

**Chapter 1 : Treachery : the shocking story of the British betrayals,**

*The unresolved and strange case of Roger Hollis is a symptom of this problem. Defence of the Realm had an unprecedented opportunity to address the problem candidly and do some good. It is deeply regrettable and indeed unacceptable that it failed to take that opportunity.*

The spycatcher in question was Peter Wright, whose book, *Spycatcher*, the British government made strenuous efforts to suppress, only to be foiled in the Australian courts by the young Malcolm Turnbull. The book was published in Australia in 1979, as Wilson reported and became a best-seller. I looked forward to reading the authorised history in order, chiefly, to discover how Christopher Andrew demonstrated both the mental illness of Peter Wright and the baselessness of the charges against Roger Hollis. What I found was profoundly puzzling: More precisely, he attacks the conclusion of Wright and Pincher that Hollis was a Soviet agent, but he fails to address their arguments as they are exhaustively presented by Pincher in his new book. This was contested by Gordon Brook-Shepherd more than twenty years ago. He claimed "in *The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors* that Gouzenko had said no such thing in 1951; that it was only in 1952, in the wake of the flight of Burgess and Maclean and the suspicion of Philby, that Gouzenko mentioned such a mole and, even then, did not offer a codename. Indeed, Brook-Shepherd argued, the codename Elli was surely improbable, because it had been the codename of Kathleen Wilshire, another GRU spy, whom Gouzenko had exposed as working in the British High Commission in Ottawa in the early 1950s. Surely, he reasoned, Moscow would not have run two spies with the same codename at the same time? Christopher Andrew, with his unprecedented access to the MI5 archives, accepts the claim that Gouzenko mentioned a mole inside MI5 codenamed Elli in 1951. He had three codenames: Fred, Tony and Blunden the last two of which look surprisingly transparent in retrospect. He then argues that Elli was actually Leo Long, a known Soviet spy. But Long, also, was KGB. So the authorised historian has a problem: Brook-Shepherd may have asserted that there was no Elli in MI5, but the authorised historian says there was. There is, therefore, an inescapable and unanswered question as to who this Elli was. Against this background, one of the first things I did when I got hold of *Defence of the Realm* was turn to the index to check what Andrew had to say about these matters. What I found astonished me: There is no discussion anywhere in the authorised history of any of these matters. Andrew does state at page 10 that the counter-espionage officers stayed in London at a building in St James Street, during the war, but he does not make any reference in this context to Hollis or to Pincher. Hollis left Worcester College Oxford without taking his degree to begin a business career in the Far East. Might perhaps be given a job. Given that vetting was not introduced until 1951, we might not be altogether surprised that MI5 would recruit a nice young man from an impeccable Anglican background with so few questions in 1951. It might be explained on the basis that the authorised historian is entirely convinced that Hollis was indeed a nice young man who went on to serve his country faithfully. But to explain is not to excuse. Given the grave allegations made against Hollis, it was surely incumbent on Andrew to do some kind of retrospective vetting and establish the bona fides of the deceased. He did nothing that can even remotely be so described. Before going into this matter and its implications in more detail, I should make clear that Christopher Andrew is very well qualified to have written the authorised history of MI5. He has been at work on history and diplomacy for more than forty years and on the history of Soviet espionage in the West and in the world at large for at least thirty of those years. His book *Secret Service*: But he had the even greater good fortune, from the early 1950s, to work with KGB defector Vassili Mitrokhin on the masses of secret KGB files that the latter had smuggled out of the collapsed Soviet Union in 1992. This issued in two bulky tomes: This publishing record enabled him to be granted unprecedented scholarly access to the archives of MI5 and a contract to write its official, authorised history. Of course, he has been far from alone in writing about Soviet espionage in the light of revelations from the archives of the former communist superpower. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been followed by something of an avalanche of books on the subject. Such books have done much to fill in the picture of Soviet espionage operations during the Cold War. But in all this history, nothing is more evident than the fact that, over many decades, MI5 and MI6 and Whitehall were both very poor at detecting Soviet moles and spies

in the UK at least until after Hollis retired in late and extremely reluctant to admit it publicly when they did find them. You would never guess this from reading the authorised history, but the details are very telling and must be considered as a rather substantial caveat emptor when we are invited to swallow an official or authorized pronouncement on the subject. These disquieting realities were notoriously the case with the Cambridge Five: Philby, Maclean, Burgess, Blunt and Cairncross. That all five were recruited without any kind of vetting in the s was only the start. They then worked within the British foreign policy, intelligence and security system for many years completely undetected and would quite possibly have remained undetected had it not been for the Venona decrypts in the United States, followed by the instability and indiscretions of Burgess and the flight of Burgess and Maclean in . Even as it was, Philby was not definitively exposed until , when he also fled to the Soviet Union; while Blunt and Cairncross were quietly pushed into the shadows by the British government until it became impossible to deny their treachery. Even then, no adequate accounting was offered of the nature of their betrayal of their country and its allies, to say nothing of the breathtaking scale of it. The official reluctance stemmed from two sources: The single most notable body of sensitive intelligence was the Venona program, which had enabled US intelligence operatives in the late s to intercept thousands of KGB and GRU messages to and from Moscow between and , of which more than were decrypted over a period of many years. The interception program was disrupted when Kim Philby alerted Moscow to the fact that its codes had been cracked; whereupon they were changed. The intercepts that were decoded revealed the existence of Soviet espionage on a disturbing scale. Hiss denied everything; White died of a heart attack after denying everything Elizabeth Bentley had said about him; while Silvermaster and his wife, also a spy, escaped prosecution by the simple expedient of taking the Fifth Amendment before Congress. Silvermaster and the key members of his ring were quietly moved to other jobs and the Left was, therefore, able to get away for decades with assertions that these people were the victims of a witch hunt. It never seemed to trouble those who cried witch hunt during the Cold War that in the Soviet Union itself at that time such people, had the boot been on the other foot, would have been tortured into making a confession and then executed. Only after the Cold War was over was the Venona material made available for public consumption. But at the same time, the KGB opened its archives a crack; and Vassili Mitrokhin smuggled out thousands of pages that had not been declassified, which threw further light on the scale of Soviet espionage all the way back to the s. Only then did it emerge that, in addition to the Cambridge spy ring, KGB spy rings had been recruited at Oxford University and the University of London at the same time, in the s. The first reports out of the archives were able to show that these rings had existed and to cite the codenames of their members, but not their actual names. It emerged, years later, that the head of the Oxford ring had been Arthur Wynn, codenamed Scott, who had been a senior civil servant for many years until his retirement in . Christopher Hill, the famous Marxist historian of the English Civil War and the Levellers of the seventeenth century, it turns out, was also a Soviet spy in the s. When confronted with the evidence in his last years, he confessed but pleaded that the truth not be made public until after he had died. He had concealed his membership of the Communist Party in order to get jobs in military intelligence 43 and the Foreign Office 45 , and there he worked for the Soviet Union. But he had, at least, picked up the scoop on Hill himself being a Soviet spy. Roger Hollis was right at the centre of where that vigilance was supposed to have been exercised. Hill, as it happens, formed a partnership of pro-Soviet influence with Peter Smollett whose real, Austrian name was Smolka , the head of the Russia desk in the Ministry of Information, who was himself a Soviet spy and a friend of Kim Philby. It was a book titled *The Soviets and Ourselves: Two Commonwealths*, which Smollett helped him to get published after the war under the pseudonym K. The book sang the praises of Lenin as a kind of genius; asserted that Soviet citizens all enjoyed the freedom to vote; and described the Great Terror as a non-violent social movement akin to the Chartist movement in nineteenth-century England. This same man then went on to become a tenured historian, the author of influential books on the English revolution and Master of Balliol College at Oxford University. He died in comfortable retirement in February . The scale of what all these spies accomplished for the Soviet Union was such that, even after a lifetime spent exposing and excoriating it, Chapman Pincher felt moved to astonishment and fury in writing *Treachery* in the past few years. Donald Maclean supplied documents, which filled forty-five boxes in the KGB archives, each box containing pages. As Pincher summarised the work of

the Cambridge spies: Most troubling of all is the fact that the authorised historian does not appear even to have been curious as to why MI5 was so effective against the Nazis and so utterly ineffective at the same time against the communists. It must be allowed, of course, that in attempting to write a history of MI5 from its foundation almost down to the present, Andrew faced a formidable task of synthesis and had, inevitably, to make choices about what to include and what to leave out. What kind of authorised history is it that judiciously omits a reckoning with these dismal failures of forty to eighty years ago? The fact that Andrew had supposedly unfettered access to the MI5 archives ought to have allowed him to set out at least some of these sensitive matters chapter and verse. Not only does he not do this, but when he cites the archives—“which he does many times”—he provides no indication whatsoever of what specific file or document in the archives he has drawn upon. What are his sources for this idea? Of all people, Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt. To begin with, we are not given any clear idea of what kind of record in the archives has yielded these two little gems, or when precisely they are dated; but both would seem to be records of conversations without any other verification. We are not even told whether anyone other than Blunt witnessed this supposed remark by Hollis. Nor are we told to whom Philby made his observation, or in what context. In each case, we are asked to take at face value the alleged remark by an exposed Soviet spy who had made a career of lying to British intelligence and who, by all accounts, continued to lie every which way as long as they lived, that they thought Hollis had been suspicious of Blunt. Does it not occur to the historian to ask whether they may have been lying? That he never suspected Blunt and appeared oblivious, also, to what Philby was up to, even though, while head of Soviet counter-espionage in MI5, he had regular dealings with each of them? It would have been far better, surely, to say that he seemed to have his nose ahead of the pack, thus diverting attention from him. Oddly enough, that is also what the authorised historian has now done. In short, whatever its other merits as a basic chronological history of the existence of MI5, *Defence of the Realm* fails entirely in what one might have thought would be the prime task of a history of MI5 in the wake of the Cold War: Given his rather vehement emphasis on the mental capacities of Peter Wright and the innocence of Hollis, in public statements and in thinly documented claims in his book, it is more than a little unsettling to find that Christopher Andrew does not do anything of the kind. This renders the massive book he has written of very much diminished stature and significance. And, whatever Andrew may say about Peter Wright, there can be no credible claim that Pincher is mentally ill or a mere conspiracy theorist. Indeed, he is more restrained than the authorised historian in actually drawing conclusions. Whereas Andrew, after a fatally flawed argument that totally omits to address the key problems in the case, declares Hollis innocent; Pincher, after amassing a great deal of circumstantial evidence that Hollis was a GRU mole throughout his career at MI5, concludes that we do not know for sure whether he was, because we do not have access to the GRU archives and Moscow is not telling. However, the Merkulov message to Stalin and Beria regarding Elli, combined with the demonstrable fact that Elli cannot have been either Blunt or Long, constitutes a very considerable problem for those, like the authorized historian, who wish to dismiss the charges against Hollis. Pincher draws attention, moreover, to a number of developments in Russia in this decade which bear on the question of whether Stalin had a highly-placed mole in MI5 in the s. These developments centre on the manner in which Moscow got a copy of the Quebec Agreement, a highly secret two-page agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt, only sixteen days after they had signed it. The Agreement stated that the two great Anglo-Saxon powers would collaborate to produce an atomic weapon and that neither would communicate any information about this to any third party without joint consent. The document was very, very closely held, as testified by several documents in the British National Archives, showing that even in June Clement Attlee was concerned that it might be revealed to a US Senate committee and then leak; while in , Harry Truman was still agreeing with Attlee that the document should remain secret. This was the kind of work, kept secret for as long as she lived, for which Sonia was decorated as a super agent of Russian military intelligence by Vladimir Putin. But Sonia was a courier, not a mole inside the British government.

Chapter 2 : The Defence of the Realm - Wikipedia

*Sir Roger Henry Hollis, KBE, CB (2 December - 26 October ) was a British journalist, and an intelligence officer who served with MI5 from to He was Director General of MI5 from*

Bagley, and John L. In the May edition we published the following letters to the editor received from Chapman Pincher, Tennent H. It also applied to investigative writers, like myself, who have put the evidence on public record and reached similar conclusions. Presumably, it still applies to me because I recorded the evidence in full in my book, Treachery, published as recently as I spent nine long days questioning Wright at his home in Cygnet, Tasmania, in October –“only four years after he had left MI5”and am better qualified than Professor Andrew to comment on his mental condition at that time. Both Wright and I had been trained in the scientific discipline and I queried everything he told me. Though Wright had a blood disorder, it was under control and I found his intellect to be razor-sharp and his exceptional memory intact. In addition to being the defence and scientific reporter for a national newspaper, I was also the medical reporter and had read widely in the psychiatry journals. No MI5 officer had ever released such a cascade of revelations before and I knew that they would cause a furore when I published them”as I did in under the title Their Trade is Treachery. They all proved to be so with one exception which the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was advised to inflate as a hopeful means of belittling the whole book. This related to a previously top-secret document known as the Trend Report. In , in secrecy, the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, induced Lord Trend, a retired Cabinet Secretary, to re-examine the evidence of Soviet penetration of MI5, with special reference to the Hollis case, which he did, leisurely, calling in witnesses, including Wright. Both Wright and another witness I questioned left Trend believing that he had agreed that there was a prima facie case for suspecting that there had been a spy at high level in MI5 and that the evidence extended from the entry of Hollis in to his retirement in That is what Wright told me and that interpretation, which I reported in my book, proved to have been misguided. A former Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers, who read the report in the line of duty, had already confirmed to me that Trend had reported that the suspicions against Hollis could not be proved and, unless and until they could be, he should be given the benefit of the doubt. The stark fact that everything else which Wright told me and which I published has proved to be true was set aside. Further, to enhance his case, he had begun to manipulate the truth, as was established by an investigation by the UK Metropolitan Police, to which I gave evidence. During my previous thirty-three years of investigative journalism in Fleet Street I was repeatedly accused of being deluded when stating that certain Labour MPs including a Minister, John Stonehouse and some trade union leaders were Soviet agents. The authorised history has now confirmed that I was right and that they were taking Soviet Bloc money. Like many other veterans and historians, I regret that so many unanswered questions and distortions both intentional and unintentional continue to block efforts to write a reliable history of the intelligence and counter-intelligence events of our times. Of course, some of this will inevitably remain until all still-secret files are opened, especially in Moscow. I send you my congratulations and regards. But, as Monk points out, Andrew deliberately kisses off this important piece of history. But as readers of your journal understand, history does matter”and facts do matter. Nor is Chapman Pincher, the British intelligence historian whose dogged research and analysis of the case Monk summarises so aptly. Hollis may or may not have been guilty of espionage. But the facts and the circumstantial evidence against him are definitely worth serious debate. In the meantime, kudos to the author and to Quadrant for publishing this important essay.

**Chapter 3 : Sex, Spies, and the s | The American Conservative**

28 *The Strange Behavior of Roger Hollis* 29 *In a New World* 30 *A Mystery Resolved* 31 *Blind Eye to Elli* 32 *The Denigration of Igor Gouzenko*

He was Director General of MI5 from 1951. His mother was a daughter of a Canon of Wells Cathedral. From the spring of 1914, he attended Worcester College, Oxford, where he read English, but left without completing his degree. From 1 April 1917, he worked for British American Tobacco. In 1921, he transferred to Beijing. Soviet Naval Attache Eugene Ivanov was also involved with Keeler at this time, in the early 1930s, and sought to learn the date of American plans to arm nuclear warheads in West Germany, from Profumo through Keeler. Profumo had to resign in mid-1956, and the resulting scandal did much to bring the Labour Party to power in the October General Election. Although many such failures were subsequently blamed on the actions of such self-confessed or defected agents as Philby, Guy Burgess, and Anthony Blunt, a number of failures occurred after all three had lost their access to secret information. Some in MI5 concluded the Soviets had an agent in a very senior position within the organisation. Peter Wright, Arthur S. Martin, Jane Sissmore and others became convinced that either Hollis or his deputy, Graham Mitchell, could be the only ones responsible, eventually confiding their suspicions to their former DG, Dick White, who was, by that time, Director General of MI6. White instructed Martin to inform Hollis that Mitchell was a suspect, and Hollis instructed Martin after due consideration to keep Mitchell under surveillance. West implies that this was a deliberate ploy to keep tabs on both Mitchell and Hollis. Much of the investigation was centred around the interviews with Anthony Blunt at that time, and Peter Wright had amassed a sizable amount of taped evidence from Blunt when Martin returned from suspension. After 1956, Blunt gradually confessed his double-agent role in exchange for immunity from prosecution. By then, some time after Hollis had retired, suspicion had lifted from Mitchell and focused solely on Hollis. Pincher published an updated version of his book in 1988. Pincher also accused Hollis of being a Soviet agent, although entirely separate from the Cambridge Five spy ring. Evidence has been advanced to support these assertions by Pincher in his book, *Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups*: Hollis was asked to come in and clear up the allegations. Having been the director, Hollis was aware of the procedures of the interrogation and investigation. He remained calm and composed throughout, denying all allegations. Wright retired in January 1964, upon reaching age 60, and, by his own account, was enraged at being denied a pension for his 30 years of service, on highly legalistic and technical grounds. He emigrated to Tasmania, Australia, where he wrote an account of his work at MI5. Among the evidence for this claim is the Igor Gouzenko defection, at Ottawa in 1951. Hollis was sent to Canada to interview Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. May was a scientist and part of the Soviet spy ring which obtained the secrets of the Manhattan Project, which built the first atomic bomb for the United States. Gouzenko noted that the man who met him seemed to be in disguise, not interested in his revelations, and discouraged him from further disclosures. In view of this circumstantial evidence, Wright became convinced that Hollis was a traitor. Gouzenko also admitted that he, being a lower level clerk, had no access to such files. Ward committed suicide on 3 August 1956 as the Profumo scandal progressed. He claims he has proved conclusively that Hollis was not a double agent and that Wright was misguided at best. They published a report and chronology. He has described how the Soviets themselves were baffled by the allegations against Hollis [20] Later life Peter Wright in *Spycatcher* asserts that Hollis and his secretary Val Hammond were carrying on a long-standing affair while both were at MI5. Hammond, according to Wright, was eligible for promotion at many points during her long service, including non-clerical positions related to intelligence analysis, but she consistently refused the opportunity to move to higher positions in MI5 to stay close to Hollis. Hollis and Hammond were married after Hollis divorced his first wife, Eve, in 1951. She was the daughter of a prosperous solicitor from Burnham-on-Sea in Somerset. The couple had one son, Adrian Swayne Hollis. Hollis divorced his first wife in 1951 and married his MI5 secretary, with whom he had carried on a long-standing affair. Philosopher Martin Hollis (1927–2012) was his nephew. Random House Publishing Group. Retrieved 21 January 2012.

**Chapter 4 : Table of contents for Treachery**

*Paul Monk's Quadrant essay "Christopher Andrew and the Strange Case of Roger Hollis" gained international interest and was discussed in letters to the editor from Chapman Pincher, Tennent H. Bagley, and John L. Wilhelm. Paul Monk's essay "Christopher Andrew and the Strange Case of Roger."*

He was Director General of MI5 from 1956 to 1963. His mother was a daughter of a Canon of Wells Cathedral. From the spring of 1945, he attended Worcester College, Oxford, where he read English, but left without completing his degree. From 1 April 1946, he worked for British American Tobacco. In 1948, he transferred to Beijing. Soviet Naval Attache Eugene Ivanov was also involved with Keeler at this time, in the early 1950s, and sought to learn the date of American plans to arm nuclear warheads in West Germany, from Profumo through Keeler. Profumo had to resign in mid-1955, and the resulting scandal did much to bring the Labour Party to power in the October General Election. Although many such failures were subsequently blamed on the actions of such self-confessed or defected agents as Philby, Guy Burgess, and Anthony Blunt, a number of failures occurred after all three had lost their access to secret information. Some in MI5 concluded the Soviets had an agent in a very senior position within the organisation. Peter Wright, Arthur S. Martin, Jane Sissmore and others became convinced that either Hollis or his deputy, Graham Mitchell, could be the only ones responsible, eventually confiding their suspicions to their former DG, Dick White, who was, by that time, Director General of MI6. White instructed Martin to inform Hollis that Mitchell was a suspect, and Hollis instructed Martin after due consideration to keep Mitchell under surveillance. West implies that this was a deliberate ploy to keep tabs on both Mitchell and Hollis. Much of the investigation was centred around the interviews with Anthony Blunt at that time, and Peter Wright had amassed a sizable amount of taped evidence from Blunt when Martin returned from suspension. After 1956, Blunt gradually confessed his double-agent role in exchange for immunity from prosecution. By then, some time after Hollis had retired, suspicion had lifted from Mitchell and focused solely on Hollis. Pincher published an updated version of his book in 1988. Pincher also accused Hollis of being a Soviet agent, although entirely separate from the Cambridge Five spy ring. Evidence has been advanced to support these assertions by Pincher in his book, *Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups*: Hollis was asked to come in and clear up the allegations. Having been the director, Hollis was aware of the procedures of the interrogation and investigation. He remained calm and composed throughout, denying all allegations. Wright retired in January 1963, upon reaching age 60, and, by his own account, was enraged at being denied a pension for his 30 years of service, on highly legalistic and technical grounds. He emigrated to Tasmania, Australia, where he wrote an account of his work at MI5. Among the evidence for this claim is the Igor Gouzenko defection, at Ottawa in 1951. Hollis was sent to Canada to interview Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. May was a scientist and part of the Soviet spy ring which obtained the secrets of the Manhattan Project, which built the first atomic bomb for the United States. Gouzenko noted that the man who met him seemed to be in disguise, not interested in his revelations, and discouraged him from further disclosures. In view of this circumstantial evidence, Wright became convinced that Hollis was a traitor. Gouzenko also admitted that he, being a lower level clerk, had no access to such files. Ward committed suicide on 3 August 1957 as the Profumo scandal progressed. He claims he has proved conclusively that Hollis was not a double agent and that Wright was misguided at best. They published a report and chronology. He has described how the Soviets themselves were baffled by the allegations against Hollis[20] Later life Peter Wright in *Spycatcher* asserts that Hollis and his secretary Val Hammond were carrying on a long-standing affair while both were at MI5. Hammond, according to Wright, was eligible for promotion at many points during her long service, including non-clerical positions related to intelligence analysis, but she consistently refused the opportunity to move to higher positions in MI5 to stay close to Hollis. Hollis and Hammond were married after Hollis divorced his first wife, Eve, in 1951. She was the daughter of a prosperous solicitor from Burnham-on-Sea in Somerset. The couple had one son, Adrian Swayne Hollis. Hollis divorced his first wife in 1951 and married his MI5 secretary, with whom he had carried on a long-standing affair. *Philosopher Martin Hollis* was his nephew. Random House Publishing Group. Retrieved 21 January 2007.

**Chapter 5 : Debating the Case of Roger Hollis – Quadrant Online**

*For readers of Legacy of Ashes comes an extraordinary and immensely readable account of six disastrous decades of Soviet espionage – from noted intelligence authority Chapman Pincher. This landmark book is a massive, meticulous, and utterly riveting account of the duplicity and incompetence that characterized twentieth-century Soviet espionage and the British response to it.*

On returning from abroad: It was Lord Avon, rather than Lord Stockton, who appointed Hollis as Director-General of the Security Service in 1956, and I am reluctant to believe that Eden, sick as he then was, could have made such an elementary mistake as to appoint a Soviet agent head of MI5. It was Macmillan who, in the pink of health, publicly exonerated Kim Philby in the House of Commons from any suggestion of having been a Soviet agent, for reasons best known to himself. One rejoices in the fact that both former prime ministers are so well, ten and 23 years later, although Wilson seems to have carried a strange grudge against the Security Service with him into his retirement. One rejoices, too, that Mrs Thatcher seems to have survived her recent minor operation, just as President Reagan survived his, without resigning. In fact believe Hollis to have been complete innocent and that Mr Chapman Pincher's energies would be better spent investigating the motives of those anxious to incriminate Hollis as a Soviet agent, but my point on this occasion is a different one. It is that the New Britons are a peculiarly odious race, and it is hard to feel much patriotic involvement with them. There were no football fans on board or at any rate none identified himself as such – and only a small sprinkling of drunken louts of the type we have come to accept as part of the price we must all pay for being allowed to drink at all. Children were the most obvious horror – whining, moaning, clinging to their unattractive, harassed parents and stuffing horrible food into their mouths, non-stop, throughout the four-hour crossing. Even worse, when one came to examine them, were the parents – all trying to look like teachers, and reading in special, patronising voices to their loathsome children out of whatever sanitised rubbish had been approved by the local library sub-committees on race relations, on women, on heterosexism and on animal welfare – not to mention the local committee of Women against Violence against Women, union leaders and representatives of other minority groups – as suitable for reading to British kiddies. But if the children were terrible – a new survey reveals that a quarter of British children between the ages of eight and fifteen are now given £20 a week or more in pocket money – and the parents were even worse, the worst of the lot were the Young People. By some extraordinarily malevolent arrangement between British Rail and the railways of Europe, our Young. Every train in Europe is full of them, always asleep, more often than not in the corridors. Talking to a group of them, I realised that they practically never left the trains and when they did they never left the station. One group had been to Munich, where there were cockroaches in the station waiting room, to Venice, where the coffee in the buffet was overpriced, to Zagreb station, which scored highest for hot dogs, to Vienna, Barcelona and Paris, leaving the railway stations only at Venice, to visit a pizza bar, and Toulouse, to visit a steakhouse. For the rest, they just slept, or tried to sleep, making rail travel extremely disagreeable for everyone else. This long complaint about my fellow-countrymen would be merely self-indulgent and otiose if there were not one more observation to add – that they seemed to feel the same about me and about themselves. There has been a revival of figurative painting, he moans, of narrative poetry, a re-emphasis on conventional, naturalistic fiction. I have not noticed them. Is it really possible that after 65 years the artistic establishment is going to come to its senses and stop arsing around with jokes which were stale 40 years ago? Even if the desire to start again could be kindled, the skills have been lost. No, the only glimmer of hope which I can see lies in our attitude to each other as revealed by the travellers on the Sealink ferry. It is not just that we are quite right to regard each other with indifference, or mild loathing, or disgust. The fact that we do so reveals that we have not yet quite lost the critical intelligence which once distinguished us. That must be our talisman for the future.

*THE STRANGE BEHAVIOR OF ROGER HOLLIS. His book *Their Trade Is Treachery*, which first charged Sir Roger Hollis with being a Soviet agent, was a sensation.*

August 11, Kenneth Reich Reich is a Times staff writer. Because it consists for almost its entire length solely of thumbnail biographical sketches and analyses of the leading figures in the world of espionage over the last several decades. Sometimes these run a couple of pages. More often, they run only a few paragraphs. Then the rest of the book is very brief descriptions of the leading intelligence services around the world and the most important intelligence techniques. There is no plot. It is encyclopedic in style. But, in fact, of several books on the subject of espionage reviewed lately, this is the most satisfactory. The authors, foreign correspondents for the Sunday Telegraph and the Daily Telegraph of London, are careful, responsible, not at all given to hyperbole, and above all, realistic. They are also able to say a good deal in a few words. What emerges is a useful primer, for those who enjoy reading about spying--a nice reference book to have at their side. Since so many espionage books appear to be wild flights of fancy, it is particularly valuable to have such a sober, no-nonsense compilation of responsible consensus as to what has happened in the key situations. Not all the sketches are of high quality. The one, for example, of J. But for the most part, there is fascinating material here and when there is more than one respected point of view, both are given. Ronald Payne and Christopher Dobson are not pedantic either. They do, when appropriate, display a restrained, sardonic sense of humor. Their one-and-a-half page exploration, incidentally, of the strange case of Sir Roger Hollis, late director-general of MI5 in British intelligence, is thought provoking. It may be recalled that the respected British espionage expert, Chapman Pincher, recently argued in a compelling book that Hollis was a Soviet spy. Here, the authors give this a balanced examination, but they point to another fascinating possibility.

**Chapter 7 : Roger\_Hollis-KNOWPIA**

*Roger Hollis is within the scope of WikiProject Espionage, which aims to improve Wikipedia's coverage of espionage, intelligence, and related calendrierdelascience.com you would like to participate, visit the project page, or contribute to the discussion.*

His mother was a daughter of a Canon of Wells Cathedral. From the spring of 1941, he attended Worcester College, Oxford, where he read English, but left without completing his degree. From 1 April 1941, he worked for British American Tobacco. In 1942, he transferred to Beijing. Soviet Naval Attache Eugene Ivanov was also involved with Keeler at this time, in the early 1940s, and sought to learn the date of American plans to arm nuclear warheads in West Germany, from Profumo through Keeler. Profumo had to resign in mid-1948, and the resulting scandal did much to bring the Labour Party to power in the October General Election. Although many such failures were subsequently blamed on the actions of such self-confessed or defected agents as Philby, Guy Burgess, and Anthony Blunt, a number of failures occurred after all three had lost their access to secret information. Some in MI5 concluded the Soviets had an agent in a very senior position within the organisation. Peter Wright, Arthur S. Martin, Jane Sissmore and others became convinced that either Hollis or his deputy, Graham Mitchell, could be the only ones responsible, eventually confiding their suspicions to their former DG, Dick White, who was, by that time, Director General of MI6. White instructed Martin to inform Hollis that Mitchell was a suspect, and Hollis instructed Martin after due consideration to keep Mitchell under surveillance. West implies that this was a deliberate ploy to keep tabs on both Mitchell and Hollis. Much of the investigation was centred around the interviews with Anthony Blunt at that time, and Peter Wright had amassed a sizable amount of taped evidence from Blunt when Martin returned from suspension. After 1951, Blunt gradually confessed his double-agent role in exchange for immunity from prosecution. By then, some time after Hollis had retired, suspicion had lifted from Mitchell and focused solely on Hollis. Pincher published an updated version of his book in 1988. Pincher also accused Hollis of being a Soviet agent, although entirely separate from the Cambridge Five spy ring. Evidence has been advanced to support these assertions by Pincher in his book, *Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups*: Hollis was asked to come in and clear up the allegations. Having been the director, Hollis was aware of the procedures of the interrogation and investigation. He remained calm and composed throughout, denying all allegations. Wright retired in January 1952, upon reaching age 60, and, by his own account, was enraged at being denied a pension for his 30 years of service, on highly legalistic and technical grounds. He emigrated to Tasmania, Australia, where he wrote an account of his work at MI5. Among the evidence for this claim is the Igor Gouzenko defection, at Ottawa in 1951. Hollis was sent to Canada to interview Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. May was a scientist and part of the Soviet spy ring which obtained the secrets of the Manhattan Project, which built the first atomic bomb for the United States. Gouzenko noted that the man who met him seemed to be in disguise, not interested in his revelations, and discouraged him from further disclosures. In view of this circumstantial evidence, Wright became convinced that Hollis was a traitor. Gouzenko also admitted that he, being a lower level clerk, had no access to such files. Ward committed suicide on 3 August 1951 as the Profumo scandal progressed. He claims he has proved conclusively that Hollis was not a double agent and that Wright was misguided at best. They published a report and chronology. He has described how the Soviets themselves were baffled by the allegations against Hollis [20] Later life[ edit ] Peter Wright in *Spycatcher* asserts that Hollis and his secretary Val Hammond were carrying on a long-standing affair while both were at MI5. Hammond, according to Wright, was eligible for promotion at many points during her long service, including non-clerical positions related to intelligence analysis, but she consistently refused the opportunity to move to higher positions in MI5 to stay close to Hollis. Hollis and Hammond were married after Hollis divorced his first wife, Eve, in 1952. She was the daughter of a prosperous solicitor from Burnham-on-Sea in Somerset. The couple had one son, Adrian Swayne Hollis. Hollis divorced his first wife in 1952 and married his MI5 secretary, with whom he had carried on a long-standing affair. Philosopher Martin Hollis "â€” was his nephew. Random House Publishing Group. Retrieved 21 January 2007

**Chapter 8 : Roger Hollis - Wikispooks**

*The Strange Behavior of Roger Hollis p. In a New World p. A Mystery Resolved p. Blind Eye to Elli p. The Denigration of Igor Gouzenko p.*

More Fact[ edit ] Not to complain, but while the allegations against the man are very interesting, and could be true, to date there has been no verification of the fact that he is a spy I mean, what if he was innocent? A lifetime of service rewarded only by the question of his loyalty? Certainly he was a spy, what is disputed is if he was a MOLE. Evaluate the possibilities and make your choice Almost all the sources are sources which claim he was a mole. But the claim that the head of MI5 was a Soviet mole is really a fringe theory. This is mentioned in "Spycatcher", by Peter Wright, page , as being volunteered by Hollis himself to Wright. It was virtually unheard of in the s and s for any young Western-based chess player to travel to the Soviet Union to compete regularly or for training. Britain was very far behind Soviet standards in chess at that time. The unwritten implication is: Perhaps a new angle of inquiry here. Taken together with the "is he a traitor or just plain incompetent" results of most of his operations, it certainly looks pretty suspicious. We are all more or less six degrees of separation from everyone else. To say people are a security risk because they have broad interests and experiences is stupid. It was an intelligence service, not an unintelligence service. There is strong suspicions on his activities there and after. Had this been known at the time of his joining MI5, it would have rung alarm bells then. David J Johnson talk Did that exclude him? Should it have excluded him? I have read Spycatcher, and was impressed by the lack of logic. The evidence is mounting!!! But, unfortunately, in the words of my late father, it is "evidence of nothing in particular". It was only when investigative reporters looked into his background that they came to light. Please also keep your comments to the article subject and stop totally unnecessary comments and POV regarding your late father. Thank you, David J Johnson talk Hollis seems to only be accused of "associations", "mixing in circles" - not of beliefs or activities. Hollis was suspected as a possible mole because of the number of cases that went wrong, that could not be attributed to any of the other defectors. I would also remind you that the Trend Report, looking at case long afterwards, could not come-up with a definitive answer - one way or the other. There was no final evidence that Hollis was guilty or innocent. I believe the article and Talk page as it stands is neutral and mentions all known details and is certainly not in need of some of the silly and POV comments recently made here. Petrus Magnus talk Sorry, but this info is not correct. Regards, David J Johnson talk This was in about There is no evidence that they shared all their agents or activities. He was one of the most senior members of MI5 but he was also somewhat paranoid. To get a sense of Peter Wright and how he saw the world I have put together some bits of him being interviewed in the s about another of his conspiracy theories. He had no hard evidence for this - but he was driven by an underlying mind-set that was going to spread throughout much of the intelligence agencies - and journalism - over the next twenty years. This said that if you imagined the other side was doing something devilish and deceptive - then they probably were. It meant that in the dark world of intelligence, imagination was more powerful than obvious facts. It was a fevered romantic view of the world that would both entrance the readers of newspapers - but would also lead the intelligence agencies into the disaster of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in Here is the granddaddy of that conviction - Peter Wright. The person called Angleton he refers to was an even odder American equivalent of Wright who was high up in the CIA - and who also was convinced Wilson was a Soviet agent. But as in all organisations - egos started to come into play. Other MI5 agents started leaking other names to other journalists. Nigel upped the stakes. He began to publish books and articles alleging that all sorts of other people had been traitors. Here he is on Nationwide in in full flow. He says that a man called Leo Long was a traitor, and then goes on to suggest that others - including even the former Governor of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen - might be traitors. When he was an undergraduate at Cambridge in the s Cohen had been a member of an intellectual society called The Apostles. So had two of the spies - Burgess and Blunt. The interviewer asks Nigel how he knows Sir Andrew might be a traitor. But Nigel does have a fabulous haircut The journalists who had started the mole-hunt went to war. He was a man called Graham Mitchell who in his spare time was a grand master in correspondence chess.

Conspiracy theories have always been a staple of the yellow press, but the truth about the Secret Service threatened national security, perhaps? The article, as it is, states exactly what happened in the s, giving the sources with inline citations for all allegations. The reader is entitled to get as much pertinent info as possible and to make up his own mind. Chapman Pincher has a long record in exposing shortcomings in the security services and has been proved right on many occasions. The fact that both the heads of MI5 and MI6 felt that the Hollis case was worthy of further investigation is surely proof that there were doubts about his loyalty. That is why he was called back from retirement to face questioning, though the outcome was inconclusive. All sources agree that with the retirement of Hollis the evidence of penetration ceased. It is unfair to single-out Pincher and Wright as the main accusers: Whilst I feel that the article could be tidied-up, the basic facts contained therein are correct and it is left for the reader to decide the pros and cons of the case against Hollis. Finally and frankly, I suspect the motives of the "editor" who has raised the matter, without any further confirmed new information. Regards, David J Johnson talk I will now check which tags were added as a result and remove them. Readers of this site should be aware that it contains many, many factual inaccuracies and the views expressed by Adam Curtis appear to be based on a very superficial understanding of how intelligence agencies work, the limits under which they operate, and even a basic understanding of specific cases. His often gratuitous comments reveal that his ignorance, for example, of the purpose of positive vetting, which is not to catch spies, but to prevent individuals with certain disadvantages from gaining access to classified information. Two central issues arise: Firstly, research of the most recent declassification of MI5 files from before the First World War show that although William le Queux may have exaggerated the scale of current German espionage, there was a major clandestine offensive underway, centred on Mrs Emily Riley and her four daughters. The investigations conducted by Chatham and Sheerness led to the exposure of a very large spy-ring, and Nicholas Hiley is quite wrong in the assessment quoted by Curtis. I would be happy to provide chapter and verse of the specific errors if requested. Sorry to see some interesting material missing. I believe the reason for the information on the Hollis grave was that it was taken from a blog and a blog is not considered a reliable source. However, the author of the "blog" is a respected writer on many subjects. My view is that it should re-instated, especially if the information appeared in a newspaper of record - plus, if true, it is important information in the whole Hollis story. It has been more than a month without any comment in the other direction so I have reverted. But then, I guess, you knew that. Absolutely agree that this information should be included. Regards, David, David J Johnson talk This is not a reliable source and the information he provides is not notable. His source of information about the grave is an old man in a pub. He has apparently made no attempt to check the facts with the Hollis family, the church, or the "Establishment" that he claims somehow organised the funeral. Many people who are cremated do not have marked graves. They have their ashes scattered, etc. However, Morgans uses this to argue that Hollis was a traitor, and compares him to Heinrich Himmler etc. Morgans was obviously on the hunt for anything incriminating, and even thinks that the fact that Hollis lived in "Primrose Cottage" is suspicious. Well, they were both foreign correspondents in Shanghai. How many conservatives did Hollis apparently associate with in his life? The fact that Nicholas Elliott had gone to Beirut to confront Philby was apparently irrelevant. During the s and s, a large number of MI5 operations failed in circumstances that suggested the Soviets had been tipped off. Is that the best explanation??? He was a very secretive man and MI5 had very little information about many aspects of his past, particularly his years in China. Peter Wright in Spycatcher asserts that Hollis and his secretary Val Hammond were carrying on a long-standing affair while both were at MI5. Hammond, according to Wright, was eligible for promotion at many points during her long service, including non-clerical positions related to intelligence analysis, but she consistently refused the opportunity to move to higher positions in MI5 to stay close to Hollis. Maybe Hollis had sex with his wife. OK, so did Morgans have a seance with a black cat and a blind owl before coming up with this revelation??? A lot of this article is speculation, rumour, and innuendo.

**Chapter 9 : Martin Hollis (philosopher) | Revolv**

*The first, led by Peter Wright, the former M15 officer in exile in Australia, holds that 'Elli' was the late Sir Roger Hollis, director general of M15 from to , and that Hollis was a Soviet penetration agent of status equal to, if not higher than, Philby.*

Tweet Illustration by Michael Hogue Shortly before 1 p. Although dressed in the standard boxy dark suit and gabardine raincoat, Ivanov cut a striking figure even in that free-swinging era. There was a certain bustle about him, and he moved through the restaurant with a simian lope, all flashing gray eyes, crinkly dark hair, tufted mustache, and abounding predatory energy. He looked like a Russian spy out of central casting, as interpreted by Groucho Marx. Ivanov was there to talk about the Cuban missile crisis, which had entered an ominous new phase that morning when 19 destroyers of the U. Second Fleet took up stations in an arc around the island, with orders to turn back ships found to be carrying offensive weapons. The world held its breath: The two had met some years earlier when they had happened to find themselves sleeping if not concurrently with the same partner. Both women were, as the jargon of the time had it, of doubtful reputation. These arrangements took on a new layer of complexity one night in July , when Ward held a garden party at Cliveden, the English country estate owned by the Astors, where he rented a summer cottage. He met Keeler for the first time when she emerged nude from the Cliveden swimming pool to demurely shake his hand. Perhaps not surprisingly, they, too, had entered into a relationship, which thus brought a national-security dimension to the proceedings. This was the man who now sat down to lunch with the libidinous Soviet diplomat whom, he thought, might be preparing to defect to the West. He had all the details. He knew the facts and figures. According to the American diplomatic correspondent Elie Abel, author of a bestselling book on the Cuban crisis, Ivanov told Ward that the US had created a dangerous situation, they were on a collision course with the Russians, and neither side could afford to lose face by seeking a compromise. The British alone could save world peace by calling an immediate summit conference in London. There would be great credit for Britain, Ivanov added, in demonstrating that she was not merely a pawn of Washington but a power capable of independent action for peace. Whether Ivanov really was in the confidence of the Kremlin, or just another of those plausible fantasists who tend to accumulate on the fringes of an international crisis, remains uncertain. We know this from a statement Macmillan himself made to the House of Commons nine months later. Part of this Soviet activity was public, some of it private â€¦ Ivanov, with the assistance of Mr Ward, was perhaps rather more persistent than most. On 24th October, Ward telephoned the Resident Clerk at the Foreign Office and gave him an account of a conversation he had just had with Ivanov, this to be passed on to me â€¦ Ivanov had told him, Ward said, that the Americans had created a situation in which there was no opportunity for either Americans or Russians to compromise, and that the Soviet government looked to the United Kingdom as their one hope of conciliation. At the time he made this statement, Macmillan had no way of knowing that the names Ivanov, Ward, Keeler, and especially Profumo would within weeks bring about his own downfall. Reinforcing the political insecurity of Britain in â€”a country still in thrall to a class system essentially unchanged since Edwardian times, led by an apparently decrepit year-old man known for his shuffling gait and grouse-moor plus-fours, yet where the likes of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones were now coming upâ€”was a series of security scandals that set the table for what became known as the Profumo affair. Some of the information was passed on in the form of microdots pasted into antique books that were mailed to Moscow. Even before the criminal trial and parliamentary investigating committee into that affair came about, there was the case of George Blake, who held the seemingly contradictory roles of being a senior officer of MI6 and an openly practicing Communist. Blake, too, was tried and found guilty of selling secrets to the USSR. He was given a year sentence, said by the press to represent one year for each of the agents killed when he betrayed them. Five years later, Blake escaped from prison with the help of some anti-nuclear campaigners who admired him. He later resurfaced, to some fanfare, in Moscow, and as of early he is still living there, aged 90, on a KGB pension. After his posting to Moscow, he had transferred to Naval Intelligence in London. Over the next five years, Vassall was able to abstract secret military documents and to photograph others until, in September , he

was arrested following a tip-off from the CIA and put on trial. There will be a great public outcry. Then the security services will not be praised for how efficient they are but blamed for how hopeless they are. There will then be an enquiry! There will be a terrible row in the press, there will be a debate in the House of Commons, the Government will probably fall. The press was not slow to seize on a story that had all the ingredients of a classic British political scandal—sex, espionage, and a possible connection to the highest rungs of the ruling establishment. Since, in fact, there were no sources—they had simply made the stories up—they could hardly have done otherwise. One need only think of the consensus media attitude to Richard Nixon in the final days of Watergate, with added prurience, to get the flavor. I have never understood this position, which is, however, sincerely held by many editors and journalists. The whole [series of scandals] led to a spate of questions, involving every crude variety of wink and insinuation. On April 4, Scotland Yard, apparently at the urging of Colonel Wigg, opened an investigation into Stephen Ward for living off immoral earnings—oddly enough, an offense in Britain only since The Labour opposition seized its opportunity. On May 24, Wigg and his colleague Harold Wilson wrote to Macmillan, enclosing a long letter from Ward—now rightly concerned that he was about to stand trial for pimping—in which he, too, alleged that Profumo had not told the truth in his statement to the Commons. Under continuing parliamentary pressure, Profumo admitted that perhaps he had slept with Christine Keeler after all. Ward himself had been arrested and charged with a variety of sexual offences, including keeping a brothel. No wonder the British press, in one of its cyclical fits of morality, saw the whole thing as a gift with which to attack a tired and corrupt government. There was even a transatlantic dimension to the affair. According to the journalist Seymour Hersch, Robert Kennedy used his considerable influence with the Hearst family, who owned the Journal-American, to spike the story. The scandal accelerated rapidly. With Profumo now disgraced and an object of public mirth, Macmillan was obliged to make an emergency statement in the House on June . He made it clear that he saw himself as a victim of events. Macmillan had won, but with his reputation for unflappable dignity in ruins. A Gallup Poll in July showed him at the nadir of his popularity, with a 35 percent approval rating, the lowest for a Prime Minister since Neville Chamberlain at the time of Munich. The next morning, while the defendant lay comatose in a hospital bed, the jury at the Old Bailey found him guilty of living on the immoral earnings of Keeler and Rice-Davies. Three days later, Ward died without having regained consciousness. People lined up the streets for it. That was, in effect, the end of the Profumo scandal, though its longer-term consequences included a disinclination among the British public ever to take politicians quite so seriously again. As a result, newspapers were free to abandon any vestiges of deference to the patrician establishment and quickly substituted the cocktail of sexual gossip and topless photographs that readers of British tabloids enjoy today. He lived until December , a few weeks short of his 93rd birthday. Now 70, she continues to publish a series of articles and books insisting that she wishes to be left alone. Mandy Rice-Davies converted to Judaism and opened a chain of successful nightclubs and restaurants in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. An alcoholic, he died insane in January , aged . But perhaps the most poignant post-scandal afterlife was that of John Profumo himself. Following his resignation, he simply disappeared from public life. One morning in December , Profumo knocked on the door of Toynbee Hall, a welfare center for down-and-outs in the east end of London, and asked if he could help in any way. He would remain there as a full-time volunteer, doing everything from cleaning the toilets to raising large sums of money for the disadvantaged, over the next 40 years. His wife Valerie, the once glamorous actress, also devoted herself to the charity until her death in . Profumo never publicly spoke about the scandal, preferring to take the flagrantly unfashionable view that it was all a private matter between him and his family. John Profumo died in March , at the age of . Christopher Sandford is a Seattle-based writer and the author, most recently, of *Masters of Mystery*: