

Chapter 1 : Full text of "THE WILL TO POWER - Nietzsche"

The will to power (German: der Wille zur Macht) is a prominent concept in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The will to power describes what Nietzsche may have believed to be the main driving force in humans - achievement, ambition, and the striving to reach the highest possible position in life.

As he explained to Elisabeth on November 8, Given that the original title appears as: Notwithstanding, the consequences of this revaluation must also be explicitly illustrated in the field of morality, philosophy, politics. She claimed that this text was substantially the magnum opus, which Nietzsche had hoped to write and name "The Will to Power, An Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values". This version was superseded in by an expanded second edition containing sections. This later compilation is what has come to be commonly known as The Will to Power. Heinz Wenzel would buy the rights of the complete works of Colli and Montinari 33 volumes in German after the French Gallimard edition and the Italian Adelphi editions. In fact, if Nietzsche did consider producing such a book, he had abandoned such plans in the months before his collapse. The title of The Will to Power, which appears for the first time at the end of the summer of 1888, was replaced by another plan at the end of August An Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values, the project under this title was set aside and some of its draft materials used to compose The Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist both written in 1888; the latter was for a time represented as the first part of a new four-part magnum opus, which inherited the subtitle Revaluation of All Values from the earlier project as its new title. So The Will to Power was not a text completed by Nietzsche, but rather an anthology of selections from his notebooks misrepresented as if it were something more. In fact, according to Montinari, not only did the Will To Power impose its own order on the fragments, but many individual fragments were themselves cut up or stitched together in ways not made clear to the reader. We wish only now that the new dawn brought on by this previously unpublished work will be the sign of a return to Nietzsche. Nietzsche did not write a completed magnum opus, a "Hauptwerk", but he planned to do so during at least the last 5 years of his active life. I will show that during and after the writing of Also sprach Zarathustra this was his main aim and ambition. The projected work passed through a number of related phases, of which the much discussed and controversial Will to Power was merely one. This intention to write a magnum opus has been denied or almost completely ignored by almost all commentators and even the many writers of Nietzsche biographies. It has been a failure of historians of philosophy, intellectual historians and Nietzsche scholars not to have taken this into consideration and account. An attempted transvaluation of all values. Books one and two". The complete works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Books three and four". Another translation was published by Kaufmann with Hollingdale in The Will to Power. The latest translation was published by Scarpitti and Hill for Penguin Classics:

Chapter 2 : The Will to Power (manuscript) - Wikipedia

The "will to power" is a central concept in the philosophy of 19th-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. It is best understood as an irrational force, found in all individuals, that can be channeled toward different ends.

Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht – und nichts ausserdem! This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! The crucial question is whether one is safe in assuming that the immense machinery of power that has resulted from activity of the utilitarian type can be made, on anything like present lines, to serve disinterested ends; whether it will not rather minister to the egoistic aims either of national groups or of individuals. To assert that man in a state of nature, or some similar state thus projected, is good, is to discredit the traditional controls in the actual world. Humility, conversion, decorum – all go by the board in favor of free temperamental overflow. Does man thus emancipated exude spontaneously an affection for his fellows that will be an effective counterpoise to the sheer expansion of his egoistic impulses? Unfortunately, the facts have persistently refused to conform to humanitarian theory. There has been an ever-growing body of evidence from the eighteenth century to the Great War that in the natural man, as he exists in the real world and not in some romantic dreamland, the will to power is, on the whole, more than a match for the will to service. To be sure, many remain unconvinced by this evidence. Stubborn facts, it has been rightly remarked, are as nothing compared with a stubborn theory. Altruistic theory is likely to prove peculiarly stubborn, because, probably more than any other theory ever conceived, it is flattering: Representative Writings , pp. Martin Buber , Between Man and Man , p. He overreaches himself, the work denies itself to him, the incarnation of the spirit no longer takes place, and to avoid the threat of senselessness he snatches after empty power. This sickness casts the genius on to the same level as those hysterical figures who, being by nature without power, slave for power, in order that they may enjoy the illusion that they are inwardly powerful, and who in this striving for power cannot let a pause intervene, since a pause would bring with it the possibility of self-reflection and self-reflection would bring collapse. The reduction of man to an object of experiment, the rule that specifies the relation between the will to power and man as an object, the sealed laboratory that is the scene of this monstrous experiment, are lessons which the theoreticians of power will discover again when they come to organizing the age of slavery. Albert Camus , The Rebel, A. If life itself is will to power, it is itself the ground, principium , of valuation. The World as Will to Power , p.

Chapter 3 : Society and the Individual in Nietzsche's The Will to Power

New to Penguin Classics, The Will to Power contains some of Nietzsche's most fascinating and combative writings on nihilism, metaphysics and the future of Europe. Assembled by Nietzsche's sister after his death, The Will to Power is a collection of the philosopher's reflections and theories taken from his unpublished notebooks.

At the same time, however, there are a number of ideas herein which an understanding of his other works can help illuminate. Whether a person is giving gifts, claiming to be in love with someone, giving someone praise, or physically harming someone, the psychological motive is the same: This presupposition entails that all human beings are ultimately and exclusively egoistic by nature. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, there are no truly altruistic actions. The will to power is not, however, limited to the psychology of human beings. Rather, it is the underlying noemenal reality of the universe, which manifests itself in various ways in everything and everyone. Growth, self-preservation, domination, and upward mobility are some of the basic elements of this will, which everything in the world exhibits, according to Nietzsche. Ideas and representations are the outward manifestations of the "Will," while the "Will" itself is the inner nature or essence of the universe. This "Will," according to Schopenhauer, is never satisfied. Once one desire is satisfied, it merely gives rise to another, and then another, and so on. The "Will" is thus the source of all of the evil and suffering in the world. These ideas lead Schopenhauer to adopt a life-denying view of the world, since it contains nothing but suffering and the burden of satisfying unrelenting desires. So, as Nietzsche concludes in the very last lines of *The Will to Power*: A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? And you yourselves are also this will to power--and nothing besides! States act in ways toward each other for which individuals do not have the strength or courage, because states do not feel responsible for their actions as do individuals. The external behavior of the state is that of conquest and war, acting in accordance with the will to power. It instills in its people values such as obedience, duty, and patriotism, while it outwardly exudes values such as strength, pride, and revenge. In other words, they cannot exert their will to power in the violent ways which they otherwise would naturally. Instead, the will to power can be found in individuals in certain disguised forms, as we will see when the will to power as individual is explicated. Feelings of potential guilt and fear of punishment whether institutional or in a life beyond for breaking moral and legal rules prevent them from acting in such a manner. The state, however, is not bound by Judeo-Christian-type moral duties and imperatives, so it is therefore unrestrained in the exertion of its will to power, which comes in the natural forms of violence and conquest. It seems then, that Nietzsche is trying to say that the violence inherent in the way a society exerts its will to power is evidence that the true nature of man is one of violence also. Other than that, however, their views differ considerably. Nietzsche seems to approve of the violent conquest of others while Noam Chomsky, of course, does not. What Nietzsche certainly does not approve of, however, is the fact that the state suppresses the natural, violent instincts of the individual to acquire power in an effort to keep one at the level of the herd. This keeping-in-check of the individual is done through the aforementioned values which are instilled and enforced by the overwhelming power of the state which represents the herd. Those who do try to act upon these instincts are branded as criminals and are removed from society. Therefore, in this respect, all truly great men, according to Nietzsche, are criminals in some respect, in that they are individuals who are courageous enough to act in a way that goes against the conformity of the herd. Crime belongs to the concept "revolt against the social order. A rebel can be a miserable and contemptible man; but there is nothing contemptible in a revolt as such--and to be a rebel in view of contemporary society does not in itself lower the value of a man. There are even cases in which one might have to honor a rebel, because he finds something in our society against which war ought to be waged--he awakens us from our slumber. The criminal points out something about society that is in need of change, helping to jolt the rest of us out of our complacency. The concept of "punishment" for criminals then, simply amounts to the "suppression of a revolt," 6 in that it is nothing more than an attempt to maintain the mediocre status quo of the herd by imprisoning or in some cases, executing those who deviate from it. That the society looks upon the punished in a derogatory manner is a terrible

mistake to Nietzsche. Punishment, in ancient times, was meant as a way to purify someone; to make them feel as if their debt to society had been paid. The suffering of a punishment was something which was done willingly, in order to help one to feel a sense of relief and restored dignity. Today, however, punishment does not purify in this manner; rather it heaps more indignity upon the individual due to the derogatory aspects it has taken on in modern society. Nietzsche attributes this derogatory evaluation of punishment to a time when it "became associated with contemptible men. For doing so does not help the criminal to be less of a contemptible man: One can enhance only those men whom one does not treat with contempt; moral contempt causes greater indignity and harm than any crime. In this way, society the herd keeps its individuals strongly in check. Specifically, those who are punished are looked upon with moral contempt even after they have served their sentences. Once one gets out of jail, he is simply referred to as an "ex-con," and carries around with him a police record of his past transgressions against society for the rest of his life. Every time such a person fills out a job application, he must answer the question: Nietzsche argues further that finding a punishment which will cause as much suffering as the suffering inflicted by the criminal is impossible, since every criminal experiences different degrees of pain and pleasure. Being that it is not possible to measure these degrees, how are we supposed to determine a punishment for such a person which would be fitting for the nature of the crime? Nietzsche suggests here that the institution of punishment thus fails to do what it sets out to do, in that it cannot possibly provide punishments which offer the same amount of pain to the criminal as the crime did to its victim. All this seems to suggest to Nietzsche that punishment as a practice should be abolished, but at the same time, he laments that it would be a great loss. By this statement, it is likely that he means it would be a loss of the pleasure one gets in being able to inflict suffering on those who have wronged one, as he discusses in *On The Genealogy of Morals*, second essay, section five: They were legally given free reign to cut off as much as they felt would satisfy their loss. Overall, however, Nietzsche sees the criminalization of those who go against the grain as simply the herd keeping people down to their level through the use of the state. Schopenhauer wanted rascals to be castrated and silly geese to be shut up in convents: The rascal has this advantage over many other men, that he is not mediocre; and the fool has this advantage over us, that he does not suffer at the sight of mediocrity. It would be more desirable that the gulf should be made wider; so rascality and folly should increase. In this way human nature would be expanded--But, after all, this is dictated by necessity; it does not depend on whether we desire it or not. Socialism, democracy, and anarchism all rest on the idea that there are no great or superior individuals, and therefore Nietzsche rejects them all. These forms of society represent nothing more than the rule of the herd; the rule of mediocrity. Nietzsche rejects such forms of society in favor of the aristocratic ideal, which values a higher form of man; a model for society which does in fact demonstrate a belief in great and talented individuals and an elite class. For here the herd does not have any power, and therefore does not keep in check those who stand out among them who deserve rank and recognition, or in other words, individuals are free to act upon their will to power in the natural ways. The blaming of others for the condition that one happens to be in is nothing more than the act of searching for a scapegoat. People feel this need to find others responsible for their miserable condition because they do not want to feel as though there is no reason that they are what they are. Nietzsche attributes this practice to the Christian instinct for revenge. This instinct has taken the innocence out of existence itself, in that it has attempted to find responsibility for everything in some past intentional act. A psychological presupposition thus arose that every action has a conscious origin, and that a punishment is thus appropriate. Nietzsche sees this idea as a product of the priestly class, who wanted to invent a right for themselves to take revenge upon those who were their oppressors. The fact of the matter, as Nietzsche claims, is that no one is responsible for the situation into which a person finds oneself born, or the qualities that a person has: We others, who desire to restore innocence to becoming, would like to be the missionaries of a cleaner idea: There is no being that could be held responsible for the fact that anyone exists at all, that anyone is thus and thus, that anyone was born in certain circumstances, in a certain environment. *The Will to Power as Individual within Society* Nietzsche takes it to be a fundamental error to place the goal of society in the masses, and not in the individual, as democracy and socialism do. He also considers it a mistake to treat sympathy as the most valuable trait in human beings, because, as he clearly states in section

seven of *The Antichrist*, pity asks for the multiplication of suffering I take Nietzsche to be using pity and sympathy interchangeably enough. It helps foster the herd, by guiltling us into helping to preserve those who would otherwise perish of their weakness and life-denying attitudes. The most redeeming quality of humans is, of course, their instinctive will to power. The "ego" subdues and kills: It wants to regenerate itself--pregnancy. It wants to give birth to its god and see all mankind at his feet. It takes much more than that: Every living thing reaches out as far from itself with its force as it can, and overwhelms what is weaker: The increasing "humanizing" of this tendency consists in this, that there is an ever subtler sense of how hard it is really to incorporate another: The individual also has this "subtler sense" that physical violence alone will most likely make others resentful and indignant toward us, and may actually drive them farther away from being truly under our power. Rather, the ego learns to find other ways to exert its will to power than through the violent or forceful domination of others. No matter what type of situation individuals find themselves in, their will to power comes through in some way or another. The first of these disguised forms of the will to power is a desire for freedom, independence, and peace. What this is at bottom, according to Nietzsche, is simply the will toward self-preservation and existence in general. One wants peace and independence so that one is not at risk from the possibly violent actions of others. Also, one does not want to become enslaved or subjugated by others. The second disguised form is that which Nietzsche calls enrollment. This form involves submission to those in power in order to acquire a certain aspect of control over them. One simply does what his superior asks and does it to the best of his ability, so much that his superior begins to see him as vital and irreplaceable. Love is also a form of enrollment, according to Nietzsche, in that it is also a way in which one gains control over the other person, while at the same time appearing to be submissive. The way in which Nietzsche talks about love is also one of the many examples of his poor attitude toward women. We are already aware that Nietzsche sees sympathy and pity as weaknesses, but he also lumps love in with this assessment as well. He looks upon women as the epitome of these "weaknesses," and often refers to love and sympathy as "effeminate" virtues. Nietzsche attributes to women exclusively, it seems, this use of love as a cunning way to gain control of others. Or is it not rather to an unbridled urge? It is strange that he does not attribute love to people in general; rather just women. Anyhow, a third disguised form of the will to power is that of a sense of duty and conscience in which one feels a type of superiority over those who are really in power. Here one, or rather a group, creates and abides by a new set of values to which they hold even those who are in power accountable.

Chapter 4 : Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Will to Power - PhilPapers

"It is a self-deception of philosophers and moralists to imagine that they escape decadence by opposing it. That is beyond their will; and, however little they acknowledge it, one later discovers that they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence."

Schopenhauer puts a central emphasis on will and in particular has a concept of the "will to live". Writing a generation before Nietzsche, he explained that the universe and everything in it is driven by a primordial will to live, which results in a desire in all living creatures to avoid death and to procreate. For Schopenhauer, this will is the most fundamental aspect of reality – more fundamental even than being. Roux was a disciple of and influenced by Ernst Haeckel [7] who believed the struggle for existence occurred at the cellular level. The various cells and tissue struggle for finite resources, so that only the strongest survive. Through this mechanism, the body grows stronger and better adapted. Some believe [citation needed] the theory lacks modern genetic theory and assumes a Lamarckian or pangenetic model of inheritance, thus making the theory plausible at the time. Elsewhere in *The Gay Science* he notes that it is only "in intellectual beings that pleasure, displeasure, and will are to be found", [9] excluding the vast majority of organisms from the desire for power. Dumont believed that pleasure is related to increases in force. The concept, at this point, was no longer limited to only those intellectual beings that can actually experience the feeling of power; it now applied to all life. The phrase *Wille zur Macht* first appears in part 1, "Goals", then in part 2, in two sections, "Self-Overcoming" and "Redemption" later in *There is will to power where there is life* and even the strongest living things will risk their lives for more power. This suggests that the will to power is stronger than the will to survive. Rolph was another evolutionary anti-Darwinist like Roux, who wished to argue for evolution by a different mechanism than the struggle for existence. Rolph argued that all life seeks primarily to expand itself. Organisms fulfill this need through assimilation, trying to make as much of what is found around them into part of themselves, for example by seeking to increase intake and nutriment. Life forms are naturally insatiable in this way. Nietzsche writes, *Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals* Nietzsche wrote a letter to Franz Overbeck about it, noting that it has "been sheepishly put aside by Darwinists". He called the seat of heritability the *idioplasma*, and argued, with a military metaphor, that a more complex, complicatedly ordered *idioplasma* would usually defeat a simpler rival. Nonetheless, in his notebooks he continues to expand the theory of the will to power. The idea of matter as centers of force is translated into matter as centers of will to power. Nietzsche wanted to slough off the theory of matter, which he viewed as a relic of the metaphysics of substance. It does recur in his notebooks, but not all scholars treat these ideas as part of his thought. Here, the will to power as a potential physics is integrated with the postulated eternal recurrence. Taken literally as a theory for how things are, Nietzsche appears to imagine a physical universe of perpetual struggle and force that repeatedly completes its cycle and returns to the beginning. But others, such as Paul Loeb, have argued that "Nietzsche did indeed believe in the truth of cosmological eternal recurrence. For example, Nietzsche claims the "world is the will to power" and nothing besides! Some interpreters also upheld a biological interpretation of the *Wille zur Macht*, making it equivalent with some kind of social Darwinism. This reading was criticized by Martin Heidegger in his courses on Nietzsche – suggesting that raw physical or political power was not what Nietzsche had in mind. I have found strength where one does not look for it: The powerful natures dominate, it is a necessity, they need not lift one finger. Even if, during their lifetime, they bury themselves in a garden house! Both Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze were careful to point out that the primary nature of will to power is unconscious. This means that the drive to power is always already at work unconsciously, perpetually advancing the will of the one over the other. This thus creates the state of things in the observable or conscious world still operating through the same tension. Derrida is careful not to confine the will to power to human behavior, the mind, metaphysics, nor physical reality individually. It is the underlying life principle inaugurating all aspects of life and behavior, a self-preserving force. A sense of entropy and the eternal return, which are related, is always indissociable from the will to power. The eternal return of all memory initiated by the will to power is an entropic force again inherent to all life. My idea is that

every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force its will to power and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement "union" with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: And the process goes on. While a rock, for instance, does not have a conscious or unconscious "will", it nevertheless acts as a site of resistance within the "will to power" dynamic. The "will to power" is thus a "cosmic" inner force acting in and through both animate and inanimate objects. Not just instincts but also higher level behaviors even in humans were to be reduced to the will to power. This includes both such apparently[need quotation to verify] harmful acts as physical violence , lying, and domination, on one hand, and such apparently non-harmful acts as gift-giving, love , and praise on the otherâ€”though its manifestations can be altered significantly, such as through art and aesthetic experience. They suggest that, for Nietzsche, power means self-perfection as well as outward, political, elitist, aristocratic domination. Nietzsche, in fact, explicitly and specifically defined the egalitarian state-idea as the embodiment of the will to power in decline: One must indeed grant something even more unpalatable: That is why I speak of a will to meaning in contrast to the pleasure principle or, as we could also term it, the will to pleasure on which Freudian psychoanalysis is centered, as well as in contrast to the will to power stressed by Adlerian psychology. A quote from Thus Spoke Zarathustra is given when the technology is discovered by the player. The 4x strategy game Stellaris also includes a technology with this name. Der Wille zur Macht. On September 8th, , melodic death metal band Arch Enemy released an album entitled "Will to Power". In Smallville Season 1, Episode 17 , the Lex Luthor character reveals that his father gave him a copy of the book for his tenth birthday.

Chapter 5 : Nietzsche: The Will to power

The will to power is not, therefore, a will to political power, although this may be one form it can take. Instead, Nietzsche understands its greatest expression to be a genuine.

This concept refers to the overall dynamics of our instincts. Once there is life, there is will to power because life is only alive if it is intensified. The will to power is a laboratory test by which life is an artist, a designer, a conqueror. It is a field of experience: Therefore, it is clear to Nietzsche that life is a desire to increase. They are sick and want to destroy life. The Will to Power covers an extremely complex reality. It was firstly seen as a vital force that was not limited to animate the human beings only but would act at the same time in the world of the living things and that of matter. Conquering power only part of a growth perspective, this drive becomes increasingly ambivalent in Nietzsche. He considered then it can reverse its course upward and become decadent, even self-destructive. But this disease is dangerous because contagious. Is it possible to question the meaning of life? Search for meaning in life, or measure the value, assumed to have a standard, a reference that is external to life itself. The man in his lifetime may be outside of life, otherwise it is not he died. Nietzsche makes the finding in *The Twilight of the Idols*: Not a living because it is a party, and even in dispute, nor by a death, for any other reason. This does not mean that we have a view, a worldview, but it will always be under the influence of our interpretation. Thus, Nietzsche is no revelation. No transcendent truth is waiting for us somewhere in the world behind. Nor does the order itself. It is a human product, for the world, before being interpreted, is chaotic: Judging from the perspective of our reason, it is unfortunate that the shots are the rule, exceptions are not the secret purpose and all the chime repeats eternally its air, which does not deserve to be called a melody. Thus the world as it stands before us, is our image. Moreover, the concepts of chaos and order do not escape representation. There are human in all reality, with all the diversity that leads because everyone is different from its neighbor. However, Nietzsche distinguishes a universal principle, which applies to all people, but to all living beings, and the plant world, and why not to matter as a whole: We are expanding, growing, for example in the first part of our lives, and also age throughout our lives. In a more general, life does not stabilize, it is moving toward the front. Only the end stop this progress. Nietzsche refers to this principle: Life, according to Nietzsche, consists in always wanting more. Life is more than the will to live, because we do not want what one already has. It is not only no longer an exclusive struggle for survival. In other words, it is not satisfied with what it is or what she has. Therefore survival is a demonstration of weakness is only to maintain a state. The will to power or force, is to extend or exceed what is, to achieve something stronger still. Even obedience and sacrifice his. Obey is to submit an order to take advantage of the power shared collective. We can not of course depart from the will to power. Nietzsche finds the value of life, the only sense that applies to all and therefore can not be faulted, however: However, it must be admitted that the will to power determines the rights, which suggests that it is instinctive and so, we would hardly different from the animal, being predestined by a natural force that no one can escape? Nietzsche says no, considering that the will to power, to respect rights, expressed in an order that has set. The agency man somehow things by giving them a meaning, and only he is the holder of this arrangement. It recognizes the human being a liability, even if it is not totally free. Moreover, when the will to power is violence, he blames it on low, that is to say to those who are unable to be strong by themselves, pushing them to grab and the energy of others. Nietzsche goes so far as to associate the will to power and giving.

Der Wille Zur Macht = The Will to Power, Friedrich Nietzsche The will to power (German: der Wille zur Macht) is a prominent concept in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Themes, Arguments, and Ideas The Nihilism of Contemporary Europe While most of his contemporaries looked on the late nineteenth century with unbridled optimism, confident in the progress of science and the rise of the German state, Nietzsche saw his age facing a fundamental crisis in values. Nietzsche rightly foresaw that people need to identify some source of meaning and value in their lives, and if they could not find it in science, they would turn to aggressive nationalism and other such salves. The last thing Nietzsche would have wanted was a return to traditional Christianity, however. Instead, he sought to find a way out of nihilism through the creative and willful affirmation of life.

The Doctrine of the Will to Power On one level, the will to power is a psychological insight: This will is stronger than the will to survive, as martyrs willingly die for a cause if they feel that associating themselves with that cause gives them greater power, and it is stronger than the will to sex, as monks willingly renounce sex for the sake of a greater cause. While the will to power can manifest itself through violence and physical dominance, Nietzsche is more interested in the sublimated will to power, where people turn their will to power inward and pursue self-mastery rather than mastery over others. An Indian mystic, for instance, who submits himself to all sorts of physical deprivation gains profound self-control and spiritual depth, representing a more refined form of power than the power gained by the conquering barbarian. On a deeper level, the will to power explains the fundamental, changing aspect of reality. According to Nietzsche, everything is in flux, and there is no such thing as fixed being. Matter is always moving and changing, as are ideas, knowledge, truth, and everything else. The will to power is the fundamental engine of this change. For Nietzsche, the universe is primarily made up not of facts or things but rather of wills. The idea of the human soul or ego is just a grammatical fiction, according to Nietzsche. Because change is a fundamental aspect of life, Nietzsche considers any point of view that takes reality to be fixed and objective, be it religious, scientific, or philosophical, as life denying. A truly life-affirming philosophy embraces change and recognizes in the will to power that change is the only constant in the world.

The Perspectivist Conception of Truth Nietzsche is critical of the very idea of objective truth. That we should think there is only one right way of considering a matter is only evidence that we have become inflexible in our thinking. A healthy mind is flexible and recognizes that there are many different ways of considering a matter. There is no single truth but rather many. At this point, interpreters of Nietzsche differ. Some argue that Nietzsche believes there is such a thing as truth but that there is no single correct perspective on it. Just as we cannot get the full picture of what an elephant is like simply by looking at its leg or looking at its tail or looking at its trunk, we cannot get a reasonable picture of any truth unless we look at it from multiple perspectives. Truth is not an elephant that we must look at from multiple perspectives under this view. Rather, truth is simply the name given to the point of view of the people who have the power to enforce their point of view. The only reality is the will to power, and truth, like morality, is just another fig leaf placed on top of this reality.

Christianity as a Life-Denying Force Throughout his work, particularly in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche writes scathingly about Christianity, arguing that it is fundamentally opposed to life. In Christian morality, Nietzsche sees an attempt to deny all those characteristics that he associates with healthy life. The concept of sin makes us ashamed of our instincts and our sexuality, the concept of faith discourages our curiosity and natural skepticism, and the concept of pity encourages us to value and cherish weakness. Furthermore, Christian morality is based on the promise of an afterlife, leading Christians to devalue this life in favor of the beyond. Nietzsche argues that Christianity springs from resentment for life and those who enjoy it, and it seeks to overthrow health and strength with its life-denying ethic. As such, Nietzsche considers Christianity to be the hated enemy of life. He shows that our values are not themselves fixed and objective but rather express a certain attitude toward life. For example, he argues that Christian morality is fundamentally resentful and life denying, devaluing natural human instincts and promoting weakness and the idea of an afterlife, the importance of which supercedes that of our present life. Rather, he aims to expose the very concept of

morality as being a fig leaf placed on top of our fundamental psychological drives to make them seem more staid and respectable. By exposing morality as a fiction, Nietzsche wants to encourage us to be more honest about our drives and our motives and more realistic in the attitude we take toward life. Man as Bridge Between Animal and Overman Nietzsche contends that humanity is a transition, not a destination. We ceased to be animals when we taught ourselves to control our instincts for the sake of greater gains. By learning to resist some of our natural impulses, we have been able to forge civilizations, develop knowledge, and deepen ourselves spiritually. Rather than directing our will to power outward to dominate those around us, we have directed it inward and gained self-mastery. However, this struggle for self-mastery is arduous, and humanity is constantly tempted to give up. Christian morality and contemporary nihilism are just two examples of worldviews that express the desire to give up on life. We come to see life as blameworthy or meaningless as a way of easing ourselves out of the struggle for self-mastery. The overman has the self-mastery that animals lack but also the untrammelled instincts and good conscience that humans lack. The overman is profoundly in love with life, finding nothing in it to complain about, not even the constant suffering and struggle to which he willingly submits himself. The Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence While it is hard to give a definitive account of the eternal recurrence, we can undoubtedly claim that it involves a supreme affirmation of life. On one level, it expresses the view that time is cyclical and that we will live every moment of our lives over and over an infinite number of times, each time exactly the same. In other words, each passing moment is not fleeting but rather echoes for all eternity. In other words, we should aim to live conscious of the fact that each moment will be repeated infinitely, and we should feel only supreme joy at the prospect. Nietzsche contends that there is no such thing as being: In other words, we cannot feel regret for one aspect of our lives and joy for another because these two aspects of our lives cannot properly be distinguished from one another. In recognizing that all of life is one indistinguishable swirl of becoming, we are faced with the simple choice of saying yes to all life or no to all life. Naturally, Nietzsche contends that the yes-saying attitude is preferable.

Chapter 7 : Will to power - Wikipedia

The Will to Power is exactly what you understand by it. The will to dominate, to have power over another. Except that it also has a deeper philosophical meaning which is not that subtle. Nietzsche's interpretation of the will to power arises from his denial of Christianity as a moral order. While.

Academic Journals in Nietzsche Studies 1. Taking this approach, however, risks confusing aspects of the Nietzsche legend with what is important in his philosophical work, and many commentators are rightly skeptical of readings derived primarily from biographical anecdotes. When young Friedrich was not quite five, his father died of a brain hemorrhage, leaving Franziska, Friedrich, a three-year old daughter, Elisabeth, and an infant son. Young Friedrich also enjoyed the camaraderie of a few male playmates. Upon the loss of Karl Ludwig, the family took up residence in the relatively urban setting of Naumburg, Saxony. Outside school, Nietzsche founded a literary and creative society with classmates including Paul Deussen who was later to become a prominent scholar of Sanskrit and Indic Studies. In Nietzsche entered the University of Bonn, spending the better part of that first year unproductively, joining a fraternity and socializing with old and new acquaintances, most of whom would fall out of his life once he regained his intellectual focus. Instead, he choose the more humanistic study of classical languages and a career in Philology. In he followed his major professor, Friedrich Ritschl, from Bonn to the University of Leipzig and dedicated himself to the studious life, establishing an extracurricular society there devoted to the study of ancient texts. The year was and Friedrich Nietzsche was 24 years old. At this point in his life, however, Nietzsche was a far cry from the original thinker he would later become, since neither he nor his work had matured. Swayed by public opinion and youthful exuberance, he briefly interrupted teaching in to join the Prussian military, serving as a medical orderly at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. His service was cut short, however, by severe bouts of dysentery and diphtheria. Back in Basel, his teaching responsibilities at the University and a nearby Gymnasium consumed much of his intellectual and physical energy. He became acquainted with the prominent cultural historian, Jacob Burckhardt, a well-established member of the university faculty. But, the person exerting the most influence on Nietzsche at this point was the artist, Richard Wagner, whom Nietzsche had met while studying in Leipzig. It is commonplace to say that at one time Nietzsche looked to Wagner with the admiration of a dutiful son. This interpretation of their relationship is supported by the fact that Wagner would have been the same age as Karl Ludwig, had the elder Nietzsche been alive. Such pressures continued to bridle Nietzsche throughout the so-called early period. If Nietzsche intended to use this text as a way of alienating himself from the Wagnerian circle, he surely succeeded. Upon its arrival in Bayreuth, the text ended this personal relationship with Wagner. It would be an exaggeration to say that Nietzsche was not developing intellectually during the period, prior to In addition, Nietzsche was taken by the persona of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, which Nietzsche claimed to have culled from close readings of the two-volume magnum opus, *The World as Will and Representation*. Nietzsche discovered Schopenhauer while studying in Leipzig. For Nietzsche, the most important aspect of this philosophy was the figure from which it emanated, representing for him the heroic ideal of a man in the life of thought: Even before the publication of *Birth of Tragedy*, he had attempted to re-position himself at Basel in the department of philosophy, but the University apparently never took such an endeavor seriously. By , his circumstances at Basel deteriorated to the point that neither the University nor Nietzsche was very much interested in seeing him continue as a professor there, so both agreed that he should retire with a modest pension [CE2]. His physical woes, however, would continue to plague him for the remainder of his life. After leaving Basel, Nietzsche enjoyed a period of great productivity. And, during this time, he was never to stay in one place for long, moving with the seasons, in search of relief for his ailments, solitude for his work, and reasonable living conditions, given his very modest budget. Moritz, and winters in Genoa, Nice, or Rappollo on the Mediterranean coast. Occasionally, he would visit family and friends in Naumburg or Basel, and he spent a great deal of time in social discourse, exchanging letters with friends and associates. She quickly began shaping his image and the reception of his work, which by this time had already gained momentum among academics such as Georg Brandes. Soon the Nietzsche legend would

grow in spectacular fashion among popular readers. Unfortunately, Friedrich experienced little of his fame, having never recovered from the breakdown of late and early His final years were spent at Villa Silberblick in grim mental and physical deterioration, ending mercifully August 25, The following division is typical: During this time Nietzsche was admitted into the prestigious Gymnasium Schulpforta; he composed music, wrote poetry and plays, and in produced an autobiography at the age of He also produced more serious and accomplished works on themes related to philology, literature, and philosophy. He was influenced intellectually by the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and emotionally by the artist Richard Wagner. This text also included a Wagnerian precept for cultural flourishing: It is a work of acerbic cultural criticism, encomia to Schopenhauer and Wagner, and an unexpectedly idiosyncratic analysis of the newly developing historical consciousness. A fifth meditation on the discipline of philology is prepared but left unpublished. Plagued by poor health, Nietzsche is released from teaching duties in February his affiliation with the university officially ends in and he is granted a small pension. A peculiar kind of meaningfulness is thus gained by the retrograde step: Postâ€”the later period Nietzsche transitions into a new period with the conclusion of The Gay Science Book IV and his next published work, the novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra, produced in four parts between and Also in he returns to philosophical writing with Beyond Good and Evil. In he attempts to consolidate his inquiries through self-criticism in Prefaces written for the earlier published works, and he writes a fifth book for The Gay Science. In he writes On the Genealogy of Morality. In , with failing health, he produces several texts, including The Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, and two works concerning his prior relationship with Wagner. During this period, as with the earlier ones, Nietzsche produces an abundance of materials not published during his lifetime. For years this material has been published piecemeal in Germany and translated to English in various collections. Philosophically, during this period, Nietzsche continues his explorations on morality, truth, aesthetics, history, power, language and identity. The intent here seems to be an overcoming or dissolution of metaphysics. And, some will even deny that he achieves nor even attempts the overcoming described above. Despite such complaints, interpreters of Nietzsche continue to reference these ineffable concepts. Although it would not be illogical to say that Nietzsche mistrusted philosophical systems, while nevertheless building one of his own, some commentators point out two important qualifications. At the very least, we can say that Nietzsche does not intend it to establish a strong and unmovable absolute, a negative-system, from which dogma may be drawn. Perhaps it is a discredit to Nietzsche as a philosopher that he did not elaborate his position more carefully within this tension; or, perhaps such uncertainty has its own ground. For a second cautionary note, many commentators will argue along with Richard Schacht that, instead of building a system, Nietzsche is concerned only with the exploration of problems, and that his kind of philosophy is limited to the interpretation and evaluation of cultural inheritances The four major concepts presented in this outline are: Why is this so? All beginnings and ends, for Nietzsche, are thus lost in a flood of indeterminacy. How then shall they be understood? The existence of a value presupposes a value-positing perspective, and values are created by human beings and perhaps other value-positing agents as aids for survival and growth. Because values are important for the well being of the human animal, because belief in them is essential to our existence, we oftentimes prefer to forget that values are our own creations and to live through them as if they were absolute. For these reasons, social institutions enforcing adherence to inherited values are permitted to create self-serving economies of power, so long as individuals living through them are thereby made more secure and their possibilities for life enhanced. Nevertheless, from time to time the values we inherit are deemed no longer suitable and the continued enforcement of them no longer stands in the service of life. To maintain allegiance to such values, even when they no longer seem practicable, turns what once served the advantage to individuals to a disadvantage, and what was once the prudent deployment of values into a life denying abuse of power. When this happens the human being must reactivate its creative, value-positing capacities and construct new values. Commentators will differ on the question of whether nihilism for Nietzsche refers specifically to a state of affairs characterizing specific historical moments, in which inherited values have been exposed as superstition and have thus become outdated, or whether Nietzsche means something more than this. It is, at the very least, accurate to say that for Nietzsche nihilism has become a problem by the nineteenth century. The scientific,

technological, and political revolutions of the previous two hundred years put an enormous amount of pressure on the old world order. In this environment, old value systems were being dismantled under the weight of newly discovered grounds for doubt. The possibility arises, then, that nihilism for Nietzsche is merely a temporary stage in the refinement of true belief. Reason is not a value, in this reading, but rather the means by which human beings examine their metaphysical presuppositions and explore new avenues to truth. But to relegate nihilism to that situation, according to Heidegger, leaves our thinking of it incomplete. Near the beginning of the aphorisms collected under the title, *Will To Power* aphorism 2, we find this note from *That the highest values devalue themselves*. According to Nietzsche, the conceptual framework known as Western metaphysics was first articulated by Plato, who had pieced together remnants of a declining worldview, borrowing elements from predecessors such as Anaximander, Parmenides, and especially Socrates, in order to overturn a cosmology that had been in play from the days of Homer and which found its fullest and last expression in the thought of Heraclitus. Values most responsible for the scientific revolution, however, are also crucial to the metaphysical system that modern science is destroying. Such values are threatening, then, to bring about the destruction of their own foundations. Thus, the highest values are devaluing themselves at the core. Most importantly, the values of honesty, probity, and courage in the search for truth no longer seem compatible with the guarantee, the bestowal, and the bestowing agent of an absolute value. What philosophical ground, after all, could support revaluation if this interpretation were accurate? If, indeed, a workable epistemology may be derived from reading specific passages, and good reasons can be given for prioritizing those passages, then consistent grounds may exist for Nietzsche having leveled a critique of morality. But, Nietzsche insisted, in an intellectual climate that demands honesty in the search for truth and proof as a condition for belief, the absence of foundations has already been laid bare. The dawn of a new day had broken, and shadows now cast, though long, were receding by the minute. In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche claims that the logic of an existence lacking inherent meaning demands, from an organizational standpoint, a value-creating response, however weak this response might initially be in comparison to how its values are then taken when enforced by social institutions aphorisms *Nihilism stands not only for that apparently inevitable process by which the highest values devalue themselves*. It also stands for that moment of recognition in which human existence appears, ultimately, to be in vain. How, and for how long, did the values here serve the living? What form of redemption was sought here, and was this form indicative of a healthy life? What may one learn about the creation of values by surveying such cultures? Emphasis is laid on the one who faces the problem of nihilism. The problem of value-positing concerns the one who posits values, and this one must be examined, along with a corresponding evaluation of relative strengths and weaknesses. Here was evidence, Nietzsche believed, that humanity could face the dreadful truth of existence without becoming paralyzed. The strength of Greek culture is evident in the gods, the tragic art, and the philosophical concepts and personalities created by the Greeks themselves. Comparing the creativity of the Greeks to the intellectual work of modernity, the tragic, affirmative thought of Heraclitus to the pessimism of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche highlights a number of qualitative differences.

Chapter 8 : The Will to Power Quotes by Friedrich Nietzsche

The Will to Power (German: Der Wille zur Macht) is a book of notes drawn from the literary remains (or Nachlass) of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche by his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Peter Gast (Heinrich Köselitz).

His father died in 1844, and the family relocated to Naumburg, where he grew up in a household comprising his mother, grandmother, two aunts, and his younger sister, Elisabeth. Nietzsche had a brilliant school and university career, culminating in May 1869 when he was called to a chair in classical philology at Basel. At age 24, he was the youngest ever appointed to that post. Before the opportunity at Basel arose, Nietzsche had planned to pursue a second Ph.D. When he was a student in Leipzig, Nietzsche met Richard Wagner, and after his move to Basel, he became a frequent guest in the Wagner household at Villa Tribschen in Lucerne. His first book, *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*, was not the careful work of classical scholarship the field might have expected, but a controversial polemic combining speculations about the collapse of the tragic culture of fifth century Athens with a proposal that Wagnerian music-drama might become the source of a renewed tragic culture for contemporary Germany. These essays are known collectively as the *Untimely Meditations*. When he sent the book to the Wagners early in 1872, it effectively ended their friendship: As a result, he was freed to write and to develop the style that suited him. He published a book almost every year thereafter. These works began with *Daybreak*, which collected critical observations on morality and its underlying psychology, and there followed the mature works for which Nietzsche is best known: *In later years*, Nietzsche moved frequently in the effort to find a climate that would improve his health, settling into a pattern of spending winters near the Mediterranean usually in Italy and summers in Sils Maria, Switzerland. His symptoms included intense headaches, nausea, and trouble with his eyesight. Recent work Huenemann has convincingly argued that he probably suffered from a retro-orbital meningioma, a slow-growing tumor on the brain surface behind his right eye. In January 1889, Nietzsche collapsed in the street in Turin, and when he regained consciousness he wrote a series of increasingly deranged letters. His close Basel friend Franz Overbeck was gravely concerned and travelled to Turin, where he found Nietzsche suffering from dementia. After unsuccessful treatment in Basel and Jena, he was released into the care of his mother, and later his sister, eventually lapsing entirely into silence. He lived on until 1900, when he died of a stroke complicated by pneumonia. *Critique of Religion and Morality* Nietzsche is arguably most famous for his criticisms of traditional European moral commitments, together with their foundations in Christianity. This critique is very wide-ranging; it aims to undermine not just religious faith or philosophical moral theory, but also many central aspects of ordinary moral consciousness, some of which are difficult to imagine doing without. By the time Nietzsche wrote, it was common for European intellectuals to assume that such ideas, however much inspiration they owed to the Christian intellectual and faith tradition, needed a rational grounding independent from particular sectarian or even ecumenical religious commitments. Then as now, most philosophers assumed that a secular vindication of morality would surely be forthcoming and would save the large majority of our standard commitments. Christianity no longer commands society-wide cultural allegiance as a framework grounding ethical commitments, and thus, a common basis for collective life that was supposed to have been immutable and invulnerable has turned out to be not only less stable than we assumed, but incomprehensibly mortal—and in fact, already lost. The response called for by such a turn of events is mourning and deep disorientation. Indeed, the case is even worse than that, according to Nietzsche. Not only do standard moral commitments lack a foundation we thought they had, but stripped of their veneer of unquestionable authority, they prove to have been not just baseless but positively harmful. Unfortunately, the moralization of our lives has insidiously attached itself to genuine psychological needs—some basic to our condition, others cultivated by the conditions of life under morality—so its corrosive effects cannot simply be removed without further psychological damage. Still worse, the damaging side of morality has implanted itself within us in the form of a genuine self-understanding, making it hard for us to imagine ourselves living any other way. Thus, Nietzsche argues, we are faced with a difficult, long term restoration project in which the most cherished aspects of our way of life must be ruthlessly investigated, dismantled, and then reconstructed

in healthier form—“all while we continue somehow to sail the ship of our common ethical life on the high seas. The most extensive development of this Nietzschean critique of morality appears in his late work *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which consists of three treatises, each devoted to the psychological examination of a central moral idea. In the First Treatise, Nietzsche takes up the idea that moral consciousness consists fundamentally in altruistic concern for others. He begins by observing a striking fact, namely, that this widespread conception of what morality is all about—“while entirely commonsensical to us—“is not the essence of any possible morality, but a historical innovation. In such a system, goodness is associated with exclusive virtues. There is no thought that everyone should be excellent—the very idea makes no sense, since to be excellent is to be distinguished from the ordinary run of people. Nietzsche shows rather convincingly that this pattern of assessment was dominant in ancient Mediterranean culture the Homeric world, later Greek and Roman society, and even much of ancient philosophical ethics. It focuses its negative evaluation evil on violations of the interests or well-being of others—and consequently its positive evaluation good on altruistic concern for their welfare. Such a morality needs to have universalistic pretensions: It is thereby especially amenable to ideas of basic human equality, starting from the thought that each person has an equal claim to moral consideration and respect. The exact nature of this alleged revolt is a matter of ongoing scholarly controversy in recent literature, see Bittner ; Reginster ; Migotti ; Ridley ; May Afterward, via negation of the concept of evil, the new concept of goodness emerges, rooted in altruistic concern of a sort that would inhibit evil actions. For Nietzsche, then, our morality amounts to a vindictive effort to poison the happiness of the fortunate GM III, 14 , instead of a high-minded, dispassionate, and strictly rational concern for others. That said, Nietzsche offers two strands of evidence sufficient to give pause to an open minded reader. Second, Nietzsche observes with confidence-shaking perspicacity how frequently indignant moralistic condemnation itself, whether arising in serious criminal or public matters or from more private personal interactions, can detach itself from any measured assessment of the wrong and devolve into a free-floating expression of vengeful resentment against some real or imagined perpetrator. The First Treatise does little, however, to suggest why inhabitants of a noble morality might be at all moved by such condemnations, generating a question about how the moral revaluation could have succeeded. The Second Treatise, about guilt and bad conscience, offers some materials toward an answer to this puzzle. Nietzsche begins from the insight that guilt bears a close conceptual connection to the notion of debt. The pure idea of moralized guilt answers this need by tying any wrong action inextricably and uniquely to a blamable agent. As we saw, the impulse to assign blame was central to the resentment that motivated the moral revaluation of values, according to the First Treatise. Thus, insofar as people even nobles become susceptible to such moralized guilt, they might also become vulnerable to the revaluation, and Nietzsche offers some speculations about how and why this might happen GM II, 16—“ These criticisms have attracted an increasingly subtle secondary literature; see Reginster , as well as Williams a, b , Ridley , May In such cases, free-floating guilt can lose its social and moral point and develop into something hard to distinguish from a pathological desire for self-punishment. Ascetic self-denial is a curious phenomenon indeed, on certain psychological assumptions, like descriptive psychological egoism or ordinary hedonism, it seems incomprehensible , but it is nevertheless strikingly widespread in the history of religious practice. One obvious route to such a value system, though far from the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives and desires that people are bound to have—“perhaps rooted in their human or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil; anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path. As Nietzsche emphasizes, purified guilt is naturally recruited as a tool for developing asceticism. Suffering is an inevitable part of the human condition, and the ascetic strategy is to interpret such suffering as punishment, thereby connecting it to the notion of guilt. Despite turning her own suffering against her, the move paradoxically offers certain advantages to the agent—“not only does her suffering gain an explanation and moral justification, but her own activity can be validated by being enlisted on the side of punishment self-castigation: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; still more precisely, a perpetrator, still more specifically, a guilty perpetrator who is susceptible to suffering, and the ascetic priests says to him: GM III, 15 Thus, Nietzsche suggests, The principal bow stroke the ascetic priest allowed himself to cause the human soul to resound with wrenching and ecstatic music of every kind was

executedâ€”everyone knows thisâ€”by exploiting the feeling of guilt. Consider, for example, the stance of Schopenhauerian pessimism, according to which human life and the world have negative absolute value. From that standpoint, the moralist can perfectly well allow that ascetic valuation is self-punishing and even destructive for the moral agent, but such conclusions are entirely consistent withâ€”indeed, they seem like warranted responses toâ€”the pessimistic evaluation. That is, if life is an inherent evil and nothingness is a concrete improvement over existence, then diminishing or impairing life through asceticism yields a net enhancement of value. While asceticism imposes self-discipline on the sick practitioner, it simultaneously makes the person sicker, plunging her into intensified inner conflict GM III, 15, 20â€” While this section has focused on the Genealogy, it is worth noting that its three studies are offered only as examples of Nietzschean skepticism about conventional moral ideas. Nietzsche tried out many different arguments against pity and compassion beginning already in *Human, All-too-human* and continuing to the end of his productive lifeâ€”for discussion, see Reginster, Janaway forthcoming, and Nussbaum. Nietzsche resists the hedonistic doctrine that pleasure and pain lie at the basis of all value claims, which would be the most natural way to defend such a presupposition. From that point of view, the morality of compassion looks both presumptuous and misguided. It is misguided both because it runs the risk of robbing individuals of their opportunity to make something positive individually meaningful out of their suffering, and because the global devaluation of suffering as such dismisses in advance the potentially valuable aspects of our general condition as vulnerable and finite creatures GS; compare Williams. For him, however, human beings remain valuing creatures in the last analysis. It follows that no critique of traditional values could be practically effective without suggesting replacement values capable of meeting our needs as valuers see GS; Anderson, esp. Nietzsche thought it was the job of philosophers to create such values BGE, so readers have long and rightly expected to find an account of value creation in his works. There is something to this reaction: It is common, if not altogether standard, to explain values by contrasting them against mere desires. If I become convinced that something I valued is not in fact valuable, that discovery is normally sufficient to provoke me to revise my value, suggesting that valuing must be responsive to the world; by contrast, subjective desires often persist even in the face of my judgment that their objects are not properly desirable, or are unattainable; see the entries on value theory and desire. We [contemplatives] are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: Only we have created the world that concerns man! Some scholars take the value creation passages as evidence that Nietzsche was an anti-realist about value, so that his confident evaluative judgments should be read as efforts at rhetorical persuasion rather than objective claims Leiter, or relatedly they suggest that Nietzsche could fruitfully be read as a skeptic, so that such passages should be evaluated primarily for their practical effect on readers Berry; see also Leiter. Others Hussain take Nietzsche to be advocating a fictionalist posture, according to which values are self-consciously invented contributions to a pretense through which we can satisfy our needs as valuing creatures, even though all evaluative claims are strictly speaking false. First, while a few passages appear to offer a conception of value creation as some kind of legislative fiat e. Second, a great many of the passages esp. GS 78, , , , connect value creation to artistic creation, suggesting that Nietzsche took artistic creation and aesthetic value as an important paradigm or metaphor for his account of values and value creation more generally. While some Soll attack this entire idea as confused, other scholars have called on these passages as support for either fictionalist or subjective realist interpretations. In addition to showing that not all value creation leads to results that Nietzsche would endorse, this observation leads to interesting questionsâ€”e. If so, what differentiates the two modes? Can we say anything about which is to be preferred? Nietzsche praises many different values, and in the main, he does not follow the stereotypically philosophical strategy of deriving his evaluative judgments from one or a few foundational principles. A well-known passage appears near the opening of the late work, *The Antichrist*: Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. Everything that is born of weakness. The feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. That doctrine seems to include the proposal that creatures like us or more broadly: The same conception has been developed by Paul Katsafanas, who argues that, qua agents, we are ineluctably committed to valuing power because a Reginster-style will to power is a constitutive condition on acting at all. His account thereby contributes to the

constitutivist strategy in ethics pioneered by Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman , On this view, what Nietzsche values is power understood as a tendency toward growth, strength, domination, or expansion. Schacht and Leiter is surely right to raise worries about the Millian reconstruction. Nietzsche apparently takes us to be committed to a wide diversity of first order aims, which raises prima facie doubts about the idea that for him all willing really takes power as its first-order aim as the Millian argument would require. It is not clear that this view can avoid the objection rooted in the possibility of pessimism. Given his engagement with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche should have been sensitive to the worry. According to Reganster I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful.

Chapter 9 : Will To Power | Definition of Will To Power by Merriam-Webster

Society and the Individual in Nietzsche's The Will to Power () Travis J. Denneson I. Introduction. In The Will to Power, specifically the section entitled "The Will to Power as Society and Individual," Nietzsche's ideas concerning how his doctrine of the will to power is manifested in both societies as a whole and in individuals within a society are presented.