

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 1 : Project MUSE - "Religious Nationalism": A Textbook Case from Turkey

Introducing Secularism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism: In recent decades, there has been what Juergensmeyer () describes as an upsurge of religious "Global Rebellion", universally evident from the rise in extremist groups, rebel overthrows and increased religion based violence and conflict.

Religious nationalism Save Religious nationalism is the relationship of nationalism to a particular religious belief, dogma, or affiliation. This relationship can be broken down into two aspects: Another political aspect of religion is the support of a national identity, similar to a shared ethnicity, language, or culture. The influence of religion on politics is more ideological, where current interpretations of religious ideas inspire political activism and action; for example, laws are passed to foster stricter religious adherence. Indeed, religious nationalism may articulate itself as the binary of secular nationalism. Nation-states whose boundaries and borders are relatively recent or that have experienced colonialism may be more prone to religious nationalism, which may stand as a more authentic or "traditional" rendering of identity. Thus, there was a global rise of religious nationalism in the wake of the end of the cold war , but also as postcolonial politics facing considerable developmental challenges, but also dealing with the reality of colonially-defined, and therefore somewhat artificial, borders became challenged. In such a scenario, appealing to a national sense of Islamic identity, as in the cases of Pakistan and Indonesia, may serve to override regional tensions. Thus, appeals to religion as a marker of ethnicity creates an opening for more strident and ideological interpretations of religious nationalism. Many ethnic and cultural nationalisms include religious aspects, but as a marker of group identity, rather than the intrinsic motivation for nationalist claims. Christian nationalism Christian nationalists focus more on internal politics, such as passing laws that reflect their view of Christianity. In the United States, Christian nationalism tends to be conservative. Distinctive radicalized forms of religious nationalism or clerical nationalism clero-nationalism or clerico-nationalism were emerging on the far-right of the political spectrum in various European countries specially during the interwar period in the first half of 20th century. Groups like the National Revival of Poland use slogans like Wielka Polska Katolicka Great Catholic Poland and protest vigorously against legalization of gay marriage and abortion. Pakistani nationalism is very closely associated with Muslim heritage, the religion of Islam and pan-Islamism as described in Two-Nation Theory. It also refers to the consciousness and expression of religious and ethnic influences that help mould the national consciousness. Jewish nationalism Religious Zionism is an ideology that combines Zionism and observant Judaism. Before the establishment of the State of Israel , Religious Zionists were mainly observant Jews who supported Zionist efforts to rebuild a Jewish state in the Land of Israel. After the Six-Day War and the capture of the West Bank , a territory referred to in Jewish terms as Judea and Samaria , right-wing components of the Religious Zionist movement became integrated with Israeli nationalism and evolved into Neo-Zionism , whose ideology revolves around three pillars: Indians may identify with their nation on account of civic ,[8] cultural , or third-world nationalism. Some commentators have expressed the idea that in modern India , a contemporary form of Hindu nationalism , or Hindutva , has been endorsed by the Bharatiya Janata Party and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. They started a rebellion in in Jeolla province in southwestern Korea. The rebellion was eventually crushed by Chinese and Japanese troops, resulting in , fatalities. It is comparable to the millenarian Taiping revolution led by Hong Xiuquan , who was also inspired by Catholic missionaries. The Donghak movement served as a template for the later Daejonggyo and Jeungsan-gyo movements, as well as for other religious nationalist movements. The Buddhist -influenced Daejonggyo movement financed guerillas in Manchuria during Japanese colonial rule of both Korea and Manchuria.

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 2 : Religious nationalism - Infogalactic: the planetary knowledge core

Religious nationalism is the relationship of nationalism to a particular religious belief, dogma, or affiliation. This relationship can be broken down into two aspects: the politicization of religion and the influence of religion on politics.

Publishing Info University of California Press, Mark Juergensmeyer, professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has written another important work usefully integrating his previous conceptual contributions and insights on religion and political violence with some new empirical evidence. In *Global Rebellion*, Juergensmeyer seeks to explain why violent religious conflict has afflicted the world so profoundly in recent years. Comparing groups across religion and geographic regions, including Hindu Nationalists, militant Zionists, and Muslim extremists, he argues that the collapse of secular national identities and the loss of faith in the moral basis of the secular state have provoked religious activism around the world. He contends that globalization and the upsurge of religious political movements are contributing factors to the global rebellion, the violent manifestations of religious imperatives to establish a political order. For Juergensmeyer, the fundamental political tension between secular and religious ideology has its roots in the history of modern nationalism. At their core, these ideologies look to different sources for what constitutes legitimate political authority. For a secular-nationalist ideal-type, the legitimate source of political authority and social order may be based on some combination of natural law, national-historical myth of peoplehood or popular will. Accordingly, these divergent sources may produce different boundaries of the political community. The rejection of secular nationalism as the legitimate order is the driving force of religious nationalist rebellions since the end of the Cold War. The readers of this journal will be particularly interested in how and why he locates the Middle East on the front line of religious rebellion. Groups such as al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine, and the Islamic Salvation Front FIS in Algeria may have the local political goal to establish an Islamic state within the borders of their homeland as part of a broader, somewhat utopian goal of reuniting the Muslim community umma. Adding another layer of nuance, Juergensmeyer points out that groups such as al-Qaeda envisage a transnational ideological state. Al-Qaeda members and others with a similar ideology share a collective identity based on a religious community that transcends state borders. If the Middle East is the front line of religious rebellion, the legacy of the Iranian revolution must be its heart. Juergensmeyer calls the Iranian revolution the paradigmatic religious nationalist rebellion because religious activists were able to realize their aim of establishing a religious state and society while appealing to a transnational or supranational community. The revolution inspired and impressed religious activists and figures across sectarian, religious, ethnic, ideological and geographic divisions. Why have people turned toward religion, and what makes religion and politics such a deadly combination? Religion has become the ideology of empowerment and protest while serving as the vehicle through which violence is expressed p. Through a violent reenactment of an ancient myth or ritual, the individual is empowered to create some sense of order in this world by transcending. At the end of the book, Juergensmeyer offers policy recommendations and thoughts about the future. He believes the future of religious rebellions will be determined by how they develop and how the United States and Europe respond to them: The war on terror is framed as a battle of good versus evil, and many Muslims perceive it as a war against Islam. Recognizing that many states facing violent rebellions lack sufficient political legitimacy, Juergensmeyer concedes that religion may be necessary to confer political legitimacy on challenged regimes in some parts of the world. Thus, he concludes that the revival of tolerant forms of religion may be the panacea for the excesses of religious extremism. Juergensmeyer is correct to remind us that all is not lost if religious activists acquire more political power. First, most of them, even if they share a religious tradition, rarely cooperate. Second, there is ample empirical evidence that religious activists may actually become more moderate when they attain power p. Resolving religious conflicts is, of course, another subject readers would like to know about. Juergensmeyer suggests that if the conflict over Northern Ireland could be solved, so could Kashmir and possibly the more complex

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the conflict in Northern Ireland has had a religious component, it was a national conflict over territory and not a religious conflict. The difficulty in resolving violent religious conflict over sacred space is that one group, whose membership is likely transnational, claims indivisible ownership based on a divine mandate. The epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a recent ethno-national struggle, is over Jerusalem. The sacred Old City contains the holiest site in Judaism, the Temple Mount, revered in Judaism, the location of the first and second temples. But this holy place is also a painful reminder that it is occupied by Jews, not Muslims. While Kashmir is spotted with religious shrines for Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists, the most important aspect of this conflict is that the land has become sacred space for Muslim extremists who believe they must obey a divine imperative to defend the umma and dar al-Islam through jihad. In contrast, the Irish conflict attracted mostly financial and some military support from the Irish diaspora, but it was not an international Catholic issue. These are significant challenges to resolving religious conflicts that cannot be disregarded. An interesting question, perhaps beyond the scope of the book, is how the idea of cosmic war can become less attractive. When do religious militants become less violent? Presumably, when the needs that attracted them in the first place are satisfied. Juergensmeyer does not offer a complementary explanation for the conditions under which a religious group becomes less violent. For example, he briefly mentions the groups al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad in the context of religious national rebellion in Egypt. He does not, however, tell us much about the violent insurgency from or why these groups renounced violence. Is there hope for reversing the appeal of religious political violence and cosmic war? How local governments respond, not just the United States and Europe, will also have a major effect on the trajectory of global rebellions. This book is an important resolve for policy makers and academics. Juergensmeyer demonstrates that ideas, culture and perceptions are important currencies for political behavior and why religion, as a political ideology, must be taken seriously.

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 3 : Religious nationalism - Wikipedia

Religious rejection of politics is a philosophy that can be found in several religions, such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Followers of this philosophy may withdraw from politics for several reasons, including the view that politics is artificial, divisionary, or corrupt.

Luke Wagner July 20, Nearly two years agoâ€”on September 20, â€”the state of Nepal promulgated its new constitution. Hindu nationalists promptly burned it in protest. In response to their detractors, they maintain that theirs is a movement to affirm and protect the Hindu identity of the majority of the population, and not one bent on curtailing religious freedom. They insist, however, that religious freedom stops short of the unfettered right to proselytize. As opposed to India, where Muslims are the focus of Hindu nationalist ire, it is Christians in Nepal who are seen as the predominant threat. As a result of their unwavering propagation of this view, even many advocates of a secular Nepal quietly agree that Christian proselytization is a problem. Exactly what it means to convert a person in the legal sense, however, remains an open question. The legal ambiguity of the article means that its interpretation rests largely with whomever controls the organs of the state in any given time and place. When the constitution was promulgated, Hindu nationalism in Nepal appeared to be an ascendant force. Despite its failure to secure a Hindu state, it had come a long way from its position over the previous nine years. Hindu nationalist parties fared poorly in the Constituent Assembly CA elections, and although they surprised many with their gains in the elections for a second CA, they remained marginal. As deliberations in the CA wore on in and , however, an oppositional Hindu nationalist movement took to the streets in sustained and increasingly widespread protest across the country. Ultimately, their agitation led to a compromise that significantly altered the character of the secular state. Over the next year and a half, there were signs that Hindu nationalism remained on the rise. Thus, when Nepal began the first phase of elections for local administrative positions in May, their expectations were high. With one phase of voting remaining, however, Hindu nationalists have largely been routed. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party RPP , the only party of national prominence that overtly promotes Hindu nationalism, has won the mayorship of only one city. Its success even there may be due as much to the popularity of its candidate as its platform. How to interpret this outcome remains an open question. Opponents of Hindu nationalism characterize the vote as a rejection of the religious extremism that reared its head in the last few years, while others argue that voters simply had the more pragmatic concerns of economic development in mind when casting their ballots. From this perspective, even supporters of Hindu nationalism may have been wary of voting for a party like RPP, which focused on national-level identity politics at the expense of the brass tacks of local development. It was a government led by the UML, for example, that removed Christmas from the list of public holidays and that Christian groups accused of more widespread discrimination. As the newly elected local bodies take control of local affairs, the practicalities of the politics of secularism and religious freedom will likely shift from the high symbolic politics of nationalism to more mundane, day-to-day affairs, and what direction things will go in remains to be seen. Discover similar content through these related topics and regions.

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 4 : A Comparison of Secular Nationalism and Fundamentalist Religion | The Society

*The rejection of secular nationalism as the legitimate order is the driving force of religious nationalist rebellions since the end of the Cold War. As Juergensmeyer tells us in his first and highly influential book, *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (), "religious nationalism" is the synthesis of.*

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Religion and Global Affairs: Secular States and Religious Oppositions Vali Nasr bio In discussing the greater prominence of religion in global affairs, it is important to consider the role of the state. Decline in the values that have sustained modern states, combined with crises that are born of the weakening of the state at the institutional level, have both been caused by religious activism, and opened the door to greater involvement of religion in politics. This paper will consider these arguments with special reference to the cases of the Muslim world and India. In recent years, religious activism has presented a serious political and intellectual challenge to the prevalent norms and values of the global order. Unwelcome intruders into the world scene, religious activists from the United States to Israel, the Muslim world, East and Central Europe, and Central and South Asia have challenged ruling orders and the values and beliefs that undergird the international system. Religious activism has rejected secular norms, arguing instead for anchoring socio-political institutions and practices in religious values. Beyond this, it has echoed demands for social justice and served as the backbone to movements of dissent in Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. It has become the flag-bearer in liberation movements from southern Philippines to Kashmir to Chechnya, and in struggles for preservation of cultural authenticity from the Middle East to India to Indonesia. Religious activism has led efforts to reduce the powers of the state in the [End Page 32] United States, and to dismantle command economies in Israel and India. Finally, it has lent support to demands for ethnic rights from East and Central Europe to South Asia. Religious activism has deeply influenced policymaking wherever it has surfaced. It has even forced states to rethink their foundational values and relations to their societies. What are we to make of this phenomenon, its cultural and political challenges, of the many social roles and political functions that it has assumed, and is likely to assume? Religious activism has emerged in rejection of secularism and the state apparatuses and institutions which embody it. It is a manifestation of the cultural divide that has separated the values of the state and those of the religiously-inclined population. The rise of religious activism suggests that the heretofore prevalent assumption that religion had either been privatized, or was on its way to becoming privatized, is not valid. In popular opinion, the current wave of religious activism was first associated with Islam. After all, no incidence of religious activism has surpassed the Iranian Revolution of in its global impact, and the followers of no other religion hold Western attention as do Muslims. More nuanced explanations have viewed Islamic activism as an ideology of dissent that surfaced in the struggle with Western political and economic domination; its roots are therefore to be found in the unsavory experiences of Muslims with imperialism, which also explains its radicalism and rejection of the West. Still, others have seen Islamic activism as the vehicle of empowerment for the lower middle classes on the one hand, and on the other for integration into the larger society of the economically marginal and the socially dislocated whom development has left behind. Similar linkages between religious activism and disgruntled social groups can also be found in India, Israel, and Southeast Asia. The ubiquitous importance of religious activism today, however, owes to more than social opposition. The global prominence of religion has been facilitated by significant changes in the values and You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 5 : What is secularism? - ABC Religion & Ethics

This paper discusses the relations between secularism, religion, and nationalism in Israel and offers a thesis about the failure of secularism there; a failure "in the last instance," so to speak, because in the "first instance," say 60 years ago, observers tended to assess that Zionist nationalism offered a viable modern secular alternative to traditional religious Jewish communalism.

The vacuum created by the evacuation of the church year would come to be filled by those American holidays celebrating civic regeneration, integrating Americans around the liturgies of their common political life. Being creatures of time and space, we invariably organize time into rhythmic structures reflecting our common priorities and collective memory. Evangelicals who long ago ceased to tell the story of redemption through the yearly cycle of ecclesiastical holidays became more than comfortable celebrating the birthday of their nation and political leaders with quasi-religious regularity. Evangelicals who would never dream of making the sign of the cross at the end of a prayer became quite comfortable putting their hands on their hearts every morning to say the Pledge of Allegiance with liturgical devotion. In place of the rejected church year, these holidays became public festivals of a new civic order celebrating the achievements of American nationalism. For a perverse yet popular telling of this quasi-redemptive story of American origins see Marshall and Manuel, *The Light and the Glory*. Spiritual Nationalism and Rationalism Further understanding of this type of spiritual nationalism was advanced in when James K. Smith came out with *Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation*, the first volume of a series devoted to cultural liturgies. Smith opening concern is to sketch a certain anthropology that, he believes, will enable us to better grasp the role liturgies play in the formation of the affections. It is just this adoption of a rationalist, cognitivist anthropology that accounts for the shape of so much Protestant worship as a heady affair fixated on messages. The result is a talking-head version of Christianity that is fixated on doctrines and ideas. Following Saint Augustine and supported by the latest discoveries in neuroscience, Smith makes the case that it is actually our desires what we love not what we think that gives us our fundamental identity as human beings. Our loves are closely aligned with our physicality, to the degree that our loves are cultivated through the embodied practices of communal ritual, through material practices that educate our desire and, in so doing, shape our identity on a level far deeper than most of us are even consciously aware. Over time, rituals and practices often in tandem with aesthetic phenomena like pictures and stories mold and shape our precognitive dispositions to the world by training our desires. Smith suggests that the pull of American nationalism has been that its liturgies reach our hearts through our bodies, thus doing justice to our reality as embedded creatures and, in the process, inscribing our hearts with a certain vision of human flourishing. In some contexts, such liturgies are not necessarily or primarily state sponsored; instead, an overarching commitment to the nation or the people so suffuses a national ethos that liturgies and rituals that infuse this are orchestrated by all sorts of nongovernmental institutions. These material, tactile rituals are formative precisely because they are material because they get hold of our passions through the body, seeping into our imaginary. While secular liturgies are after our hearts through our bodies, the church thinks it only has to get into our heads.

Civic Redemption Narratives Undoubtedly the Puritans were animated by noble motives when they rejected the cycle of Christian holidays, for they wanted to show that the entire year was sanctified, that every day is a holiday unto the Lord. However, by relinquishing the church year as one legitimate way to tell the story of redemption, the Puritans and their descendants bequeathed to America a sense that religion is most pure when disembodied, detached from the space-time continuum. Being creatures of time and space, any attempt to disassociate the gospel from its embedded-ness in time and space opens the material realm up to various forms of pseudo-religious ordering. Many Christians who would never dream of making the sign of the cross will say the pledge every morning with liturgical devotion. One of these quasi-religious metanarratives is the idea of civic soteriology. Both groups tell the story of American democracy as their own, a redemptive narrative

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

that includes a significant element of forward-looking eschatology. To read more about the importance of the church year, see the two-part series I wrote in for the Reformed Liturgical Institute at the links below. In Part Two of this series I develop a case that a robust affirmation of, and participation in, the ecclesiastical calendar can act as an effective hedge against the types of statist idolatries discussed in this post:

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 6 : Spiritual Nationalism in America Unpragmatic Thoughts

Noting that the synthesis of traditional religion and secular nationalism yields a religious version of the modern nation-state, Juergensmeyer claims that such a political entity could conceivably embrace democratic values and human rights.

By contrast, too many people who proclaim a deep commitment to religion are convinced that they have a handle on absolute truth, which therefore gives them the right to harass and bully others or even to kill them. Yes, Karen, the problem is religion. During the war there was a strong feeling that we really were bound together, and people went to church. We prayed for peace, also for victory. My young ears often heard these words: Since the war we have somehow lost this bonding, and church services are seldom occasions that celebrate togetherness. But there is still plenty of spiritual wickedness in high places to wrestle against, and secularists should not lightly dismiss our Christian heritage. The Ottoman empire was divided by Sykes, Picot, and western powers, sowing the seeds of present discontents and dangers. These coups are no more secular than historical colonial takeovers that were preceded by and accompanied by church missionary invasion. As stated by the author, wars have been primarily politically motivated, without strict religious divides, but it is a fallacy to say that people confused religion with politics: A monotheistic god has been used as a tool of war since the time of Constantine, and the rhetoric of the US Bush administration was an overt Christian crusade, so secularism cannot take the blame for any entrenchment of Islam against the west. Karen Armstrong appears to have confused religion with politics: While repressive regimes can emerge in both secular and religious societies, monotheist theocracies do seem particularly prone to them. If secularism is, as she suggests, a rare aberration, the very concept of freedom of belief may be an endangered species – a possibility few of us would contemplate with equanimity. Her history is good and her conclusions are sound: But she has skated over a central point, which she herself mentions elsewhere in her work: Founders of religions seem to incline more towards behaviour, but their successors have emphasised belief: But belief is based on conviction, not evidence; those who do not share the convictions are wrong, and no compromise with them is possible. From there it is a small step to believing that it is right to make them believe, and that thought can escalate until it includes torture and death, which has already happened countless times in history. Of course, the lust for power can produce the same outcomes, but that does not excuse religion, and we can hope that power is occasionally realistic enough to be capable of compromise especially if it sees its power in danger, but a deeply held religious belief is not. I do not believe that religion is inherently violent, but I do believe that with wonderful and inspiring exceptions many religious people, and most religious leaders, regard the non-religious, or those who hold different beliefs, as outsiders, lesser folk, dreadfully misguided, a danger to the true believers, and therefore – to put it simply – as less than human. And seeing people as less than human is why we have wars. The reason why religion and deeply ideological politics are so dangerous is that they make absolute truth claims but have deeply unsatisfactory procedures for deciding between competing claims. Compare this with science. Scientists make tentative truth claims and have very robust decision procedures to settle conflicting views. Consequently, serious religious disputes generally result either in bloodshed or, if that is prevented, in division. The latter then provides a continuing danger of the former; as with Protestants and Catholics, Shia and Sunni and many more. She portrays secularisation, the declining social significance of religion, as the often violent outcome of secularism, the policy of separating church and state. This is an ahistorical conflation. In Europe and many other nations, the collapse of Christendom, church decay and the erosion of religious culture and rites have been almost entirely due to the blossoming of religious indifference. It is apathy, not anti-religion, violent or otherwise, that has sent swaths of the west hurtling towards secularity. Whatever the sources of the fundamentalism within Islam, Christianity or Judaism, and however much philosophers may pitch secularism against religionism, secularisation has a discrete history driven almost wholly by popular alienation from either. She also fails to draw the essential and

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

imperative distinction between, on the one hand, the incitements by those who, in the name of religion, drive loyal followers to atrocities and, on the other, the practices of religion itself. While it is true that psychopaths of one kind or another have led others to massacres and to self-destruction as Karen shows, we should not mistake this loyalty for innate crowd malevolence. Persuaded by their self-esteeming betters, decent people will go on crusades, bomb whole families, fight in trenches, despise Africans, Jews, Germans, French, American natives, women, or any designated group of difference, and be incited to use violence against them all. It is loyalty pure and simple. History has demonstrated that a tiny minority of psychopaths have had the power to seize any banner "religion or whatever" and lead the brave and patriotic to murder one another on an increasingly scientific and massive scale. And yet, religions, in the personal lives of the decent majorities, have inspired perhaps all that is best in the human story: So what must we do? Somehow we must rid ourselves of the psychos on all sides who exploit differences including religion for their own insanities and we must heed the decencies of men and women for many of whom religion is a valued compass. In short, democracy in the total sense and in much more than just the ballot box. Put more bluntly, do religion and political ideology serve the same role in human minds? Armenians were relocated by the Ottomans not because of their religion, but because of their bloody uprising posing a serious security threat. Armenians in the western part of Anatolia were exempt from relocation. The western powers and Christian missionaries fuelled the rebellion. If Ms Armstrong has a problem with secularism, she can move to a Muslim country where sharia is the law and judge it for herself. It was about separation of religion from the state and government whereby stopping the domination of any particular religion or sect over others. In order to understand the historical events and present conflicts in the Middle East, it is essential to recognise that religion is the most effective instrument to manipulate and to dominate peoples and not only by the leaders of the groups involved in these conflicts, but also, and spectacularly, by external powers who are very much involved to exploit any potential to pursue their own interests.

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 7 : Religious rejection of politics - Wikipedia

In this Pew study, it was found that religious Europeans are considerably more ethnocentric, more nationalistic, more anti-immigrant, and more suspicious of Jews and Muslims than secular.

List of nationalist organizations Politics portal Religious nationalism is the relationship of nationalism to a particular religious belief, dogma, or affiliation. This relationship can be broken down into two aspects: Another political aspect of religion is the support of a national identity, similar to a shared ethnicity, language, or culture. The influence of religion on politics is more ideological, where current interpretations of religious ideas inspire political activism and action; for example, laws are passed to foster stricter religious adherence. Indeed, religious nationalism may articulate itself as the binary of secular nationalism. Thus, there was a global rise of religious nationalism in the wake of the end of the cold war , but also as postcolonial politics facing considerable developmental challenges, but also dealing with the reality of colonially-defined, and therefore somewhat artificial, borders became challenged. In such a scenario, appealing to a national sense of Islamic identity, as in the cases of Pakistan and Indonesia, may serve to override regional tensions. Thus, appeals to religion as a marker of ethnicity creates an opening for more strident and ideological interpretations of religious nationalism. Many ethnic and cultural nationalisms include religious aspects, but as a marker of group identity, rather than the intrinsic motivation for nationalist claims. Christianity and nationalism Main article: Christian nationalism Christian nationalists focus more on internal politics, such as passing laws that reflect their view of Christianity. In the United States, Christian nationalism tends to be conservative. Distinctive radicalized forms of religious nationalism or clerical nationalism clero-nationalism or clerico-nationalism were emerging on the far-right of the political spectrum in various European countries specially during the interwar period in the first half of 20th century. Groups like the National Revival of Poland use slogans like Wielka Polska Katolicka Great Catholic Poland and protest vigorously against legalization of gay marriage and abortion. Islam and nationalism Main article: Pakistani nationalism is very closely associated with Muslim heritage, the religion of Islam and pan-Islamism as described in Two-Nation Theory. It also refers to the consciousness and expression of religious and ethnic influences that help mould the national consciousness. Judaism and nationalism Main articles: Religious Zionism and Jewish nationalism Religious Zionism is an ideology that combines Zionism and observant Judaism. Before the establishment of the State of Israel , Religious Zionists were mainly observant Jews who supported Zionist efforts to rebuild a Jewish state in the Land of Israel. After the Six-Day War and the capture of the West Bank , a territory referred to in Jewish terms as Judea and Samaria , right-wing components of the Religious Zionist movement became integrated with Israeli nationalism and evolved into Neo-Zionism , whose ideology revolves around three pillars: Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism Given the extensive linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity of the Indian population, [7] nationalism in India in general does not fall within the purview of a solitary variant of nationalism. Indians may identify with their nation on account of civic , [8] cultural , or third-world nationalism. Some commentators have expressed the idea that in modern India , a contemporary form of Hindu nationalism , or Hindutva , has been endorsed by the Bharatiya Janata Party and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh , although it is not subscribed to by the majority of Indians. They started a rebellion in in Jeolla province in southwestern Korea. The rebellion was eventually crushed by Chinese and Japanese troops, resulting in , fatalities. It is comparable to the millenarian Taiping revolution led by Hong Xiuquan , who was also inspired by Catholic missionaries. The Donghak movement served as a template for the later Daejonggyo and Jeungsan-gyo movements, as well as for other religious nationalist movements. The Buddhist -influenced Daejonggyo movement financed guerillas in Manchuria during Japanese colonial rule of both Korea and Manchuria.

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 8 : Project MUSE - Religion and Global Affairs: Secular States and Religious Oppositions

The elimination of sacred times, like the rejection of sacred spaces, involves a failure to take seriously the reality of incarnation and resurrection; this, in turn, creates a vacuum for other quasi-religious metanarratives to be incarnated in a people's social imaginary.

Whatsapp In September of , Talal Asad, William Connolly, Charles Hirschkind and I met at the annual American Political Science Association conference to discuss two seminal texts in a recently emerging field of study, which could tentatively be called the critical study of secularism. Christianity, Islam and Modernity , each now roughly a decade old. In preparing for this conversation, we did not set the task of doing justice to the scope and subtlety of these texts, but aimed instead to use them as a starting point for taking stock of and thinking about the ground that has been covered in the critical study of secularism since their original publication. What follows here are six questions that emerged for me in re-reading *Why I am not a Secularist* and *Formations of the Secular*. There may, however, be important reasons for the muddle that besets critical literatures on "the secular," "secularity," "secularism" and "secularization," sending them around this question again and again. To be sure, they acknowledge and grapple with the persistence of familiar and, in some sense, indispensable answers: And yet they also show how such answers are insufficiently accurate, woefully unhistorical, and incomplete in more fundamental ways. In reframing the question, Talal Asad argues not about secularism per se, but about "the secular. It is a possible object of anthropological analysis. It has a discernible grammar, but it is also historically layered, at times contradictory, quite complex, and best approached indirectly. By way of comparison with "the secular," secularism is relatively easy to locate as a "concept" and a "doctrine" bound together with, or "centrally located within," a concept of "modernity" that has recently "become hegemonic as a political goal," however unequally it is attained in practice around the globe. But "the secular" is not reducible to secularism, and it bears upon rudimentary attitudes toward the human body, contributes to specific ways of training, cultivating and structuring the senses, and grounds specific conceptions of the human. Secularists prefer to connect secularism to the European experience of toleration among diverse forms of Christianity, "because it paints the picture of a self-sufficient public realm fostering freedom and governance without recourse to a specific religious faith. Perhaps more precisely, wherever secularism comes from, it can be engaged as a particular political ideal, voiced in a certain way, by an identifiable constituency. As a preliminary definition, secularism is an idealized vision of political life that "strains metaphysics out of politics" and "dredges out of public life as much cultural density and depth as possible" in order to secure the authority of public reason and a rational morality, and the legitimacy of both to govern within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state until such a time as they can govern universally. But let me now draw out some precise questions from this: To what extent is secularism itself an essentially contested concept that is constantly open to reconfiguration? In what ways has the operative significance of secularism shifted in the last ten years? To what extent has it become important to contest or defend new aspects of the secular and new turns of secularism in line with these changes? How is secularism related to Christianity? Charles Taylor, in his recent book *A Secular Age* , makes a subtle argument about the emergence of a secular age that inherits and perfects the Christian tradition, though Hegel seems to have put a similar thesis in bolder form in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Where Kantian secularists emphasize the detachment of secular reason from religious tradition, Hegelian secularists emphasize the work done by a specifically Christian religious tradition in preparing secular reason, and thus the continuity between this tradition and modern secularism. Secularist discourses today tend to flicker between Hegelian and Kantian modes, pitching secularism at times as an extension of Christianity and at times as a rebuke to Christianity, though these two modes do not seem to be mutually exclusive. When Asad, in *Formations of the Secular*, approaches the intersection of secularism conceived as a modern pattern of organizing public life and religion conceived as part of an older tradition , it draws attention to the ways in which an historically specific concept

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

of "the secular" places religions in a hierarchical order. It brings to light, in other words, how some kinds of religion are determined to be compatible with liberal, democratic modernity, while others are not. To quickly follow this second thread, a significant measure of Kantian moral and political thought inherits the concepts and commitments of the Judaic and Christian traditions, as well as their confusions - problems, in particular, with the fundamental conceptions of freedom, responsibility and will. As Connolly puts it: Rather than arguing that a generic Christianity - or, slightly more specifically, Protestant Christianity - set the conditions for modern secularism, it seems to suggest that Kantian secularism and, for example, Augustinian Christianity emerge as responses to the human predicament, each with possibilities and limitations, some of which are shared. Again, let me draw these observations into a question: Are Euro-American secular discourses becoming more Hegelian and less Kantian, meaning that they increasingly tie secularism strongly to Christianity and to a story about western civilization, rather than to the exclusion of metaphysics and the purity of reason? If so, what new problems does such a reorientation present? Can modern secularism be understood as a process of conversion? In addressing the connection between secularism and Christianity, Asad reaches a formulation that could be shared by Connolly: John Locke, as a key early modern proponent of the regimes of toleration that preceded modern secularism, similarly understood conversion to play an important role in thinking about tolerance. Early modern debates about secularism, it should be recalled, were often debates about the impropriety of forced religious conversion. The connection proposed here between the problem of modern secularism and the figure of religious conversion should be surprising insofar as religious conversion was explicitly excluded from the purview of political institutions, and from the conceptual vocabulary of political thought, precisely as a concept of separation became ascendant in early European modernity. A constitutive moment, in fact, of the modern separation of public and private spheres consisted in excluding religious conversion from public life and consigning it to the private - such is a plausible way of understanding the core of the seventeenth century debates over tolerance. While this exclusion formed a precondition for a more tolerant politics, it also restricted the theoretical vocabulary within which processes of social transformation could be described - tolerance was purchased by introducing new regulations upon the public sphere and upon speaking subjects, and it was also purchased at the cost of diminished aspirations for a deep and genuine pluralism. As part of rethinking the possibilities of modern secularism, it would seem worthwhile to ask which resources can be drawn from those "religious" traditions that have been excluded by the various modes of secularism. By promoting the principle of separation to a central place, the modern secular imaginary isolates a single part of a much larger, multifaceted process which reshapes the specific practices, institutions and discourses that condition experience in both political and religious domains. As Asad and Connolly both note, this larger process has produced a series of variable boundaries between politics and religion throughout history - and not only modern and western history. In the context of modern Euro-American secularism, I would like to suggest, this process unfolds as a process of conversion; ironically, it is a process of conversion in which modern secularism emerges by excluding religious conversion from public life, and from its own narrative self-identity. Within the Augustinian tradition, conversion refers to a transformational process of ethical character formation and communal re-orientation that is retrospectively consolidated through the production of a new narrative self-identity. Such a figure foregrounds the transformation of individuals in relation to communities mediated by narrative, which is by no means merely a religious phenomenon, but occurs instead within politics generally, and within the politics of modern secularism specifically. Figuring the emergence of modern secularism as a process of conversion, I would suggest, might allow us to grasp how secularism has in fact emerged in new, distinctly modern forms by reshaping institutions, practices, sensibilities, communities, discourses, and yet how these transformations are both exaggerated and catalysed by the simplifying figure of secularism as the separation of church and state posited through retrospective narration. This places the problem of secularism in the register of thinking a secular body opened by Charles Hirschkind. In other words, the social transformations that produced modern Euro-American secularism excluded forced conversion from politics through a conversion of political and

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

religious sensibilities, a process which has since been obscured by a conversion narrative that simplifies and obscures its outlines. If modern secularism is produced through various exclusions of religion, in a general sense, could opening secularism toward the future depend on re-opening various religious archives? More specifically, if secularism is bound to the problem of excluding conversion in an historical sense, is it possible that recovering a figure of conversion can illuminate the contours of secularism as a process of transformation in a theoretical sense? Does it help to make sense of secularism, and of the nature of its connection to Christianity and perhaps other traditions as well, to view it as a process of transformation figured as a process of conversion? Pain, suffering and the limits of the secular? Meditations on pain and suffering are central to the arguments of both *Why I am not a Secularist* and *Formations of the Secular*. Connolly and Asad agree that a key motivation for secularism is the perceived need to manage and potentially eliminate pain and suffering. Connolly argues that secularists often blind themselves to certain forms of pain and suffering, and Asad adds that secular liberal democracies harbor profound contradictions with respect to pain, which appear when they inflict unavowed suffering, for example, through torture. Connolly and Asad differ, however, insofar as Asad attributes the imperative to master and eliminate pain to a highly specific formation of the secular, while Connolly frames the response to suffering as part of the human predicament. We suffer from illness, disease, unemployment, dead-end jobs, bad marriages, the loss of loved ones, social relocation, tyranny, police brutality, street violence, existential anxiety, guilt, envy, resentment, depression, stigmatization, rapid social change, sexual harassment, child abuse, poverty, medical malpractice, alienation, political defeat, toothaches, the loss of self-esteem, identity-panic, torture, and fuzzy categories. Utilitarian or economic calculi take pleasure and pain as the basis for public policy. More examples are possible. This leads me to ask: In what sense are the responses to pain and certain failures to respond to pain "secular" or "secularist," rather than, say, modern, liberal, American, capitalist, technological, medical, biomedical, or simply Kantian? Can something like "the secular" be reliably identified in the absence of a precise relation to "religion," such as in the case of secular attitudes toward pain? A more general way of putting this is to ask: Are there identifiable conceptual and practical limits to the secular? If it is not secularism, is a deep multidimensional pluralism still secular? William Connolly responds to a contemporary crisis of secularism, but its argument is presented as a "cautious reconfiguration," rather than a wholesale rejection. It suggests that authoritative images of public reason be downgraded, along with the fiction of a "post-metaphysical" political discourse and the paradigm of secularism as the strict separation of politics from religion. But to what extent is the openness to engagement with others that characterizes critical responsiveness related to "the secular," and what connections might therefore be made between a possible deep pluralism and a non-Kantian secularism? Asad argues that "what modernity To put this more directly, if we are not secularists, are we still secular? Leaving Kantian secularists aside for the moment, is pluralism nonetheless connected to "the secular" in the sense that Asad gives this term? Is it one distinctive possibility opened by and for the secular? And if secularism is being reconstituted today as a more explicitly and self-consciously Euro-American-Christian formation in the Hegelian, rather than the Kantian, fashion, can this formation still be pressed toward a deep multi-dimensional pluralism? My sixth and final question: What about the relationships among nation, state, capital and secularism? Connolly argues that secularist discourse is insufficient to hold such constituencies in check, and it suggests that an ethos of multi-dimensional pluralism and egalitarianism might fare better against the dangers of nationalism. And while both books remain guarded about the likelihood of establishing such an ethos, they strongly argue for its political necessity. One of the points at which they differ is in their assessment of the power and durability of modern secularism. In short, Asad attributes enormous power to secularism, while Connolly suggests that it is faltering. Part of this variance may be definitional, but part of it is related to the different connections traced between secularism, nationalism, capitalism and the state. What are the most salient connections between secularism, global capital, nationalism and the state today? Is it any more or less possible now to articulate the relations between secularism and these other key world shaping forces than it was when these books were written? Is it important to trace them differently today? In order to contest the forms of

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

violence and injustice particular to modern secularism, is it necessary to place secularism in connection with these other formations? How are we to think about the challenges and possibilities of doing so? He specializes in modern secularism, religion and politics, liberalism, constitutionalism and political theology. Related If it is true that Australia does the secular state in a unique and inclusive manner, then this approach is fatally flawed and has proven to be a miserable failure.

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Chapter 9 : Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion, and Secularism in Quebec, Zubrzycki

Today's religious revival is not a resurrection of the traditionalist opposition to secular nationalism but a new form of hyper-nationalism underwritten by religious eschatology. Traditionalist revivalism tends to evoke three types of responses.

Secularism in Turkey Secularism in Turkey was both dramatic and far reaching as it filled the vacuum of the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Religious lodges and Sufi orders were banned. The religious court system and institutions of religious education were abolished. The use of religion for political purposes was banned. A separate institution was created that dealt with the religious matters of the people. The alphabet was changed from Arabic to Latin. A portion of religious activity was moved to the Turkish language, including the Adhan call to prayer which lasted until This was done by the second president of the republic of Turkey. Throughout the 20th century secularism was continuously challenged by Islamists. At the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, political Islamists and Islamic democrats such as the Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party AKP gained in influence, with the AKP in the elections acquiring government and holding on to it ever since with increasingly authoritarian methods. Secularism in Lebanon Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy within the overall framework of Confessionalism , a form of consociationalism in which the highest offices are proportionately reserved for representatives from certain religious communities. He restricted the influence of the religious University of Ez-Zitouna and replaced it with a faculty of theology integrated into the University of Tunis, banned the headscarf for women, made members of the religious hierarchy state employees and ordered that the expenses for the upkeep of mosques and the salaries of preachers to be regulated. Since then it has become the biggest and most well-organized party in Tunisia, so far outdistancing its more secular competitors. Secularism in Egypt Secularism in Egypt has had a very important role to play in both the history of Egypt and that of the Middle East. It combined secular policies with a nationalist agenda and had the majority support in the following years against both the rule of the king and the British influence. The Wafd party supported the allies during World War II and then proceeded to win the parliamentary elections, following these elections the prime minister was overthrown by the King leading to riots. These riots precipitated a military coup after which all political parties were banned including the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood. Key elements of Nasserism: No religious or other political movements allowed to impact government. Concentration on Arab values, identity and nationalism rather than Muslim values, identity and nationalism. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has become one of the most influential movements in the Islamic world , particularly in the Arab world. For many years it was described as "semi-legal" [83] and was the only opposition group in Egypt able to field candidates during elections. Secularism in Syria The process of secularization in Syria began under the French mandate in the s and went on continuously under different governments since the independence. The constitution guarantees religious freedom for every recognized religious communities, including many Christian denominations. Political forms of Islam are not tolerated by the government. The Syrian legal system is primarily based on civil law , and was heavily influenced by the period of French rule. It is also drawn in part from Egyptian law of Abdel Nasser, quite from the Ottoman Millet system and very little from Sharia. Syria has separate secular and religious courts. Civil and criminal cases are heard in secular courts, while the Sharia courts handle personal, family, and religious matters in cases between Muslims or between Muslims and non-Muslims. Secularism in Iran Following the military coup of 21 February , Reza Khan had established himself as the dominant political personality in the country. Fearing that their influence might be diminished, the clergy of Iran proposed their support and persuaded him to assume the role of the Shah. Reza Shah began to make some dramatic changes to Iranian society with the specific intention of westernization and removing religion from public sphere. Nevertheless, the regime became totally undemocratic and authoritarian with the removal of Majles power the first parliament in and the clampdown on free speech. During the early s the Prime Minister

DOWNLOAD PDF THE RELIGIOUS REJECTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

Dr Mossadeq was again forming a secular government with a socialist agenda with the specific aim of reducing the power held by the clergy. However his plans for nationalization the oil industry were a step too far for Britain, and the legislature became increasingly wary of his concentration of power. Using the mandate of westernization, Mohammad Reza Shah introduced White Revolution , aiming to transform Iran into a Westernized secular capitalist country. Opposition rallied united behind Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and by the end of the s the Shah was overthrown in an Islamic Revolution

Secularism in Pakistan Early in the history of the state of Pakistan 12 March , a parliamentary resolution the Objectives Resolution was adopted, just a year after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah , the founder of Pakistan, in accordance with the vision of other founding fathers of Pakistan Muhammad Iqbal , Liaquat Ali Khan. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the elected representatives of the people. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah. Provision shall be made for the religious minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures. This resolution later became key source of inspiration for writers of Constitution of Pakistan and is included in constitution as preamble. However, Pakistan is an Islamic republic, with Islam as the state religion; it has aspects of secularism inherited from its colonial past. Islamists and Islamic democratic parties in Pakistan are relatively less influential than democratic Islamists of other Muslim democracies however they do enjoy considerable street power. The Council of Islamic Ideology is a body that is supposed to advise the Parliament of Pakistan on bringing laws and legislation in alignment with the principles of the Quran and Sunnah , though it has no enforcement powers. The Federal Shariat Court can strike down any law deemed un-Islamic, though its decisions can be overturned by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. To disapprove of the application of the hudud legal punishments decreed by God that they are incompatible in the modern age. And whoever allows what God has prohibited is a kafir. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. May Learn how and when to remove this template message A number of scholars believe that secular governments in Muslim countries have become more repressive and authoritarian to combat the spread of Islamism , but this increased repression may have made many Muslim societies more opposed to secularism and increased the popularity of Islamism the Middle East.