

Chapter 1 : Philosophy of language - Wikipedia

Description: Our semi-annual journal is published by the University of Arkansas Department of Philosophy. Philosophical Topics publishes contributions to all areas of philosophy, each issue being devoted to the problems in one area.

Meaning philosophy of language There have been several distinctive explanations of what a linguistic "meaning" is. Each has been associated with its own body of literature. The ideational theory of meaning, most commonly associated with the British empiricist John Locke , claims that meanings are purely mental contents provoked by signs. This tradition goes back at least to Frege and is associated with a rich body of modern work, spearheaded by philosophers like Alfred Tarski and Donald Davidson. Wittgenstein was interested in the way in which the communities use language, and how far it can be taken. Strawson , John Searle , Robert Brandom , and others. Speech act theory was developed by J. Austin , although other previous thinkers have had similar ideas. There are two broad subspecies of externalism: The traditional formulation of such a theory is that the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification or falsification. Dummett attributes such a theory of meaning to Charles Sanders Peirce and other early 20th century American pragmatists. Gottlob Frege was an advocate of a mediated reference theory. Frege divided the semantic content of every expression, including sentences, into two components: The sense of a sentence is the thought that it expresses. Such a thought is abstract, universal and objective. The sense of any sub-sentential expression consists in its contribution to the thought that its embedding sentence expresses. Senses determine reference and are also the modes of presentation of the objects to which expressions refer. Referents are the objects in the world that words pick out. The senses of sentences are thoughts, while their referents are truth values true or false. The referents of sentences embedded in propositional attitude ascriptions and other opaque contexts are their usual senses. Logically proper names are such terms as I, now, here and other indexicals. Trump may be an abbreviation for "the current President of the United States and husband of Melania Trump. Such phrases denote in the sense that there is an object that satisfies the description. However, such objects are not to be considered meaningful on their own, but have meaning only in the proposition expressed by the sentences of which they are a part. Hence, they are not directly referential in the same way as logically proper names, for Russell. For example, co-referential names, such as Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain, cause problems for a directly referential view because it is possible for someone to hear "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens" and be surprised " thus, their cognitive content seems different. Despite the differences between the views of Frege and Russell, they are generally lumped together as descriptivists about proper names. Kripke put forth what has come to be known as "the modal argument" or "argument from rigidity". Consider the name Aristotle and the descriptions "the greatest student of Plato", "the founder of logic" and "the teacher of Alexander". Aristotle obviously satisfies all of the descriptions and many of the others we commonly associate with him , but it is not necessarily true that if Aristotle existed then Aristotle was any one, or all, of these descriptions. Aristotle may well have existed without doing any single one of the things for which he is known to posterity. He may have existed and not have become known to posterity at all or he may have died in infancy. Suppose that Aristotle is associated by Mary with the description "the last great philosopher of antiquity" and the actual Aristotle died in infancy. But this is deeply counterintuitive. Hence, names are rigid designators , according to Kripke. That is, they refer to the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists. In the same work, Kripke articulated several other arguments against " Frege"Russell " descriptivism. Some important questions are How much of language is innate? Is language acquisition a special faculty in the mind? What is the connection between thought and language? There are three general perspectives on the issue of language learning. The first is the behaviorist perspective, which dictates that not only is the solid bulk of language learned, but it is learned via conditioning. The final candidate for explanation is the innatist perspective, which states that at least some of the syntactic settings are innate and hardwired, based on certain modules of the mind. Reductionist models attempt to explain higher-level mental processes in terms of the

basic low-level neurophysiological activity of the brain. There have been a number of different perspectives on this issue, each offering a number of insights and suggestions. Philosopher Michael Dummett is also a proponent of the "language-first" viewpoint. The "knowledge-first" position can be found, for instance, in the work of Paul Grice. According to his argument, spoken and written language derive their intentionality and meaning from an internal language encoded in the mind. Another argument is that it is difficult to explain how signs and symbols on paper can represent anything meaningful unless some sort of meaning is infused into them by the contents of the mind. One of the main arguments against is that such levels of language can lead to an infinite regress. Another tradition of philosophers has attempted to show that language and thought are coextensive – that there is no way of explaining one without the other. Donald Davidson, in his essay "Thought and Talk", argued that the notion of belief could only arise as a product of public linguistic interaction. Daniel Dennett holds a similar interpretationist view of propositional attitudes. Some thinkers, like the ancient sophist Gorgias, have questioned whether or not language was capable of capturing thought at all. Hence, since the objects of sight cannot be presented to any other organ but sight, and the different sense-organs cannot give their information to one another, similarly speech cannot give any information about perceptibles. Therefore, if anything exists and is comprehended, it is incommunicable. Some of them were performed by Lera Boroditsky. For example, English speakers tend to say things like "John broke the vase" even for accidents. However, Spanish or Japanese speakers would be more likely to say "the vase broke itself. Later everyone was asked whether they could remember who did what. Spanish and Japanese speakers did not remember the agents of accidental events as well as did English speakers. The Piraha, a tribe in Brazil, whose language has only terms like few and many instead of numerals, are not able to keep track of exact quantities. The descriptions they gave differed in a way predicted by grammatical gender. For example, when asked to describe a "key" – a word that is masculine in German and feminine in Spanish – the German speakers were more likely to use words like "hard," "heavy," "jagged," "metal," "serrated," and "useful," whereas Spanish speakers were more likely to say "golden," "intricate," "little," "lovely," "shiny," and "tiny. They had to guess whether each alien was friendly or hostile, and after each response they were told if they were correct or not, helping them learn the subtle cues that distinguished friend from foe. A quarter of the participants were told in advance that the friendly aliens were called "leebish" and the hostile ones "grecious", while another quarter were told the opposite. For the rest, the aliens remained nameless. It was found that participants who were given names for the aliens learned to categorize the aliens far more quickly, reaching 80 per cent accuracy in less than half the time taken by those not told the names. By the end of the test, those told the names could correctly categorize 88 per cent of aliens, compared to just 80 per cent for the rest. It was concluded that naming objects helps us categorize and memorize them. In another series of experiments [40] a group of people was asked to view furniture from an IKEA catalog. Half the time they were asked to label the object – whether it was a chair or lamp, for example – while the rest of the time they had to say whether or not they liked it. It was found that when asked to label items, people were later less likely to recall the specific details of products, such as whether a chair had arms or not. It was concluded that labeling objects helps our minds build a prototype of the typical object in the group at the expense of individual features. Questions inevitably arise on surrounding topics. One question is, "What exactly is a convention, and how do we study it? Noam Chomsky proposed that the study of language could be done in terms of the I-Language, or internal language of persons. If this is so, then it undermines the pursuit of explanations in terms of conventions, and relegates such explanations to the domain of "meta-semantics". Metasemantics is a term used by philosopher of language Robert Stainton to describe all those fields that attempt to explain how semantic facts arise. Etymology the study of the origins of words and stylistics philosophical argumentation over what makes "good grammar", relative to a particular language are two other examples of fields that are taken to be meta-semantic. Not surprisingly, many separate but related fields have investigated the topic of linguistic convention within their own research paradigms. The presumptions that prop up each theoretical view are of interest to the philosopher of language. For instance, one of the major fields of sociology, symbolic

interactionism , is based on the insight that human social organization is based almost entirely on the use of meanings. Rhetoric is the study of the particular words that people use to achieve the proper emotional and rational effect in the listener, be it to persuade, provoke, endear, or teach. Some relevant applications of the field include the examination of propaganda and didacticism , the examination of the purposes of swearing and pejoratives especially how it influences the behavior of others, and defines relationships , or the effects of gendered language. It can also be used to study linguistic transparency or speaking in an accessible manner , as well as performative utterances and the various tasks that language can perform called "speech acts". It also has applications to the study and interpretation of law, and helps give insight to the logical concept of the domain of discourse. Literary theory is a discipline that some literary theorists claim overlaps with the philosophy of language. It emphasizes the methods that readers and critics use in understanding a text. This field, an outgrowth of the study of how to properly interpret messages, is unsurprisingly closely tied to the ancient discipline of hermeneutics. Language and Continental philosophy[edit] In Continental philosophy , language is not studied as a separate discipline, as it is in analytic philosophy. Rather, it is an inextricable part of many other areas of thought, such as phenomenology , semiotics , hermeneutics , Heideggerean ontology , existentialism , structuralism , deconstruction and critical theory. The idea of language is often related to that of logic in its Greek sense as " logos ", meaning discourse or dialectic. Language and concepts are also seen as having been formed by history and politics, or even by historical philosophy itself. The field of hermeneutics, and the theory of interpretation in general, has played a significant role in 20th century Continental philosophy of language and ontology beginning with Martin Heidegger. Heidegger combines phenomenology with the hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey. Heidegger believed language was one of the most important concepts for Dasein. Heidegger believed that language today is worn out because of overuse of important words, and would be inadequate for in-depth study of Being Sein. For example, Sein being , the word itself, is saturated with multiple meanings.

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PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS, 18, 1990, PP. 53-64**

Chapter 2 : Candide, Voltaire - Essay - calendrierdelascience.com

Review of Stephen Yablo, Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality (Philosophical Papers, Volume 1). [REVIEW] Stephan Leuenberger - - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (9). Philosophical Papers.

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Chapter 3 : The Epistemology Page " Keith DeRose

The Significance of Rights Language. Martin E. Golding - - Philosophical Topics 18 (1) Analytics. Added to PP index

In addition, several thousands more are born each year as the result of a surrogate arrangement in a wide-variety of nations worldwide. Australia, Canada, and Brazil report numbers at least as large as those reported in the United States Covington and Burns , ; and in India, where commercial surrogacy was legalized in , poor women are recruited to gestate what may amount to hundreds more likely thousands of babies for couples throughout the world Gentleman , A9. Although surrogate parenting arrangements are spreading across the globe, such arrangements apparently remain the exception rather than the rule. Most people prefer not to involve third parties in their attempts to procreate, and most people cannot afford to finance expensive third-party pregnancies. Still, the existence and use of surrogacy arrangements lead society to raise substantial questions about the nature of parenthood. What makes a parent the real parent of a child? The fact that she or he is genetically related to the child? The fact that she or he rears the child? Or the fact that she gestates the child at present, gestation is an exclusively female task? Or will most people continue to form the kind of nuclear, biologically-based families that exist today? Traditional Surrogacy versus Gestational Surrogacy There are two basic types of surrogate parenting: Because the surrogate is both the genetic mother and the gestational mother of the child, she must legally terminate her parental rights to the child after its birth, at which point the intended female rearing parent may adopt the child as her stepchild. The situation is quite different in a gestational surrogacy arrangement where both of the intended rearing parents may have a genetic connection to the child. In a variation on this arrangement, the intended rearing parents provide the surrogate with an embryo s to gestate for them. However, if one or both of the intended rearing parents do not have a genetic connection to the child, they may be required to adopt the child. Infertile, heterosexual couples are the group most likely to contract a surrogate mother. However, single people, lesbian couples, gay couples, and even fertile people may also seek the services of a contracted mother. For example, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Old Testament octogenarian couple, Abraham and Sarah, used a surrogate mother to carry a child to term for them. Much later, throughout the European continent and England, middle- and upper-class women used wet nurses to nurture their infant children. Moreover, in polygamous families, two or more wives of one husband collaboratively raise all of his children. Noncommercial Surrogacy Of particular significance in any discussion of surrogate parent arrangements is the fact that some of them are commercial while others are noncommercial. Commercial surrogate parenting arrangements involve monetary payments both to the surrogate and to other third parties. In contrast to commercial surrogacy, non-commercial surrogacy involves an arrangement where the intended rearing parents use the services of a family member or a friend. Typically, the surrogate does not expect or want monetary compensation for her gestational services. Moral Arguments against Surrogacy vs. Moral Arguments for Surrogacy As noted above, the number of surrogate babies born annually in the United States or elsewhere is relatively small. In large measure, it is probably failed, highly-publicized surrogate parenting arrangements such as the notorious Baby M case that continue to put a damper on intended rearing parents using surrogate parenting arrangements. In the s New Jersey Baby M case, Mary Beth Whitehead contracted with William Stern to be artificially inseminated with his sperm, to get pregnant if possible , to carry the child to term, and then to relinquish the child to Stern. In addition, Whitehead agreed not to engage in sexual relations with her husband until she was pregnant; to abstain from harmful substances during the pregnancy; to undergo amniocentesis; and to submit to abortion if Stern so requested. Whitehead became pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl. But she did not relinquish the baby to Stern. Feeling very attached to the baby, Whitehead refused to abide by the terms of the contract. At first, lawyer Noel Keane, who had brokered the surrogacy arrangement, did not take Whitehead that seriously. He managed to persuade Whitehead to give the baby to the Sterns for an overnight stay. But when Whitehead became extremely upset the next day, the Sterns gave the baby back to her. Whitehead soon told the Sterns she

had reached a final decision and would never relinquish the child to them. Money was not nearly as important to her as love for the baby. At one point, the entire Whitehead family fled to Florida with the baby to escape the arm of the law, but the New Jersey police tracked the Whiteheads down and seized the baby. By then the Sterns had persuaded Judge Harvey Sorkow to grant them sole custody of the baby. Judge Sorkow thought that Whitehead was unfit parent material because of her emotional instability and the fact that she had entered into the arrangement at all. However, the high court allowed the Sterns to keep the baby with the proviso that Whitehead be given visitation rights. The high court reasoned it was in the best interests of the two-year-old child to remain in the home of the only family she had ever known: Although many people thought this decision was fair, others complained it was an instance where privileged people, the Sterns, were presumed by virtue of their wealth and status to be better parents than poor, working-class people like the Whiteheads. In addition, some opponents of surrogacy object to non-commercial surrogacy for at least two reasons. First, a female family member may be pressured to demonstrate love for another female family member, for example, by serving as a surrogate mother for her. Second, a child may be deeply troubled upon discovering that not the mother who is raising her but actually her aunt is her gestational and perhaps also genetic mother. Finally, yet other opponents of surrogacy object that surrogacy arrangements risk the commoditization of babies as goods or products that can be contracted for as if they were mere things rather than human persons. Advocates of surrogate parenting accuse its opponents of distorting empirical facts to rationalize their discomfort about breaking the formerly seamless web between genetic, gestational, and rearing forms of parentage. Although those who favor surrogacy concede that intended rearing parents are typically more affluent than most of the surrogates they hire, they deny that intended rearing parents routinely exploit surrogates. They note that, truth be told, most surrogates are white, between 20 and 30 years old, working class not underclass, and married. Moreover, most surrogacy agencies prefer to use surrogates who have had at least one child and are altruistically as well as financially motivated to work as surrogates. Advocates of surrogate parenting also stress that when intended rearing parents and surrogates have and maintain good relationships with each other, no harm befalls the very-much wanted child. If anything, such a child generally finds him or herself in a particularly loving family. Finally, they claim that in a society that increasingly favors open adoptions and celebrates blended families, surrogate parenting is just another way for people to establish a family.

Legal Remedies for Surrogacy Arrangements In the United States, four legal remedies each with varying permutations have been proposed at the state level to regulate surrogate parenting. Each of these remedies has its strengths and weaknesses, and none of them is the clear winner in attempts to properly regulate surrogate parenting arrangements. Banning A relatively small number of states ban commercial surrogacy, imposing civil and criminal penalties on surrogacy brokers in particular. Michigan is probably the most anti-surrogacy state in the Union. Even though states like Michigan typically do not prohibit non-commercial surrogate parenting arrangements, they do refuse to enforce them as binding contracts. States that ban commercial surrogacy do so on the grounds that it is a disguised form of baby-selling that exploits women and commodifies children. Such states also dismiss arguments that most women who serve as surrogates do so freely, and that the children to which they give birth are not viewed as merchandise but as very much wanted children. Whether outright bans of commercial surrogate parenting arrangements are constitutionally permissible remains an open question, however. Advocates of these arrangements argue that if the only way a married infertile couple, for example, can have child genetically-related to them is to use a surrogate mother service, then prohibiting them from doing so is probably a violation of their fundamental right to procreate.

Endorsement An increasing number of states use codified law to recognize and enforce properly negotiated surrogate parenting contracts. One state, California, uses case law to enforce parenting contracts. Importantly, these states regulate the terms of the surrogacy contract. Interestingly, most states that enforce surrogacy contracts are maximally supportive of intended rearing parents who are also the genetic parents of the child. These states reason that the intended rearing parents have two parental claims—one based on the intent to rear the child and the other based on genetics—which in combination trump any parental claim a surrogate

might make solely on the basis of her gestational relationship to the child. Assimilation Some states that recognize surrogate parenting arrangements maintain features of adoption law in their codified-law and case-law frameworks. Typically, these states provide the surrogate with a change-of-heart period, usually around 72 hours, during which she may decide not to revoke her parental rights to the child. In the estimation of some legal theorists, intent alone does not necessarily determine rightful parenthood. Hands-off Nearly half of the states do not view surrogate parenting arrangements as legally enforceable. Deeming a contract for a mother unenforceable means that, if either the surrogate mother or the intended rearing parents breach the contract, the state will not intervene. The parties to the contract will need to work out their differences in custody court. So, for example, if the intended rearing parents fail to pay the surrogate mother her fee, the state will not help her collect it. Or if the intended rearing parents refuse to take the child from the surrogate mother because they no longer want the child, the state will not force them to become rearing parents. Instead, the state will require the surrogate mother either to maintain her parental relationship with the child or to put the child up for adoption. In the former case, she may be entitled to child support from the genetic or intended rearing father. As it so happens, a non-enforcement situation is just as risky for the intended rearing parents as it is for the surrogate. If the surrogate mother refuses to relinquish the child to the intended parents, they will not be able to secure custody of the child based solely on the contract they made with the surrogate mother. In cases of traditional surrogacy, virtually all family law courts will view the custody dispute as one between two genetic parents: In cases of gestational surrogacy, some family-law courts will view the custody dispute as a conflict between the gestational mother the surrogate mother and the genetic mother most typically the intended mother but in some instances an egg donor to be decided by appeal to the original intention of the involved parties. The two main medical societies that set the gold standards for assisted-reproduction accept with some reservations surrogate parenting arrangements. The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology ACOG accepts surrogacy arrangements only when they are medically necessary, and the compensation to the surrogate or gestational mother is based on her services and not on her ability to produce a child for the intended rearing parents. Adopting the assimilationist view described above, ACOG also suggests that private nonprofit agencies, similar to adoption agencies, oversee surrogacy arrangements ACOG , , and that subsequent to the birth of the child, the surrogate or gestational mother be given a short period of time during which she can change her mind about giving up the child. The other main assisted-reproduction medical society, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine ASRM , recommends that intended rearing parents avoid a traditional surrogacy arrangement and instead use a gestational surrogacy arrangement. Although the ASRM is not enthusiastic about any widespread use of surrogate mothers, it recognizes surrogacy arrangements as a way for a limited number of people to exercise their procreative freedom. Conclusion Because the assisted-reproduction industry is regulated primarily by non-enforceable practice guidelines, assisted reproduction centers and infertility clinics usually decide their own policies and procedures for surrogacy arrangements. Some centers and clinics limit their services to infertile married couples, whereas other centers and clinics welcome anyone who can pay for their services. It may be morally and legally justifiable for a center or clinic to refuse to assist people who do not have a medical reason, specifically infertility, to contract a surrogate mother. However, when physicians and nurses refuse to help gay or lesbian individuals or couples who need to enter into a surrogacy arrangement in order to have a child, their refusal to extend help to these individuals or couples may constitute an act of discrimination. People in the United States view their procreative rights as sacrosanct: Developing ideal laws to govern surrogate parenting arrangements will be no easy matter, however, not when a gay man can use donor sperm and donor eggs to produce embryos that are then implanted in the womb of a gestational mother. Perhaps so, despite the fact that it will be quite some time before the majority of the U. References and Further Reading a. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Proposed Laws on Surrogate Motherhood. Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies. Reproductive Laws for the s.

Chapter 4 : Rights (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

"My philosophy of law, in the law in philosophical perspectives: my philosophy of law, ed. L.J. Wintgens, Dordrecht; Kluwer Academic Publishers, , pp. -- Principled decision-making and the Supreme Court, Columbia law review, , 63, pp. -- A note on discovery and justification in science and law, Justification, J.R. Pennock.

And as mentioned above these atomic incidents also bond together in characteristic ways to form complex rights. The privilege on this first level entitles you to use your computer. The claim correlates to a duty in every other person not to use your computer. Also on the second order, your immunity prevents others from altering your first-order claim over your computer. Your immunity, that is, prevents others from waiving, annulling, or transferring your claim over your computer. The four incidents together constitute a significant portion of your property right. Of course all of these incidents are qualified: These qualifications to the incidents carve the contours of your property right, but they do not affect its basic shape. There may also be more incidents associated with ownership than shown in the figure above. A naval captain has an active privilege-right to walk the decks and an active power-right to order that the ship set sail. A player in a chess tournament has a passive claim-right that his opponent not distract him, and a professor has a passive immunity-right that her university not fire her for publishing unpopular views. The holder of a negative right is entitled to non-interference, while the holder of a positive right is entitled to provision of some good or service. A right against assault is a classic example of a negative right, while a right to welfare assistance is a prototypical positive right Narveson Since both negative and positive rights are passive rights, some rights are neither negative nor positive. Privileges and powers cannot be negative rights; and privileges, powers, and immunities cannot be positive rights. The privilege- right to enter a building, and the power- right to enter into a binding agreement, are neither negative nor positive. It is sometimes said that negative rights are easier to satisfy than positive rights. However, when it comes to the enforcement of rights, this difference disappears. Moreover, the point is often made that the moral urgency of securing positive rights may be just as great as the moral urgency of securing negative rights Shue The Will Theory and the Interest Theory 2. However, some diagrams of Hohfeldian incidents that we could construct do not correspond to any right. Rights are only those collections of Hohfeldian incidents that have a certain function or perhaps certain functions. To take an analogy: The question of the function of rights is the question of what rights do for those who hold them. Before discussing the two major positions on this issue, we can survey some statements that theorists have made that may appear to be describing which Hohfeldian incidents are rights: Rights tell us what the bearer is at liberty to do. He is claiming that the other has a duty not to interfere. Through history many have asserted, for example, that God has the right to command man; yet presumably no one asserting such a right would maintain that society ought to defend God in the possession of anything. On Mill see also Hart , " To take an example from the scholarly literature, it is not uncommon to encounter a general statement that all rights are, or at least include, claim-rights see, e. The statement that rights are claims is prescriptive for, not descriptive of, usage. Each theory presents itself as capturing an ordinary understanding of what rights do for those who hold them. Which theory offers the better account of the functions of rights has been the subject of spirited dispute, literally for ages. In Hohfeldian terms, will theorists assert that every right includes a Hohfeldian power over a claim. An owner has a right, according to the interest theorist, not because owners have choices, but because the ownership makes owners better off. A promisee has a right because promisees have some interest in the performance of the promise, or alternatively some interest in being able to form voluntary bonds with others. Your rights, the interest theorist says, are the Hohfeldian incidents you have that are good for you. The contest between will-based and interest-based theories of the function of rights has been waged for hundreds of years. Each theory has stronger and weaker points as an account of what rights do for rightholders. The will theory captures the powerful link between rights and normative control. To have a right is to have the ability to determine what others may and may not do, and so to exercise authority over a certain

domain of affairs. The resonant connection between rights and authority the authority to control what others may do is for will theorists a matter of definition. Within the will theory there can be no such thing as an unwaivable right: Yet intuitively it would appear that unwaivable rights are some of the most important rights that we have: Moreover, since the will theorist holds that all rights confer sovereignty, she cannot acknowledge any rights in beings incapable of exercising sovereignty. Within the will theory it is impossible for incompetents like infants, animals, and comatose adults to have rights. Yet we ordinarily would not doubt that these incompetents can have rights, for example the right not to be tortured MacCormick , 1977 Will theories also have difficulties explaining bare privilege-rights such as in the Hobbesian state of nature , which are not rights of authority over others. The interest theory is more capacious than the will theory. It can accept as rights both unwaivable rights the possession of which may be good for their holders and the rights of incompetents who have interests that rights can protect. The interest theory also taps into the deeply plausible connection between holding rights and being better off. However, the interest theory is also misaligned with any ordinary understanding of rights. We commonly accept that people can have interests in x without having a right to x; and contrariwise that people can have a right to x without having interests sufficient to explain this. In the second category are many of the rights of office-holders and role-bearers Jones , 1982; Wenar b. Yet there appear to be many rights for which the interests of the putative right-holder are not sufficient to hold other person s to be under a duty. For example, Raz himself allows that the interest of a journalist in protecting his sources is not itself sufficient reason to hold others to be under the corresponding duty Raz , 1986. Nor does this difficulty only affect the rights of office-holders like journalists; Raz admits that weighty rights such as the rights of free expression and freedom of contract are not justified solely by the interests of the individual citizens who hold them Raz a, 1986. Or again, parents may have the right to receive child benefit payments from the state, but here only the interests of the children, and not the interests of the parents, could be sufficient to hold the state to be under a duty. Will theorists and interest theorists have developed their positions with increasing technical sophistication. The issues that divide the two camps are clearly defined, and the debates between them are often intense. Kramer, Simmonds, and Steiner , Van Duffel a, Kramer The seemingly interminable debate between these two major theories has driven some to conclude that the debate itself rests on the mistaken premise that there is a single concept of a right for which these theories provide rival analyses Van Duffel b, Hayward The deadlock has encouraged other theorists to develop alternative positions on the function of rights. Like the will theory, these demand theories center on the agency of the right-holder. They may, however, have more difficulties in explaining power-rights. Other recent analyses of what rights do for rightholders are varied. Scanlon , defends the position that rights are constraints on the discretion of individuals or institutions to act. Recently, theorists have attempted to make progress on the question of functionality by scrutinizing the claim-right in particular, and by shifting attention onto the corresponding duty. The promisor, for example, owes a duty of performance to the promisee. After all, not all duties are directed to specific others: The violation of any duty may be wrong it may be wrong not to give to charity , but the violation of a directed duty is a wronging of the being to whom the duty is owed: And unlike a mere wrong, the wronging of some being calls, ceteris paribus, for apology and compensation. Cruft further argues that the violation of any duty owed to a being is disrespectful of that being. The question is what could possibly account for the extra significance of the duties that have direction. The History of the Language of Rights Intellectual historians have tangled over the origins of rights. Yet insofar as it is really the emergence of the concept of a right that is at issue, the answer lies beyond the competence of the intellectual historian and within the domain of the anthropologist. Even the most primitive social order must include rules specifying that certain individuals or groups have special permission to perform certain actions. Moreover, even the most rudimentary human communities must have rules specifying that some are entitled to tell others what they must do. Such rules ascribe rights. The genesis of the concept of a right was simultaneous with reflective awareness of such social norms. The more productive characterization of the debate within intellectual history concerns when a word or phrase appeared that has a meaning close to the meaning of our modern word. The

Roman jurist Ulpian, for instance, held that justice means rendering each his right *ius*. The ancient authors often used words imprecisely, and smeared their meanings across and beyond the Hohfeldian categories. The intellectual historians themselves have occasionally congested the discussion by taking different features of rights as definitive of the modern concept. Moreover, the scholarly debate has sometimes accepted over-optimistic assumptions about the sharpness of conceptual boundaries. Nevertheless, two broad trends in the scholarly discussions are clear. Donohue now argues that *ius* is used in a subjective sense throughout the works of the classical Roman jurists in the first century BCE to the third century CE. The second and related trend has been to establish that terms referring to active rights what we would call privilege-rights and power-rights predate terms referring to passive rights what we would call claim-rights and immunity-rights. It appears that the earliest medieval debates using recognizably modern rights-language, for instance, concerned topics such as whether the pope has a power- right to rule an earthly empire, and whether the poor have a privilege- right to take what they need from the surplus of the rich. Rights and Freedom Most rights entitle their holders to freedom in some sense; indeed holding a right can entail that one is free in one or more of a variety of senses. In the most general terms, the active incidentsâ€”the privilege and the powerâ€”entitle their holders to freedom to act in certain ways. The passive incidentsâ€”the claim and the immunityâ€”often entitle their holders to freedom from undesirable actions or states. We can be more specific. A government employee with a security clearance, for instance, has a privilege-right that makes him free to read classified documents. One can be free in this non-forbidden way without having the physical ability to do what one is free to do. You may be free to join the march, even when both your knees are sprained. The actions you are free to do in this sense may or may not be possible for you, but at least they are not disallowed. Someone who has a pair of privilege rightsâ€”no duty to perform the action, no duty not to perform the actionâ€”is free in an additional sense of having discretion over whether to perform the action or not. You you may be free to join the march, or not, as you like. This dual non-forbiddleness again does not imply physical ability.

Chapter 5 : Essentially contested concept - Wikipedia

The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, de re and de dicto necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism about meaning.

Life[edit] Putnam was born in Chicago , Illinois , in His father, Samuel Putnam , was a scholar of Romance languages, columnist, and translator who wrote for the Daily Worker , a publication of the American Communist Party , from to when he became disillusioned with communism. His wife, the philosopher Ruth Anna Putnam , took a teaching position in philosophy at Wellesley College. They had "no idea how to do it [themselves]", in the words of Ruth Anna. They therefore began to study Jewish ritual and Hebrew, and became more Jewishly interested, identified, and active. In , Hilary Putnam celebrated a belated Bar Mitzvah service. His wife had a Bat Mitzvah service four years later. In keeping with the family tradition, he was politically active. Putnam was disturbed when he learned from reading the reports of David Halberstam that the U. The following year, he was selected as Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic, in recognition of his contributions to the philosophy of logic and mathematics. He continued to be forthright and progressive in his political views, as expressed in the articles "How Not to Solve Ethical Problems" and "Education for Democracy" He retired from teaching in June , but, as of , he continued to give a seminar almost yearly at Tel Aviv University. His corpus includes five volumes of collected works, seven books, and more than articles. M stands for mental and P stands for physical. It can be seen that more than one P can instantiate one M, but not vice versa. Causal relations between states are represented by the arrows M1 goes to M2, etc. His most noted original contributions to that field came in several key papers published in the late s that set out the hypothesis of multiple realizability. Putnam cited examples from the animal kingdom to illustrate his thesis. He asked whether it was likely that the brain structures of diverse types of animals realize pain, or other mental states, the same way. If they do not share the same brain structures, they cannot share the same mental states and properties. The answer to this puzzle had to be that mental states were realized by different physical states in different species. Putnam then took his argument a step further, asking about such things as the nervous systems of alien beings, artificially intelligent robots and other silicon-based life forms. These hypothetical entities, he contended, should not be considered incapable of experiencing pain just because they lack the same neurochemistry as humans. Putnam concluded that type-identity theorists had been making an "ambitious" and "highly implausible" conjecture which could be disproven with one example of multiple realizability. He defined the concept in these terms: Therefore, a computer made out of silicon chips and a computer made out of cogs and wheels can be functionally isomorphic but constitutionally diverse. Functional isomorphism implies multiple realizability. In fact, there are many functional kinds, such as mousetraps, software and bookshelves, which are multiply realized at the physical level. This formulation, which is now called "machine-state functionalism", was inspired by analogies noted by Putnam and others between the mind and Turing machines. The point, for functionalism is the nature of the states of the Turing machine. Each state can be defined in terms of its relations to the other states and to the inputs and outputs, and the details of how it accomplishes what it accomplishes and of its material constitution are completely irrelevant. According to machine-state functionalism, the nature of a mental state is just like the nature of a Turing machine state. Just as "state one" simply is the state in which, given a particular input, such-and-such happens, so being in pain is the state which disposes one to cry "ouch", become distracted, wonder what the cause is, and so forth. His change of mind was primarily due to the difficulties that computational theories have in explaining certain intuitions with respect to the externalism of mental content. Asserting that functionalism is really a watered-down identity theory in which mental kinds are identified with functional kinds, Putnam argued that mental kinds may be multiply realizable over functional kinds. The argument for functionalism is that the same mental state could be implemented by the different states of a universal Turing

machine. The view holds that "what matters for consciousness and for mental properties generally is the right sort of functional capacities and not the particular matter that subserves those capacities". Twin Earth shows this, according to Putnam, since on Twin Earth everything is identical to Earth, except that its lakes, rivers and oceans are filled with XYZ whereas those of earth are filled with H₂O. Consequently, when an earthling, Fredrick, uses the Earth-English word "water", it has a different meaning from the Twin Earth-English word "water" when used by his physically identical twin, Frodrick, on Twin Earth. Since Fredrick and Frodrick are physically indistinguishable when they utter their respective words, and since their words have different meanings, meaning cannot be determined solely by what is in their heads. This led Putnam to adopt a version of semantic externalism with regard to meaning and mental content. Since the time of Descartes, philosophers had been concerned with proving knowledge from the basis of subjective experience. Thanks to Saul Kripke, Putnam, Tyler Burge and others, Davidson said, philosophy could now take the objective realm for granted and start questioning the alleged "truths" of subjective experience. So, for example, the reference of the term "lion" is fixed by the community of zoologists, the reference of the term "elm tree" is fixed by the community of botanists, and the reference of the term "table salt" is fixed as "NaCl" by chemists. These referents are considered rigid designators in the Kripkean sense and are disseminated outward to the linguistic community. Such a vector consists of four components: Such a "meaning-vector" provides a description of the reference and use of an expression within a particular linguistic community. It provides the conditions for its correct usage and makes it possible to judge whether a single speaker attributes the appropriate meaning to that expression or whether its use has changed enough to cause a difference in its meaning. According to Putnam, it is legitimate to speak of a change in the meaning of an expression only if the reference of the term, and not its stereotype, has changed. However, since there is no possible algorithm that can determine which aspect—the stereotype or the reference—has changed in a particular case, it is necessary to consider the usage of other expressions of the language. One must have ontological commitments to all entities that are indispensable to the best scientific theories, and to those entities only commonly referred to as "all and only". Mathematical entities are indispensable to the best scientific theories. Therefore, One must have ontological commitments to mathematical entities. Both Putnam and Quine invoke naturalism to justify the exclusion of all non-scientific entities, and hence to defend the "only" part of "all and only". The assertion that "all" entities postulated in scientific theories, including numbers, should be accepted as real is justified by confirmation holism. Since theories are not confirmed in a piecemeal fashion, but as a whole, there is no justification for excluding any of the entities referred to in well-confirmed theories. This puts the nominalist who wishes to exclude the existence of sets and non-Euclidean geometry, but to include the existence of quarks and other undetectable entities of physics, for example, in a difficult position.

Chapter 6 : Surrogate Parenting | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

"African Sage Philosophy" is the name now commonly given to the body of thought produced by persons considered wise in African communities, and more specifically refers to those who seek a rational foundation for ideas and concepts used to describe and view the world by critically examining the.

And, although the notion could be misleadingly and evasively used to justify "agreeing to disagree", [7] the term offers something more valuable: Since its introduction by W. Gallie in , the expression "essentially contested concept" has been treated both as a challenge and as an excuse by social theorists. It has been treated as a challenge in that theorists consider their uses of terms and concepts to be in competition with the uses advocated by other theorists, each theorist trying to be deemed the champion. It has been treated as an excuse in that, rather than acknowledge that the failure to reach agreement is due to such factors as imprecision, ignorance, or belligerence, instead theorists point to the terms and concepts under dispute and insist that they are always open to contest – that they are terms and concepts about which we can never expect to reach agreement. He suggests three avenues whereby one might resolve such disputes: Discovering a new meaning of "work of art" to which all disputants could thenceforward agree. Convincing all the disputants to conform to one meaning. Declaring "work of art" to be a number of different concepts employing the same name. Otherwise, the dispute probably centres on polysemy. Has the term been incorrectly used, as in the case of mistakenly using decimated for devastated catachresis? Or, is it really the case that the term is an essentially contested concept? Contested versus contestable[edit] Clarke has made a valuable contribution to the overall debate by suggesting that, in order to determine whether a particular dispute was a consequence of true polysemy or inadvertent homonymy, one should seek to "locate the source of the dispute". This source might be "within the concept itself", or "[within] some underlying non-conceptual disagreement between the contestants". Clarke argued that to state that a concept is merely "contested" is to "attribute significance to the contest rather than to the concept". Yet, to state that a concept is "contestable" is to "attribute some part of any contest to the concept". In other words, this is "to claim that some feature or property of the concept makes it polysemantic, and that the concept contains some internal conflict of ideas"; and it is this fact that provides the "essentially contested concept" with its inherent potential for "generating disputes". The different constituent elements of that internally complex entity are initially variously describable. Psychological and sociological causes influence the extent to which any particular consideration is salient for a given individual, regarded as a stronger reason by that individual than by another, and regarded as a reason by one individual and not by another. Disputes centred on essentially contested concepts are "perfectly genuine", "not resolvable by argument", [31] and "nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence". Because the use of an essentially contested concept is always the application of one use against all other uses, any usage is intentionally aggressive and defensive. Because it is essentially contested, rather than "radically confused", the continued use of the essentially contested concept is justified by the fact that, despite all of their on-going disputation, all of the competitors acknowledge that the contested concept is derived from a single common exemplar. Concepts and conceptions[edit] Scholars such as H. From their work it is easy to understand the issue as one of determining whether there is a single notion that has a number of different instantiations, or whether there is more than one notion, each of which is reflected in a different usage. In a section of his article in The New York Review of Books, Dworkin used the example of "fairness" to isolate and elaborate the difference between a concept *sum cuique* and its conception various instantiations, for example utilitarian ethics. Therefore, he argues, his instructions do, in fact, "cover" this new case. Exploring what he considers to be the "crucial distinction" between the overall concept of "fairness" and some particular, and specific conception of "fairness", he asks us to imagine a group whose members share the view that certain acts are unfair. In these circumstances, says Dworkin, "the group has a concept of unfairness, and its members may appeal to that concept in moral instruction or argument. And, because each considers that certain principles

"[which] must be relied upon to show that a particular division or attribution is unfair" are far a more "fundamental" sort of principle than certain other principles, it can be said that members of the group have different conceptions of "fairness". Consequently, those responsible for giving "instructions", and those responsible for setting "standards" of "fairness", in this community may be doing one of two things: Appealing to the concept of "fairness", by demanding that others act "fairly". In this case, those instructed to act "fairly" are responsible for "developing and applying their own conception of fairness as controversial cases arise". It is important to recognize that rather than it just being a case of delivering two different instructions; it is a case of delivering two different kinds of instruction: In the case of the appeal to the concept of "fairness", one invokes the ideal and, implicitly, the universally agreed upon notion of "fairness"; and whatever one might believe is the best instantiation of that notion is, by and large, irrelevant. In the case of laying down a conception of "fairness", one specifies what one believes to be the best instantiation of the notion "fairness"; and, by this action, one specifies what one means by "fairness"; and whatever one might believe is the ideal notion of "fairness" is, by and large, irrelevant. As a consequence, according to Dworkin, whenever an appeal is made to "fairness", a moral issue is raised; and, whenever a conception of "fairness" is laid down, an attempt is being made to answer that moral issue. So long as contestant users of any essentially contested concept believe, however deludedly, that their own use of it is the only one that can command honest and informed approval, they are likely to persist in the hope that they will ultimately persuade and convert all their opponents by logical means. But once [we] let the truth out of the bag i.

Chapter 7 : Deirdre McCloskey: Books

This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional.

History[edit] British idealism , as taught by philosophers such as F. Bradley and Thomas Hill Green , dominated English philosophy in the late 19th century. With reference to this intellectual basis the initiators of analytic philosophy, G. Moore and Bertrand Russell , articulated early analytic philosophy. This is closely related to the opinion that relations between items are internal relations, that is, properties of the nature of those items. Russell, along with Wittgenstein, in response promulgated logical atomism and the doctrine of external relations the belief that the world consists of independent facts. Frege was also influential as a philosopher of mathematics in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, , where he provided an alternative to psychologistic accounts of the concept of number. Like Frege, Russell argued that mathematics is reducible to logical fundamentals in The Principles of Mathematics Later, his book written with Whitehead, Principia Mathematica , encouraged many philosophers to renew their interest in the development of symbolic logic. For example, the English word "is" has three distinct meanings which predicate logic can express as follows: Russell sought to resolve various philosophical problems by applying such logical distinctions, most famously in his analysis of definite descriptions in " On Denoting " Linguistic philosophy From about to , analytic philosophers like Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasized creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language that, in their opinion, often made philosophy invalid. This philosophical trend can be termed "ideal-language analysis" or "formalism". During this phase, Russell and Wittgenstein sought to understand language and hence philosophical problems by using formal logic to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made. Wittgenstein developed a comprehensive system of logical atomism in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus German: He thereby argued that the universe is the totality of actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed by the language of first-order predicate logic. Thus a picture of the universe can be construed by means of expressing atomic facts in the form of atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators. Logical positivism used formal logical methods to develop an empiricist account of knowledge. These two constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was nonsense. The claims of ethics, aesthetics and theology were consequently reduced to pseudo-statements, neither empirically true nor false, and therefore meaningless. Logical positivists typically considered philosophy as having a very limited function. For them, philosophy concerned the clarification of thoughts, rather than having a distinct subject matter of its own. The positivists adopted the verification principle , according to which every meaningful statement is either analytic or is capable of being verified by experience. This caused the logical positivists to reject many traditional problems of philosophy, especially those of metaphysics or ontology , as meaningless. Ordinary language philosophy After World War II , during the late s and s, analytic philosophy became involved with ordinary-language analysis. This resulted in two main trends. The other, known as "Oxford philosophy" , involved J. In contrast to earlier analytic philosophers including the early Wittgenstein who thought philosophers should avoid the deceptive trappings of natural language by constructing ideal languages, ordinary-language philosophers claimed that ordinary language already represents many subtle distinctions not recognized in the formulation of traditional philosophical theories or problems. While schools such as logical positivism emphasize logical terms, supposed to be universal and separate from contingent factors such as culture, language, historical conditions , ordinary-language philosophy emphasizes the use of language by ordinary people. The most prominent ordinary-language philosophers during the s were the aforementioned Austin and Gilbert Ryle. Ordinary-language philosophers often sought to dissolve philosophical problems by showing them to be the

result of misunderstanding ordinary language. Contemporary analytic philosophy[edit] Although contemporary philosophers who self-identify as "analytic" have widely divergent interests, assumptions, and methods—and have often rejected the fundamental premises that defined analytic philosophy before—analytic philosophy today is usually considered to be defined by a particular style, [3] characterized by precision and thoroughness about a specific topic, and resistance to "imprecise or cavalier discussions of broad topics". After , Anglophone philosophy began to incorporate a wider range of interests, opinions, and methods. Many philosophers and historians have attempted to define or describe analytic philosophy. Those definitions often include an emphasis on conceptual analysis: Hales described analytic philosophy as one of three types of philosophical method practiced in the West: Soames also states that analytic philosophy is characterised by "a more piecemeal approach. There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance". Behaviorism later became much less popular, in favor of type physicalism or functionalism , theories that identified mental states with brain states. During this period, topics of the philosophy of mind were often related strongly to topics of cognitive science such as modularity or innateness. Finally, analytic philosophy has featured a certain number of philosophers who were dualists , and recently forms of property dualism have had a resurgence; the most prominent representative is David Chalmers. In recent years, a central focus of research in the philosophy of mind has been consciousness. While there is a general consensus for the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, [29] there are many opinions as to the specifics. Meta-ethics which investigates moral terms and concepts; Normative ethics which examines and produces normative ethical judgments; Applied ethics which investigates how existing normative principles should be applied to difficult or borderline cases, often cases created by new technology or new scientific knowledge. Normative ethics[edit] The first half of the 20th century was marked by skepticism toward, and neglect of, normative ethics. Related subjects, such as social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of history , became only marginal topics of English-language philosophy during this period. During this time, utilitarianism was the only non-skeptical type of ethics to remain popular. However, as the influence of logical positivism began to decrease mid-century, analytic philosophers had renewed interest in ethics. Today, contemporary normative ethics is dominated by three schools: Meta-ethics[edit] Twentieth-century meta-ethics has two origins. The first is G. The second is in logical positivism and its attitude that statements which are unverifiable are meaningless. Although that attitude was adopted originally to promote scientific investigation by rejecting grand metaphysical systems, it had the side effect of making ethical and aesthetic value judgments as well as religious statements and beliefs meaningless. But because value judgments are of major importance in human life, it became incumbent on logical positivism to develop an explanation of the nature and meaning of value judgements. As a result, analytic philosophers avoided normative ethics, and instead began meta-ethical investigations into the nature of moral terms, statements, and judgments. The logical positivists opined that statements about value — including all ethical and aesthetic judgments— are non-cognitive ; that is, they cannot be objectively verified or falsified. Instead, the logical positivists adopted an emotivist theory, which was that value judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker. For example, in this view, saying, "Killing is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval. While non-cognitivism was generally accepted by analytic philosophers, emotivism had many deficiencies, and evolved into more sophisticated non-cognitivist theories such as the expressivism of Charles Stevenson , and the universal prescriptivism of R. Hare , which was based on J. These theories were not without their critics. Philippa Foot contributed several essays attacking all these theories. Perhaps the most influential being Elizabeth Anscombe , whose monograph *Intention* was called by Donald Davidson "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle". Applied ethics[edit] A significant feature of analytic philosophy since approximately has been the emergence of applied ethics — an interest in the application of moral principles to specific practical issues. Topics of special interest for applied ethics include environmental

issues, animal rights, and the many challenges created by advancing medical science. Adams worked on the relationship of faith and morality. Phillips, among others. The name "contemplative philosophy" was first coined by D. Isaiah Berlin also had a lasting influence on both analytic political philosophy and Liberalism with his lecture the Two Concepts of Liberty. During recent decades there have also been several critiques of liberalism, including the feminist critiques of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, the communitarian critiques of Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre although neither of them endorses the term, and the multiculturalist critiques of Amy Gutmann and Charles Taylor. Consequentialist libertarianism also derives from the analytic tradition. Analytical Marxism[edit] Another development of political philosophy was the emergence of the school of analytical Marxism. Members of this school seek to apply techniques of analytic philosophy modern social science such as rational choice theory to clarify the theories of Karl Marx and his successors. The best-known member of this school is G. A. Cohen, is generally considered to represent the genesis of this school. Cohen himself would later engage directly with Rawlsian political philosophy to advance a socialist theory of justice that contrasts with both traditional Marxism and the theories advanced by Rawls and Nozick. Communitarianism[edit] Communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Michael Sandel advance a critique of Liberalism that uses analytic techniques to isolate the main assumptions of Liberal individualists, such as Rawls, and then challenges these assumptions. In particular, Communitarians challenge the Liberal assumption that the individual can be considered as fully autonomous from the community in which he lives and is brought up. Instead, they argue for a conception of the individual that emphasizes the role that the community plays in forming his or her values, thought processes and opinions. Metaphysics One striking difference with respect to early analytic philosophy was the revival of metaphysical theorizing during the second half of the 20th century. Philosophers such as David Kellogg Lewis and David Armstrong developed elaborate theories on a range of topics such as universals, causation, possibility and necessity, and abstract objects. Ayer and the logical positivists. Although many discussions are continuations of old ones from previous decades and centuries, the debate remains active. The theory of special relativity has had a profound effect on the philosophy of time, and quantum physics is routinely discussed in the free will debate. Philosophy of language[edit] Main article: Philosophy of language Philosophy of language is a topic that has decreased during the last four decades, as evidenced by the fact that few major philosophers today treat it as a primary research topic. Indeed, while the debate remains fierce, it is still strongly influenced by those authors from the first half of the century: Austin, Alfred Tarski, and W. V. Quine. By wedding the techniques of modal logic to a causal theory of reference, Kripke was widely regarded as reviving theories of essence and identity as respectable topics of philosophical discussion. Philosophy of science[edit] Main article: Philosophy of science Reacting against both the verificationism of the logical positivists as well as the critiques of the philosopher of science Karl Popper, who had suggested the falsifiability criterion on which to judge the demarcation between science and non-science, discussions of philosophy of science during the last 40 years were dominated by social constructivist and cognitive relativist theories of science. Thomas Samuel Kuhn with his formulation of paradigm shifts and Paul Feyerabend with his epistemological anarchism are significant for these discussions. Other and related topics of contemporary research include debates between internalism and externalism, [51] basic knowledge, the nature of evidence, the value of knowledge, epistemic luck, virtue epistemology, the role of intuitions in justification, and treating knowledge as a primitive concept. Aesthetics As a result of attacks on the traditional aesthetic notions of beauty and sublimity from post-modern thinkers, analytic philosophers were slow to consider art and aesthetic judgment. Susanne Langer [52] and Nelson Goodman [53] addressed these problems in an analytic style during the 1950s and 1960s. Since Goodman, aesthetics as a discipline for analytic philosophers has flourished.

Chapter 8 : Daniel C. Dennett : Recent Work

Establishing the significance of elasmobranchs in ancient economies is complicated by a variety of biological and taphonomic problems that hinder NISP, MNI, and weight measures and comparisons with other fish or faunal classes.

Now the sense in which we may justly say that the Luo in the traditional setting practiced communalism is not one in which people generously shared property or wealth. Their idea of communalism is, I think, of a co-operative nature. For the owner of the cattle would distribute his cattle among people who did not have cattle [of their own] so that the less well-off people may take care of them—[but] never completely given away. The result is that everybody had cows to look after and so milk to drink. When something is true, it is just as you see it—it is just what it is—just like this bottle—it is true that it is just a bottle—just what it is. He who says the truth is accepted by good people. A liar may have many followers—but he is bad. Bwatoto nokhulola sindu ne siene sa tu—nga inchpa yino olola ichupa ni yene sa tu. So that they may eat—so that they may get empty prestige. They want to profit fraudulently. First, they display the deeply personal nature of the ideas, or opinions, that the sages expressed in response to the questions. Second, they provide evidence of abstract thought about philosophic topics. By pointing out that some people choose deliberately to be untruthful for unjust gain he also addresses the moral aspects of truth. Unlike Greek sages who used reason, African sages do not engage in philosophic thought. African sages are part of an oral tradition, whereas philosophic thought requires literacy. African traditions encourage unanimity regarding beliefs and values and discourage individual critical thought. His reply to these claims has significantly shaped the discourse on Sage Philosophy. In what follows the criteria he proposed to determine what counts as Sage Philosophy will be considered in the light of his critique of the Eurocentric bias against African philosophic thought and the question of whether literacy is required. This bias arises out of the implicit belief that philosophy is the privileged activity of certain races. He believed that this unjustified belief had further led to the image of philosophy as the restricted property of Greeks, or Europeans, and, even more exclusively, the property of white males. Partly concerned with exposing the falsehood of this Eurocentric attitude, he recognized that what had raised the apparently simple sayings of the pre-Socratics to the status of philosophy was the subsequent sustained commentaries by later philosophers. He maintained that the ideas expressed by indigenous African sages were no different from those by the earlier Greeks. Oruka supports his comparison of indigenous African sages with the pre-Socratics by citing two methods that have contributed to the growth of philosophy in the West, beginning with its Greek roots. One direct method of using dialogues is exemplified in the early Platonic works. Socrates asks primary questions upon which the exposition of ideas by his interlocutor is based. Oruka viewed his own dialogues with the sages as an example of this practice in the African context. He brought out what was in each case really the property of his interlocutors, not his own. Oruka meant his dialogues, in similar fashion, to capture both this method and its outcome. He maintained that the sages he and his disciples interviewed were the owners of their own ideas. Oruka believed that, by these two methods, the growth of African philosophy can take place in a manner similar to the growth of Western philosophy. He insisted that there are African thinkers, not yet absorbed into the tradition of the written word, whose memories are, in terms of consistency and organization, as good as the information recorded in books Sage Philosophy, pp. Responding to adversaries, he cautioned that: He argued that to show that there were people, like the indigenous sages, who were capable of philosophical thinking was one thing, but it was a completely different thing to show that there were African philosophers who have engaged in organized systematic reflections on the traditions of their people. In another essay popularly associated with his name, Oruka identified four main trends to be constitutive of African philosophy, namely i African ethnophilosophy, ii African nationalist-ideological philosophy, iii professional African philosophy, and of course, iv the African Sage philosophy under consideration here. Not only do these trends show different approaches that African philosophers have adopted to unravel and systematically to expose the underlying principles on which

different departments of African life are based, they also demonstrate that African philosophy is not limited or confined to the academic institutions. Indeed, many African philosophers look far beyond the traditional philosophical texts for sources and subject matter of philosophical reflection. For example, while engaging in subtle analytic philosophical reflections, African philosophers incorporate with great ease narratives from everyday lives and from literature into their reflections of the philosophical implications of their cultural events. Oruka was especially wary of the sub-group among professional African philosophers whose position regarding African traditional modes of thought was analogous to European bias in denying reason to Africans in their traditional settings. It was this attitude, according to Oruka, that amounted to a claim that Africans lacked a tradition of organized systematic philosophical reflections on the thoughts, beliefs, and practices of their own people. He thought that this view was exemplified in its most eloquent and strongest form by Peter Bodunrin. Oruka thought that this view was rather absurd, for no society of humans can live for any reasonable amount of time, let alone making any advances in their own ways of seeing and doing things, if they do not have reason, or if the ideas and concepts upon which their cultures are built do not make sense. While systematicity is important to the structure and consistency of good thinking, neither it nor preservation of thought necessarily requires literacy. For just as thoughts can be expressed either in writing, or as unwritten oral reflections, e. Such a fusion is part of bringing into focus the interplay between philosophy and practice. Oruka believed, as he explains in *Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy* pp. Senghor, and Julius K. The third negative claim Oruka aimed to challenge pertains to the philosophical status of indigenous African thought. Ethnophilosophy had falsely popularized the view that traditional Africa was a place of philosophical unanimity and that African traditions encouraged unanimity regarding beliefs and values. If this were true it would allow no room for individual thinkers like, say, Socrates or Descartes, with their own independent views on such matters. Oruka was concerned that African intellectuals were drawn into this false assumption regarding the intellectual inclination of African people, maintaining the belief that critique is absent from indigenous African thought. This situation was worsened by the new political movements of postindependence African nations where one-party political systems sprang up. By outlawing opposition politics as being both unAfrican and antinationalist, political leaders often appealed to this view of unanimity. The Sage Philosophy project objected to this claim regarding unanimity in Africa, which Oruka regarded as absurd, by presenting empirical evidence of the diversity of thought among indigenous thinkers. Oruka insisted that, while rulers everywhere will always crave unanimity, thinkers thrive in dialogue and diversity of opinion. He pointed out that Sage philosophy was about thinkers, not rulers. An important charge against ethnophilosophy has been that, by simply presenting the teachings of African beliefs in the allegorical modes, the impression is created that indigenous African modes of thought are deeply grounded in their mythical representations of reality, thus leaving the philosophic ideas largely unexplained. Secondly, he contested the idea that a qualitative mental leap from myth is required for Africans to embrace philosophical thought. Moral principles, for example, would have to be abstract in character to be applicable in general terms beyond one person Hountondji. According to Wiredu Thus, contrary to the view that knowledge at the communal level was anonymous, Wiredu argues that it is precisely in regard to the importance of consensus on matters of common good that disputation and careful navigation through different opinions was not just considered to be crucial, but was put on transparent display until some form of consensus was attained. In other words, consensus was not imposed, but relentlessly pursued. Such important matters like just claims to different kinds of rights were not adjudicated without the input of those members of community who were well regarded for their independent opinions. Another point that Oruka makes against the perception of unanimity in African traditional thought can be found in the expressions of thinkers whose ideas are grounded in critical analysis and evaluation of everyday experiences in their communities. Another example of this, besides such figures as Paulo Mbuya Akoko and others who Oruka mentions and discusses in the book *Sage Philosophy* is the famous Swahili poet, critic, and philosopher Shabaan bin Robert from then Tanganyika, now Tanzania. Shabaan, famed as a pioneer in the interface between the oral and the written traditions, has established a unique legacy as an indigenous

independent thinker, whose focus in his written work was to theorize about metaphysical and social ideals. About the former, Shabaan theorizes in his work entitled *Utubora Mkulima* the attributes of ideal personhood by arguing strongly, in a dialogical setting, that an ideal person is one whose moral righteousness is aimed at being a perfect member of community, and therefore his concerns for common good supersede individual interests pp. Regarding social ideals, Shabaan argues in *Kusadikika* that a good society is defined as one in which all members are accorded their basic rights and treated with equality regardless of gender, age, or social status pp. This makes Shabaan Robert an example of a liberal thinker whose ideas bridge between indigenous or pre-colonial social structures and values, and the so-called modern society whose values were significantly influenced by colonial occupations and interests, as well as new economic, political, and moral values. In these senses, Shabaan Robert thought and works complement those of other indigenous thinkers in critiquing both indigenous and new modes of existence. To Oruka, these are signs that indigeneity is not, as is widely but falsely thought, synonymous with anonymity and stagnation in thought. What counts as Sage Philosophy? Oruka, however, had very definite ideas about who qualifies as a philosophic sage and how such persons are to be distinguished from other sages. When asked whether or not philosophy advances knowledge, Barasa is quoted as saying: The tendency to express dissatisfaction with the status quo belief system of their communities is an important critical component and a criterion Oruka used to identify sages as philosophical. Dissatisfaction sometimes motivates the philosophic sage to advance the knowledge that everyone has by subjecting it to scrutiny in order to determine its validity and worth. While philosophic sages may still share with others some customary practices and beliefs, or aspects of them, unlike other members of their community, they emphasize rational explanations and justifications of courses of action. They owe greater loyalty to reason than to custom for its own sake. As a result, not only are sages often a source of new knowledge, but they are also a catalyst to change within their communities. In the example cited above, Mbuya defines communalism in terms of a morality that appeals to the welfare of others as a guide to action. He indicates its goals, and limitations as a principle that aims at minimizing socio-economic disparity between the haves and the have-nots. While he recognizes that there are other indigenous sages in African communities, he distinguishes these from philosophic sages such as Mbuya and Chaungo, who are committed to critical inquiry and to the rational grounding of values and beliefs. Other indigenous sages, who may be wise in some sense, but not critically oriented, act as repositories of the statements of the beliefs of their communities, which they have learned and can repeat, or teach, to others exactly as they are supposed to be remembered. Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas Eng. His own voice is submerged into a communal mode of expression. A folk sage is a highly intelligent and good narrator of traditionally imposed beliefs and myths. He, or she, may explain such beliefs and values with great detail and may even expound on the relation between the mythical representations and the lessons in and for society that they are intended to illustrate. The onisegun, deliberately kept anonymous by Hallen and Sodipo for reasons of privacy, and who expound and elucidate the traditional thought of the Yoruba, are certainly wise and very knowledgeable people. Quine attacked the concept of universal propositions and meanings that are frequently assumed by translators to exist across all languages. This draws in question the practice of anthropologists studying African belief systems. Failing to find in non-Western modes of thought precise translations of comparable rational expressions in their own languages, anthropologists hastened to conclude that the problem must lie with the non-Western modes of thought which appear to lack ways of accommodating rational expressions. The outcome of their comparative analyses shows that our conceptual assumptions about reality are often tied to the natural languages we speak. Rather, they attempt to tease out what was intended conceptually in a language translated as faithfully as possible into propositions which they contrast with comparable ones in English. Conclusion It is not entirely clear what Oruka believed ought to be the relationship between the indigenous philosophic sage and his or her Western-trained counterpart. On this point at least, Oruka seems to position himself away from philosophers such as Appiah, Wiredu, and Gyekye. He understood the work of professional philosophers to be distinct from that of the philosophic sages and expressed the wish that they could remain so, as a way of

preserving traditions. So, British philosophy, for example, is taken to be the texts of Lockes, Humes, Bacons, Russels, etc. He was concerned that the language of African professional philosophers was too dependent on the Western conceptual lexicon and that its unchecked imposition on indigenous conceptual schemes might finally contribute to the demise of the latter. Oruka believed that professional African philosophers could interact with their sagacious counterparts, provided there was sufficient room for each to flourish separately. This idea suggests that he desired to expand the location of legitimate philosophical activity beyond the institutional confines of the academy, which he considered to be intricately connected to the colonial legacy. It is in this regard that the idea of African Sage philosophy has provided an important intervention in the development of contemporary African philosophy, addressing many crucial issues African philosophers continue to face in the wider context of postcolonial cultural inquiry, of which philosophy is only a part.

Chapter 9 : African Sage Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

3 (ii) *Moorean Facts* Thomas Kelly, "Moorean Facts and Belief Revision" manuscript. 5. 2/ *Challenges to Dogmatism* Roger White, "Problems for Dogmatism", forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

Princeton University Press, When this occurs, the little basic sentence has a tendency to expand, though not beyond modest proportions. The pattern then becomes subject-verb-adverb-object, or subject-adjective-verb-adverb-object, or subject-adjective-verb-adverb-adverb-object-adjective, or one of the many combinations which these patterns will offer. These various additions have the task of adding modifications, qualifications, value-judgments which the story will accumulate and coordinate into some unified meaning. At times, one of the elements will extend itself, giving the impression of a broadened horizon in time and space. Finally, the basic sentence, lengthened or unlengthened, may break into a relative clause, or a series of relative clauses, or a causal, temporal, concessive, or participial clause, or a series of subordinate clauses. The extension of these really long and sometimes complicated sentences is carried out in the terms of the sentence itself, for the purpose of contrast, balance, or buildup. Whatever the terms, a constant effort is made to keep the pattern symmetrical and the rhythm formal: The merit of the basic sentence is apparent. As long as it is kept short, it presents an opportunity for the densest sort of action, since its verbs are multiplied and varied. The effect should be one of continuous, sharp, exasperating, inevitable, variable little actions which can build up into a flood of paradoxical, ironical, contradictory, but overwhelming action. There is danger, however, that these short sentences will become monotonous; there is further danger that the story will become more important than its meaning. The moderately expanded short sentence presents an opportunity for avoiding both of these difficulties. The modifying adjective-adverb factors take some of the continuous, exasperating sharpness out of the closely packed action, and at the same time give depth to the meaning. In addition, when one of the elements begins to expand, an explosive effect is added to the movement effect of the primary form. These explosive sentences serve as a halfway stage between that form and the enlarged, complicated sentences which go trailing off into space like oscillations of explosive sound. Thus, the rhythm is from dense, varied action, to deep, varied meaning, to all the ambiguities of density, variety, and depth which go trailing off into universal time and space and in an all-embracing judgment destroy and create simultaneously. One of these sentences of gigantic sweep will suffice: If the explosive quality is wrapped up in the sentence and threatens to burst from any of its elements, the energy behind the explosive quality is certainly released from verbs. We have already seen how the nature of the basic sentence itself offers the opportunity of increasing the number of verbs and therefore the quantity of energy released. The following example will demonstrate this release of energy: The terrible contradiction in the two controlling energies of the sentence is apparent: The way Candide makes his request and the nature of the request represent two discordant energies paradoxically situated. Moreover, the energies released in the first part of the sentence all concern Candide; then suddenly a whole series of energies concern the King; the latter series unites with the first only at the end, creating thereby a third energy mercy which goes dancing off into eternal time and space and concerns only indirectly Candide and the King. A number of such cases might be cited. Their accumulation would build up an effect of limitless energy ill-directed and badly controlled. If this energy is the source of life, life must be a chaotic thing, contradicting itself, destroying itself, but creating itself, too, in an ironical, paradoxical, symbolic way. This limitless energy is not so ill-directed or so badly controlled as it first seems. Thanks to the saving power of form some order is kept. A factor in this order-keeping form is the amazing ease and grace with which Voltaire shifts from present to imperfect to perfect and back again. In the case we have just cited, he even shoots the energy into the limitless future. This constant regard for timing the released energy is really a method of controlling and ordering it. But he is just as skillful in giving it direction by cleverly manipulating the infinitive, past participle, and present participle. Hundreds of other cases might be cited. An interesting one occurs in the last chapter where la Vieille uses the infinitive to summarize the

action of the whole book: The role played by infinitives in the release of energy is apparent in this example. They complement the action of modal verbs, and they also designate pure action, that is action in the process of developing with scant reference to time and space. In their own peculiar way, they generalize or depersonalize action. Furthermore, they give it tremendous variety. At times they occur in veritable phalanxes, for instance: Past participles are more useful still. Contrary to the infinitive which marks pure action, they note not only the action itself, but the source of the action, the recipient of the action, the actual condition and value quality that the action possesses. These four possibilities can be seen schematically: These forms occur in great abundance in *Candide*. The story is related with the marvelous variety of tense forms so characteristic of Voltaire. Nevertheless, the release of this active energy discloses the vital urge of his characters to live by acting. In a certain sense, it is a guarantee of the characters, since it takes its origin in them. That is, in the overflow of active action, the impression produced is that of action not only in its initial stage, characterized by disorder and inexperience, but also in its more mature stage, characterized by all the youth, vigor, freshness of *Candide* himself. One short example of this usage will suffice: Just a few examples will suffice: Finally, a good example of the active responding to the passive is in The past participle used alone contrasts with the present participle in the same way that passive and active tenses contrast with each other. When used as an ablative absolute or even as an adjective, it serves as a passive with no great stress on the origin of the action but with great importance attributed to the receiver of the action, to the annihilation of the action, and to the past time of the action. The conte is literally filled with these past participles used in an ablative absolute sense: But there are fully as many cases where past participles have become adjectives, adding a quality to the modified word, whether people or things. They often occur in sequences with adjectives: Often also they form sequences themselves: Finally, there are examples where they occur in phalanxes, as in the following case: It would be difficult to give a more perfect picture of total destruction, a condition, incidentally, under which the most violent actions are driving to the annihilation of action. In one of its aspects the world of *Candide* is submitting to action, is really absorbing action. This action comes from so many varied, unexpected sources that it seems ill-defined, ill-directed, badly ordered. As it permeates living creatures, it does not add to their life, it tends rather to press the life out of them. It is cosmic energy which, in its uncontrolled, undirected aspects, kills life. Left to itself, it could easily wipe out the universe, or at least it could reduce life to unendurable torture. It is not, of course, left to itself. There is a whole array of them in *Candide*. The active, creative quality of these participles is obvious in When so used it adds a condition, a qualification, as well as a continuation of action. This usage is extended and it, too, becomes an adjective: But the vast majority of these present participles push the action outward, often introducing additional action. They represent the effort of the submerged universe to meet the energetic chaos of destruction with personal, willful, creative energy. Sometimes they, too, occur in sequences of adjectives: At other times, they counterbalance in the same sentence the cumulative effect of dead past participles: Or they add vitality to a still scene: And there is a final case where the present participle serves to prevent life from totally disappearing: It springs from many unknown sources and submerges those upon whom it falls; with constant pounding it beats out life. Whether it comes from forces in nature or in man-made institutions, it crushes and exasperates. Somehow one gets the impression that action produces energy and energy begets force and force is an evil thing. It must be met by another force which springs from another energy derived from counteraction. For the outside action pressing upon the individual brings forth a response which is another action. It leaves behind the dead, past, traditional action, the absorbed evil action. It pushes forward, young, vigorous, eager, inexperienced, but confident that it can master by struggle, effort, and work the deadly past and the uncertain future. Creation in *Candide* is certainly the answer to universal destruction. In this creative action, struggling to overcome destructive action, adverbs and adjectives also play their role. They characterize the actors, the objects involved, and the action. At the same time, they bestow value judgment on the phenomena. There is in *Candide* an extraordinary tendency to attach adjectives to nouns as if the adjectival quality were a guarantee for the existence of the object. Many of them are colorless: Others contribute a trait of character: Still others add by their incongruity a

touch of irony: This use of adjectives to characterize is in fact carried to an extreme. There are many instances where these adjectives are massed in phalanx, as in This massing very often occurs in Voltaire. Surely the world of Candide is a world of chaos, a world of mutually consuming qualities, ironically and paradoxically qualified. It is not predominantly good nor badâ€”good in its potentialities, perhaps, bad in its actualities, certainly, and very full of strife, energy, effort. There is a type of adjective which conveys interpretation much better than the mass of qualifying adjectives we have just mentioned. In a sense it carries a value judgment of superior proportions, it has a superlative force in itself. It attaches to its noun a quality, to be sure, but it carries a very definite intellectual judgment on the part of the speaker. And yet the judgment is partly irrational: