

Chapter 1 : William James - Wikipedia

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Educated by tutors and at private schools in New York. Family moves to Europe. William attends school in Geneva, Paris, and Boulogne-sur-Mer; develops interests in painting and science. Family settles in Geneva, where William studies science at Geneva Academy; then returns to Newport when William decides he wishes to resume his study of painting. William abandons painting and enters Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard. Enters Harvard School of Medicine. Returns to medical school. Suffers eye strain, back problems, and suicidal depression in the fall. Travels to Europe for health and education: Severe depression in the fall. Depression and poor health continue. Accepts offer from President Eliot of Harvard to teach undergraduate course in comparative physiology. Accepts an appointment to teach full year of anatomy and physiology, but postpones teaching for a year to travel in Europe. Begins teaching psychology; establishes first American psychology laboratory. Marries Alice Howe Gibbens. Appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. Continues to teach psychology. Teaches psychology and philosophy at Harvard: Briefer Course with Henry Holt. Publishes *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*: Becomes active member of the Anti-Imperialist League, opposing U. All were reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* His partially completed manuscript published posthumously as *Some Problems of Philosophy*. Dies of heart failure at summer home in Chocorua, New Hampshire. Survival, James asserts, is merely one of many interests human beings have: We are all teleological creatures at base, James holds, each with a set of a priori values and categories. When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the rationality. The ideal philosopher, James holds, blends these two passions of rationality, and even some great philosophers go too far in one direction or another: Sentiments of rationality operate not just in logic or science, but in ordinary life. James is sympathetic both to the idea that the universe is something we can be intimate with and to the idea that it is wild and unpredictable. Certainly it is always seen in the philosophy of William James. Little, Brown, , pp. In fact he takes a number of methodological approaches in the book. As the book moves along, he involves himself in discussions with philosophers—for example with Hume and Kant in his hundred-page chapter on the self, and he finds himself making metaphysical claims that anticipate his later pragmatism, as when he writes: The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is gone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted, our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place. There is an excitement during the crying fit which is not without a certain pungent pleasure of its own; but it would take a genius for felicity to discover any dash of redeeming quality in the feeling of dry and shrunken sorrow PP We answer by consents or non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! In this last quotation, James tackles a philosophical problem from a psychological perspective. Our psychic life has rhythm: We rest when we remember the name we have been searching for; and we are off again when we hear a noise that might be the baby waking from her nap. However, the objective world originally experienced is not the world of spatial relations that we think: Certainly a child newly born in Boston, who gets a sensation from the candle-flame which lights the bedroom, or from his diaper-pin [who] does not feel either of these objects to be situated in longitude 71 W. The flame fills its own place, the pain fills its own place; but as yet these places are neither identified with, nor discriminated from, any other places. Many habits must begin early in life: The significance of this view, according to James, is that our emotions are tied in with our bodily expressions. In his survey of a range of cases, James finds that some actions involve an act of resolve or of outgoing nervous energy, but others do not. I sit at table after dinner and find myself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the dish and eating them. My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the conversation I am hardly aware of what I do; but the perception of the fruit, and the fleeting notion that I may eat it, seem fatally to bring the act about. There is certainly no express fiat here; PP If I am on an isolated mountain trail, faced with an icy

ledge to cross, and do not know whether I can make it, I may be forced to consider the question whether I can or should believe that I can cross the ledge. In such a case the belief may be justified by the outcome to which having the belief leads. He extends his analysis beyond the religious domain, however, to a wide range of secular human life: A social organism of any sort is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted. James defends our right to believe in certain answers to these questions anyway. In the higher animals a theoretical or thinking stage intervenes between sensation and action, and this is where, in human beings, the thought of God arises. The blindness to which James draws attention is that of one human being to another, a blindness he illustrates with a story from his own life. Riding in the mountains of North Carolina he comes upon a devastated landscape, with no trees, scars in the earth, here and there a patch of corn growing in the sunlight. But after talking to the settlers who had cleared the forest to make room for their farm, James comes to see it their way at least temporarily: This plurality, he writes: Even prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations. Wordsworth and Shelley, Emerson, and W. But at some five hundred pages it is only half the length of *The Principles of Psychology*, befitting its more restricted, if still large, scope. For James studies that part of human nature that is, or is related to, religious experience. Healthy-mindedness can be involuntary, just natural to someone, but often comes in more willful forms. Some sick souls never get well, while others recover or even triumph: The first is ineffability: Thirdly, mystical states are transient; and, fourth, subjects are passive with respect to them: Nevertheless, James articulates his own belief—which he does not claim to prove—that religious experiences connect us with a greater, or further, reality not accessible in our normal cognitive relations to the world: They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse. James holds neither that we create our truths out of nothing, nor that truth is entirely independent of humanity. Gustav Fechner and Henri Bergson. James concludes by embracing a position that he had more tentatively set forth in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*: Certain sequences of pure experiences constitute physical objects, and others constitute persons; but one pure experience say the perception of a chair may be part both of the sequence constituting the chair and of the sequence constituting a person. It is never precisely defined in the *Essays*, and is best explicated by a passage from *The Meaning of Truth* where James states that radical empiricism consists of a postulate, a statement of fact, and a conclusion. His legacy extends into psychology and the study of religion, and in philosophy not only throughout the pragmatist tradition that he founded along with Charles Peirce, but into phenomenology and analytic philosophy. James is one of the most attractive and endearing of philosophers: *The Nation* 3 September. Harvard University Press, 17 vol. Library of America, Contained in *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. Harvard University Press, Originally published in [PP]. Harvard University Press, ; first published in [WB]. Henry Holt, [TT]. Originally published in [V]. Originally published in [P]. Originally published in [PU]. Harvard University Press, [MT]. Originally published in Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, [E]. *Some Problems of Philosophy*. *The Letters of William James*, ed.

**Chapter 2 : William James, The Stream of Consciousness and Freewill | Philosophy Is Not A Luxury**

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His oldest brother, Henry James, Jr. The family frequently moved between America and Europe, the father having inherited an amount of money sufficient to allow him to enjoy the life of an intellectual. While growing up, William had a passion for drawing. Since he wanted to become a painter, the family moved to Newport, Rhode Island in , where William studied with the leading American portraitist, William Morris Hunt. Although he had talent, he gave up this career goal in less than a year. He had decided that it was insufficient for him to do first-rate work. All this is indicative of three things: In , the American Civil War erupted. However, already in delicate health, he left when it expired after three months. His younger brothers Wilky and Bob served in the Union Army. A couple of years later, he took a year off to join a scientific expedition to Brazil, led by Louis Agassiz. But bad health eventually forced him to quit the expedition, and he returned to medical school the James family moving from Boston to Cambridge, Massachusetts. Again he left, this time to study physiology and medicine in Germany and to recover his health. He failed to find a cure for his curious back pains, but returned to Harvard, passed his medical exams, and received his medical degree in . Nevertheless, he did not plan to practice medicine and seemed lost as to what to do with the rest of his life. His training in hard science was making it impossible for him to believe in human freedom and, thus, in the value of struggling for moral ideals; the despair of materialism was leading him to the depression of determinism. In a barely disguised case history in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, he tells of visiting an asylum while he was a medical student, and seeing an epileptic patient whose condition had reduced him to an idiotic state. James could not dispel the realization that if universal determinism prevails, he could likewise sink into such a state, utterly incapable of preventing it *Varieties*, pp. By the spring of , when James was twenty-eight years old, he experienced a critical moment while reading a treatment of human freedom by the French neo-Kantian Charles Renouvier. He discovered the solution to his problem in the voluntaristic act of will whereby he could commit himself to believing in his own freedom despite any lack of objective evidence. He started down the road to recovery, though the remainder of his life would be plagued by seemingly psychosomatic troubles serious eye strain, mysterious back pains, digestive problems, and periods of exhaustion, as well as chronic mood swings, including times of brooding depression. Unfortunately, he still lacked a constructive career goal. He accepted and began his career of more than a third of a century as a faculty member there. The next year, he became an instructor of anatomy and physiology. By the mid-eighteen-seventies, he was teaching psychology there, using the physiological approach he had learned in Germany and establishing the first psychology laboratory in America. He met a schoolteacher named Alice Howe Gibbens, whom he married in . Like his parents, they had five children, naming the first two Henry and William. Alice was adept at handling his neurotic obsessions and emotional moodiness, and they seem to have had a good marriage, living comfortably in Cambridge. The year they married, James agreed to write a psychology textbook; however, by then he was already drifting away from psychology into philosophy. He was a member of a Metaphysical Club that included Oliver Wendell Holmes, who taught law at Harvard and would go on to serve on the U. Supreme Court, and Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher of science, who would become the founder of American pragmatism. In , James began teaching philosophy at Harvard, becoming an assistant professor of philosophy the next year. As he got deeper into philosophy, he developed a negative attitude towards psychology. After becoming a full professor of philosophy in and of psychology in , he published his *Principles of Psychology* in . It had taken him close to twelve years to finish it, and, though it would be extremely successful, he was dissatisfied with it and disgusted with psychology *Letters*, vol. Nevertheless, he agreed to prepare an abridged version, which was published two years later as *Psychology: Briefer Course*; it too would be widely used and help to establish his reputation as the foremost living American psychologist. Overworked at Harvard and jeopardizing his fragile health, he suffered a physical breakdown that same year. While recovering his health,

he studied a wide range of accounts of religious experience and prepared his Gifford Lectures, which he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1890. These were published as *The Varieties of Religious Experience* in 1892 and proved to be quite successful, although James himself was displeased, believing them to contain too much reporting on facts and too little philosophical analysis. For the remainder of his life, James focused on the development of his own philosophy, writing essays and lectures that would later be collected and published in four books. In the spring of 1890, he took a leave of absence from Harvard to take a visiting professorship at Stanford University, though his lecture series in California was interrupted by the great San Francisco earthquake. In late 1890 and early 1891, he delivered his lectures on Pragmatism in Boston and at Columbia University, publishing them in the spring of 1891. That was also the year he resigned from Harvard, worried that he might die before being able to complete his philosophical system, as he was suffering from angina and shortness of breath. He delivered the Hibbert Lectures in England in 1890, published the next year as *A Pluralistic Universe*, aimed at combating the neo-Hegelian idealism that was then prevalent in Great Britain. Meanwhile, he was under intellectual assault by mainstream philosophers for his pragmatic treatment of truth, which he defended in a collection of essays published in 1897 as *The Meaning of Truth*. He was attempting to complete his textbook on *Some Problems of Philosophy*, but died on August 26, 1902. In 1902, his textbook, edited by his son Henry, and his *Memories and Studies* were posthumously published. His writings have survived in part because of the provocative honesty of his ideas, but also because of the vibrant, sometimes racy, style in which he expressed them. In *A Pluralistic Universe*, he castigates philosophers who use technical jargon instead of clear, straightforward language. He practiced the spontaneous thinking and freshness of expression he advocates there. It has been said by the novelist Rebecca West that, while Henry James wrote fiction as though it were philosophy, his older brother, William, wrote philosophy in a colorful style typical of fiction. Despite impatience with the process of that development, he contributed significantly to moving it along, regarding psychology as the science of our mental phenomena or states of consciousness, such as thoughts, feelings, desires, volitions, and so forth. In analyzing what can broadly be termed human thinking, James delineates five generic characteristics: The self can be viewed as an object of thought or as the subject of thought. Sensation, Perception, Imagination, and Belief James states that if we track the dynamic of mental activity, we discern a standard pattern from sensation to perception to imagination to belief. Through sensation, we become acquainted with some given fact. This can, but need not, lead to knowledge about that fact, achieved by perceiving its relations to other given facts. Both sensation and perception involve an immediate intuition of some given objects. Imagination, less immediate, retrieves mental copies of past sensations and perceptions, even when their external stimuli are no longer present. Belief is the sense or feeling that ideas or propositions formed in the imagination correspond to reality. Every proposition can be analyzed in terms of its object and whether that object is believed. The object of a proposition comprises a subject such as my horse, a predicate wings, and a relation between them my horse has sprouted wings. The belief is the psychic attitude a mind has towards that object for example, I believe it or deny it or am in doubt about it. Principles, vol. Emotion and Will Like other animals, we have primitive instincts, such as fear, some desires, and certain forms of sympathy, which do not require being taught them or consciously focusing on ends. However, we also have emotions that are learned behavior and do involve such a focus—for example, a fear of failure and the desire for an academic degree. Instincts and emotions thus overlap, the latter tending to cover a broader range of objects than the former. We tend to assume that perceptions trigger emotional responses, eventuating in bodily expressions—that we suddenly see a bear, become frightened, and then tremble and run away. But James thinks the actual sequence is perception, followed by bodily expressions, followed by emotional feeling—that we see the bear, tremble and run away, then feel those physical events as what we call fear. The idea that emotions ultimately have physical causes emphasizes the intimate relationship between our bodies and our mental life. Principles, vol. The human will is crucial for deliberately acting on our beliefs and emotions. Sometimes we consider alternative courses of action and seem to select one among them, as if making a voluntary decision. James maps out five sorts of decision-making: Epistemology Even if philosophically interesting matters such as freedom vs. Whatever approach is chosen, it is clear that James repudiates rationalism, with its notions of a priori existential truths.

He is particularly hostile to German idealism, which he identifies especially with Hegel and which he attacks in many of his essays. This identification leads him to be remarkably unfair to Kant, an earlier German idealist. The tradition of modern empiricism is more promising, yet too atomistic to allow us to move much beyond the knowledge of acquaintance to genuine comprehension. Will, pp. Fortunately, James had already learned about the pragmatic approach from Peirce. The first of its eight lectures presents pragmatism as a more attractive middle ground between the two mainstream approaches of European philosophy. It is difficult to identify many pure types of either of these in the history of philosophy, and some thinkers such as Kant are deliberately mixed, as is James himself. He thinks that most of us want a philosophical method that is firmly anchored in empirical facts, while being open to, rather than dismissive of, moral and religious values. He offers pragmatism as a philosophy that coherently meets both demands. Before we invest much time or effort in seeking the meaning of anything, we should consider what practical difference it would make if we could find out. Providing an example to illustrate his point, James refers to the Hegelian notion of God as the all-encompassing Absolute Spirit. How should we decide whether this is what we should mean by God? Consider the practical consequences for a believer: From that pragmatic perspective, James rejects the Hegelian notion. Undoubtedly, philosophy provides us with only one legitimate approach to belief, as he observes in his fifth lecture, others being common sense with its basic concepts derived from experience and science. However, these others are impotent in dealing with questions of freedom and value. Pragmatism, pp. The Pragmatic Theory of Truth It seems that anything knowable must be true. He begins with a standard dictionary analysis of truth as agreement with reality. By contrast, he advocates a more dynamic and practical interpretation, a true idea or belief being one we can incorporate into our ways of thinking in such a way that it can be experientially validated. He is a fallibilist, seeing all existential truths as, in theory, revisable given new experience. They involve a relationship between facts and our ideas or beliefs. Because the facts, and our experience of them, change we must beware of regarding such truths as absolute, as rationalists tend to do. Pragmatism, pp. This relativistic theory generated a firestorm of criticism among mainstream philosophers to which he responded in *The Meaning of Truth*. The Pragmatic Approach to Belief Western philosophers have traditionally viewed knowledge as justified, true belief. So long as the idea of truth is pragmatically analyzed and given a pragmatic interpretation of justification, James seems to accept that view. His entire philosophy can be seen as fundamentally one of productive beliefs.

Chapter 3 : William James, dude " Mind Hacks

*WILLIAM JAMES: The Message of a Modern Mind [Lloyd Morris] on calendrierdelascience.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. William James bequeathed a rich legacy of thought to the modern world, and the author has disclosed masterfully its essential meaning and enduring value.*

The military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their place among our ideals until better substitutes are offered than the glory and shame that come to nations as well as to individuals from the ups and downs of politics and the vicissitudes of trade. Ask all our millions, north and south, whether they would vote now were such a thing possible to have our war for the Union expunged from history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time substituted for that of its marches and battles, and probably hardly a handful of eccentrics would say yes. Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out. Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing, in cold blood, to start another civil war now to gain another similar possession, and not one man or woman would vote for the proposition. In modern eyes, precious though wars may be they must not be waged solely for the sake of the ideal harvest. Only when forced upon one, is a war now thought permissible. It was not thus in ancient times. The earlier men were hunting men, and to hunt a neighboring tribe, kill the males, loot the village and possess the females, was the most profitable, as well as the most exciting, way of living. Thus were the more martial tribes selected, and in chiefs and peoples a pure pugnacity and love of glory came to mingle with the more fundamental appetite for plunder. Modern war is so expensive that we feel trade to be a better avenue to plunder; but modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. The horrors make the fascination. War is the strong life; it is life in extremis; war taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us. History is a bath of blood. No detail of the wounds they made is spared us, and the Greek mind fed upon the story. It is horrible reading " because of the irrationality of it all " save for the purpose of making "history" " and the history is that of the utter ruin of a civilization in intellectual respects perhaps the highest the earth has ever seen. Those wars were purely piratical. Pride, gold, women, slaves excitement were their only motives. In the Peloponesian war, for example, the Athenians ask the inhabitants of Melos the island where the "Venus de Milo" was found , hitherto neutral, to own their lordship. The envoys meet, and hold a debate which Thucydides gives in full, and which, for sweet reasonableness of form, would have satisfied Matthew Arnold. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first to have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. They then colonized the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own. There was no rational purpose in it, and the moment he died his generals and governors attacked one another. The cruelty of those times is incredible. When Rome finally conquered Greece, Paulus Aemilius, was told by the Roman Senate, to reward his soldiers for their toil by "giving" them the old kingdom of Epirus. How many they killed I know not; but in Etolia they killed all the senators, five hundred and fifty in number. Brutus was "the noblest Roman of them all," but to reanimate his soldiers on the eve of Philippi he similarly promises to give them the cities of Sparta and Thessalonica to ravage, if they win the fight. Such was the gory nurse that trained soldiers to cohesiveness. We inherit the warlike type; and for most of the capacities of heroism that the human race is full of we have to thank this cruel history. Dead men tell no tales, and if there were any tribes of other type than this they have left no survivors. The popular imagination fairly fattens on the thought of wars. Let public opinion once reach a certain fighting pitch, and no ruler can withstand it. In our people had read the word "war" in letters three inches high for three months in every newspaper. The pliant politician, McKinley, was swept away by their eagerness, and our squalid war with Spain became a reality. At the present day, civilized opinion is a curious mental mixture. The military instincts and ideals are as strong as ever, but they are confronted by reflective criticisms which sorely curb their ancient freedom. Innumerable writers are showing up the bestial side of military service. Pure loot and mastery seem no longer morally allowable motives, and

pretexts must be found for attributing them solely to the enemy. England and we, our army and navy authorities repeat without ceasing, are solely for "peace. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that "peace" and "war" mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the "peace"-interval. It is plain that on this subject civilized man has developed a sort of double personality. If we take European nations, no legitimate interest of any one of them would seem to justify the tremendous destructions which a war to compass it would necessarily entail. It would seem that common sense and reason ought to find a way to reach agreement in every conflict of honest interests. I myself think it our bounden duty to believe in such international rationality as possible. But, as things stand, I see how desperately hard it is to bring the peace-party and the war-party together, and I believe that the difficulty is due to certain deficiencies in the program of pacifism which set the military imagination strongly, and to a certain extent justifiably, against it. In the whole discussion both sides are on imaginative and sentimental ground. It is but one utopia against another, and everything one says must be abstract and hypothetical. Subject to this criticism and caution, I will try to characterize in abstract strokes the opposite imaginative forces, and point out what to my own very fallible mind seems the best utopian hypothesis, the most promising line of conciliation. In my remarks, pacifist though I am, I will refuse to speak of the bestial side of the war-regime already done justice to by many writers and consider only the higher aspects of militaristic sentiment. Patriotism no one thinks discreditable; nor does any one deny that war is the romance of history. But inordinate ambitions are the soul of any patriotism, and the possibility of violent death the soul of all romance. The militarily-patriotic and the romantic-minded everywhere, and especially the professional military class, refuse to admit for a moment that war may be a transitory phenomenon in social evolution. Where then would be the steeps of life? If war had ever stopped, we should have to re-invent it, on this view, to redeem life from flat degeneration. Reflective apologists for war at the present day all take it religiously. It is a sort of sacrament. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet! So far as the central essence of this feeling goes, no healthy minded person, it seems to me, can help to some degree parting of it. Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for everyone is sensitive to its superiority. This natural sort of feeling forms, I think, the innermost soul of army writings. Without any exception known to me, militarist authors take a highly mystical view of their subject, and regard war as a biological or sociological necessity, uncontrolled by ordinary psychological checks or motives. When the time of development is ripe the war must come, reason or no reason, for the justifications pleaded are invariably fictions. War is, in short, a permanent human obligation. General Homer Lea, in his recent book *The Valor of Ignorance*, plants himself squarely on this ground. Readiness for war is for him the essence of nationality, and ability in it the supreme measure of the health of nations. Nations, General Lea says, are never stationary "they must necessarily expand or shrink, according to their vitality or decrepitude. Japan now is culminating; and by the fatal law in question it is impossible that her statesmen should not long since have entered, with extraordinary foresight, upon a vast policy of conquest" the game in which the first moves were her wars with China and Russia and her treaty with England, and of which the final objective is the capture of the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, and whole of our Coast west of the Sierra passes. This will give Japan what her ineluctable vocation as a state absolutely forces her to claim, the possession of the entire Pacific Ocean; and to oppose these deep designs we Americans have, according to our author, nothing but our conceit, our ignorance, our commercialism, our corruption, and our feminism. General Lea makes a minute technical comparison of the military strength which we at present could oppose to the strength of Japan, and concludes that the Islands, Alaska, Oregon and Southern California, would fall almost without resistance, that San Francisco must surrender in a fortnight to a Japanese investment, that in three or four months the war would be over and our republic, unable to regain what it had heedlessly neglected to protect sufficiently, would then "disintegrate," until perhaps some Caesar should arise to weld us again into a nation. A dismal forecast indeed! But there is no reason to think that women can no longer be the mother of

Napoleonic or Alexandrian characters; and if these come in Japan and find their opportunity, just such surprises as The Valor of Ignorance paints may lurk in ambush for us. Ignorant as we still are of the innermost recesses of Japanese mentality, we may be foolhardy to disregard such possibilities. Other militarists are more complex and more moral in their considerations. The Philosophie des Krieges, by S. Steinmetz is good example. War, according to this author, is an ordeal instituted by God, who weighs the nations in its balance. It is the essential form of the State, and the only function in which peoples can employ all their powers at once and convergently. No victory is possible save as the resultant of a totality of virtues, no defeat for which some vice or weakness is not responsible. Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht; and Dr. Steinmetz does not believe that in the long run chance and luck play any part in apportioning the issues. The virtues that prevail, it must be noted, are virtues anyhow, superiorities that count in peaceful as well as in military competition; but the strain is on them, being infinitely intenser in the latter case, makes war infinitely more searching as a trial. No ordeal is comparable to its winnowings. Its dread hammer is the welder of men into cohesive states, and nowhere but in such states can human nature adequately develop its capacity. The only alternative is "degeneration. Steinmetz is a conscientious thinker, and his book, short as it is, takes much into account. If we speak of the fear of emancipation from the fear-regime, we put the whole situation into a single phrase; fear regarding ourselves now taking the place of the ancient fear of the enemy. Turn the fear over as I will in my mind, it all seems to lead back to two unwillingnesses of the imagination, one aesthetic, and the other moral; unwillingness, first, to envisage a future in which army-life, with its many elements of charm, shall be forever impossible, and in which the destinies of peoples shall nevermore be decided quickly, thrillingly, and tragically by force, but only gradually and insipidly by "evolution," and, secondly, unwillingness to see the supreme theatre of human strenuousness closed, and the splendid military aptitudes of men doomed to keep always in a state of latency and never show themselves in action. These insistent unwillingnesses, no less than other aesthetic and ethical insistentcies, have, it seems to me, to be listened to and respected. The horror makes the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremest and supremest out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious. The weakness of so much merely negative criticism is evident — pacifism makes no converts from the military party. The military party denies neither the bestiality nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says that these things tell but half the story. It only says that war is worth them; that, taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to adopt a peace economy. Pacifists ought to enter more deeply into the aesthetical and ethical point of view of their opponents. Do that first in any controversy, says J. Chapman, then move the point, and your opponent will follow. And as a rule they do fail.

**Chapter 4 : The Principles of Psychology / William James**

*Psychologist and philosopher William James () is often referred to as the father of American psychology. His landmark textbook, The Principles of Psychology, is considered a classic text and one of the most significant works in psychology history.*

The work of William James, a leader of the Pragmatic movement, was typical of many contemporary tendencies, one of which was the attempt to locate the role of science in knowledge and culture. Trained in medicine, James hoped to protect the autonomy of the individual. Early life and education James was the eldest son of Henry James, an idiosyncratic and voluble man whose philosophical interests attracted him to the theology of Emanuel Swedenborg. Building upon the works of Swedenborg, which had been proffered as a revelation from God for a new age of truth and reason in religion, the elder James had constructed a system of his own that seems to have served him as a vision of spiritual life. When James was 18 years of age he tried his hand at studying art, under the tutelage of William M. Hunt, an American painter of religious subjects. But he soon tired of it and the following year entered the Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard University. From courses in chemistry, anatomy, and similar subjects there, he went to the study of medicine in the Harvard Medical School; but he interrupted this study in order to accompany the eminent naturalist Louis Agassiz, in the capacity of assistant, on an expedition to the Amazon. He returned to the medical school for a term and then during 1868 went to Germany for courses with the physicist and physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz, who formulated the law of the conservation of energy; with Rudolf Virchow, a pathologist; with Claude Bernard, the foremost experimentalist of 19th-century medicine; and with others. At the same time he read widely in the psychology and philosophy then current, especially the writings of Charles Renouvier, a Kantian Idealist and relativist. He seems from adolescence to have been a delicate boy, always ailing, and at this period of his stay in Germany he suffered a breakdown, with thoughts of suicide. When he returned home in November, after 18 months in Germany, he was still ill. Though he took the degree of M. D. Early in this period he experienced a sort of phobic panic, which persisted until the end of April. Interest in psychology In James was appointed instructor in physiology at Harvard College, in which capacity he served until 1872. Philosophy ceased to be an exercise in the grammar of assent and became an adventure in methodological invention and metaphysical discovery. With his marriage in 1878, to Alice H. Gibbens of Cambridge, Mass. The old neurasthenia practically disappeared. He went at his tasks with a zest and an energy of which his earlier record had given no hint. It was as if some deeper level of his being had been tapped: He contracted to produce a textbook of psychology by 1880. But the work grew under his hand, and when it finally appeared in 1890, as *The Principles of Psychology*, it was not a textbook but a monumental work in two great volumes, from which the textbook was condensed two years later. The *Principles*, which was recognized at once as both definitive and innovating in its field, established the functional point of view in psychology. It assimilated mental science to the biological disciplines and treated thinking and knowledge as instruments in the struggle to live. At one and the same time it made the fullest use of principles of psychophysics the study of the effect of physical processes upon the mental processes of an organism and defended, without embracing, free will. Interest in religion The *Principles* completed, James seems to have lost interest in the subject. Creator of the first U.S. He liked best the adventure of free observation and reflection. His studies, which were now of the nature and existence of God, the immortality of the soul, free will and determinism, the values of life, were empirical, not dialectical; James went directly to religious experience for the nature of God, to psychical research for survival after death, to fields of belief and action for free will and determinism. He was searching out these things, not arguing foregone conclusions. Having begun to teach ethics and religion in the late 1870s, his collaboration with the psychical researchers dated even earlier. His natural interest in religion was reinforced by the practical stimulus of an invitation to give the Gifford Lectures on natural religion at the University of Edinburgh. He was not able to deliver them until 1890, and their preparation focussed his labours for a number of years. His disability, involving his heart, was caused by prolonged effort and exposure during a vacation in the Adirondacks in 1880. A trip to Europe, which was to have taken up a sabbatical year away from

university duties, turned into two years of invalidism. The Gifford Lectures were prepared during this distressful period. Published as *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, they had an even greater acclaim as a book than as articles. Cautious and tentative though it was, the rich concreteness of the material and the final summary of the evidence—that the varieties of religious experience point to the existence of specific and various reservoirs of consciousness-like energies with which we can make specific contact in times of trouble—touched something fundamental in the minds of religionists and at least provided them with apologetic material not in conflict with science and scientific method. Career in philosophy James now explicitly turned his attention to the ultimate philosophic problems that had been at least marginally present along with his other interests. Already in 1890, in a lecture at the University of California on philosophical conceptions and practical results, he had formulated the theory of method known as Pragmatism. He showed how the meaning of any idea whatsoever—scientific, religious, philosophical, political, social, personal—can be found ultimately in nothing save in the succession of experiential consequences that it leads through and to; that truth and error, if they are within the reach of the mind at all, are identical with these consequences. Having made use of the pragmatic rule in his study of religious experience, he now turned it upon the ideas of change and chance, of freedom, variety, pluralism, and novelty, which, from the time he had read Renouvier, it had been his preoccupation to establish. His classes rang with the polemic against absolutes, and a new vitality flowed into the veins of American philosophers. Indeed, the historic controversy over Pragmatism saved the profession from iteration and dullness. Meanwhile, James had been asked to lecture at Stanford University, in California, and he experienced there the earthquake that nearly destroyed San Francisco. The same year he delivered the Lowell Lectures in Boston, afterward published as *Pragmatism: The fundamental point of these writings is that the relations between things, holding them together or separating them, are at least as real as the things themselves; that their function is real; and that no hidden substrata are necessary to account for the clashes and coherences of the world.* The Empiricism was radical because until this time even Empiricists believed in a metaphysical ground like the hidden turtle of Hindu mythology on whose back the cosmic elephant rode. James was now the centre of a new life for philosophy in the English-speaking world. In England it was championed by F. H. Bradley. In 1898 James gave his last course at Harvard. In the spring he repeated the lectures on Pragmatism at Columbia University. It was as if a new prophet had come; the lecture halls were as crowded on the last day as on the first, with people standing outside the door. These lectures, published in 1902 as *A Pluralistic Universe*, state, in a more systematic and less technical way than the *Essays*, the same essential positions. These overbeliefs involve a panpsychistic interpretation of experience one that ascribes a psychic aspect to all of nature that goes beyond radical Empiricism and the pragmatic rule into conventional metaphysics. Home again, James found himself working, against growing physical trouble, upon the material that was partially published after his death as *Some Problems of Philosophy*. He also collected his occasional pieces in the controversy over Pragmatism and published them as *The Meaning of Truth*. Finally, his physical discomfort exceeded even his remarkable voluntary endurance. After a fruitless trip to Europe in search of a cure, he returned, going straight to the country home in New Hampshire, where he died in 1902. In philosophy, his positive work is still prophetic. The world he argued for was soon reflected in the new physics, as diversely interpreted, with its resonances from Charles Peirce, particularly by Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and the Danish quantum physicist Niels Bohr—a world of events connected with one another by kinds of next-to-next relations, a world various, manifold, changeful, originating in chance, perpetuated by habits that the scientist calls laws, and transformed by breaks, spontaneities, and freedoms. In human nature, James believed, these visible traits of the world are equally manifest. The real specific event is the individual, whose intervention in history gives it in each case a new and unexpected turn. But in history, as in nature, the continuous flux of change and chance transforms every being, invalidates every law, and alters every ideal. James lived his philosophy. It entered into the texture and rhythms of his rich and vivid literary style. It determined his attitude toward scientifically unaccepted therapies, such as Christian Science or mind cure, and repugnant ideals, such as militarism. It made him an anti-imperialist, a defender of the small, the variant, the unprecedented, the weak, wherever and whenever they appeared. His philosophy is too viable and subtle, too hedged, experiential, and tentative to have become the dogma of a school. It has functioned rather

to implant the germs of new thought in others than to serve as a standard old system for others to repeat.

**Chapter 5 : What are the Contributions of William James in Psychology? | What is Psychology?**

*William James James defines religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine," and writes.*

James spent almost all of his academic career at Harvard. He was appointed instructor in physiology for the spring term, instructor in anatomy and physiology in , assistant professor of psychology in , assistant professor of philosophy in , full professor in , endowed chair in psychology in , return to philosophy in , and emeritus professor of philosophy in . James studied medicine, physiology, and biology, and began to teach in those subjects, but was drawn to the scientific study of the human mind at a time when psychology was constituting itself as a science. He taught his first experimental psychology course at Harvard in the 1870 academic year. Louis Menand suggested that this Club provided a foundation for American intellectual thought for decades to come. On hearing the camera click, James cried out: I say Damn the Absolute! Du Bois , G. Lewis , and Mary Whiton Calkins. Antiquarian bookseller Gabriel Wells tutored under him at Harvard in the late s. James was increasingly afflicted with cardiac pain during his last years. It worsened in while he worked on a philosophy text unfinished but posthumously published as *Some Problems in Philosophy*. He sailed to Europe in the spring of 1902 to take experimental treatments which proved unsuccessful, and returned home on August 1902. His heart failed on August 26, at his home in Chocorua, New Hampshire. He was buried in the family plot in Cambridge Cemetery, Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was one of the strongest proponents of the school of functionalism in psychology and of pragmatism in philosophy. He was a founder of the American Society for Psychological Research , as well as a champion of alternative approaches to healing. He challenged his professional colleagues not to let a narrow mindset prevent an honest appraisal of those beliefs. In an empirical study by Haggblom et al. He had four siblings: Henry the novelist , Garth Wilkinson, Robertson, and Alice. They had 5 children: Henry born May 18, 1842, William born June 17, 1842, Herman born 1843, died in infancy , Margaret born March, and Alexander the artist born December 22, 1844. Writings[ edit ] William James wrote voluminously throughout his life. A non-exhaustive bibliography of his writings, compiled by John McDermott , is 47 pages long. The *Briefer Course*, was an abridgement designed as a less rigorous introduction to the field. These works criticized both the English associationist school and the Hegelianism of his day as competing dogmatisms of little explanatory value, and sought to re-conceive the human mind as inherently purposive and selective. His pragmatic theory of truth was a synthesis of correspondence theory of truth and coherence theory of truth , with an added dimension. Truth is verifiable to the extent that thoughts and statements correspond with actual things, as well as the extent to which they "hang together," or cohere, as pieces of a puzzle might fit together; these are in turn verified by the observed results of the application of an idea to actual practice. They also were called true for human reasons. They also mediated between still earlier truths and what in those days were novel observations. Purely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role whatsoever, is nowhere to be found. He writes, "First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe, and second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. In other words the "Absolute" with his one purpose, is not the man-like God of common people. The mind, its experiences, and nature are inseparable. In *What Pragmatism Means*, James writes that the central point of his own doctrine of truth is, in brief, that "Truths emerge from facts, but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again create or reveal new truth the word is indifferent and so on indefinitely. Truth is the function of the beliefs that start and terminate among them. To the contrary, he supported an epistemological realism position. James went on to apply the pragmatic method to the epistemological problem of truth. A belief was true, he said, if it worked for all of us, and guided us expeditiously through our semihospitable world. James was anxious to uncover what true beliefs amounted to in human life, what their "cash value" was, and what consequences they led to. A belief was not a mental entity which somehow mysteriously corresponded to an external reality if the belief were true. Beliefs were ways of acting with reference to a precarious environment, and to say they were true was to say they were efficacious in this environment. In this

sense the pragmatic theory of truth applied Darwinian ideas in philosophy; it made survival the test of intellectual as well as biological fitness. The lectures inside depict his position on the subject. In his sixth lecture he starts off by defining truth as "agreement with reality". With this, James warns that there will be disagreements between pragmatics and intellectualists over the concepts of "agreement" and "reality", the last reasoning before thoughts settle and become autonomous for us. However, he contrasts this by supporting a more practical interpretation that: For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be Acknowledged. Pragmatism , p. Saying that these truths agree with the realities pragmatically means that they lead us to useful outcomes. Belief in anything involves conceiving of how it is real, but disbelief is the result when we dismiss something because it contradicts another thing we think of as real. In his "Sentiment of Rationality", saying that crucial beliefs are not known is to doubt their truth, even if it seems possible. James names four "postulates of rationality" as valuable but unknowable: God, immorality, freedom, and moral duty. However, a claim that does not have outcomes cannot be justified, or unjustified, because it will not make a difference. This idea foresaw 20th century objections to evidentialism and sought to ground justified belief in an unwavering principle that would prove more beneficial. Both argued that one must always adhere to fallibilism , recognizing of all human knowledge that "None of our beliefs are quite true; all have at least a penumbra of vagueness and error", and that the only means of progressing ever-closer to the truth is to never assume certainty, but always examine all sides and try to reach a conclusion objectively. Free will[ edit ] In his search for truth and assorted principles of psychology, William James developed his two-stage model of free will. In his model, he tries to explain how it is people come to the making of a decision and what factors are involved in it. He firstly defines our basic ability to chose as free will. Then he specifies our two factors as chance and choice. James says that in the sequence of the model, chance comes before choice. In the moment of decision we are given the chance to make a decision and then the choice is what we do or do not do regarding the decision. When it comes to choice, James says we make a choice based on different experiences. And will be drawn from as a positive solution. But in his development of the design, James also struggled with being able to prove that free will is actually free or predetermined. People can make judgements of regret, moral approval and moral disapproval, and if those are absent, then that means our will is predetermined. In *The Will to Believe*, James simply asserted that his will was free. As his first act of freedom, he said, he chose to believe his will was free. He was encouraged to do this by reading Charles Renouvier , whose work convinced James to convert from monism to pluralism. In his diary entry of April 30, , James wrote, I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. At any rate, I will assume for the presentâ€”until next yearâ€”that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will. Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. It did not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the like. Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom. James described chance as neither hard nor soft determinism, but " indeterminism ". He said The stronghold of the determinist argument is the antipathy to the idea of chance This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one of several things may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance. What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after the lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance? It means that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street are called but only one, and that one either one, shall be chosen. Philosophy of religion[ edit ] Excerpt James did important work in philosophy of religion. In his Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh he provided a wide-ranging account of *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and interpreted them according to his pragmatic leanings. Some of the important claims he makes in this regard: Religious genius experience should be the primary topic in the study of religion, rather than religious institutionsâ€”since institutions are merely the social descendant of genius. The intense, even pathological varieties of experience religious or otherwise should be sought by psychologists, because they represent the closest thing to a microscope of the mindâ€”that is, they show us in drastically enlarged form the normal processes of things. In order to usefully interpret the realm of common, shared experience and history, we must each make certain " over-beliefs " in things which, while they cannot

be proven on the basis of experience, help us to live fuller and better lives. An Encyclopedia classes him as one of several figures who "took a more pantheist or pandeist approach by rejecting views of God as separate from the world. Ineffability - no adequate way to use human language to describe the experience. Noetic - universal truths revealed that are unable to be acquired anywhere else. Transient - the mystical experience is only a temporary experience. This way of thinking about emotion has great consequences for the philosophy of aesthetics as well as to the philosophy and practice of education. To this simple primary and immediate pleasure in certain pure sensations and harmonious combinations of them, there may, it is true, be added secondary pleasures; and in the practical enjoyment of works of art by the masses of mankind these secondary pleasures play a great part. Classicism and romanticism have their battles over this point. The theory of emotion was also independently developed in Italy by the Anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi,. This obvious answer to a seemingly trivial question has been the central concern of a century-old debate about the nature of our emotions. It was important, not because it definitively answered the question it raised, but because of the way in which James phrased his response. He conceived of an emotion in terms of a sequence of events that starts with the occurrence of an arousing stimulus the sympathetic nervous system or the parasympathetic nervous system ; and ends with a passionate feeling, a conscious emotional experience.

**Chapter 6 : William James -- Philosophy Books and Online Resources**

*The work of William James, a leader of the Pragmatic movement, was typical of many contemporary tendencies, one of which was the attempt to locate the role of science in knowledge and culture. Trained in medicine, James hoped to protect the autonomy of.*

Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience. The consequence of this is that, in spite of the exclusion of the important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and aesthetic feelings and judgments, the work has grown to a length which no one can regret more than the writer himself. The man must indeed be sanguine who, in this crowded age, can hope to have many readers for fourteen hundred continuous pages from his pen. But wer Vieles bringt wird Manchem etwas bringen; and, by judiciously skipping according to their several needs, I am sure that many sorts of readers, even those who are just beginning the study of the subject, will find my book of use. Since the beginners are most in need of guidance, I suggest for their behoof that they omit altogether on a first reading chapters 6, 7, 8, 10 from page to page , 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, and Chapter 20, on Space-perception, is a terrible thing, which, unless written with all that detail, could not be fairly treated at all. I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data 1 thoughts and feelings, and 2 a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which 3 they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them as of other elements is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book, assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of the brain, can go no farther -- can go no farther, that is, as a, natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality. Of course this point of view is anything but ultimate. Men must keep thinking; and the data assumed by psychology, just like those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must some time be overhauled. The effort to overhaul them clearly and thoroughly is metaphysics; but metaphysics can only perform her task well when distinctly conscious of its great extent. Metaphysics fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural science. Even if their results be true, it would be as well to keep them, as thus presented, out of psychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of physics. I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers, and regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with brain-states as the ultimate laws for our science. The reader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mess of descriptive details, running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with. That will perhaps be centuries hence; and meanwhile the best mark of health that a science can show is this unfinished-seeming front. Acknowledgment is made in the proper places. The bibliography, I regret to say, is quite unsystematic. I have habitually given my authority for special experimental facts; but beyond that I have aimed mainly to cite books that would probably be actually used by the ordinary American college-student in his collateral reading. The bibliography in W. Finally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to single out particular creditors; yet I cannot resist the temptation at the end of my first literary venture to record my gratitude for the inspiration I have got from the writings of J. Harvard University, August The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like; and, superficially considered, their variety and complexity is such as to leave a chaotic impression on the observer. The most natural and consequently the earliest way of unifying the material was, first, to classify it as well as might be, and, secondly, to affiliate the diverse mental modes thus found, upon a simple entity, the personal Soul, of which they are taken to be so many facultative manifestations. Now, for instance, the Soul manifests its faculty of Memory, now of Reasoning, now of Volition, or again its Imagination or its Appetite. Another and a less obvious way of unifying the chaos is to seek common elements in the divers mental facts rather than a common agent behind them, and to explain them constructively by the

various forms of arrangement of these elements, as one explains houses by stones and bricks. The very Self or ego of the individual comes in this way to be viewed no longer as the pre-existing source of the representations, but rather as their last and most complicated fruit. Now, if we strive rigorously to simplify the phenomena in either of these ways, we soon become aware of inadequacies in our method. Any particular cognition, for example, or recollection, is accounted for on the soul-theory by being referred to the spiritual faculties of Cognition or of Memory. These faculties themselves are thought of as absolute properties of the soul; that is, to take the case of memory, no reason is given why we should remember a fact as it happened, except that so to remember it constitutes the essence of our Recollective Power. But its successes can invoke no factors save the existence of certain objective things to be remembered on the one hand, and of our faculty of memory on the other. And yet the admission is far from being a satisfactory simplification of the concrete facts. For why should this absolute god-given Faculty retain so much better the events of yesterday than those of last year, and, best of all, those of an hour ago? Why should illness and exhaustion enfeeble it? Why should repeating an experience strengthen our recollection of it? Why should drugs, fevers, asphyxia, and excitement resuscitate things long since forgotten? If we content ourselves with merely affirming that the faculty of memory is so peculiarly constituted by nature as to exhibit just these oddities, we seem little the better for having invoked it, for our explanation becomes as complicated as that of the crude facts with which we started. Moreover there is something grotesque and irrational in the supposition that the soul is equipped with elementary powers of such an ingeniously intricate sort. Why should our memory cling more easily to the near than the remote? Why should it lose its grasp of proper sooner than of abstract names? Such peculiarities seem quite fantastic; and might, for aught we can see a priori, be the precise opposites of what they are. However firmly he may hold to the soul and her remembering faculty, he must acknowledge that she never exerts the latter without a cue, and that something must always precede and remind us of whatever we are to recollect. This multitude of ideas, existing absolutely, yet clinging together, and weaving an endless carpet of themselves, like dominoes in ceaseless change, or the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope,-whence do they get their fantastic laws of clinging, and why do they cling in just the shapes they do? For this the associationist must introduce the order of experience in the outer world. The dance of the ideas is a copy, somewhat mutilated and altered, of the order of phenomena. But the slightest reflection shows that phenomena have absolutely no power to influence our ideas until they have first impressed our senses and our brain. The bare existence of a past fact is no ground for our remembering it. Unless we have seen it, or somehow undergone it, we shall never know of its having been. The experiences of the body are thus one of the conditions of the faculty of memory being what it is. And a very small amount of reflection on facts shows that one part of the body, namely, the brain, is the part whose experiences are directly concerned. If the nervous communication be cut off between the brain and other parts, the experiences of those other parts are non-existent for the mind. The eye is blind, the ear deaf, the hand insensible and motionless. And conversely, if the brain be injured, consciousness is abolished or altered, even although every other organ in the body be ready to play its normal part. A blow on the head, a sudden subtraction of blood, the pressure of an apoplectic hemorrhage, may have the first effect; whilst a very few ounces of alcohol or grains of opium or hasheesh, or a whiff of chloroform or nitrous oxide gas, are sure to have the second. The fact that the brain is the one immediate bodily condition of the mental operations is indeed so universally admitted nowadays that I need spend no more time in illustrating it, but will simply postulate it and pass on. The whole remainder of the book will be more or less of a proof that the postulate was correct. Bodily experiences, therefore, and more particularly brain-experiences, must take a place amongst those conditions of the mental life of which Psychology need take account. Our first conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of brain-physiology must be presupposed or included in Psychology 1. In still another way the psychologist is forced to be something of a nerve-physiologist. Mental phenomena are not only conditioned a parte ante by bodily processes; but they lead to them a parte post. That they lead to acts is of course the most familiar of truths, but I do not merely mean acts in the sense of voluntary and deliberate muscular performances. Mental states occasion also changes in the calibre of blood-vessels, or alteration in the heartbeats, or processes more subtle still, in glands and viscera. If these are taken into account, as well as acts which follow at some remote period because the mental state was once

there, it will be safe to lay down the general law that no mental modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change. The ideas and feelings, e. Our psychology must therefore take account not only of the conditions antecedent to mental states, but of their resultant consequences as well. But actions originally prompted by conscious intelligence may grow so automatic by dint of habit as to be apparently unconsciously performed. The performances of animal instinct seem semi-automatic, and the reflex acts of self-preservation certainly are so. Shall the study of such machine-like yet purposive acts as these be included in Psychology? The boundary-line of the mental is certainly vague. It is better not to be pedantic, but to let the science be as vague as its subject, and include such phenomena as these if by so doing we can throw any light on the main business in hand. It will ere long be seen, I trust, that we can; and that we gain much more by a broad than by a narrow conception of our subject. At a certain stage in the development of every science a degree of vagueness is what best consists with fertility. I shall therefore feel free to make any sallies into zoology or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem instructive for our purposes, but otherwise shall leave those sciences to the physiologists. Can we state more distinctly still the manner in which the mental life seems to intervene between impressions made from without upon the body, and reactions of the body upon the outer world again? Let us look at a few facts. If some iron filings be sprinkled on a table and a magnet brought near them, they will fly through the air for a certain distance and stick to its surface. A savage seeing the phenomenon explains it as the result of an attraction or love between the magnet and the filings. But let a card cover the poles of the magnet, and the filings will press forever against its surface without its ever occurring to them to pass around its sides and thus come into more direct contact with the object of their love. Blow bubbles through a tube into the bottom of a pail of water, they will rise to the surface and mingle with the air. Their action may again be poetically interpreted as due to a longing to recombine with the mother-atmosphere above the surface. But if you invert a jar full of water over the pail, they will rise and remain lodged beneath its bottom, shut in from the outer air, although a slight deflection from their course at the outset, or a re-descent towards the rim of the jar, when they found their upward course impeded, could easily have set them free. If now we pass from such actions as these to those of living things, we notice a striking difference. Romeo wants Juliet as the filings want the magnet; and if no obstacles intervene he moves towards her by as straight a line as they. But Romeo and Juliet, if a wall be built between them, do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against its opposite sides like the magnet and the filings with the card. With the filings the path is fixed; whether it reaches the end depends on accidents. With the lover it is the end which is fixed, the path may be modified indefinitely. Suppose a living frog in the position in which we placed our bubbles of air, namely, at the bottom of a jar of water. The want of breath will soon make him also long to rejoin the mother-atmosphere, and he will take the shortest path to his end by swimming straight upwards. But if a jar full of water be inverted over him, he will not, like the bubbles, perpetually press his nose against its unyielding roof, but will restlessly explore the neighborhood until by re-descending again he has discovered a path around its brim to the goal of his desires. Again the fixed end, the varying means! Such contrasts between living and inanimate performances end by leading men to deny that in the physical world final purposes exist at all. Loves and desires are to-day no longer imputed to particles of iron or of air. No one supposes now that the end of any activity which they may display is an ideal purpose presiding over the activity from its outset and soliciting or drawing it into being by a sort of *vis a fronte*. The end, on the contrary, is deemed a mere passive result, pushed into being a *tergo*, having had, so to speak, no voice in its own production.

Chapter 7 : James, William | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Wilhelm Wundt was the founder of \_\_\_\_\_, whereas William James was the founder of \_\_\_\_\_.*

History[ edit ] This article possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. July See also: Edward Titchener , the main structuralist, gave psychology its first definition as a science of the study of mental experience, of consciousness , to be studied by trained introspection. William James is considered to be the founder of functional psychology. But he would not consider himself as a functionalist, nor did he truly like the way science divided itself into schools. Carr , and especially James Rowland Angell were the main proponents of functionalism at the University of Chicago. Thorndike , and Robert S. Egon Brunswik represents a more recent, but Continental, version. The functionalists retained an emphasis on conscious experience. Behaviourists also rejected the method of introspection but criticized functionalism because it was not based on controlled experiments and its theories provided little predictive ability. Skinner was a developer of behaviourism. He did not think that considering how the mind affects behaviour was worthwhile, for he considered behaviour simply as a learned response to an external stimulus. Yet, such behaviourist concepts tend to deny the human capacity for random, unpredictable, sentient decision-making, further blocking the functionalist concept that human behaviour is an active process driven by the individual. Perhaps, a combination of both the functionalist and behaviourist perspectives provides scientists with the most empirical value,[ citation needed ] but, even so, it remains philosophically and physiologically difficult to integrate the two concepts without raising further questions about human behaviour. The behaviourist perspective explains a mixture of both types of muscle behaviour, whereas the functionalist perspective resides mostly in the somatic nervous system. It can be argued that all behavioural origins begin within the nervous system, prompting all scientists of human behaviour to possess basic physiological understandings, something very well understood by the functionalist founder William James. Contemporary descendants[ edit ] Evolutionary psychology is based on the idea that knowledge concerning the function of the psychological phenomena affecting human evolution is necessary for a complete understanding of the human psyche. Even the project of studying the evolutionary functions of consciousness is now an active topic of study.

Chapter 8 : Functional psychology - Wikipedia

*William James was born at the Astor House in New York City in He was the son of Henry James Sr., a noted and independently wealthy Swedenborgian theologian well acquainted with the literary and intellectual elites of his day.*

Chapter 9 : William James (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*William James wrote the first textbook on psychology, "Principles of Psychology." The text included functionalist's conclusions such as the nature of consciousness, emotions, and memory. The phrase "stream of consciousness" was introduced in the book and described the functionalist's belief that the mind responds to multiple.*