

Chapter 1 : Republicanism in the United States - Wikipedia

Conceptions of virtue and corruption have been central in the study of politics and history since at least the time of Plato and Aristotle. But while these concepts can be seen as significant in the works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, for instance, they are“beginning with Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* (1714)“*thematic of the eighteenth century.*

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Parliament, Print and Corruption in Later Stuart Britain Mark Knights bio Parliament and the press had enjoyed a symbiotic relationship well before the later Stuart period. Speeches and reports of parliamentary activity, together with the publication of bills, acts and papers, had been relatively common in the early and mid seventeenth century. Freedom of the press after 1689, and then more permanently after 1703, coincided with a period of intense electioneering and partisan conflict. This article will briefly map out the resulting innovations before focusing on one neglected aspect of the print-parliament relationship: One remarkable print campaign allows us to explore this, since a dogged and self-vindicating individual, Robert Crosfeild, waged a paper war to redress corruption both inside and outside Westminster. His case study will show the power of the press both to expose corruption and invoke the weight of public opinion against it. Failing to find redress for the grievances that he highlighted, Crosfeild even began to develop a notion that the exposure of corruption justified the freedom of the press. This marked a move away from the argument that freedom of conscience and religious controversy in pursuit of truth justified liberty of print. Moreover, his printed output raises interesting questions about public and private interests, for in exposing the self-interest of others, Crosfeild used print to construct a persona as a martyred public crusader free from self-interest. The Evolution of the Relationship between Parliament and Print In part the enhanced interaction of the press and parliament in the later Stuart period was the result of changes in the structure of the press. Distribution of print also became more sophisticated. The introduction of the penny post in 1680 facilitated circulation within London, while the growth in the number of coffee houses, both in London and in provincial towns, provided forums in which print was greedily consumed. And it was not just that the number of pamphlets and books surpassed levels first achieved in the 1650s. By 1700 there were 18 London periodicals, including the first daily and the first evening paper. The expansion of the periodical market after 1700, after which titles became more long-lived and were given larger print-runs, contributed not only to the ready availability of parliamentary news but also to commentary on such news. Periodicals were routinely used for electioneering purposes or, as in 1701 over the commercial clauses of the treaty with France, specifically as part of legislative campaigns. Yet it was the variety of new uses to which this print culture was put that is also striking. One innovatory use of the press was the systematic publication of electoral advice and propaganda, a genre that originated in the mid-century struggles but that only really flowered during the period of frequent electioneering in the later Stuart period. There were well over 100 titles of election propaganda published in the reign of Queen Anne; and such material became increasingly sophisticated, tailored even to individual constituencies. A second novelty was the frequent publication of division lists, another product of the age of party, since it allowed electors to scrutinise the activity of M. A third development was the need to put rival versions of what had occurred at an election into the public domain through print. A fourth innovation, resulting from rather similar reasons, was the emergence of the printed poll book. The publication of the poll book for You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 2 : Against "Anti-Corruption"

Get this from a library! Virtue, corruption, and self-interest: political values in the eighteenth century. [Richard K Matthews;] -- This collection of essays examines the importance of virtue, corruption, and self-interest in the contexts of different political and historic settings.

They often disagree about the most basic of ideas. But one thing no serious economist rejects is the important role of self-interest in promoting economic growth. In fact, this idea has been a mainstay of economic theory for centuries. Schools use grades to encourage students to learn. Employers offer bonuses for high-performing employees. Governments offer tax credit for environmentally friendly choices. But unfortunately, pursuing self-interest can go too far. Nelson defines two types of self-interest. This is the same kind of self-interest Adam Smith described. This type of self-interest is usually condemned, and often illegal. But while illegitimate self-interest may be rare in the United States on a large scale, this is not the case in many parts of the world. Political violence is common in east Africa. Government transparency is deficient in communist China. Police corruption is rampant in places like Sudan, Mexico and Afghanistan. Americans often analyze these disadvantaged nations and blame certain public figures or features of regional economies like the presence of oil, drugs or famines. But what we often forget is that the same drive for success that fuels our own economic success creates economic disaster when unaccompanied by strong moral values. This is because self-interest is the most powerful force in the world. It fuels profit-making and charitable enterprises alike. It drives technological progress and entrepreneurial innovation. Yet without strong social pressure to restrain self-interest, economic mayhem results"regardless of financial conditions. As Nelson shows, the nation of Zambia was for years one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in Africa, yet the Zambian economy actually worsened during this same period. Much of this aid, he argues, went straight into the hands of oppressive political rulers who used it to serve their own ends without regard for the rights of their countrymen. What Zambia lacked was a social system that upheld the values required for economic growth"values that encourage self-interest in the market yet condemn it as a way to harm others. Until these values exist, no amount of investment or aid will do any good. Self-interest will rule, as it always does, but only through the violence of those whose self-interest overcomes their respect for the rights of those around them. Self-interest is the fount of economic growth. It is the catalyst for innovation and production. But it can also be the prime mover behind violence and corruption. Needless to say, values and capitalism go hand in hand. If either is left without the other, the economic blessings of self-interest will never be known.

Chapter 3 : Adam Smith and Self-Interest - Oxford Handbooks

Robert W. Hoffert; Virtue, Corruption, and Self-Interest: Political Values in the Eighteenth Century. Ed. by Richard K. Matthews. (Bethlehem: Lehigh University.

We were riding across Zanzibar, Tanzania on motorcycles and assumed that we would be easy targets for the notoriously corrupt police force. Sure enough, a police officer flagged us down towards the end of our journey and proceeded to explain why we owed him money for pulling over on the wrong side of the road. I felt as though the officer was being unethical in that I was being used as a means to an end and that I had my freedom greatly restricted in the process. In addition to this, I felt as though this officer had reduced the overall welfare of the island of Zanzibar. I would likely curtail my spending in the local economy to make up for the unexpected loss and had formed a slightly less positive opinion of Zanzibar culture in response to this act of corruption. The repercussions of this corrupt act are still being felt – you, the reader, are currently making your own judgments about Zanzibar that may or may not have negative impacts down the line. While not all acts of corruption are as cut and dry as bribery from a state official, this example does stress the multifaceted ethical impermissibility of corruption. Michael Sandel explores different faces of justice and ethical permissibility in his book *Justice: To do this*, Sandel filters the most relevant literature and theorists into three fairly broad themes: This paper explores the issue of corruption using the same demarcations to address whether corruption could be ethically permissible within any of these three frameworks. Finally, suggestions for effectively and ethically reducing corruption in modern society are drawn from the available solution space. Definition Corruption is the misuse of power for personal gain. Typically, this power comes from public office and most definitions of corruption reflect this commonality. This definition is limiting, however, and should be expanded to those who hold private office. Is insider trading – using private knowledge and power for private gain and public loss – not corrupt? Expanding the definition of corruption makes it easier to address the ethical parameters of corruption without becoming disoriented in the individual nuances and manifestations of the phenomenon. Sandel invokes the utilitarian theorists John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham to illustrate this ethical conception. Corruption rarely passes the utilitarian examination of a welfare-based ethical perspective. According to utilitarian scholars, an action is morally permissible if the resulting consequences create more benefit than cost, more happiness than sadness, or more pleasure than pain Sandel, Most scholars who operate in this utilitarian framework – particularly economists – attempt to approach the topic of corruption using empirical evidence. Through complex calculations and measurements, economists intend to prove that the overall impact of corruption is either beneficial or detrimental. If it were to be beneficial, then it would be deemed ethically permissible. While Akcay acknowledges that arguments have and can be made in either group, his empirical collection and analysis of human development data as it relates to corruption indices shows that corruption is most often negatively associated with human development Akcay, In most of the 63 countries observed there was a pattern that greater corruption levels correlate with slower human development rates. This was true regardless of status in the global economy; both developed and developing nations of varying economic strength were measured. This cannot be drawn from the data – it could just as easily prove to be the case that sluggish human development, caused by other factors, creates corruption. Pareto efficiency is a term borrowed from game theory, the field of study that explores decision-making when dealing with multiple imperfectly rational and self-interested individuals. Pareto efficiency occurs when the involved individuals or groups reach a stable outcome that creates the greatest possible overall good. In other words, while there is a benefit to cooperation, there is an even stronger benefit for that person to defect if the other cooperates. To use a practical example, it is widely known that traffic would flow much quicker without people changing lanes. Whenever traffic gets dense, drivers begin shifting lanes more often to try to find the lane that offers the fastest commute. Unfortunately, everybody else is also looking for the fastest lane and is switching at the same time. If everyone were to stay in their own lane, it is likely that the average driver would arrive at their destination faster. Instead, we are left with an outcome lacking pareto efficiency due to a personal incentive or even need, as will be discussed in later sections to

defect and perform a corrupt act. This person then has the advantage over others, creating an inequality that fosters a system expecting corruption, thereby creating greater incentive to be corrupt because cooperation is not trusted or recognized. Eventually, the social contract disintegrates as the trust between state and citizen erodes. Social contract theory, most famously explored by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, takes the principles explored in game theory and applies them to the modern nation-state. Each individual relinquishes the same freedoms for the sake of an orderly and safe existence but is also expected to submit to the same restrictions. Friend, According to Rousseau, the only way to have a virtuous social contract is for these restrictions to apply to those in public office and people with authority as well. The French interpreted this virtue as cause for revolution “ a more modern democratic approach would be to vote out the corrupt and vote in the righteous. The bitter injustice of corruption is that reform is not quite this easy. The corrupt remain in office through fraudulent elections and cronyism. The righteous tend to disappear. The categorical imperative suggests that a moral agent should consider if the action is universalizable “ that if everyone adopted the action it would not lead to a worse off condition Sandel, Using this rule, the moral agent would have to imagine a scenario where everyone was corrupt. A state of complete and universal corruption would create rifts in social and political fabric and a collapse in the state. The categorical imperative exists in the narrow space between the golden rule and utilitarianism but has applications beyond each of these notions. For example, the categorical imperative requires that the means are also appropriate and virtuous rather than just the corresponding ends Sandel, This brings a different aspect of corruption to closer examination: This requires a closer view of the means that corruption takes. Nearly all corruption is based around self-interest in some form. Whether an individual commits a corrupt act for subsistence or for excess, it requires using another person as a means to an end. Kant would argue that this is ultimately unethical, even if the overall benefit outweighed the immediate pain caused by the corruption. Corruption is unethical because it cannot be made a universal rule and because it devalues humans. It is ethically impermissible even when a wealthy individual pays a bribe to a low-income government employee with hungry children. The very process of corruption is unethical regardless of the consequences because of the relationship it builds between humans. Freedom-based theories, on the other hand, might permit exceptions to this rule for the sake of preserving individual liberties. It is only within this framework “ of pure, unadulterated freedom “ that corruption might be ethically permissible. The actions they take will be harmonious with their own moral code and there cannot be any external force regulating what is and is not moral. This form of strict freedom-based ethics borders on anarchism and rarely takes serious form in ethical discussions. Instead, most loyalists to freedom-based ethics take a libertarian approach and suggest that there must be a governing force in place to ensure that people do not inflict any direct harm to one another and that contracts are upheld Sandel, In either approach “ anarchism or libertarianism “ it could be interpreted that corruption is a natural course for society and should not be regulated. If the prices are unfair or the corruption unjust, then the competitive free market will set in and somebody will provide a less corrupt alternative. The tenets of modern libertarianism revolve around the notion that it is ethically impermissible for the government to restrict individual liberty. Many suggested solutions to corruption involve increased control and regulation “ mechanisms incompatible with libertarian ethics Nichols, While there might exist ethical permission for corrupt acts within a freedom-based moral code, it is often seen that practicing libertarians are against corruption. In practical application of freedom ethics, libertarians are against corruption for two main reasons: Both reasons rely on a definition of corruption that is focused on public offices and government rather than the holistic definition that includes the private and social sectors Eiras, ; Hodgson and Jang, With this fairly limited definition in mind, libertarians suggest that government is the cause of corruption. The first reason is the fault of the government for not upholding the rule of law for not being controlling enough and the second reason is to be pegged on cumbersome and inefficient regulations and unnecessary bureaucracy in the government for being too controlling. When freedom is restricted due to regulation lengthy permitting processes or inefficiencies bribery , citizens will turn to an informal market that is naturally predisposed for corruption Eiras, Whereas the strict libertarian or anarchist might see corruption as ethically permissible as part and parcel of individual freedom, the practicing libertarian would view corruption as limiting freedom and would

actively seek out a solution to the corruption problem. Solutions Corruption is effectively ethically impermissible in all three major perspectives of justice and ethical conduct. As such, each perspective has a corresponding approach to reducing corruption and creating a more just society. These solutions most often involve both state and non-governmental organizations pushing for increased control and regulation of activities that either qualify or cause corrupt acts. Through the rule of law, reform, and command-and-control regulation, all aspects of corruption public, private, social can be reduced. Voice solutions require increased accountability and transparency in business, governance, and society as a whole. By tracking and exposing corruption, virtue theorists expect that corruption will be eradicated as it becomes better understood. In exposing injustice, they intend to create societal shifts that will call for a less corrupt system " power through knowledge. Transparency International has been keeping a Corruption Perception Index that red flags corrupt institutions with the hopes of shifting the flow of money and influence. In addition to these organizational countermeasures, voice solutions include increased freedom of press and citizen information campaigns. All of these initiatives intend to empower those that are on the receiving end of corrupt acts and measures. These solutions revolve around the libertarian hypothesis that government is entirely to blame for corruption. If government is the problem, than exit solutions advocate for the reduction of government to the bare necessities of maintaining an orderly state. Libertarians suggest reallocation of government resources so that the state becomes more effective at enforcing the rule of law and less effective at controlling the free market. This will shift business and public outreach to the formal economy, thereby reducing the corruption capacity that currently lies in the informal economy. Discussion and Conclusion Control solutions are the best option for reducing corruption. They rearrange the incentive structure in ways that the other two solution strategies cannot. People are not always corrupt because they are unethical. Corruption is often circumstantial and the other two solutions do very little to rearrange or change these circumstances. As seen in game theory and social contract theory, increased communication or a governing body are needed to create the incentive for cooperation in a society that has already experienced corruption. Exit solutions are especially passive in their altering of the incentive structure. Regardless of whether or not government and public institutions caused corruption, removing them is not going to alleviate it. The equilibrium without pareto efficiency that is a corrupt state might be imperfect, but it is stable. Corruption will maintain the default once it becomes the norm " corruption begets corruption. Slackening regulations will not help the system find a less corrupt equilibrium. Similarly, voice solutions lack the authority or assertiveness needed to rearrange the incentive structure of a corrupt state. They come a step closer than exit strategies by opening communication and transparent flow of information but do not eliminate the incentive to defect. Voice solutions would be analogous to having a conference call among all commuters on a highway.

Chapter 4 : Brexit: A Story of Virtue and Corruption - Should Happen

*Virtue, Corruption, and Self-Interest: Political Values in the Eighteenth Century [Richard K. Matthews] on calendrierdelascience.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This collection of essays examines the importance of virtue, corruption, and self-interest in the contexts of different political and historic settings.*

Republican virtues[edit] The colonial intellectual and political leaders in the s and s closely read history to compare governments and their effectiveness of rule. Country party philosophy relied heavily on the classical republicanism of Roman heritage; it celebrated the ideals of duty and virtuous citizenship in a republic. It drew heavily on ancient Greek city-state and Roman republican examples. This approach produced a political ideology Americans called "republicanism", which was widespread in colonial America by Pocock explained the intellectual sources in America: American republicanism was centered on limiting corruption and greed. Virtue was of the utmost importance for citizens and representatives. Revolutionaries took a lesson from ancient Rome; they knew it was necessary to avoid the luxury that had destroyed the empire. The republic was sacred; therefore, it was necessary to serve the state in a truly representative way, ignoring self-interest and individual will. Republicanism required the service of those who were willing to give up their own interests for a common good. According to Bernard Bailyn, "The preservation of liberty rested on the ability of the people to maintain effective checks on wielders of power and hence in the last analysis rested on the vigilance and moral stamina of the people The duty of the virtuous citizen became a foundation for the American Revolution. Bernard Bailyn states, "The fact that the ministerial conspiracy against liberty had risen from corruption was of the utmost importance to the colonists. The patriot press provided emphasized British corruption, mismanagement, and tyranny. The greatest threat to liberty was thought by many to be corruption " not just in London but at home as well. The colonists associated it with luxury and, especially, inherited aristocracy, which they condemned. Pocock argues that Republicanism explains the American Revolution in terms of virtuous Republican resistance to British imperial corruption. They stirred up a martial spirit justified war against England. The sermons called on soldiers to behave morally and in a "manly" disciplined fashion. The rhetoric not only encouraged heavy enlistment, but helped create the intellectual climate the Patriots needed to fight a civil war. He states, "With the onset of the revolutionary crisis, a major conceptual shift convinced Americans across the theological spectrum that God was raising up America for some special purpose. So too did our idea that we Americans are a special people with a special destiny to lead the world toward liberty and democracy. In Discourse of Jonathan Mayhew states "An absolute submission to our prince, or whether disobedience and resistance may not be justified able in some cases"to all those who bear the title of rulers in common but only to those who actually perform the duty of rulers by exercising a reasonable and just authority for the good of human society. This need to protect virtue was a philosophical underpinning of the American Revolution. Such a government is evidently restrained to very narrow limits of space and population. I doubt if it would be practicable beyond the extent of a New England township. The first shade from this pure element, which, like that of pure vital air, cannot sustain life of itself, would be where the powers of the government, being divided, should be exercised each by representatives chosen This I should consider as the nearest approach to a pure republic, which is practicable on a large scale of country or population Jefferson and Madison roundly denounced the Federalists for creating a national bank as tending to corruption and monarchism; Alexander Hamilton staunchly defended his program, arguing that national economic strength was necessary for the protection of liberty. Jefferson never relented but by Madison switched and announced in favor of a national bank, which he set up in John Adams often pondered the issue of civic virtue. And this public Passion must be Superior to all private Passions. Men must be ready, they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their private Pleasures, Passions, and Interests, nay their private Friendships and dearest connections, when they Stand in Competition with the Rights of society. He decided that history taught that "the Spirit of Commerce This had a great influence on the revolution as it implied the inborn right of the people to overthrow their leaders should those leaders betray the agreements implicit in the sovereign-follower relationship. But first and last came a commitment to republicanism, as shown by many

historians such as Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood. The interpretation before, following Progressive School historians such as Charles A. Beard, Vernon L. Parrington and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Louis Hartz refined the position in the 1950s, arguing John Locke was the most important source because his property-oriented liberalism supported the materialistic goals of Americans. The "New School" was led by J. Morgan Kousser. They emphasized slightly different approaches to republicanism. The relative importance of republicanism and liberalism remains a topic of strong debate among historians, as well as the politically active of present day. The Constitution[edit] The Founding Fathers wanted republicanism because its principles guaranteed liberty, with opposing, limited powers offsetting one another. They thought change should occur slowly, as many were afraid that a "democracy" — by which they meant a direct democracy — would allow a majority of voters at any time to trample rights and liberties. They believed the most formidable of these potential majorities was that of the poor against the rich. They set up a House of Representatives to represent the people. In practice the electoral college soon gave way to control by political parties. As the country urbanized and people took on different work, the property ownership requirement was gradually dropped by many states. Property requirements were gradually dismantled in state after state, so that all had been eliminated by 1820, so that few if any economic barriers remained to prevent white, adult males from voting. The influence of names on the mass of mankind, was never more distinctly exhibited, than in the increase of the democratic party in the United States. After 1800, the Democrats were opposed by another faction that named themselves "Whigs" after the Patriots of the 1770s who started the American Revolution. Both of these parties proclaimed their devotion to republicanism in the era of the Second Party System. Republican motherhood[edit] Under the new government after the revolution, "republican motherhood" became an ideal, as exemplified by Abigail Adams and Mercy Otis Warren. The first duty of the republican woman was to instill republican values in her children, and to avoid luxury and ostentation. During the 1800s, thousands of female mill workers went on strike to battle for their right to fair wages and independence, as there had been major pay cuts. Many of these women were daughters of independent land owners and descendants of men who had fought in the Revolutionary War; they identified as "daughters of freemen". In their fight for independence at the mills, women would incorporate rhetoric from the revolution to convey the importance and strength of their purpose to their corporate employers, as well as to other women. If the Revolutionary War was fought to secure independence from Great Britain, then these "daughters of freemen" could fight for the same republican values that through striking would give them fair pay and independence, just as the men had. They were appalled that Hamilton was increasing the national debt and using it to solidify his Federalist base. Burrows says of Gallatin: Not only was it necessary to extinguish the existing debt as rapidly as possible, he argued, but Congress would have to ensure against the accumulation of future debts by more diligently supervising government expenditures. Thus, George Washington in complained, "that you could as soon scrub the blackamoor white, as to change the principles of a profest Democrat; and that he will leave nothing unattempted to overturn the Government of this Country. Therefore, the larger the nation, the safer is republicanism. A precocious legal scholar, Story was appointed to the Court by James Madison in 1809. Story opposed Jacksonian democracy because it was inclined to repudiate lawful debts and was too often guilty of what he called "oppression" of property rights by republican governments. Military service thus was an integral duty of the citizen. As John Randolph of Roanoke put it, "When citizen and soldier shall be synonymous terms, then you will be safe. Military service was considered an important demonstration of patriotism and an essential component of citizenship. To soldiers, military service was a voluntary, negotiated, and temporary abeyance of self-governance by which they signaled their responsibility as citizens. In practice self-governance in military affairs came to include personal independence, enlistment negotiations, petitions to superior officials, militia constitutions, and negotiations regarding discipline. Together these affected all aspects of military order, discipline, and life. The party officially designated itself "Republican" because the name resonated with the struggle of Mills Thornton argues that in the antebellum South the drive to preserve republican values was the most powerful force, and led Southerners to interpret Northern policies against slavery as a threat to their republican values. The main legislation was explicitly designed to promote Republicanism. They held that the republicanism meant that true political knowledge was to be gained in exercising the right to vote and organizing for elections. Anthony

and other advocates of woman suffrage said republicanism covered them too, as they demanded the vote. The Progressives restructured the political system to combat entrenched interests for example, through the direct election of Senators , to ban influences such as alcohol that were viewed as corrupting, and to extend the vote to women, who were seen as being morally pure and less corruptible. In the presidential election of , Republicans emphasized that the Democratic candidate Grover Cleveland had purchased a substitute to fight for him in the Civil War, while his opponent General Benjamin Harrison had fought in numerous battles. Army after war broke out in Europe. Many said it violated the republican notion of freely given civic duty to force people to serve. Legal terminology[edit] The term republic does not appear in the Declaration of Independence , but does appear in Article IV of the Constitution which "guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government. The Supreme Court , in Luther v. Borden , declared that the definition of republic was a " political question " in which it would not intervene. During Reconstruction the Constitutional clause was the legal foundation for the extensive Congressional control over the eleven former Confederate states; there was no such oversight over the border slave states that had remained in the Union. In United States v. Cruikshank , the court ruled that the "equal rights of citizens" were inherent to the idea of republic. The opinion of the court from In re Duncan [75] held that the "right of the people to choose their government" is also part of the definition. It is also generally assumed that the clause prevents any state from being a monarchy " or a dictatorship. Due to the and court decisions establishing basic definition, in the first version of the Pledge of Allegiance , which included the word republic, and like Article IV which refers to a Republican form of government, the basic definition of republic is implied and continues to do so in all subsequent versions, including the present edition, by virtue of its consistent inclusion. By the s, democracy was seen as an unmitigated positive and the term "Democratic" was assumed by the Democratic Party and the term "Democrat" was adopted by its members. The last restrictions on black voting were made illegal in

Chapter 5 : Virtue, Corruption, and Self-Interest | Lehigh University Press

Virtue Corruption And Self Interest Political Values In The Eighteenth Pdf Download Books placed by Madison Jameson on October 26 This is a copy of Virtue Corruption And Self Interest Political Values In The Eighteenth that reader could be safe this by your self at calendrierdelascience.com Fyi, i can not store pdf.

But he was also a significant moral philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, with its characteristic concern for integrating sentiments and rationality. This article considers Adam Smith as a key moral philosopher of commercial society whose critical reflection upon the particular ethical challenges posed by the new pressures and possibilities of commercial society remains relevant today. The discussion has three parts. First I address the artificial separation between self-interest and morality often attributed to Smith, in which his work on economics is stripped of its ethical context. Introduction These days Adam Smith is most familiar to us as an economist, and specifically as the defender of the famous Invisible Hand of free-market economics, wherein the private self-interested actions of private individuals, mediated through free markets, generate results that are good for all. The market-system comprehends the true level of demand for any good and provides the appropriate incentives "profits" for producers to adjust their output to match. No external intervention or guidance is necessary. However the popular view of Smith that has resulted from this emphasis is twice distorted. Firstly, it is based on the narrow foundations of a few select quotations from *The Wealth of Nations* WN that are taken in isolation as summing up his work, and secondly these quotations have been analyzed in a particularly narrow way. On turning to the full *Wealth of Nations* one finds an economics discussed and justified in explicitly moral terms, in which markets, and the division of labour they allow, are shown to both depend upon and produce not only prosperity but also justice and freedom, particularly for the poor. Unsurprisingly, Smith was a staunch and vehement critic of those particularly grotesque sins associated with early capitalism, European empires and the slave trade. Nonetheless, while the structural features of commercial society set the terms of its main opportunities and challenges, they did not determine the outcome. Commercial society was for Smith an ethical project whose greatest potential benefits had to be struggled for, and which could and should be much better than it was. Smith was perhaps the last philosopher to consider prudence a proper virtue, rather than mere cleverness at best. But he also resisted reducing all motives to self-interest and considered man a fundamentally social being, motivated to seek the approval of others and to help those dear to him. In doing so it also described and promoted ethical ambition and excellence, though only a few might attain it. Part 3 Part I: Private vices and public virtue? George Stigler is reported to have started his banquet speech at the bicentennial of the original publication of *The Wealth of Nations* by declaiming, "I bring you greetings from Adam Smith, who is alive and well and living in Chicago". Notably such famous remarks as, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. This stylised account presents Smith in a crudely Mandevillian sense: The Mandevillian interpretation works further harm since Mandeville, unlike Smith, reduced all motivations to self-interest, and all self-interest to the vice of selfishness. Smith is thus presented as promoting not even an amoral but an anti-moral economics, and one that is conveniently compatible with the selfish utility maximising homo economicus of contemporary orthodox economic theory. The first problem with the thesis is that Smith published multiple editions of both books, with substantial revisions, right up until the end of his life. Thus, the fundamental change of mind attributed to him must have been more of a continuous violent oscillation than a considered judgement. There is also plentiful evidence from drafts, correspondence, and student notes from his lectures in moral philosophy at Glasgow that Smith had been developing the main lines of the analysis that would appear in WN even before the first publication of TMS. Smith appears to have had an entire system of thought in mind, of which the only books he completed occupied quite different branches of moral philosophy: The second problem is that WN and TMS do not seem to contradict each other as the thesis

claims though there are tensions, as I discuss below. Self-interest is also positively defended in TMS as natural and morally praiseworthy, in its proper place under the virtue of prudence and as one among other motives. In this Smith placed himself against those, like his teacher Francis Hutcheson, who saw benevolence as the only virtuous motivation for behaviour, and those cynics, like Bernard Mandeville, who saw self-interest likewise always as a vice selfishness, but a publicly beneficial one. Nor is it correct to say that in TMS actors are motivated by sympathy. It does not motivate us directly, nor should it be confused with selflessness or the disposition to be nice to other people that the word sympathy nowadays evokes. The reason Smith talks about sympathy a lot in TMS, rather than WN, is because his sophisticated and original analysis of how sympathy works is the core of his system of moral philosophy. To read Smith through the narrow conventional lens of economics vs. Once one sets this artificially limited perspective aside one can begin to get to grips with the real insights and challenges of this quintessential moral philosopher of commercial society. There is no inconsistency here. Smith was optimistic about the achievements, and even greater possibilities, of commercial society in allowing more people than ever before to live decent lives characterized by material prosperity, justice, and freedom. But he was no blind zealot for the market. As Rousseau put it, The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. For morality, the sociological mechanism is sympathy which we will return to while for economics it is market exchange. Smith was not interested in what a perfect society might look like, but rather with understanding the world as it is and how it might be improved. What Smith described and analysed so well was the appearance of commercial society characterized by an enormously increased division of labour, dependence on strangers, formal property rights, and individual mobility. Smith noted following a number of previous writers in political economy that a European peasant was now materially better off than an African king, but he attributed this not to innate European superiority but to changes in the political economy. The recent increase in the wealth of certain nations was due to the increasing role of markets in the economy, which made possible and rewarded the technical innovations and efficient organisation of labour that dramatically increase the productivity of labour. That benefits the ordinary citizens of a country – i. Firstly, when producers compete fairly and freely with each other to supply the public with cheaper and better products there is a natural tendency for the market price to fall towards the actual cost of production, meaning less profits for producers and cheaper products for consumers. Secondly, at the other end, the rise in labour productivity means that wage labourers the bulk of the population can exchange their labour for a greater command of those goods. The wealth of the nation – the ability of its citizens to command goods to satisfy their wants – is increased. It was particularly important to Smith that the poor benefit from this process: No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed and lodged. Smith saw such arguments, whether for direct subsidies or competition-restricting regulations, as an intellectually bankrupt, and often morally corrupt, rhetorical veil for what were actually taxes upon the poor. There is an outrageous degree of iniquity in the rich and powerful classes choosing to place such burdens on the poor and powerless. While mercantilism had achieved a great deal it still fell far short of creating the level playing field and commitment to fair play that Smith argued a civilised society should realise in its positive jurisprudence and institutions. In terms of a level playing field, Smith excoriated the efforts of the politically connected to write rules that suited themselves. When people gain equality before the law and thus security from the predations of the powerful, they have the security they need to make the investments that increase productivity. But such mercantilist regulations were wrong not only because they reduced economic efficiency by reducing and distorting competition. This was not only a matter of the freedom of great merchants to engage in high international trade. Smith was particularly exercised about the 18th century English laws that deprived wage-labourers, whose only means of subsistence was to sell their labour, of the right to change occupations, negotiate wages, or even move around the country. These policies, justified by chimerical arguments about the public good, reduced and distorted the options available to ordinary people to help

themselves and through such artificial helplessness induced real hardship and destitution. One should note that liberty was a maxim for Smith rather than a dogma, and he was in favour of regulations properly justified by the public good. The feudal system that Smith describes as preceding commercial society and whose traces could still be seen in his own time in parts of Scotland was a society characterised by direct relationships of dependence; a world of great landowners with the power of lords over their tenant farmer subjects and retainers. Such a social order caters to a pernicious human vice – pride – that all too easily becomes a vicious institution. The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. In commercial society informal webs of mutual obligation are transformed into formal consensual relationships between independent agents because these are far more economically productive. The division of labour mediated by extensive markets replaces closed relationships of direct dependence, in which some must subordinate themselves to the whims of their masters and curry favour to survive, with open networks of inter-dependence spread among the thousands of people involved in producing and bringing to market the most ordinary essentials of life. If people find the working conditions in one employment oppressive they are free to take their labour elsewhere. Increased wealth and the security that followed a proper administration of justice allowed ordinary people to reflect about matters beyond their daily subsistence. Freedom from artificial constraints and domination allowed them to control important aspects of their own lives, from religion to employment, while taking greater responsibility for how they lived. Markets themselves could be schools for certain virtues. For example, people who worked for themselves would be more industrious and temperate; people who interacted through markets would be more honest than when trapped in sycophantic relationships with masters. Nevertheless Smith was careful to acknowledge the particular problems and limitations that life in commercial society posed for autonomy and, after extolling the benefits of free markets at great length, spent book V of WN laying out in great detail partial institutional correctives for its deleterious consequences. He noted for example that the division of labour could have deleterious effects on the physical, mental and moral capacities of workers performing simple repetitive rote tasks, as in the famous pin factory. But though sectarian membership might head off the danger of dissipated morality and hold people to high moral standards, it was all too often based on a hubristic moral righteousness that Smith considered a travesty of real moral autonomy and, through its tendency to political factionalism, a threat to social order. That danger might be mitigated, non-coercively of course, through the official encouragement of those antidotes to superstition and gloom – the study of science and philosophy, and public entertainments such as painting, poetry, music, dancing, or drama. He justified commercial society for its tremendous contribution to the prosperity, justice, and freedom of its members, and most particularly for the poor and powerless in society. But he was no naive ideologue for free markets and profits. He criticised the moral character of the very merchants and manufacturers who, he acknowledged, were driving economic development, and not only told them they should act better, but also argued for institutional measures to restrict their worst influences particularly by getting government out of the business of economic micro-management. Though its promise was great, commercial society also meant the loss of valuable old ways and posed new challenges of its own. Its success was not predetermined, but had to be worked for. That spirit of optimistic pragmatism contrasts markedly with contemporary critics of commercial society like Rousseau, who saw things in more absolute terms. Or what is the tone of temper, and tenour of conduct, which constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, the character which is the natural object of esteem, honour, and approbation? Or in other words, how and by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenour of conduct to another, denominates the one right and the other wrong; considers the one as the object of approbation, honour, and reward, and the other of blame, censure, and punishment? His answer to the second, which we will turn to first, was a sophisticated model of moral psychology based on sympathy. Smith built up his account of moral psychology from an anthropological study of how ordinary people go about their moral lives. His motivations for doing so were to be true to the phenomena in question. Firstly, he had little patience for those who tried to squeeze actual moral phenomena into distorted shapes to fit an elegant conceptual system, for example on the aesthetically pleasing principle of

accounting for everything with as few principles as possible. But that separation is also an epistemic resource because the spectator is able to bring her own knowledge and sense of propriety with her to the assessment of this new perspective. Smith argues that this too comes about through sympathy. People have a natural desire for the approval of others and an aversion to their disapproval. From childhood we learn to see ourselves as others see us, to understand what others approve of and what they are unwilling to go along with, and through such discipline and direction we gradually come to understand and internalise the prevailing moral norms of propriety in terms of what the representative disinterested bystander – any impartial spectator – would go along with, even if no such spectator is physically present. For example, spectators are more reluctant to sympathise with some emotions than others, even when they are justified. They will go along with an excess of joy far more than an excess of grief or anger, because joy is more pleasant. As a result, and in a manner generally beneficial for social order, people will particularly tend to self-censor their less pleasant or unsocial passions, to lower their pitch to the level the impartial spectator can go along with. This produces an ethics of conventional propriety that is important for social order and an important stage in moral education, but not its final goal:

Extra resources for Virtue, corruption, and self-interest: political values in the eighteenth century Example text Indeed, the fullest and most systematic discussion of the concept of virtue published in colonial America, a work entitled Ethics Elementa.

Considered as one symptom of a broader disease that heralded the ascent of Donald Trump and the decontamination of Marine Le Pen, Brexit has been both celebrated and derided as a victory for a species of exclusionary populism that seeks to push back against the unforgiving winds of globalisation. While with this attempted explanation of Brexit certainly touches on some truths, it stops short of telling the whole story. Instead, they had for some time found themselves looking on patiently as the political institutions of Brussels and London began to appear ever more incestuous, and not to mention increasingly concerned with supporting a carefully-chosen set of interests. As London and continued to grow as a financial and cultural centre fluent in the language of political correctness, the remainder of the country simply stagnated – and was often mocked for it, privately if not publicly. The provinces, it seemed, had been at best forgotten, and were at worst held in contempt by those charged with managing the affairs of the nation. George was, for some, confirmation of this. The political elite were no longer simply detached from the country; now, they had stopped trying to hide this fact. If the above sketch of the divide between the provinces and Westminster is in any way accurate, it would suggest that history might very well rhyme after all. In , a similar perception existed. Only this time, the impression was that the power vested in Parliament had been transferred to a different, albeit equally unaccountable, source in the form of the European Commission. Equally important was the perception that the machinery of government – both in Brussels and London – had become increasingly organised around advancing a distinct set of interests and ideals which were alien to many in the provinces. Many who voted to leave the European Union in found in Brussels a detached elite concerned to the point of obsession with expanding an already cryptic and inscrutable power base. The importance of perception The question, it should be said, of whether or not the political and cultural elites of London and Brussels are indeed corrupt and parasitic is in many ways immaterial. In the paradigm of virtue and corruption, perception is all that matters. Similarly, whether or not it is true that Brussels can be found siphoning-off power and suppressing the oxygen of democracy, the perception is that the institutions of the European Union are doing just that – and doing it with abandon and a disdain for the people over which they govern. In championing the economic benefits of the European project as compensation for losses in political and individual freedom, those charged with making the argument for continued membership offered up an enormous intellectual concession, and one that was significant enough to cost them the broader argument. Of course, prizing economic security and growth over political liberty is an understandable position to take. In a sense, we all do it in our personal lives. And indeed, the trade-off between freedom and prosperity is a foundational pillar of society – the only disagreements are about where to draw the line. But when the perception was that only a fraction of society benefited from the bargain, the economic advantages championed by Remainers appeared as little more than selfish interests. Where the Remain argument expressed in the language of economics, the rationale behind the Leave campaign was cultivated in a set of political considerations. Something that the Remainers failed to grasp was that many of their opponents accepted the economic case for continued membership. They were keenly aware that the economy could suffer, and suffer greatly, if Britain were to leave. Being free, both personally and politically, is, for some, worth almost any financial price. The key point is really this: For them, it is the primary driver of politics. But the self-interest argument failed in the provinces where other ideals and principles were prioritised. Notions of individual liberty and parliamentary democracy – concepts derided by Remainers as ancient relics with no place in the cosmopolitan twenty-first century – actually mattered, and will continue to matter, to many.

Chapter 7 : Values & Capitalism Â» Self-interest: A Powerful Force for Good and Evil - Values & Capitalism

Endemic corruption suggests a pervasive failure to tap self-interest for productive purposes" (p. 2). Later, we will show that our unified ethics, with an emphasis on character, can be an important ingredient in efforts to channel self-interest as part of comprehensive anti-corruption campaigns.

Megan Erickson The fight against corruption has become a defining theme of contemporary politics. Everyone from the World Bank to Donald Trump insists on the need to clean up the swamp and oust wrongdoer officials. The Left has struggled to offer a coherent response to this problem, particularly when anticorruption politics are mobilized against progressive governments. Yet if the Left is serious about wielding and transforming state power, it needs to go beyond a moralistic understanding of this question. Yet it is only by properly understanding the sources of this ill and the reasons for its ongoing relevance that we can address it as a political problem. Corruption tends to thrive amid a culture of impunity and a low degree of development. In the modern era, the remnants of pre-capitalist oligarchies perpetuating personalized sources of power are a major source of corruption in the relations between state and capital. But this tendency is reinforced wherever mass movements are not powerful enough to hold elites accountable. Precisely for this reason, corruption is not the inevitable fate of impoverished or sinful nations, but a product of specific historical forces and class struggles. In fact, the very notion of corruption has changed over time. Classical political theory saw corruption as a preordained process that causes institutions to degenerate unless something intervenes to bring about their renewal. Corruption sparks a cycle of diminishing expectations, producing apathy and political demoralization. But this shift in the definitions of corruption reflects a broader move from understanding politics as a sphere of passions and civic virtue to one that sees it as no more than a terrain of competing interests. In truth, corruption is more than simply a set of illicit exchanges. Rather, it is a political strategy that specific interests use to capture or influence institutions or the state. It is, in essence, the privatization of public life. To see this, we need only look at the recent example of the Guptas, an Indian business clan who were able to capture the South African state. With the aid of former president Jacob Zuma who they had bought off, the Guptas were able to direct cabinet appointments, state procurement strategy and budgets in order to channel public funds into their private coffers. This ranges from businessmen bribing politicians to vote for deregulation to possibly non-illegal activities such as the revolving door between the private sector and politics. Private actors can corrupt institutions over time to the point where unwritten codes and practices incentivize public officials to engage in or turn a blind eye to corrupt exchanges. If one is forced to choose between a neoliberal politician who might not be corrupt, but will slash social spending, or a corrupt demagogue who makes sure his community gets something back, can we really say the former is better? Corruption and Development This, however, carries its own dangers. Systemic corruption does more than just affect the functioning of institutions. It sparks a cycle of diminishing expectations, producing apathy and political demoralization. If political change is impossible, what else is there but to look after your family and your own personal wellbeing? Such cynicism is toxic. Such is this vicious cycle that today the World Bank decries corruption as the single greatest obstacle to global development. As a result, anticorruption policy has become a standard feature of post-Cold War development projects, institutionalized as a feature of the neoliberal world order. Yet in fact, corruption was not always seen as an impediment to development. Indeed, the shift from corruption being viewed as a domestic issue to it appearing as an international concern is a particular feature of the post-Cold War era. During the heyday of modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s, key development theorists such as Samuel Huntington argued that corruption was actually conducive to development, as it could cut red tape and allow markets to operate more smoothly, thus making it easier for multinational corporations to do business. Corruption did not stand outside of the modernization process; rather, it was seen as its inevitable product. The real or asserted failings of Eastern Bloc socialism and of social democracy were also explained in terms of corruption. In the 1980s, as liberal ideologues rushed to proclaim that socialism had been proven unviable, they insisted that all collectivist projects were doomed to fail because of individual greed and the rational pursuit of self-interest, which inevitably corrupted these systems. In this

argument, these energies could only be controlled and put to use through the free market. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, corruption came to be seen as the essential obstacle to Third World development. By anticorruption had been adopted as a key component of international development policy by the World Bank, IMF, and United Nations. Anticorruption policy became centered on something called transparency — meaning, adherence to standards that suit the interests of international capital. Technocrats and Populists The politics that claims to stand against corruption can largely be broken down into two main types, depending on whether it is predominantly technocratic or populist. The former is a feature of the international economic and political order promoted through multilateral institutions like the World Bank and IMF, or big money NGOs such as Transparency International. It set international standards on what counts as corruption, often in line with opening up countries to international capital. State intervention in the economy, redistributive reforms, and welfare states are portrayed as either vulnerable to being captured by corrupt interests or sometimes as a form of corruption unto themselves particularly for libertarians who regard all taxation as theft. Here, we need only think of the ritual condemnations of bloated bureaucracies and red tape. Populist anticorruption emerges in response to political systems widely perceived as stuck in the mire of corruption that stains every politician and political party regardless of their ideology. A charismatic outsider untainted by the stain of the establishment appears promising to sweep the system clean purging the corrupt elite that dominate the country, as he — for it is invariably a he — offers a messianic politics of redemption. The West invokes corruption to excuse itself of blame for the misery, poverty, and suffering it has inflicted across the world. Anticorruption plays a central role in anti-politics: Any attempt to exert change through politics will inevitably fall prey to corruption, the entire system is corrupt and only somebody or something outside of the system will be able to exert meaningful change. Populist anticorruption, while not necessarily always conservative-leaning, tends to favor reactionary forces. This is especially true in the contemporary context of a widespread loss of legitimacy for mainstream center-left or social-democratic parties. Right-wing anti-corruption populism, like the National Front in France or the Lega in Italy, has come to fill the void left by the collapse of the center-left. Anticorruption populism is form of moralism cloaked in the veil of anti-politics; the solution is just to kick the bad guys out of office. Corruption tends to be individualized and personified as some aloof elite or center-left politician becomes the symbol of all that is corrupt and wrong. This works especially if it is plausible as in the case of Hilary Clinton but can also function in terms of class hatred, sexism, racism and anti-poor sentiment in the case of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. Anticorruption individualizes politics while ignoring the structural incentives that produce systemic corruption; ironically, this empowers corrupt self-serving leaders like Donald Trump or Silvio Berlusconi. Populist anticorruption politics and technocracy share similar antidemocratic impulses. Anticorruption populism tends to dismiss democratic political systems as corrupt, portraying rights or due process as things that just get in the way of fighting corruption. Technocratic anticorruption politics sees popular mobilization and ideological debate over policy as illegitimate and thus corrupting. At times populist and technocratic forms of anticorruption can even merge. In practice, this tech-utopianism replaces mass mobilization, public debate, and other forms of inclusive political life with incessant online polling. Even beyond the antidemocratic impulses that unite these two approaches, we also find that they share one same millenarian core in which the redemptive force of technology or leadership can eliminate the stain of corruption and redeem the country concerned. Ironically, by removing politics from the checks and balances of democratic accountability, technocratic anticorruption politics leads to exactly the disillusionment with politics that helps corruption thrive. Anticorruption populism turns political struggle into a simple moralism, often delegitimizing mass struggle as a vehicle for meaningful change. Criminalizing Social Democracy In order to more concretely illustrate the failings of anticorruption politics it is worth contemplating the specific example of its effects in Brazil. Yet their real target lay elsewhere. The central protagonist in Lava Jato, Judge Sergio Moro, was turned into a messianic international anticorruption superstar. Following calls in the media, hundreds of mostly middle-class Brazilians took to the streets in protest against corruption. Crucially, it was the upper-middle class that led these protests, even if the protests included sections of the working class and even organized labor. The protests were backed by shadowy anticorruption movements like the Movement for Brazilian Liberty MBL , funded by the Koch

brothers and the dark web of libertarian money and international right-wing parties. Lava Jato paralyzed these efforts and with the help of opposition parties prevented the PT from responding to economic crisis. Lava Jato was used to cast state intervention in the economy as itself being a form of corruption. We must fight corruption not simply by boasting of our higher morality, but through the struggle to expand the reach of democracy itself. The effect was to criminalize moderate social democracy and the Left through the rhetoric of anticorruption. Post-coup president Michel Temer “ who enjoys the lowest approval rating in recorded history ” and his government have been tainted by corruption scandals. But while he is heavily implicated in Lava Jato, he has not faced prosecution. However, this type of politics often sows the seeds of its own downfall. A center-left or socialist government coming to power on anticorruption platform will surely risk demoralization and demobilization if it itself falls prey to scandals. For this reason, the Left has to move beyond an easy, moralistic anticorruption rhetoric, especially if we are serious about taking power. The Left faces the particular challenge of convincing ordinary people not only that the existing order is undesirable but that it can be substantially transformed through collective action, in a struggle that will surely itself demand sacrifices. The Right has the much lesser burden, in this regard, because all it usually has to do is persuade people to stay home and pursue their own private interests. Corruption and anticorruption movements pose a significant danger to the Left because they each reorient politics onto this terrain, while also feeding a wider cynicism that politics can ever be more than a terrain of self-seeking. Taking power necessarily requires a degree of compromise; some elements of a political project will be absorbed by the state, and anyone governing institutions that are run according to their own unwritten codes will have to depend on the exchange of favors or influence. Often, as in the case of Syriza in Greece, a left-wing government is dependent on unsavory coalition partners. This results in key cadres and intellectuals being absorbed by a bureaucracy that incentivizes not just negotiation but horse-trading. At the same time opportunists will invariably flock to a successful party seeking to advance their own careers, even though lacking its core principles. Corruption thus presents a particular challenge for that Left which is concerned with taking power. It is all too easy for a Left concentrated on maintaining its own purity in permanent opposition to embrace a moralistic cynicism about those in power, without reflecting on the rebound effect this may have on belief in political change itself. A left-wing anticorruption politics must, therefore, accomplish two central tasks. Firstly, it needs to politicize corruption in way that is neither moralistic nor technocratic. Secondly it has to focus on reducing the sources of systemic corruption “ elite power and inequality. The source of systemic corruption can only be combated through political struggles to achieve meaningful reforms in conjunction with egalitarian social policies. But imposing such change, which is perhaps the greatest challenge a left-wing anticorruption politics has to face, also relies on building democratic control through mass mobilization.

Chapter 8 : Project MUSE - Parliament, Print and Corruption in Later Stuart Britain

CHARACTER, VIRTUE AND SELF-INTEREST IN THE ETHICS OF THE PROFESSIONS Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION *The professions today are afflicted with a species of moral malaise that.*