

Chapter 1 : BBC - Ethics - War: Just War - introduction

Just war theory (Latin: jus bellum iustum) is a doctrine, also referred to as a tradition, of military ethics studied by military leaders, theologians, ethicists and policy makers.

The historical context is essential to understanding his purposes. Augustine, more than any other figure of late antiquity, stands at the intellectual intersection of Christianity, philosophy, and politics. As a Christian cleric, he takes it as his task to defend his flock against the unremitting assault by heresies spawned in an era uninformed by the immediate, divine revelations which had characterized the apostolic age. As a philosopher, he situates his arguments against the backdrop of Greek philosophy in the Platonic tradition, particularly as formulated by the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria. As a prominent Roman citizen, he understands the Roman Empire to be the divinely-ordained medium through which the truths of Christianity are to be both spread and safeguarded. Augustine died reciting the Penitential Psalms as the Vandals besieged the city of Hippo on the coast of northern Africa now the city of Annaba, in Algeria. This occurred two decades after the sacking of Rome by Alaric. Quite the contrary, his political arguments are scattered throughout his voluminous writings, which include autobiography, sermons, expositions, commentaries, letters, and Christian apologetics. Moreover, the contexts in which the political and social issues are addressed are equally varied. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suggest that his arguments are not informed by a cogent theory. Taken together, his political and social musings constitute a remarkable tapestry. The Augustinian World View Because Augustine considers the Christian scriptures to constitute the touchstone against which philosophy—“including political philosophy”—must be assayed, his world view necessarily includes the Christian tenets of the Creation, the Fall of man, and the Redemption. In stark contrast to the pagan philosophers who preceded him—who viewed the unfolding of history as a cyclical phenomenon, Augustine conceives history in strictly linear terms, with a beginning and an end. According to Augustine, the earth was brought into existence ex nihilo by a perfectly good and just God, who created man. The earth is not eternal; the earth, as well as time, has both a beginning and an end. Man, on the other hand, was brought into existence to endure eternally. Damnation is the just desert of all men because of the Fall of Adam, who, having been created with free will, chose to disrupt the perfectly good order established by God. The onward march of human history, then, constitutes the unfolding of the divine plan which will culminate in one or the other outcome for every member of the human family. Within this framework of political and legal systems, the state is a divinely ordained punishment for fallen man, with its armies, its power to command, coerce, punish, and even put to death, as well as its institutions such as slavery and private property. The state simultaneously serves the divine purposes of chastening the wicked and refining the righteous. Also simultaneously, the state constitutes a sort of remedy for the effects of the Fall, in that it serves to maintain such modicum of peace and order as it is possible for fallen man to enjoy in the present world. In any case, predestination fixes the ultimate destination of every human being—as well as the political states to which they belong. Hence, predestination for Augustine is the proverbial elephant in the room. Whether predestination was divinely contemplated prior or incidental to the Fall a point which Augustine never clearly articulates, the following problem arises: If one is to be saved or damned by divine fiat, what difference does it make whether the world possesses the social order of a state? For those predestined for salvation, what is the point of their being refined by the vicissitudes of life in a political state? In order to prevent the collapse of such a systematic account of the human condition as Augustine provides, the question simply must be set aside as a matter unknowable to finite man. As the social fabric of the world around him unravels in the twilight years of the Roman Empire, Augustine attempts to elucidate the relationship between the eternal, invisible verities of his faith and the stark realities of the present, observable political and social conditions of humanity. At the intersection of these two concerns, Augustine finds what for him is the central question of politics: How do the faithful operate successfully but justly in an unjust world, where selfish interests dominate, where the general welfare is rarely sought, and where good and evil men are inextricably and, to human eyes, often unidentifiably intermingled, yet search for a heavenly reward in the world hereafter? Foundational Political

and Social Concepts a. Two Cities Even though those elected for salvation and those elected for damnation are thoroughly intermingled, the distinction arising from their respective destinies gives rise to two classes of persons, to whom Augustine refers collectively and allegorically as cities—the City of God and the earthly city. Indeed, the object of their love—whatever it may be—is something other than God. No political state, nor even the institutional church, can be equated with the City of God. What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? Likewise, the legitimacy of any earthly political regime can be understood only in relative terms: The emperor and the pirate have equally legitimate domains if they are equally just. The state maintains order by keeping wicked men in check through the fear of punishment. In this regard, the institution of the state marks a relative return to order from the chaos of the Fall. Rulers have the right to establish any law that does not conflict with the law of God. Citizens have the duty to obey their political leaders regardless of whether the leader is wicked or righteous. There is no right of civil disobedience. Citizens are always duty bound to obey God; and when the imperatives of obedience to God and obedience to civil authority conflict, citizens must choose to obey God and willingly accept the punishment of disobedience. Nevertheless, those empowered to levy punishment should take no delight in the task. Augustine clearly holds that the establishment and success of the Roman Empire, along with its embracing of Christianity as its official religion, was part of the divine plan of the true God. Indeed, he holds that the influence of Christianity upon the empire could be only salutary in its effect: Still, while Augustine doubtless holds that it is better for Rome to be Christian than not, he clearly recognizes that officially embracing Christianity does not automatically transform an earthly state into the City of God. Augustine does not wish ill for Rome. He sees Rome as the last bastion against the advances of the pagan barbarians, who surely must not be allowed to overrun the mortal embodiment of Christendom that Rome represents. Nevertheless, Augustine cannot be overly optimistic about the future of the Roman state as such—not because it is Rome, but because it is a state; for any society of men other than the City of God is part and parcel of the earthly city, which is doomed to inevitable demise. Even so, states like Rome can perform the useful purpose of championing the cause of the Church, protecting it from assault and compelling those who have fallen away from fellowship with it to return to the fold. Indeed, it is entirely within the provinces of the state to punish heretics and schismatics. War and Peace a. Although one might feel to call upon Augustine to defend the notion that God can, with propriety, use so terrible a vehicle as war to chasten the wicked, two points must be kept in mind: This point invites a somewhat more philosophically intriguing question: Is it just to compel men to do good who, when left to their own devices, would prefer evil? If one were forced to act righteously contrary to his or her will, is it not the case that he or she would still lack the change of heart that is necessary to produce a repentant attitude—an attitude that results in genuine reformation? Perhaps; but Augustine is unwilling to concede that it is better, in the name of recognizing the agency of others, to let them continue to wallow in evil practices. Augustine argues, The aim towards which a good will compassionately devotes its efforts is to secure that a bad will be rightly directed. For who does not know that a man is not condemned on any other ground than because his bad will deserved it, and that no man is saved who has not a good will? Exactly how God is to bring about his good purposes through the process of war may not be clear to man in any particular case. Moreover, those of good will shall administer discipline to those erring by moving them toward repentance and reformation. All of this leads conveniently to a second point: War can bring the need to discipline by chastening. Those of good will do not manifest cruelty in the proper administration of punishment but, rather, in the withholding of punishment. For Augustine, it is always better to restrain an evil man from the commission of evil acts than it is to permit his continued perpetration of those acts. For Augustine, even the death of the mortal body, as ultimate a penalty as it might appear from the mortal perspective, is not nearly so serious a consequence as that which would ensue if one is left to wallow in sin: Neither is there any prohibition against taking the lives of the enemies of the state, so long as he does it in his public capacity as a soldier and not in the private capacity of a murderer. Nevertheless, Augustine also urges that soldiers should go to war mournfully and never take delight in the shedding of blood. He becomes quite pessimistic though in his view of human nature and of the ability and desire of humans to maintain themselves orderly, much less rightly. Augustine holds that, given the inextricable mixing of citizens of the two cities, the total avoidance of

war or its effects is a practical impossibility for all men, including the righteous. Happily, he holds that the day will come when, coincident with the end of the earthly city, wars will no longer be fought. For, says Augustine, citing words from the Psalms to the effect that God will one day bring a cessation of all wars, This not yet see we fulfilled: For the present, however, man—particularly Christian man—is left with the question of how to live in a world full of war. On the one hand, the wicked are not particularly concerned about just wars. This is by no means a perfect solution; but then again, this is not a perfect world. If it were, all talk of just wars would be altogether nonsensical. Perfect solutions characterize only the heavenly City of God. Its pilgrim citizens sojourning on earth can do no better than try to cope with the present difficulties and imperfections of the earthly life. Thus, for Augustine, the just war is a coping mechanism for use by the righteous who aspire to citizenship in the City of God. In terms of the traditional notion of *jus ad bellum* justice of war, that is, the circumstances in which wars can be justly fought, war is a coping mechanism for righteous sovereigns who would ensure that their violent international encounters are minimal, a reflection of the Divine Will to the greatest extent possible, and always justified. In terms of the traditional notion of *jus in bello* justice in war, or the moral considerations which ought to constrain the use of violence in war, war is a coping mechanism for righteous combatants who, by divine edict, have no choice but to subject themselves to their political masters and seek to ensure that they execute their war-fighting duty as justly as possible. In sum, why would a man like Augustine, whose eye is fixed upon attainment of citizenship in the heavenly city, find it necessary to delineate what counts as a just war in this lost and fallen world? In general terms, the demands of moral life are so thoroughly interwoven with social life that the individual cannot be separated from citizenship in one or the other city. In more specific terms, the just man who walks by faith needs to understand how to cope with the injustices and contradictions of war as much as he needs to understand how to cope with all other aspects of the present world where he is a stranger and pilgrim. Augustine takes important cues from both Cicero and Ambrose and synthesizes their traditions into a Christianized world view that still retains strong ties to the pre-Christian philosophic past. He resolves the dilemma of just war and pacifist considerations by denying the dilemma: War arises from, and stands as a clear manifestation of, the nature of fallen man. His approach explains how a morally upright citizen of a relatively just state could be justified in pursuing warfare, in prosecuting war, and ultimately, although unhappily, in taking human life. Augustine as a Christian philosopher achieves a full synthesis of the Roman and Christian values associated with war in a way that legitimizes war as an instrument of national policy which, although inferior to the perfect ideals of Christianity, is one which Christians cannot altogether avoid and with which they must in some sense make their peace. *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* Traditionally, the philosophical treatment of the just war is divided into two categories: The former describes the necessary and, by some accounts, sufficient conditions for justifying engagement in war. The latter describes the necessary conditions for conducting war in a just manner. Concerning *jus in bello*, Augustine holds that wars, once begun, must be fought in a manner which: Augustine distinguishes the two cities in several important ways, as well as the kind of peace they seek: There is, in fact, one city of men who choose to live by the standard of the flesh, another of those who choose to live by the standard of the spirit. The citizens of each of these desire their own kind of peace, and when they achieve their aim, that is the kind of peace in which they live. Because the common choice of fallen man is a peace of his own liking—one that selfishly serves his own immediate or foreseeable ends, peace becomes, in practice, merely an interlude between ongoing states of war. Augustine is quick to point out that this life carries with it no guarantee of peace; that blessed state is reserved for the saved in heaven.

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However, just war theory also acts to remind contenders that war is a last resort and that its essential aim is always peace, so if peace is forthcoming in any guise, it is morally critical for all parties to seek a return to a permanent peace rather than a momentary lapse of war.

Saint Augustine is usually identified as the first individual to offer a theory on war and justice. The Saint referred to the Bible and regarded some wars as necessary to amend an evil. The moral justifications for a war are expressed in *jus ad bellum*; whereas, the moral conduct of the war is expressed in *jus in bello*. The Just-War Theory is a set of rules for military combat.

Principles of Just-War Theory

- 1. Last Resort** A just war can only be waged after all peaceful options are considered. The use of force can only be used as a last resort.
- Legitimate Authority** A just war is waged by a legitimate authority. A war cannot be waged by individuals or groups that do not constitute the legitimate government.
- Just Cause** A just war needs to be in response to a wrong suffered. Self-defense against an attack always constitutes a just war; however, the war needs to be fought with the objective to correct the inflicted wound.
- Probability of Success** In order for a war to be just, there must be a rational possibility of success. A nation cannot enter into a war with a hopeless cause.
- Right Intention** The primary objective of a just war is to re-establish peace. In particular, the peace after the war should exceed the peace that would have succeeded without the use of force. The aim of the use of force must be justice.
- Proportionality** The violence in a just war must be proportional to the casualties suffered. The nations involved in the war must avoid disproportionate military action and only use the amount of force absolutely necessary.
- Civilian Casualties** The use of force must distinguish between the militia and civilians. Innocent citizens must never be the target of war; soldiers should always avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are only justified when they are unavoidable victims of a military attack on a strategic target.

Contemporary just war theory is dominated by two camps: traditionalist and revisionist. The traditionalists might as readily be called legalists. Their views on the morality of war are substantially led by international law, especially the law of armed conflict.

In it, one of five ruling brothers asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified, and then a long discussion ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots, no attacking people in distress , just means no poisoned or barbed arrows , just cause no attacking out of rage , and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just conduct" appropriate to the context of war. In ancient Rome , a "just cause" for war might include the necessity of repelling an invasion, or retaliation for pillaging or a breach of treaty. He claimed that, while individuals should not resort immediately to violence, God has given the sword to government for good reason based upon Romans In *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* book 22 sections , Augustine argues that Christians as part of government should not be ashamed to protect peace and punish wickedness. Augustine asserted that this was a personal, philosophical stance: The sacred seat of virtue is the heart. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. Proper Authority is first: Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence. Soldiers must also fight for this intention. School of Salamanca This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. February Growing from Aquinas arguments was the School of Salamanca , which expanded on Thomistic understanding of natural law and just war. Given that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind, the adherents of the School reasoned that it ought to be resorted to only when it was necessary in order to prevent an even greater evil. A diplomatic agreement is preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are: In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack. War to punish a guilty enemy. A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: It is necessary that the response be commensurate with the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war. Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war. Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages. It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort. Under this doctrine expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans , and wars for glory are all inherently unjust. Just War Doctrine The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church - sometimes mistaken as a "just war theory" [16] [17] - found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church , in paragraph , lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force": The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. The Charter of the United Nations , born from the tragedy of the Second World War with the intention of preserving future generations from the scourge of war, is based on a generalized prohibition of a recourse to force to resolve disputes between States, with the exception of two cases: Therefore, engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions. International legitimacy for the use of armed force, on the basis of rigorous assessment and with well-founded motivations, can only be given by the decision of a competent body that identifies specific situations as threats to peace and authorizes an intrusion into the sphere of autonomy usually reserved to a State. Although the criticism can be made that the application of just war theory is relativistic , one of the fundamental bases of the tradition is the Ethic of Reciprocity , particularly when it comes to in bello considerations of deportment during battle. If one set of combatants promise to treat their enemies with a modicum of restraint and respect, then the hope is that other sets of combatants will do similarly in reciprocation, a concept not unrelated to the considerations of Game Theory. Just war theorists

combine a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just war theories are attempts "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice ". Anarcho-capitalist scholar Murray Rothbard stated: A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuries "that violence is an evil that can, in certain situations, be condoned as the lesser of evils" is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, right intention from the older war theory that first evolved around A.

Exceptions theory has developed in the military field more than in any other. It has come to be known as Just War Theory (Fotion, Coppieters, & Apressyan,). Over the years the most common version of the theory addresses situations where two nations threaten to go to war with one another.

Pre-Christian[edit] The Indian Hindu epic, the Mahabharata , offers one of the first written discussions of a "just war" dharma-yuddha or "righteous war". In it, one of five ruling brothers asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified, and then a long discussion ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots; no attacking people in distress , just means no poisoned or barbed arrows , just cause no attacking out of rage , and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just conduct" appropriate to the context of war. A study found that the just war tradition can be traced as far back as to Ancient Egypt, "demonstrating that just war thought developed beyond the boundaries of Europe and existed many centuries earlier than the advent of Christianity or even the emergence of Greco-Roman doctrine. In *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* book 22 sections 69â€”76, Augustine argues that Christians, as part of a government, need not be ashamed of protecting peace and punishing wickedness when forced to do so by a government. Augustine asserted that this was a personal, philosophical stance: The sacred seat of virtue is the heart. They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill. But, say they, the wise man will wage Just Wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. Mark Mattox writes that, for the individual Christian under the rule of a government engaged in an immoral war, Augustine admonished that Christians, "by divine edict, have no choice but to subject themselves to their political masters and [should] seek to ensure that they execute their war-fighting duty as justly as possible. Proper Authority is first: Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence. Soldiers must also fight for this intention. Both are fountains of knowledge; both come from God. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. February Learn how and when to remove this template message The School of Salamanca expanded on Thomistic understanding of natural law and just war. It stated that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind. Diplomatic resolution is always preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are: In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack. War to punish a guilty enemy. A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: It is necessary that the response be commensurate with the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war. Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war. Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages. It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort. Under this doctrine expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans , and wars for glory are all inherently unjust. Doctrine[edit] The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church â€”sometimes mistaken as the "just war theory" [23] [24] â€”found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church , in paragraph , lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force": It is important to remember that "it is one thing to wage a war of self-defence; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation. The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. Nor does the mere fact that war has unfortunately broken out mean that all is fair between the warring parties". The Charter of the United Nations intends to preserve future generations from war with a prohibition against force to resolve disputes between States. Like most philosophy, it permits legitimate defence and measures to maintain

peace. In every case, the charter requires that self-defence must respect the traditional limits of necessity and proportionality. Therefore, engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions. International legitimacy for the use of armed force, on the basis of rigorous assessment and with well-founded motivations, can only be given by the decision of a competent body that identifies specific situations as threats to peace and authorizes an intrusion into the sphere of autonomy usually reserved to a State. Although the criticism can be made that the application of just war theory is relativistic, one of the fundamental bases of the tradition is the Ethic of Reciprocity, particularly when it comes to in bello considerations of deportment during battle. If one set of combatants promise to treat their enemies with a modicum of restraint and respect, then the hope is that other sets of combatants will do similarly in reciprocation, a concept not unrelated to the considerations of Game Theory. Just war theorists combine a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just war theories are attempts "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice". Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin defined only three types of just war [31], all of which share the central trait of being revolutionary in character. In that manner, Lenin shunned the more common interpretation of a defensive war as a just one -- often summarized as "who fired the first shot? Which side initiated aggressions or had a grievance or any other commonly considered factor of jus ad bellum mattered not at all, he claimed; if one side was being oppressed by the other, the war against the oppressor would always be, by definition, a defensive war anyway. Any war lacking this duality of oppressed and oppressor was, in contradistinction, always a reactionary, unjust war, in which the oppressed effectively fight in order to protect their own oppressors: Clearly, the application of the term "defensive" war, or war "for the defence of the fatherland" in such a case would be historically false, and in practice would be sheer deception of the common people, of philistines, of ignorant people, by the astute slaveowners. Precisely in this way are the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie deceiving the peoples by means of "national ideology" and the term "defence of the fatherland" in the present war between slave-owners for fortifying and strengthening slavery. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuries -- "that violence is an evil that can, in certain situations, be condoned as the lesser of evils" -- is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, right intention from the older war theory that first evolved around AD, it has rejected two premises that underpinned all medieval just wars, including crusades:

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Asymmetric wars suggest two changes to just war theory. First, if there can be just wars in which one party is not a state, then the declaration of war need not be made by a.

Types of war War must entail some degree of confrontation using weapons and other military technology and equipment by armed forces employing military tactics and operational art within a broad military strategy subject to military logistics. Studies of war by military theorists throughout military history have sought to identify the philosophy of war , and to reduce it to a military science. Modern military science considers several factors before a national defence policy is created to allow a war to commence: Biological warfare , or germ warfare, is the use of weaponized biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi. Chemical warfare involves the use of weaponized chemicals in combat. Poison gas as a chemical weapon was principally used during World War I , and resulted in over a million estimated casualties, including more than , civilians. Civil war is a war between forces belonging to the same nation or political entity. Conventional warfare is declared war between states in which nuclear , biological , or chemical weapons are not used or see limited deployment. Insurgency is a rebellion against authority, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents lawful combatants. Information warfare is the application of destructive force on a large scale against information assets and systems, against the computers and networks that support the four critical infrastructures the power grid, communications, financial, and transportation. Total war is warfare by any means possible, disregarding the laws of war , placing no limits on legitimate military targets , using weapons and tactics resulting in significant civilian casualties , or demanding a war effort requiring significant sacrifices by the friendly civilian population. Unconventional warfare , the opposite of conventional warfare, is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict. War of aggression is a war for conquest or gain rather than self-defense; this can be the basis of war crimes under customary international law. War of liberation , Wars of national liberation or national liberation revolutions are conflicts fought by nations to gain independence. The term is used in conjunction with wars against foreign powers or at least those perceived as foreign to establish separate sovereign states for the rebelling nationality. From a different point of view, these wars are called insurgencies, rebellions, or wars of independence. Military history The percentages of men killed in war in eight tribal societies, and Europe and the U. Keeley, archeologist The earliest recorded evidence of war belongs to the Mesolithic cemetery Site , which has been determined to be approximately 14, years old. About forty-five percent of the skeletons there displayed signs of violent death. The advent of gunpowder and the acceleration of technological advances led to modern warfare. According to Conway W. Henderson, "One source claims that 14, wars have taken place between BC and the late 20th century, costing 3. For comparison, an estimated 1,, people died from infectious diseases in the 20th century. All of these forms of warfare were used by primitive societies, a finding supported by other researchers. Scarcity of resources meant defensive works were not a cost-effective way to protect the society against enemy raids. At the end of each of the last two World Wars, concerted and popular efforts were made to come to a greater understanding of the underlying dynamics of war and to thereby hopefully reduce or even eliminate it altogether. These efforts materialized in the forms of the League of Nations , and its successor, the United Nations. According to the U. Bureau of the Census , the Indian Wars of the 19th century cost the lives of about 50,

Chapter 6 : Just War Theory - International Relations - Oxford Bibliographies

The Just War Theory forum is an open resource for everyone concerned with issues of war, peace, justice, and reason. An open invitation to web discussions on the conditions of Just War Theory is extended to all.

References and Further Reading 1. Introduction Historically, the just war tradition--a set of mutually agreed rules of combat--may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar enemies. That is, when an array of values are shared between two warring peoples, we often find that they implicitly or explicitly agree upon limits to their warfare. It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people, sharing a moral identity with whom one will do business in the following peace, that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve and what kind of relations should apply in the aftermath of war. In part, the motivation for forming or agreeing to certain conventions, can be seen as mutually benefiting--preferable, for instance, to the deployment of any underhand tactics or weapons that may provoke an indefinite series of vengeance acts, or the kinds of action that have proved to be detrimental to the political or moral interests to both sides in the past. Regardless of the conventions that have historically formed, it has been the concern of the majority of just war theorists that the lack of rules to war or any asymmetrical morality between belligerents should be denounced, and that the rules of war should apply to all equally. That is, just war theory should be universal, binding on all and capable in turn of appraising the actions of all parties over and above any historically formed conventions. The just war tradition is indeed as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors to limit the outbreak or to rein in the potential devastation of warfare. They may have involved consideration of women and children or the treatment of prisoners enslaving them rather than killing them, or ransoming or exchanging them. Commonly, the earlier traditions invoked considerations of honor: Robinson notes that honor conventions are also contextually slippery, giving way to pragmatic or military interest when required. The just war theory also has a long history. Parts of the Bible hint at ethical behavior in war and concepts of just cause, typically announcing the justice of war by divine intervention; the Greeks may have paid lip service to the gods, but, as with the Romans, practical and political issues tended to overwhelm any fledgling legal conventions: Augustine provided comments on the morality of war from the Christian perspective railing against the love of violence that war can engender as did several Arabic commentators in the intellectual flourishing from the 9th to 12th centuries, but the most systematic exposition in the Western tradition and one that still attracts attention was outlined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. In the *Summa Theologicae*, Aquinas presents the general outline of what becomes the traditional just war theory as discussed in modern universities. He discusses not only the justification of war but also the kinds of activity that are permissible for a Christian in war see below. The most important of these writers are: In the twentieth century, just war theory has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry and American involvement in the Vietnam war. Conference proceedings are regularly published, offering readers a breadth of issues that the topic stirs: What has been of great interest is that in the headline wars of the past decade, the dynamic interplay of the rules and conventions of warfare not only remain intact on the battlefield but their role and hence their explication have been awarded a higher level of scrutiny and debate. In the political circles, justification of war still requires even in the most critical analysis a superficial acknowledgement of justification. But, arguably, such acts do remain atrocities by virtue of the just war conventions that some things in war are deemed to be inexcusable, regardless of the righteousness of the cause or the noise and fog of battle. Yet increasingly, the rule of law - the need to hold violators and transgressors responsible for their actions in war and therefore after the battle - is making headway onto the battlefield. In chivalrous times, the Christian crusader could seek priestly absolution for atrocities committed in war, a stance supported by Augustine for example; today, the law courts are seemingly less forgiving: Nonetheless, the idealism of those who seek the imposition of law and responsibility on the battlefield cf. And in some cases, no just war conventions and hence no potential for legal acknowledgement of malfeasance, exist at all; in such cases, the ethic of war is considered, or is implicitly held to be, beyond the norms of peaceful ethics and

therefore deserving a separate moral realm where "fair is foul and foul is fair" Shakespeare, Macbeth I. In such examples e. The continued brutality of war in the face of conventions and courts of international law lead some to maintain that the application of morality to war is a nonstarter: But there are those of a more skeptical persuasion who do not believe that morality can or should exist in war: But as there are several ethical viewpoints, there are also several common reasons laid against the need or the possibility of morality in war. Generally, consequentialists and act utilitarians may claim that if military victory is sought then all methods should be employed to ensure it is gained at a minimum of expense and time. However, intrinsicists who claim that there are certain acts that are good or bad in themselves may also decree that no morality can exist in the state of war: Alternatively, intrinsicists may claim that possessing a just cause the argument from righteousness is a sufficient condition for pursuing whatever means are necessary to gain a victory or to punish an enemy. A different skeptical argument, one advanced by Michael Walzer, is that the invention of nuclear weapons alters war so much that our notions of morality—and hence just war theories—become redundant. However, against Walzer, it can be reasonably argued that although such weapons change the nature of warfare for example, the timing, range, and potential devastation they do not dissolve the need to consider their use within a moral framework: Whilst skeptical positions may be derived from consequentialist and intrinsicist positions, they need not be. Consequentialists can argue that there are long-term benefits to having a war convention. For example, by fighting cleanly, both sides can be sure that the war does not escalate, thus reducing the probability of creating an incessant war of counter-revenges. Intrinsicists, on the other hand, can argue that certain spheres of life ought never to be targeted in war; for example, hospitals and densely populated suburbs. The inherent problem with both ethical models is that they become either vague or restrictive when it comes to war. Consequentialism is an open-ended model, highly vulnerable to pressing military or political needs to adhere to any code of conduct in war: In principle such a prescription is commendable, yet the nature of war is not so clean cut when military targets can be hidden amongst civilian centers. Against these two ethical positions, just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war *jus ad bellum* tradition, theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war *jus ad bellum* from those that govern just and fair conduct in war *jus in bello* and the responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war *jus post bellum*. The three aspects are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars or situations. One can immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor consequentialist—they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this provides just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems. Possessing just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of *jus ad bellum*. Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. But unless "aggression" is defined, this proscription is rather open-ended. The onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons why the other explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external threat interventionism. Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed for example, to pursue and punish an aggressor, or to pre-empt an anticipated attack. In recent years, the argument for preemption has gained supporters in the West: By acting decisively against a probable aggressor, a powerful message is sent that a nation will defend itself with armed force; thus preemption may provide a deterrent and a more peaceful world. Unfortunately, false flag operations tend to be quite common. Realists may defend them on grounds of a higher necessity but such moves are likely to fail as being smoke screens for political rather than moral interests. War should always be a last resort. This connects intimately with presenting a just cause — all other forms of solution must have

been attempted prior to the declaration of war. The resulting damage that war wrecks tends to be very high for most economies and so theorists have advised that war should not be lightly accepted: Yet the just war theorist wishes to underline the need to attempt all other solutions but also to tie the justice of the war to the other principles of *jus ad bellum* too. The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here. If a government is just, i. A historical example can elucidate the problem: What allegiance did the people of France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian rendition of almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong so long as the state is not tyrannical and imposes war when it should be the guardian of peace ; whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no sovereignty, and the right of declaring war to defend themselves against the government or from a foreign power is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government. The possession of right intention is ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. According to Kant, possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds, the most pertinent here being the value of self-interest itself. Acting with proper intent requires us to think about what is proper and it is not certain that not acting in self interest is necessarily the proper thing to do. On the other hand, a nation may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may rightly argue that the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i. On that account, the realist may counter that national interest is paramount: The issue of intention raises the concern of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be considered before declaring war. The next principle is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced in the following questions. Should one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of not complying are too prohibitive? Would it be right to crush a weak enemy because it would be marginally costless? Is it not sometimes morally necessary to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in , for the sake of national self-esteem or simple interests of defending land? Historically, many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: Victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. However, the thrust of the reasonable success principle emphasizes that human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds. The final guide of *jus ad bellum* is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. This principle overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of *jus in bello*. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back.

Chapter 7 : War (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The Just War theory specifies conditions for judging if it is just to go to war, and conditions for how the war should be fought. Although it was extensively developed by Christian theologians, it.

Traditionalists and Revisionists Contemporary just war theory is dominated by two camps: Traditionalists and Revisionists. Their views on the morality of war are substantially led by international law, especially the law of armed conflict. They aim to provide those laws with morally defensible foundations. Civilians may not be targeted in war, but all combatants, whatever they are fighting for, are morally permitted to target one another, even when doing so foreseeably harms some civilians so long as it does not do so excessively. Most revisionists are moral revisionists only: Some, however, are both morally and legally revisionist. Among its key contributions were its defence of central traditionalist positions on national defence, humanitarian intervention, discrimination, and combatant equality. Revisionist criticism of combatant equality and discrimination followed Holmes ; McMahan ; Norman They have accordingly sought firmer foundations for broadly traditionalist positions on national defence Benbaji ; Moore , humanitarian intervention Coady , discrimination Rodin b; Dill and Shue ; Lazar c , and especially combatant equality Zohar ; Kutz ; Benbaji ; Shue ; Steinhoff ; Emerton and Handfield ; Benbaji We will delve deeper into these debates in what follows. First, though, some methodological groundwork. Traditionalists and revisionists alike often rely on methodological or second-order premises, to the extent that one might think that the first-order questions are really just proxy battles through which they work out their deeper disagreements Lazar and Valentini forthcoming. Readers are directed to the excellent work of philosophers and intellectual historians such as Greg Reichberg, Pablo Kalmanovitz, Daniel Schwartz, and Rory Cox to gain further insights about historical just war theory see, in particular, Cox ; Kalmanovitz ; Reichberg ; Schwartz In particular, we should prescribe morally justified laws of war. We then tell individuals and groups that they ought to follow those laws. On the second approach, we should focus first on the moral reasons that apply directly to individual and group actions, without the mediating factor of institutions. We tell individuals and groups to act as their moral reasons dictate. Indirect consequentialists believe these institutions are justified just in case they will in fact have better long-run results than any feasible alternative institutions see Mavrodes ; Dill and Shue ; Shue ; Waldron Non-contractualist deontologists and direct- or act-consequentialists tend to prefer the interactional approach. Their central question is: This focus on killing might seem myopicâ€”war involves much more violence and destruction than the killing alone. However, typically this is just a heuristic device; since we typically think of killing as the most presumptively wrongful kind of harm, whatever arguments one identifies that justify killing are likely also to justify lesser wrongs. And if the killing that war involves cannot be justified, then we should endorse pacifism. Any normative theory of war should pay attention both to what the laws of war should be, and to what we morally ought to do. These are two distinct but equally important questions. And they entail the importance of a third: Too much recent just war theory has focused on arguing that philosophical attention should be reserved to one of the first two of these questions Buchanan ; Shue , ; Rodin b. Not enough has concentrated on the third though see McMahan ; Lazar a. Although this entry touches on the first question, it focuses on the second. Addressing the first requires detailed empirical research and pragmatic political speculation, both of which are beyond my remit here. Addressing the third takes us too deep into the minutiae of contemporary just war theory for an encyclopaedia entry. Rule-consequentialists need an account of the good bad that they are hoping that the ideal laws of war will maximise minimise in the long run. This means, for example, deciding whether to aim to minimise all harm, or only to minimise wrongful harm. But to follow this course, we need to know which harms are extra-institutionally wrongful. Similarly, contractualists typically acknowledge various constraints on the kinds of rules that could form the basis of a legitimate contract, which, again, we cannot work out without thinking about the extra-institutional morality of war Benbaji We can start by thinking about actual wars and realistic wartime scenarios, paying attention to international affairs and military history. Or, more clinically, we can construct hypothetical cases to isolate variables and test their impact on our intuitions. Some early revisionists relied heavily on highly artificial cases e. They were criticized for this by traditionalists, who

generally use more empirically-informed examples. Walzer. Revisionists can pay close attention to actual conflicts. e. Traditionalists can use artificial hypotheticals. e. Abstraction forestalls unhelpful disputes over historical details. It also reduces bias—we are inclined to view actual conflicts through the lens of our own political allegiances. But it also has costs. We should be proportionately less confident of our intuitions the more removed the test case is from our lived experience. How can we trust our judgements about such cases more than we trust our views on actual, realistic scenarios? Artificial hypotheticals have their place, but any conclusions they support must be tested against the messy reality of war. The second divide is related to the first. Reductivists think that killing in war must be justified by the same properties that justify killing outside of war. Non-reductivists, sometimes called exceptionalists, think that some properties justify killing in war that do not justify killing outside of war. A paradigm reductivist, by contrast, might argue that justified wars are mere aggregates of justified acts of individual self- and other-defence (see Rodin ; McMahan a). Reductivists are much more likely to use far-fetched hypothetical cases, since they think there is nothing special about warfare. The opposite is true for exceptionalists. Many traditionalists replied by rejecting reductivism, arguing that there is something special about war that justifies a divergence from the kinds of judgements that are appropriate to other kinds of conflict (Zohar ; Kutz ; Benbaji ; Dill and Shue). Again, some philosophers buck these overarching trends for reductivist traditionalist arguments, see e. But this masks a deeper methodological disagreement: Should we model justified killing in war on justified killing outside of war? Or, in focusing on the justification of killing in war, might we then discover that there are some non-canonical cases of permissible killing outside of war? My own view is that thinking about justified killing outside of war has its place, but must be complemented by thinking about war directly. Next, we can distinguish between individualists and collectivists; and we can subdivide them further into evaluative and descriptive categories. Evaluative collectivists think that collectives can matter independently of how they contribute to individual well-being. Descriptive individualists think that any act that might appear to be collective is reducible to component acts by individuals. Descriptive collectivists deny this, thinking that some acts are irreducibly collective. And again there are outliers—individualist traditionalists. e. War is a useful test case for theories of collective action and the value of collectives, but no more than that. Intuitions about war are no substitute for a theory of collective action. Perhaps some collectives have value beyond their contribution to the well-being of their members. For example, they might instantiate justice, or solidarity, which can be impersonally valuable (Temkin). It is doubtful, however, that groups have interests independent from the well-being of their members. On the descriptive side, even if we can reduce collective actions to the actions of individual members, this probably involves such complicated contortions that we should seriously question whether it is worth doing (Lazar b). More recently, they have added an account of permissible action post-war, or *jus post bellum*. Others suggest an independent focus on war exit, which they have variously called *jus ex bello* and *jus terminatio* (Moellendorf ; Rodin a). These Latin labels, though unfortunately obscurantist, serve as a useful shorthand. When we refer to *ad bellum* justice, we mean to evaluate the permissibility of the war as a whole. This is particularly salient when deciding to launch the war. But it is also crucial for the decision to continue fighting. *Jus ex bello*, then, fits within *jus ad bellum*. The *jus in bello* denotes the permissibility of particular actions that compose the war, short of the war as a whole. *Jus ad bellum* typically comprises the following six principles: Reasonable Prospects of Success: Typically the *jus in bello* list comprises: These all matter to the ethics of war, and will be addressed below. However, it is unhelpful to view them as a checklist of necessary and sufficient conditions. To get an intuitive grasp on necessity and proportionality, note that if someone threatens my life, then killing her would be proportionate; but if I could stop her by knocking her out, then killing her would be unnecessary, and so impermissible. The necessity and proportionality constraints have the same root: Harms and indeed all bads that we cause must therefore be justified by some positive reason that counts in their favour—such as good achieved or evil averted (Lazar a). Both the necessity and proportionality constraints involve comparing the bads caused by an action with the goods that it achieves. They differ only in the kinds of options they compare. The use of force is proportionate when the harm done is counterbalanced by the good achieved in averting a threat. To determine this, we typically compare the candidate course of action with what would happen if we allowed the

threat to eventuate. Of course, in most cases we will have more than one means of averting or mitigating the threat. And a harmful option can be permissible only if all the harm that it involves is justified by a corresponding good achieved. If some alternative would as successfully avert the threat, but cause less harm, then the more harmful option is impermissible, because it involves unnecessary harm. We determine its proportionality by comparing it with the harm suffered if T should come about. In my view, we should simply expand this so that the necessity constraint compares all your available options bar none. Then proportionality would essentially involve comparing each option with the alternative of doing nothing, while necessity would involve comparing all options including doing nothing in terms of their respective balances of goods and bads. On this approach, necessity would subsume proportionality. But this is a technical point with little substantive payoff. More substantively, necessity and proportionality judgements concern consequences, and yet they are typically made *ex ante*, before we know what the results of our actions will be.

Chapter 8 : Just-War Theory

Just War Theory traditionally has two sets of criteria. The first establishing jus ad bellum, the right to go to war; the second establishing jus in bello, right conduct within war. [10] In addition, some scholars have recently considered a third criteria, jus post bellum, right conduct after war.

In it, one of five ruling brothers asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified, and then a long discussion ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots, no attacking people in distress, just means no poisoned or barbed arrows, just cause no attacking out of rage, and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just conduct" appropriate to the context of war. In ancient Rome, a "just cause" for war might include the necessity of repelling an invasion, or retaliation for pillaging or a breach of treaty. He claimed that, while individuals should not resort immediately to violence, God has given the sword to government for good reason based upon Romans Christians as part of government should not be ashamed to protect peace and punish wickedness. The sacred seat of virtue is the heart. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. Proper Authority is first: Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence. Soldiers must also fight for this intention. School of Salamanca Edit Growing from Aquinas arguments was the School of Salamanca, which expanded on Thomistic understanding of natural law and just war. Given that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind, the adherents of the School reasoned that it ought to be resorted to only when it was necessary in order to prevent an even greater evil. A diplomatic agreement is preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are: In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack. War to punish a guilty enemy. A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: It is necessary that the response be commensurate to the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war. Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war. Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages. It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort. Under this doctrine, expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans, and wars for glory are all inherently unjust. Just War Doctrine Edit The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church - sometimes mistaken as a "just war theory" [15] [16] - found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, in paragraph, lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force": The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. The Charter of the United Nations, born from the tragedy of the Second World War with the intention of preserving future generations from the scourge of war, is based on a generalized prohibition of a recourse to force to resolve disputes between States, with the exception of two cases: Therefore, engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions. International legitimacy for the use of armed force, on the basis of rigorous assessment and with well-founded motivations, can only be given by the decision of a competent body that identifies specific situations as threats to peace and authorizes an intrusion into the sphere of autonomy usually reserved to a State. Although the criticism can be made that the application of Just War is relativistic, one of the fundamental bases of the tradition is the Ethic of Reciprocity, particularly when it comes to in bello considerations of deportment during battle. If one set of combatants promise to treat their enemies with a modicum of restraint and respect, then the hope is that other sets of combatants will do similarly in reciprocation, a concept not unrelated to the considerations of Game Theory. Just War theorists combine both a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just war tradition act as an aid to determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just War theories are attempts "to distinguish between justifiable and

unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice". Anarcho-capitalist scholar Murray Rothbard stated, "a just war exists when a people tries to ward off the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people, or try to retain an already existing coercive rule over them. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuries â€” that violence is an evil which can in certain situations be condoned as the lesser of evils â€” is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, right intention from the older war theory that first evolved around A.

Chapter 9 : War - Wikipedia

Theories Of A Just War. Return To Main Page. I. DEFINING A JUST WAR "The term 'just war' is employed to refer in a shorthand way to the set of norms or criteria for assessing whether a government's recourse to force is morally justified.