

Chapter 1 : UN Office of the Iraq Program - Oil for Food: About the Program

The Oil-for-Food Programme (OIFP), established by the United Nations in (under UN Security Council Resolution) was established to allow Iraq to sell oil on the world market in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian needs for ordinary Iraqi citizens without allowing Iraq to boost its military capabilities.

Volcker Chairman , Richard J. Goldstone Member , and Mark Pieth Member. The desire for wholehearted international action that could at least slow down a universal catastrophe like global warming is lacking. Expediency rules the policies of most of the governments mainly responsible, although it is encouraging that several governments, the governors of at least ten states in the United States, and a number of major corporations are beginning to take steps to curb carbon emissions on their own. Nonetheless, it seems still to be widely accepted that the short-term interests of the economy and the industrial sector outweigh the need to avert a global disaster that will, in time, blight the lives of billions of people, and animals as well. Friedman wrote in a recent article about the political situation in the United States: It is the yawning gap between the huge problems our country faces today International politics, as reflected in the United Nations, in spite of the efforts of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, now largely concern compromise and half-measures. The North-South difference has succeeded the forty-year East-West deadlock as a brake on international policy and action. It is hardly surprising that the United Nations, [3] originally the embodiment of practical idealism on an international scale, is not thriving in such an atmosphere. In June , when the representatives of fifty states signed the Charter at San Francisco, the idea of a new world inspired a sense of optimism and a spirit of enthusiasm. It was to be a world where the ideals and principles of the Charter would be paramount. The victorious wartime alliance was widely and confidently expected to live on indefinitely as the backbone of the future peace. With the possible exception of a very few American, British, and Soviet officials, the delegates at San Francisco had never heard of nuclear weapons. Nor had they heard of the balance of terror, the cold war, interdependence, environmental degradation, the population explosion, the information revolution, globalization, global terrorism, global warming, global poverty, global epidemics, nuclear proliferation, the threat of failed states, and other phenomena that are now part of our daily lives. The positive, even visionary, international atmosphere of evaporated with the cold war and has never been recaptured. Obviously the United Nations should be seen as an indispensable universal organization through which governments can more effectively address the great problems of our time. In , therefore, there has been much talk of reforming the world organization, and some tentative steps toward that ever-elusive goal have been taken. The September summit meeting produced a long and much-qualified manifesto that included some signs of genuine progress, such as the creation of a peace-building commission intended to assist countries emerging from conflict to avoid falling back into it again, and the recognition of the obligation of governments in the UN to protect suffering populations under certain conditions, particularly genocide, if the government in question is unable to do so or is itself inflicting the suffering. The almost daily atrocities in Darfur painfully demonstrate the very real obstacles to be overcome before this becomes a practical proposition. A strong independent report on some particular UN activity may also provide an incentive for reform. The so-called Volcker Report [4] on the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program, and especially the overwhelming interest of the press in the more gossipy aspects of it, hung over the year of UN reform like a recurrent thunderstorm at a community picnic. It was intended to counter the calamitous shortages of food and other essentials in Iraq caused by the sanctions that had been imposed by the UN after Iraq invaded Kuwait in and that continued after the Gulf War ended. Among their other provisions, the sanctions provided that Iraq could not sell its oil internationally until it showed that it had destroyed any weapons of mass destruction that it possessed and had shut down any programs to produce them. This enormous operation lasted from until the invasion by the US coalition in March The Independent Inquiry Committee was established on the initiative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan and with the agreement of the Security Council in April , after serious charges concerning the management of the program, based originally on captured Iraqi documents, had been made and aired with much colorful exaggeration in the press. The Inquiry Committee was to look into a question of fundamental importance for

the United Nations: Practically everybody even remotely involved with Oil-for-Food seems to have been interviewed except Saddam Hussein and his ministers, the principal culprits. The last and largest volume, "Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime," came out almost two months after the rest of the report. But it has attracted far less sustained attention and few of the righteous cries of scandal that greeted the previous volumes, which dealt mostly with the UN management of the program. A former French ambassador to the UN, it is true, is under investigation in France for allegedly trying to profit from the program, and the Indian foreign minister, Natwar Singh, has had to resign for similar alleged reasons, but public interest in the final volume quickly flagged. The charges against the UN Secretariat, on the other hand, were front-page news almost throughout the more than one-year duration of the Volcker inquiry. The UN Secretariat was widely denounced as an "oil-drenched" sea of corruption and incompetence. Outraged legislators in Albany canceled a carefully worked out and mutually advantageous plan for temporarily rehusing the UN while its fifty-five-year-old building underwent a much-needed modernization. Now that the Volcker Report is complete, it is well worth a look at what it actually says. UN Member States and Secretariat Share Responsibility," [5] issued by Volcker and his two colleagues when the main body five volumes of the report was released. The release also reminds the public of what the Oil-for-Food program had actually done. This very large and very complex Programme accomplished many vital goals in Iraq. It reversed a serious and deteriorating food crisis, preventing widespread hunger and probably reducing deaths due to malnutrition. While there were problems with the sporadic delivery of equipment and medical supplies, undoubtedly many lives were saved. At the same time things went wrong, damaging the reputation and credibility of the United Nations. However, responsibility for what went wrong with the Programme cannot be laid exclusively at the door of the Secretariat. Members of the Security Council and its Committee [6] must shoulder their share of the blame in providing uneven and wavering direction in the implementation of the Programme. Volcker and his two colleagues concluded that the Security Council failed to define adequately both the policies and the chain of administrative responsibility governing the program, so that neither the Council and its Committee nor the secretary-general and the Secretariat were in overall control. As a result Saddam Hussein, to whom the Security Council had given the right to choose and negotiate both with the oil companies that would buy and sell Iraqi oil and with other contractors under the program, soon found ways to make a large profit from oil surcharges as well as kickbacks from other companies under contract. It is important to note that the regime derived far more revenues from smuggling oil outside the Programme than from its demands for surcharges and kickbacks from companies that contracted within the Programme. Smuggling on such a scale could hardly be secret, but it was the position of the United States, tacitly accepted by the Security Council, that since the smuggled oil was largely going to Jordan and Turkey, two friendly countries that previously had done much business with Iraq and had been particularly hard hit by the UN sanctions, that the council should turn a blind eye. This informal exemption had been in place since those illicit revenues were not used by Saddam Hussein to pay for food and medicine but, among other dictatorial purposes, to build presidential palaces. America and Britain held up 5, contracts, sometimes for months, to ensure that no technology was getting through that Saddam Hussein could use for weapons purposes. This arrangement not only made it possible for Iraq to obtain illicit income; it also gave Iraq political and economic leverage. Iraq used this leverage primarily in an effort to secure support in the Security Council for overturning of the sanctions. Oil allocations, therefore, went first to those countries which the Iraqi regime thought might be influential for this purpose. About one half of the allocations went to Russia, with France as the next-largest contractor. Surcharges on oil contracts from ten to thirty cents a barrel were paid into Iraqi embassies or into Iraqi bank accounts in Jordan or Lebanon, both well outside the range of UN oversight. In late , when oil traders balked at Iraqi attempts to impose a fifty-cent-per-barrel surcharge, UN overseers warned the traders that surcharges were illegal. By the end of the demand for Iraqi oil decreased, and Iraq discontinued the surcharges. Hidden from the UN, these kickbacks went straight into Iraqi bank accounts or front companies. The inquiry committee was extremely critical of the management of Benon Sevan, the director of the program, whom the UN deputy secretary-general, Louise Frechette, referred to as a "one-man band. Sevan was the only member of the UN Secretariat charged by the Volcker group with receiving illicit funds. An Iraqi document listed Sevan as being

a "beneficiary" of an allocation of 8,000 barrels of oil contracted for by the African Middle East Petroleum Company Inc. He was summarily dismissed by the secretary-general but was recently reinstated, and retired, after a UN joint disciplinary committee concluded that his dismissal was unjust. Another matter that particularly obsessed the press was a variety of charges related to Kofi Annan personally. These concerned a Swiss accounting firm, Cotecna, which, in 1997, won a contract to inspect items being sent to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Program. It is highly unlikely that the secretary-general, who is responsible for the entire range of UN operations, would have known in detail about this or any other of the 36 contracts involved. One of the most surprising things about the Volcker inquiry was the active and tendentious public discussion of its investigations before the committee itself had reached any of its conclusions. There is no doubt, as Secretary-General Annan has himself publicly stated, that there was a lack of adequate oversight of this very important and complex program. No one at the UN, which largely remained silent under a barrage of innuendo and abuse while the Volcker committee was at work, has attempted to excuse this failure either on the grounds that the UN does not have the administrative and management facilities to run such a program adequately at short notice, or that the program was operating under extremely difficult conditions in a country completely controlled by a particularly ruthless dictator, who was able to choose, and deal directly with, the contracting companies involved. Their main proposals call for the appointment of a chief operating officer with full control over all aspects of UN administration and of an independent oversight board responsible for all independent auditing, investigation, and evaluation activities. These reforms make excellent business sense. It remains to be seen whether such powerful and independent positions can be installed in a member intergovernmental organization whose members attach great importance to their own role in controlling the administrative and financial side of the organization, and whose charter designates the secretary-general as "chief administrative officer. The short- and long-term damage created by some of the press handling of the so-called "Oil-for-Food scandal" is another matter. He seems to have been remarkably successful in pursuing this campaign, especially with his neoconservative friends in Washington. This was quickly taken up in Washington by the press and by various US congressional inquiries, another fertile source of combustible material to feed the "Oil-for-Food scandal. This kind of mud sticks. The world organization has been pictured as a morass of corruption, nepotism, and incompetence on the basis of charges that have now mostly been dismissed by the Volcker committee, while other, much larger anomalies have been ignored. It is believed that this sum was then passed on by the Authority to the Halliburton Company, but it has never been accounted for or audited. While it was working, the Oil-for-Food Program was widely regarded as remarkably successful. It helped 26 million Iraqis to survive the rigors of sanctions, thus making it possible to keep the sanctions in place. The committee recognizes that the UN did not have the infrastructure, the management skills, or the expert personnel to run such a vast program at short notice. The UN was not originally set up to run complex operations, but almost from the outset it steadily developed programs in the field, especially in peacekeeping, without ever providing adequate permanent structures to support them. Instead, the programs were subject to bureaucratic rules not designed for emergency field operations. The Secretariat thus often had to rely on a large degree of improvisation. Such a haphazard way of working would not be acceptable for the foreign operations of the larger and wealthier member states. These governments accepted it in the case of UN operations, however, rather than finance a more comprehensive, long-term support structure for field operations. The Inquiry Report frequently acknowledges that the Oil-for-Food Program did what it was supposed to do. It states, for example, in Vol. I. The Committee also believes that the successes of the Programme, although not extensively chronicled here, should not be buried by the allegations of corruption that have enjoyed so much attention in the media and elsewhere. Unfortunately, through no fault of the Volcker committee, that burial is exactly what did happen. Thus, instead of being welcomed as a significant and successful achievement of the UN as it deserves, the Oil-for-Food Program has come to be seen by many people as a synonym for its disgrace. Of course there are much larger and more important questions than unwarranted damage to personal reputations and to the credibility of the world organization itself. There is nothing new about the ideological dislike of the UN in some circles in Washington, and the Oil-for-Food "scandal" was certainly a useful distraction from the steadily worsening news from Iraq. In recent months

some longtime supporters of the UN have worried about "saving the UN. If there is a general question worth considering, it is, Can our planet be saved? And how can the UN play the most constructive role in what will have to be a titanic global effort? Whole-hearted collective action is needed, and it is needed now. Governments should use the existing UN structure as the foundation for coordinating collective action that is essential to a decent future. If that were to happen, reform of the UN might become really substantial. The North sees the UN as a forum for putting forward its political views; is more prepared to take action against errant states; champions human rights, peace and security and UN peacekeeping ironically now carried out largely by soldiers from the South ; favors more development by the private sector; and wishes to give more administrative power to the secretary-general to counter micromanagement from the General Assembly.

Chapter 2 : Oil-for-Food Programme - Wikipedia

About the Programme. Oil-for-Food. Origins: In August the Security Council adopted resolution , imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iraq following that country's invasion of Kuwait.

As Urquhart points out, misinformed attacks on the UN from US neoconservatives and a complicit media serve to promote narrow nationalist interests while overshadowing legitimate discussions of UN reform and the genuine need for collective action. The report shows the central corporate dimension of the "UN" scandal. The bulk of illicit money was in the form of bribes and kickbacks paid to Saddam in securing corporate contracts. Christian Science Monitor Oil-for-Food: He points out that oversight of the sanctions was not the responsibility of the OIP but that of the Security Council and its member states. Oil-for-Food Benefited Russians, Report Says May 16, A US Senate investigation has concluded that high-ranking Russian officials and politicians "reaped millions of dollars in profits" from oil sales under Oil-for-Food programme sanctions. He notes that "sanctions enforcement was bottom of the agenda" and took a back seat to other diplomatic considerations. Guardian Oil for Food: A representative of one of the companies involved said the decision to bypass sanctions had the "full endorsement of both the executive and legislative branches of the United States. The author also denounces the "creation" of the oil-for-food scandal as simply a way for US neoconservatives "who have been historically opposed to the United Nations" to push their own "reform" agenda to weaken "multilateral institutions and their role in the world. Inter Press Service Volcker Highlights Smuggling Over Oil-for-Food in Iraq Inquiry December 28, The Volcker investigation of corruption within the UN Oil-for-Food programme finds that Saddam Hussein accumulated most of his wealth by securing illegal trade deals, rather than diverting funds from the program to his private accounts. December 8, John G. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker leads an inquiry of UN mismanagement and corruption, Ruggie reminds readers that Congress turned a blind eye to illegal sales and pricing irregularities which favored US companies and served US national interest. The UN bureaucracy does not hold primary blame for allowing Saddam Hussein to accumulate substantial profits. Rather, the blame lies with Security Council members who knew of illegal trade agreements outside the program between Iraq and Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. The Times argues that Council members did not take up responsibility for overseeing the sanctions they imposed on Iraq. Hundreds of companies paid similar bribes and left Saddam with several billion in illicit income. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has ordered an investigation into the emerging scandal but US Conservatives are already seizing the opportunity to point at the incompetence of the world body. Sevan defended the Oil-for-Food programme, claiming that Security Council members "prevented him from effectively administering the multibillion-dollar-a-year program. Investigators worry that the delay "is making it easier for those involved to destroy incriminating evidence.

Chapter 3 : Oil-for-Food Programme

British Member of Parliament George Galloway testified at a hearing on how Saddam Hussein manipulated the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program to win influence and reward friends in order to.

Security Council Resolution of 15 August was introduced to allow the sale of Iraqi oil in exchange for food. The Oil-for-Food Programme started in December , and the first shipments of food arrived in March . The programme used an escrow system. Oil exported from Iraq was paid for by the recipient into an escrow account possessed until by BNP Paribas bank, rather than to the Iraqi government. The money was then apportioned to pay for war reparations to Kuwait , ongoing coalition and United Nations operations within Iraq. The remainder, the majority of the revenue, was available to the Iraqi government to purchase regulated items. The Iraqi government was permitted to purchase only items that were not embargoed under the economic sanctions. Certain items, such as raw foodstuffs, were expedited for immediate shipment, but requests for most items, including such simple things as pencils and folic acid , were reviewed in a process that typically took six months before shipment was authorized. Items deemed to have any potential application in chemical, biological or nuclear weapons systems development were not available to the regime, regardless of stated purpose. Internal audits have not been made public. The good news is that this same UN machinery proved equal to the task of preventing that same regime from fielding WMD, developing nuclear weapons and reconstituting a military threat to its neighbours. Most observers would conclude that the UN, however inadequate its financial oversight, certainly got its priorities right. The UN sanctions regime against Iraq, including the Oil for Food program, is worth close scrutiny not because it was a scandal, although scandal there was, but because taken as a whole, it is the most successful use of international sanctions on record. Documenting the why and wherefores of that success is as important as correcting the shortfalls that allowed a rogue regime, in connivance with unscrupulous international businessmen, to siphon funds from UN-administered Iraqi accounts. The resolution under discussion made clear that the chief responsibility for addressing humanitarian consequences of the war would fall to the United States and Britain if they took control of the country. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention these are the responsibilities of the occupying power. The programme was formally terminated on 21 November and its major functions were turned over to the Coalition Provisional Authority. Throughout its existence, the programme was dogged by accusations that some of its profits were unlawfully diverted to the government of Iraq and to UN officials. These accusations were made in many countries, including the US and Norway. Sevan stonewalled efforts to review and investigate the programme. Sevan and UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette , rejected any such investigation, claiming that it would be too expensive to be worthwhile. He said that they were from working file that contained copies of documents received by his office, and were purged due to lack of space, and also that the originals were held elsewhere. He also stated he encountered a number of cases in which he felt the lack of Iraqi cooperation was designed to exacerbate the suffering of its own people. He also said that in his opinion the sanctions were not an effective deterrent. The list came from over 15, documents which were reportedly found in the state-owned Iraqi oil corporation, the Iraq National Oil Company , which had close links to the Iraqi Oil Ministry. Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh , was removed from office because of his role in the scandal. Many prominent Russian firms and individuals were also included on the al Mada list. Even the Russian Orthodox Church was supposedly involved in illegal oil trading. George Galloway subsequently won two libel actions against the Christian Science Monitor and Daily Telegraph , which had reported the allegations. Few deny that in Iraq, like in many third-world countries, bribes and kickbacks were regularly paid to the leadership in order to get contracts, but some[who? The seller was then to refund the Iraqi government a certain percentage of the commission. Contracts to sell Iraq humanitarian goods through the Oil-for-Food Programme were given to companies and individuals based on their willingness to kick back a certain percentage of the contract profits to the Iraqi regime. Sevan denied the charges. An investigation by the US House Committee on International Relations found that BNP Paribas made payments for goods without proof of delivery and allowed payments to third parties not identified as authorized recipients. Duelfer

Report[edit] The Iraq Survey Group , which was tasked with finding evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, found that OFF saved the Iraqi economy from decline after the imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, the Iraqi regime found that it could corrupt OFF to get hard currency that could be used to manipulate the Iraq Sanctions Committee and undermine sanctions as well as to obtain more weapons.

Chapter 4 : Benon Sevan - Wikipedia

The United Nations is extremely concerned about the serious allegations of corruption surrounding the Oil-for-Food programme.

That same day, the Security Council adopted a unanimous resolution calling on the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq and all other Member States, including their national regulatory authorities, to cooperate fully with the probe. The Secretary-General also issued written instructions to all UN staff to do the same, and publicly declared that those who fail to cooperate will face dismissal. On the question of outside requests for information, the UN has urged contractors working for the Oil-for-Food programme to cooperate with subpoenas from other investigations and they are in fact doing so. Volcker has stated on a number of occasions that he is committed to cooperating with other ongoing investigations. Unfortunately, those measures also had unintended negative consequences on the civilian population. In an effort to mitigate the damage, the Security Council adopted resolution setting up the Oil-for-Food Programme, which allowed Iraq to sell its oil and use the major portion of the revenues to purchase food and other humanitarian relief supplies. At no time did Saddam Hussein have access to or authority over any of the funds in the UN-managed escrow accounts. The Committee, which had the same membership as the Security Council itself, also approved contracts and dealt with any irregularities in their implementation. Operations began in December, 1995, and the first relief goods under the Programme arrived in Iraq. Caloric intake rose by 83 percent, while malnutrition rates in much of the country were cut by half, and some 76,000 mines were cleared. On the health front, enough medicines and vaccines were imported to eradicate polio and drastically reduce other often deadly communicable diseases, including cholera, malaria, measles, mumps, meningitis and tuberculosis. The capacity to undertake major surgeries increased by 40 per cent in the centre and south of Iraq. UNSCOM destroyed missiles, mobile launchers, fixed launch sites, chemical munitions, a chemical weapons complex and a germ warfare complex as well as tons of missile fuel, chemical warfare agents, precursor chemicals and bacteria growth media. The effort was interrupted in late 1998. UNMOVIC inspectors only returned to Iraq in November, 1998, when they destroyed dozens of Iraqi Al Samoud 2 missiles and warheads, as well as launchers, shells filled with chemical weapons precursors and other arms. Neither figure is in any way correct. Funds were allocated according to a formula determined by the Security Council as follows: Once the UN has completed an assessment of the liabilities left against the account, the remaining balance will be transferred to the DFI. As far back as 1990, the Security Council mandated a Multinational Interception Force not administered by the UN to prevent illegal smuggling. As the GAO noted, "Under Security Council resolutions, all member states were responsible for enforcing the sanctions and the United Nations depended on states bordering Iraq to deter smuggling. Although constrained by international sanctions, he nevertheless was still the leader of a recognized, sovereign State. Conscious of this fact, when the Security Council, by unanimous decision, set up the Oil-for-Food programme, it agreed to allow the Iraqi Government to choose who could buy Iraqi oil, and from whom Iraq would import humanitarian supplies. Without this agreement, Iraq would not have allowed humanitarian goods to enter Iraq at a rate high enough to make a difference to the daily lives of the Iraqi people. As the GAO put it, "the Security Council allowed the Iraq government, as a sovereign entity, to negotiate contracts directly with purchasers of Iraqi oil and suppliers of commodities. This structure was an important factor in allowing Iraq to levy illegal surcharges and commissions. Representative to the UN, said: In retrospect, had the program been constructed differently, perhaps by eliminating Iraqi contracting authority and the resulting large degree of autonomy afforded to Saddam to pick suppliers and buyers, then the allegations currently facing the program might not exist. The problem is, of course, that these specific decisions to allow the government of Iraq to continue to exercise authority, to let Saddam Hussein continue to determine who he could sell oil to and purchase goods from were all done in a larger context of a political debate on Iraq. It was reluctantly accepted to ensure that the significant sanctions program would remain in place, thus achieving a U. Chairman, here I want to reiterate a point that I made earlier on the issue of sovereignty. While we oppose the authoritarian regime of the former Saddam era, Iraq was and is a sovereign nation. Sovereign nations are generally free to

determine to whom they will sell their national product and from whom they purchase supplies. Volcker made public 58 audit reports under his purview, including 37 related to the Oil-for-Food programme, 16 related to the UN Compensation Commission and two draft reports related to the Oil-for-Food programme which were not finalized due to the outbreak of war. The Secretary-General immediately welcomed the release of the internal audits as part of the effort he initiated to get to the bottom of allegations surrounding the programme. The Briefing Paper shows that there was a dynamic auditing process generated by the United Nations itself, as well as the reports of external auditors which have already been made public. All the audits, both internal and external, were conducted in accordance with internationally recognized standards. Some lessons are already being applied. For example, on the financial side of the tsunami relief effort the United Nations is already implementing procedures for greater accountability and transparency. The tsunami effort, like Oil for Food, is a humanitarian programme on an unusually large scale, although they differ from each other in nearly all other respects. The Iraq Programme and tsunami relief efforts are two very different projects. With tsunami relief, the UN is coordinating the donations of individual countries and international organizations. Coordinating and directing aid is a familiar role for the UN, which has well-proven tracking and monitoring systems in place. The US accounting firm Price Waterhouse is providing pro bono services to the United Nations to help improve tracking of assistance being offered to the victims of the tsunami. The Secretary-General himself drew attention to the problem in a public report to the Security Council. In response, the Council instituted a "retroactive pricing" mechanism designed to curb the practice. The UN secretariat also strengthened contract review procedures in response to reports of kickbacks. From onwards, hundreds of contracts were queried for pricing, some were held back indefinitely and many were specifically flagged by UN staff to the Security Council. Not once did the members place any of them on hold for pricing reasons. The members of the Security Council nevertheless unanimously approved the contract. It was only in April that the US Treasury Department identified this company as a front for the regime. This example demonstrates that UN staff did report suspicious cases and that while they were not mandated or equipped to check the backgrounds of all suppliers, even those who could, such as the US Government, did not have all of this information until after the Oil-for-Food programme ceased to operate. All details of every contract were known not only by the national authorities of each supplier but also by the members of the Security Council Committee who had the power to approve or hold any contract. It is important to note that in the ISG report, all names of U. That said, the Secretary-General stated on 15 April that "Transparency is the only way to deal with allegations [like those surrounding the Oil-for-Food programme], and by far the best way to prevent corruption from happening in the first place. That, I believe, will be one of the main lessons we have to learn from this affair, whatever the outcome of the inquiry. Contrary to press reports, no contracts for Johnny Walker whiskey were ever submitted or approved under the Oil-for-Food programme. While the Iraqi regime did indicate its desire to fund the construction of an Olympic stadium, no money for the stadium was ever approved or paid. In response to questions raised at the time, the UN did an internal investigation which found that there was no knowledge, including on the United Nations Committee on Contracts or the Procurement Officer handling that contract, that Kojo Annan had any link to Cotecna. That matter is also now in the hands of the IIC. Media reports also allege that the UN was responsible for the delivery of substandard goods to Iraq. Further, under the Oil-for-Food programme, there was a system for conducting complete checks when requested by a member of the Sanctions Committee. In such cases, each box and container for a given contract would be opened and the contents photographed. All Committee members had access to a database containing reports on such cases. The UN is adamantly opposed to all forms of terrorism, from whatever quarter and for whatever reason. The United Nations helped to negotiate the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which aims to prevent exactly the type of outrageous abuse Saddam Hussein allegedly committed. That Convention currently has States parties. The Secretary-General urges all countries which have not yet ratified that pact to do so without delay. We also set up a Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to ensure that these obligations are met. In addition, UN agencies around the world are actively working to prevent terrorism in very concrete ways. The IAEA is helping countries to detect malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, and to prevent illicit trafficking in these

potentially dangerous substances. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime provides assistance to more than 90 countries in strengthening their counter-terrorism capacity. The International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO has taken steps to foster secure skies, including by developing an Aviation Security Plan of Action and sharing expertise in this area through its network of training centres.

Chapter 5 : The U.N. Oil for Food scandal - Washington Times

The United Nations' Independent Inquiry Committee was established in April to investigate allegations of corruption and misconduct within the Oil for Food program and its overall management of the humanitarian program.

About the Programme Oil-for-Food Origins: In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War in , the Secretary-General dispatched an inter-agency mission to assess the humanitarian needs arising in Iraq and Kuwait. The mission visited Iraq from 10 to 17 March and reported that "the Iraqi people may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met. The Government of Iraq declined these offers, contained in particular, in resolutions and , adopted, respectively, in August and September On 14 April , acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council adopted resolution , establishing the "oil-for-food" programme, providing Iraq with another opportunity to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods, and various mandated United Nations activities concerning Iraq. The programme, as established by the Security Council, is intended to be a "temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, until the fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including notably resolution of 3 April ". The first Iraqi oil under the Oil-for-Food Programme was exported in December and the first shipments of food arrived in March Until 20 March , when war intervened and oil exports under the programme ended, the Oil-for-Food Programme was funded exclusively from the proceeds of Iraqi oil exports, authorised by the Security Council. In December , the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports under the programme was removed by the Security Council. The Office of the Iraq Programme is headed by the Executive Director who is responsible for the overall management and coordination of all United Nations humanitarian activities in Iraq under resolutions and and the procedures established by the Security Council and its Committee set up by resolution , as well as the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq May The Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq reports directly to the Executive Director of OIP, and is responsible for the management and implementation of the programme in the field. There are nine United Nations agencies and organizations involved in the programme. It focuses on improvements, shortcomings and difficulties in the humanitarian situation in Iraq; a revenue shortfall in the programme; and an assessment of the implementation of the new set of procedures for the processing and review of contracts for humanitarian supplies. It is the first such assessment since the adoption of that resolution. The Programme, as outlined in the latest report of the Secretary-General , was expanded by the Security Council beyond its initial emphasis on food and medicines to include infrastructure rehabilitation and 24 sectors: The Government of Iraq introduced the following 10 new sectors in June Pre-War and Post-War Developments On 17 March , the United Nations Secretary-General announced that in view of warnings received from the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, regarding the prospect of war and the continued safety and security of UN personnel present in the territory of Iraq, he was no longer in a position to guarantee their safety and security. All remaining UN international staff in Iraq were evacuated on 18 March and the President of the Security Council asked the Secretary General to submit proposals to adjust the mandate of the Oil-for-Food Programme so that it would have flexibility to meet new humanitarian challenges presented by the prospect of war in Iraq. On 19 March , the war in Iraq began with the bombing of Baghdad and on 20 March , the Secretary General pledged to do his utmost to ensure that the UN rose to the challenge of shielding the civilian population "from the grim consequences of war. On 24 April those provisions were extended to 3 June. The extension under resolution , gave the Office of the Iraq Programme and UN agencies, valuable time to identify and ship additional goods and supplies. The Security Council lifted civilian sanctions on Iraq on 22 May with the adoption of resolution Updated 4 November

Chapter 6 : The UN Oil-for-Food Program: Who Is Guilty?

The United Nations Oil-For-Food program was created in by UN Security Council Resolution to "provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people" while Iraq was still subject to economic sanctions for having disobeyed Security Council resolutions requiring its disarmament.

Plus, some evidence suggests that some of the money ended up in the hands of potential terrorists who are opposed to the United States. This is one in a series of articles about the U. Check back tomorrow for the next installment. Although Saddam lost the war, he walked away with one important victory -- he got to stay in power in Iraq. Thirteen years later, a second U. And it did so without the help of the United Nations, which failed to pass a resolution backing the U. As the death toll rises in Iraq -- the number of U. Can the United Nations help now? Only 29 percent say that U. Christopher Shays search , R-Conn. Shays is leading one of several Oil-for-Food probes by the federal government. It could end up being a lot more. But why did these countries really object to a second U. Some evidence suggests that those countries that said they were opposing the Bush administration on principle were actually making billions from Oil-for-Food. On July 1, a bomb placed under his car exploded in Baghdad, killing him, and U. But I can tell you this: Shays places part of the blame on people inside the United Nations, even though U. Norm Coleman search -- leaders of two of at least five federal Oil-for-Food investigations -- have started firing off subpoenas. Yet Shays and Coleman both said in interviews they believe a role exists for an organization like the United Nations. I think the Oil-for-Food program busted that. For more information â€” including government documents, U.

Chapter 7 : United Nations Oil Food Program, May 17 | Video | calendrierdelascience.com

The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme A report by the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (five volumes) Paul A. Volcker (Chairman), Richard J. Goldstone(Member), and Mark Pieth (Member).

Chapter 8 : Facts about the UN Oil-for-Food Programme

the united nations oil-for-food program: issues of accountability and transparency wednesday, april 28, house of representatives, committee on international relations, washington, dc.

Chapter 9 : UN extends oil for food programme | World news | The Guardian

Under the Oil-for-Food program, the United Nations was supposed to monitor and approve all of Iraq's oil sales. All profits went into special escrow accounts that the United Nations controlled.