

Chapter 1 : What Does China Think? by Mark Leonard

To ask other readers questions about What Does China Think?, please sign up. Be the first to ask a question about What Does China Think? This is a fairly decent, very brief -- but ultimately far too superficial -- treatment of the political debates current (or current 3 years ago) in contemporary.

For more than a decade, Chinese people have been living a version of this once-utopian concept. And, since the financial crisis, the government has been terrified of the consequences for its legitimacy of this newly enriched bourgeoisie losing its wealth. This came on top of a growing sense that the traditional foundations of growth were eroding as labour costs, the price of land, and exchange rates all went up. Some, such as the economist Justin Yifu Lin, who dramatically defected from Taiwan to China in by swimming ashore during a military training exercise, think that China is backward enough to continue growing in the traditional way for another two decades. Others think he is hopelessly over-optimistic, although they would probably have said the same thing if he had told them in that the country would grow in double digits for the next three decades. Unlike Lin, Yu is old enough to remember China declining as well as growing. His defining experience was seeing his world turned upside down by the Cultural Revolution: Chinese thinkers such as Wang Shaoguang and Sun Liping are looking in interesting places to understand the crisis. Rather than studying the experience of other post-communist states, they have rediscovered J. China has gone from being one of the most equal countries in the world to a nation with a bigger gap between rich and poor than the United States. The result is that a city such as Guangzhou formerly known as Canton , the largest in Guangdong, has become like Saudi Arabia: The rest have had no rights to housing, education, or healthcare and live on subsistence wages. In Saudi Arabia the cheap migrant labourers are attracted by the oil wealth; but in Guangdong the labourers are the sources as well as the byproduct of the wealth. Reform of these conditions is painfully slow. Without state-backed pensions, healthcare, or education, citizens save almost half their incomes as a hedge against personal misfortune. But the state-owned banks give them an artificially low interest rate. This makes vast amounts of capital available to crony capitalists at cheap rates for speculative investments, which have swelled the GDP and strewn the Chinese landscape with white elephants like palatial municipal buildings, factories that stand still, and empty hotels. On one side of the debate about how to escape from the affluence trap are economists such as Zhang Weiyong who form the core of the pro-market New Right. They pioneered the gradualist economic reforms of the 1980s and now want the state to finish the job and privatise the rest of the economy. Their concerns have their champions within the Chinese system: On the other side of the debate are New Left thinkers such as Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan and Wang Shaoguang, who have been calling for a different model of development since the 1980s. Since the early 1980s, they have been setting out ideas that have challenged the orthodoxy of neoliberal economics and called for a return of the state. They talk about low-price healthcare; about socialised capital and reforming property rights to give workers a say over the companies for which they work; and about green development. Back in the 1980s, when the neoliberal economists ruled the roost, the New Left struggled to find any major political figures who supported their ideas; the best they could do was to find village leaders who still embraced collectivisation. Thus, in 1989, Cui Zhiyuan edited a breathless book about a backward village called Nanjie, which had embraced collectivisation and was outperforming its rivals, as a model for a non-neoliberal Chinese future. But, by 1992, the political mood had shifted to the left. Rather than scouring the countryside for neo-Maoist villages, the New Left could point to Chongqing – a city the size of a country, responsible directly to the State Council and led by the most high-profile and charismatic politician in China. The problem for the approaches of both the left and the right – stimulating demand on the one hand and supply-side reforms on the other – is that they run into the massive vested interests that have grown during the dizzying two decades in which crony capitalism has taken off. Thus the greatest opponents of the New Left and the New Right are not each other but the beneficiaries of the system that has evolved. How to break that is increasingly a question that impinges on politics. But, after the Tiananmen Square massacre and the collapse of the Soviet Union, China eschewed these sorts of political reforms for fear that they could lead to the dissolution of the country. A surprising number of intellectuals talk

privately about the threat of revolution or, at the very least, much more dramatic scenarios of democratic transition. Pei Minxin, an American-based Chinese academic, has written what a lot of his fellow thinkers believe but cannot write: The biggest gulf is between thinkers who believe in institutional sources of legitimacy and those who believe in political ones. One group of Chinese intellectuals thinks that the way out of the stability trap is to find ways of institutionalising Chinese politics. The New Right, which does not believe in removing the roots of inequality, wants to use politics to make it more legitimate. It is conscious that the country is becoming more complex and more restive as an epidemic of riots is spreading across the country. But since then the number of riots has grown even faster than the Chinese economy: That means that there is now more than one major riot every two minutes. How can the system channel this anger so that it does not threaten to overturn the system? The place where these issues have come the most to the fore is Guangdong, which has become a model of flexible authoritarianism that gives greater voice to the concerns of citizens on the internet and allows civil society and NGOs to voice concerns. Before Wukan, elections had more or less disappeared from the menu of systemic reforms. However, even Sun â€” a bold and articulate voice for political liberalisation â€” fears that the Wukan model cannot be universalised as a solution to social tensions. The problem is, he says, that too many people have already been dispossessed of their land and property across China, and free elections could see the whole system unravel. That is the reason why some of the economic liberals who have written for this collection, such as Zhang Weiying, would prefer strong political leadership to elections. Some Chinese thinkers have also been influenced by the collapse of faith in elections in developed democracies that are beset by falling turnouts, the rise of populism, and a crisis in the very idea of representation. Thus, although they want a more institutionalised Chinese system â€” with term limits, public consultation, and the rule of law â€” they do not see elections as a panacea. China, according to these new political thinkers, will do things the other way around: Another group of Chinese intellectuals think that such institutional innovations are counter-productive. They argue that they are in danger of causing a crisis of Chinese legitimacy by creating an overly bureaucratised and cautious political leadership that is incapable of taking the radical choices that will be needed to legitimate China. These intellectuals think the solution is to look for more political sources of legitimacy. The stereotype outside China is that Chinese politics has remained trapped in aspic even as the economy has been through radical changes. In fact, the country has gone from having a system animated by larger-than-life charismatic figures such as Deng or Mao towards the collective bureaucratic leadership of technocrats who exercise power according to strict term limits and are subject to regular reviews by their peers and constituents. The neo-authoritarians and fans of mass participation think this is a bad thing. Only the charismatic power of a leader â€” combined with the political organisation of the party â€” could cut through. This fear of bureaucratisation is best captured by the neoconservative thinker Pan Wei. In his essay in this collection, Pan argues that although the bureaucratic state is able to make the big decisions, it is 18 the trivial things that lead to social unrest and the fall of political systems. Pan argues that the natural communities that had existed for thousands of years in China have gradually been destroyed, first by Maoism and then by the market â€” and he lays out a Chinese variant of communitarianism to recreate them. Pan reads the unrest in Wukan as driven by a lack of respect for the local original clan-communities, which the election of a new leader only amplifies. They are less interested in restricting the power of the executive than they are in empowering the masses, and see a populist democracy as the solution. The only way that the leadership could drive market reforms that made one of the most equal societies in the world into one more unequal than the United States without provoking massive political unrest was to have strong political controls. But, as his essay in this collection shows, he fears that instead of a new period of mass democracy, the removal of Bo Xilai could see another era in which political repression goes hand in hand with economic liberalisation. It is within this context of the debate between political and institutional sources of legitimacy that we should also view the effect of the internet in China. It has been an article of faith among many Western observers that the inevitable consequence of the internet is to open up societies and defeat autocratic regimes, bringing liberal democracy in its wake. However, the Chinese state has changed the internet as much it has been changed by the internet. In particular, central government uses the absence of censorship as a political tool to rein in local government officials. After a tragic train crash in

Wenzhou in , the government allowed million critical messages about the Chinese railway minister “ who was the object of ire of even top officials at that point “ to be aired on social media over five days. Later there was an even more dramatic and relatively free internet debate about Chongqing party head Bo Xilai from February to April of this year. There is speculation that lurid rumours about Bo and his wife, Gu Kailai, were deliberately encouraged by the party to sap the legitimacy of a very popular leader to the point where he could be purged. This arresting image shows how China 3. In that sense, social media could actually lengthen the life of the one-party state by giving citizens an outlet for discontent, while allowing the leadership to understand public opinion and, if necessary, prevent political mobilisation. This could be a practical solution to the stability trap, so long as it does not prevent the reforms that will be necessary for China to continue growing as an economic and political power.

WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? Mark Leonard Mark Leonard became interested in China as executive director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Public Affairs, pp. What does China think? And there are few more complicated issues than the so-called rise of China. This ancient and fascinating nation has joined the international community with a dramatic flourish, and no one really knows where the so-called rise of China is going to lead. Mark Leonard has produced a thin but important book. He finds no unanimity among leading intellectuals. In an admittedly cursory review of a complex kaleidoscope of views, he explores economic and political philosophies of both "right" and "left," as well as foreign policy views ranging between hard-line nationalist and squishy internationalist. His work suggests two important conclusions. The authoritarian Communist Party rules, but how it rules is not preordained. The Chinese left, as it were, looks more traditionally socialist, though without the murderous madness of totalitarianism. The second point is that similar forces are contending for control of Chinese foreign policy. This could change, of course, but no new Mao Zedong appears to be poised on the horizon. All of this matters because China matters. Those were the days! That world has ended. But China the culture and China the people have before been great and almost certainly again will be great, whatever the national context of their achievements. What they will achieve, however, is not so clear. But Leonard talks with nationalists who propagate a philosophy which he terms a "Walled World. So-called "New Left" intellectuals denounce Beijing for being despotic while failing to govern: Indeed, he makes an important point often lost in the West. While there were students and intellectuals in Tiananmen Square demanding political reform, they were joined by "a wider group of workers who came to the square with more concrete social and economic demands triggered by mounting discontent about the radical market reforms of which had set off rocketing inflation and inequality. There have always been intellectuals in favor of economic collectivism. More surprising is the rise of an anti-democracy movement among the intelligentsia. In the early reform years, intellectuals debated the usual political reforms involving multi-party elections and constraints on government. For many intellectuals today, however, writes Leonard, "Reform is less seen through the prism of human rights and freedom, than the question of how to increase the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party. Instead of trying to develop a Chinese variant of liberal democracy, many intellectuals are looking for a different model altogether. But just as the PRC might very well fall short of Western-style capitalism, so it might fall short of Western-style democracy. China has changed much and will continue to change. The impact on the rest of the globe of such a phenomenon likely would be profound. How so is the subject of the final section of *What does China Think?* What kind foreign policy is China likely to conduct? The Chinese "must be the most self-aware rising power in history," Leonard writes. Leonard quotes one Chinese professor as dismissing the internationalists as appeasers. While China should do all it can to avoid war, Yan Xuetong "argues that no great nation in history ever rose in peace. As in America, there are pragmatists in the PRC as well. Moreover, Beijing is watching the U. Ironically, at a time when American neocons dismiss the importance of "soft power," China is ramping up its campaign to gain influence through cultural and economic means. It has become a truism in Chinese circles that the former Soviet Union spent itself into oblivion by being lured into a competition for military primacy. It has traditionally been used to describe how terrorists can take on and defeat standing armies, in the same way that David took out Goliath. However, the Chinese have taken this debate far beyond the techniques of terrorism. Or accept that Washington no longer can dictate to Beijing? China is likely to be a particularly effective competitor because it is sophisticated and takes a long view. But, suggests Leonard, "The story of the next thirty years will be about how a more self-confident China reaches out and shapes the world. If the 21st Century is the Chinese Century, that does not mean Chinese dominance so much as shared dominance along with America and Europe. And it is doing so by offering an alternative geopolitical model. The outcomes are unpredictable and not necessarily benign. But peaceful accommodation is possible, so long as Washington, in particular, recognizes that the so-called unipolar moment is quickly passing, and there may soon be two "essential" nations. Read more by Doug Bandow.

Chapter 3 : WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? by Mark Leonard | Kirkus Reviews

Yes I do! In fact, I have two rooms dedicated to Hello Kitty! and even more rooms dedicated to even more cute stuff. Okay, I' bluffing, but I really do have a large collection of Hello Kitty products.

Archaeological evidence suggests that early hominids inhabited China between 2. Many independent states eventually emerged from the weakened Zhou state and continually waged war with each other in the year Spring and Autumn period , only occasionally deferring to the Zhou king. Most of the present structure, however, dates to the Ming dynasty. His dynasty also conquered the Yue tribes in Guangxi , Guangdong , and Vietnam. Han involvement in Central Asia and Sogdia helped establish the land route of the Silk Road , replacing the earlier path over the Himalayas to India. Han China gradually became the largest economy of the ancient world. At its end, Wei was swiftly overthrown by the Jin dynasty. The Jin fell to civil war upon the ascension of a developmentally-disabled emperor ; the Five Barbarians then invaded and ruled northern China as the Sixteen States. The various successors of these states became known as the Northern and Southern dynasties , with the two areas finally reunited by the Sui in The Sui restored the Han to power through China, reformed its agriculture and economy, constructed the Grand Canal , and patronized Buddhism. However, they fell quickly when their conscription for public works and a failed war with Korea provoked widespread unrest. However, it was devastated and weakened by the An Shi Rebellion in the 8th century. The Song dynasty ended the separatist situation in , leading to a balance of power between the Song and Khitan Liao. The Song was the first government in world history to issue paper money and the first Chinese polity to establish a permanent standing navy which was supported by the developed shipbuilding industry along with the sea trade. The Song dynasty also saw a revival of Confucianism , in response to the growth of Buddhism during the Tang, [81] and a flourishing of philosophy and the arts, as landscape art and porcelain were brought to new levels of maturity and complexity. The remnants of the Song retreated to southern China. In , the Mongol leader Kublai Khan established the Yuan dynasty ; the Yuan conquered the last remnant of the Song dynasty in Before the Mongol invasion, the population of Song China was million citizens; this was reduced to 60 million by the time of the census in Under the Ming dynasty, China enjoyed another golden age, developing one of the strongest navies in the world and a rich and prosperous economy amid a flourishing of art and culture. It was during this period that Zheng He led the Ming treasure voyages throughout the world, reaching as far as Africa. With the budding of capitalism, philosophers such as Wang Yangming further critiqued and expanded Neo-Confucianism with concepts of individualism and equality of four occupations. The Chongzhen Emperor committed suicide when the city fell. End of dynastic rule A 19th-century depiction of the Taiping Rebellion “ The Qing dynasty , which lasted from until , was the last imperial dynasty of China. Its conquest of the Ming “ cost 25 million lives and the economy of China shrank drastically. China was forced to pay compensation, open treaty ports, allow extraterritoriality for foreign nationals, and cede Hong Kong to the British [93] under the Treaty of Nanking , the first of the Unequal Treaties. The Qing dynasty also began experiencing internal unrest in which tens of millions of people died, especially in the White Lotus Rebellion , the failed Taiping Rebellion that ravaged southern China in the s and s and the Dungan Revolt “77 in the northwest. The initial success of the Self-Strengthening Movement of the s was frustrated by a series of military defeats in the s and s. In the 19th century, the great Chinese diaspora began. Losses due to emigration were added to by conflicts and catastrophes such as the Northern Chinese Famine of “79 , in which between 9 and 13 million people died. The ill-fated anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion of “ further weakened the dynasty. Although Cixi sponsored a program of reforms, the Xinhai Revolution of “12 brought an end to the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China. Republic of China “ Main article: Republic of China “ Yuan Shikai left and Sun Yat-sen right with flags representing the early republic. In the face of popular condemnation and opposition from his own Beiyang Army , he was forced to abdicate and re-establish the republic. Its Beijing-based government was internationally recognized but virtually powerless; regional warlords controlled most of its territory.

Chapter 4 : China - Wikipedia

China's past and future come under close scrutiny in Mark Leonard's What Does China Think and Mobo Gao's The Battle for China's Past, says Michael Rank Michael Rank Fri 18 Apr EDT First.

In one essay titled "Meritocracy vs. What Does China Think? Such is the case with Englishman Joseph Needham, who went to China in the 1940s and embarked on a lifelong project to catalog all of the inventions for which the Chinese were responsible. Big deal, you say. This unforgettable and unputdownable book is a major revelation both about Chinese ingenuity and the remarkable man who spent his life unearthing and cataloging it. Among the notable inventions credited to the Chinese: In the end, Needham produced 17 exhaustive volumes, rendering him a legend in the annals of encyclopaedia. The pictures are first-rate, of National Geographic quality. Each rates a two-page spread, without margins or captions to distract from the images the pictures are all reproduced in thumbnail size in the back of the book, along with descriptive captions. Layma displays a rare sensitivity and humor in depicting daily life in China. One picture shows stately houseboats wending their way down a misty canal; another depicts the elaborate geometric pattern of a rice paddy. Still others offer glimpses into the daily lives of such diverse groups as falconers, runway models, fishermen, factory workers, religious figures and martial arts practitioners. Also included are essays by five noted Chinese writers: The other books in this article each illustrate a facet of the modern miracle that is China, but this is the one that will make you long to pay a visit to the Middle Kingdom. Of course, everyone in the West is familiar with the staples: Less known are such culinary delights as red-braised bear paw, dried orangutan lips I am not making this up , camel hump and the ovarian fat of the Chinese forest frog. This could happen to you And now for the fun part, the book that made me laugh out loud more times than I can remember, J. After spending too long in Sacramento "a little corner of Oklahoma that got lost and found itself on the other side of the Sierra Nevada. Clearly a compromise was required, and so it came to pass that Troost set forth on a solo exploratory mission to Old Cathay. After learning some vital Chinese phrases "I am not proficient at squatting; is there another toilet option?

Chapter 5 : North Korea nuclear test: What will China do? - CNN

They think of China as the years of Mao Zedong, which lasted from to , when China had a planned economy, a Leninist political system, and a foreign policy of spreading global revolution. China was the China that began with Deng Xiaoping in and spanned a generation until the financial crisis of

Since his victory on Nov. His election campaign, policy announcements, and cabinet appointments have provoked harsh words from foreign leaders. Over the past several weeks, however, many in China have watched the events in America unfold, silently triumphant. The future of U. While the narrative of a Sino-American Cold War on the horizon has been popular recently, in reality, the two superpowers share a lucrative relationship in which both can profit. China supplies cheap goods for American consumers and the U. China was notably excluded from this U. His recent tweets criticizing heavy taxes on U. It is now expected that China will assume economic leadership in Asia to fill any trade void that a U. Many of the Chinese establishment have actively endorsed a Trump-led America, which looks to be less interventionist and less imperialistic than previous administrations. Unlike the American establishment led by figures like Obama and Hillary Clinton, Trump may reduce geopolitical pressure on China. Perhaps, it is only precisely because they know that Trump is such a poor choice that the Chinese are delighted. Trump has been flagged in China as an example of democracy gone wrong. He has been a blessing for Communist Party officials trying to convince 1. His advisers have made rigorous attempts to dismiss the claim that this will be official government policy. Nonetheless, it may be an indication of tension ahead. The Brexit vote in the U. Perhaps a developing trend toward nationalism and away from supranationalism, which grants power to institutions higher than the state, will accelerate the movement for Taiwanese independence. A resistance to large, interventionist powers that attempt to erode national sovereignty is spreading around the world. Perhaps China does have something to fear after all.

Chapter 6 : What Does China Think? - Mark Leonard - Google Books

*(Me: *holding China* Yes, you did. Actually, two times each. *fake smiles* *struggles to hold China* I think you should leave fast. The bathroom is first to the left. *still fake smiling* *sweat drop*.*

Chapter 7 : What does China think? (Book,) [calendrierdelascience.com]

By Lucy Rodrick. It's fair to say the surprise election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency has been divisive in both domestic and international politics.

Chapter 8 : What Does China Think of Trump? - World Policy

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Chapter 9 : What Does China Think? - calendrierdelascience.com Original

As an ethnic Chinese who speaks Russian, have lived in Russia, & is interested in Sino-Russian relations, here are my thoughts: 1. Russia is an indispensable, comprehensive strategic partner for the PRC.