political and economic "convergence" for example, promoting domestic energy-saving measures as cost-saving as well as - or instead of - climate-protecting. More concretely, Giddens and Challen between them offer a series of options: There are limits to these options, however. Challen tells some good stories about how electoral politics can be an obstacle to cross-party consensus. He also suggests that "the calm pastures of cross-party consensus will be most thoroughly tested" when it comes to delivering results: The limits seem particularly strict in relation to international agreements. Even if common and specific commitments could be forged, there are no effective mechanisms of enforcement. This analysis draws on the approach of the Stanford University political scientist David G Victor , who says that a process with universal participation, binding emissions-targets, integrated emissions-trading and compensation to poorer countries is a guarantee of stalemate. Giddens concludes that binding targets are only ever likely to work at a national or local level - he recommends instead working for looser forms of collaboration, especially between the United States and China. The collective-action model The risk in this approach is a sort of collective evasion in which all involved focus on long-term objectives - for example, avoid detail at all costs; have little to say on implementation; remain sceptical about multilateralism; trust Barack Obama and Wen Jiabao to do a deal. I hope we can do more, and on a foundation of principles and values. Should the parliaments of middle-income states also pass a climate act, and set up their own committees on climate change? Could scenario-planning techniques, as successfully used to build consensus in for example South Africa, be generalised? What could more support for think-tanks and civil-society groups working on climate change achieve? In an article on the future of global governance - reflecting on the United Nations report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All - I outlined an eight-step programme for more effective collective action see "How to help reform multilateral institutions: In brief the steps are: An example of a practical outcome of such an approach is Aid for Trade , a central plank of the Doha trade negotiations which was devised as an incentive to developing countries to sign a trade deal. Are there more such examples, and opportunities? What are the deal-makers for Copenhagen? Dirk Messner and I have written on openDemocracy about wider reform of global governance, advocating a kind of Brandt commission for the 21st century. Would that help to build consensus? When I wrote my " triple call " in January , I started by saying that nobody in the development field could stand aside from climate change: Climate change will be even faster and more severe than has until recently been thought. There is a need for radical new policies,

shaped by a vision of global social justice. To succeed in this ambitious and essential task will require sophisticated political management. There is indeed no escape from "the politics of climate change". We encourage anyone to comment, please consult the.